Quarles v. Merrillville School Corporation et al
Filing
14
OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 8 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; denying 13 Motion for Summary Disposition. Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul R Cherry on 11/24/10. cc: Quarles (mc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
WILLIAM QUARLES,
Plaintiff,
v.
MERRILLVILLE COMMUNITY SCHOOL
CORPORATION and GREG PIERSON,
Defendants.
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)
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) CAUSE NO.: 2:10-CV-296-PRC
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OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [DE
8], filed by Defendants on September 29, 2010, and Motion for Summary Disposition [DE 13], filed
by Defendants on November 2, 2010. For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies
in part the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and denies the Motion for Summary Disposition.
BACKGROUND
On December 15, 2009, Plaintiff William Quarles filed a Charge of Discrimination with the
EEOC against Merrillville Community School Corporation. On April 29, 2010, the EEOC issued
a Dismissal and Notice of Rights to Sue.
On July 20, 2010, the Plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint on an Employment Discrimination
form in this Court. The Plaintiff’s Complaint consists of six numbered paragraphs regarding his
allegations of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and Equal rights under law, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The
first paragraph references his Charge of Discrimination filed with the EEOC “concerning [his]
discrimination charge against Merrillville School coroporation [sic], concerning Asst. Head
Custodian position at Merrillville High School and a Head Custodian position at Saulk [sic]
elementary school.” Compl. ¶ I. Paragraph six alleges that Plaintiff “ha[s] been discriminated
against by falsifyed [sic] records and discrimination of seniority due to race and gender.” Compl.
¶ VI.
On September 29, 2010, Defendants filed the instant Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings, with an accompanying brief in support, and Defendants’ Lewis Notice informing
Plaintiff, pro se, of the manner and time frame for a response to the Motion. Plaintiff did not file
a response. On November 2, 2010, when the time for Plaintiff to file a response had passed,
Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Disposition. Plaintiff has not filed a response to
this Motion, and the time to do so has passed.
The parties have consented to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge
to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. Thus, this
Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
DISCUSSION
A.
Summary Disposition
Defendants request that the Court enter a summary disposition in this matter because Plaintiff
did not respond to their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Northern District of Indiana Local
Rule 7.1 provides:
(a) Unless the court otherwise directs, or as otherwise provided in
L.R. 56.1, an adverse party shall have fifteen (15) days after service
of a motion in which to serve and file a response, and the moving
party shall have seven (7) days after service of a response in which
to serve and file a reply. Failure to file a response or reply within the
time prescribed may subject the motion to summary ruling. Time
shall be computed as provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, and any
extensions of time for the filing of a response or reply shall be
granted only by order of the assigned or presiding judge or magistrate
judge for good cause shown.
N.D. Ind. L.R. 7.1(a) (emphasis added). Local Rule 56.1, which applies to motions for summary
judgment, is inapplicable in this instance. The trial court’s interpretation and application of its Local
Rules is subject to great deference. Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co., 401 F.3d 803, 809-10 (7th
Cir. 2005); Cuevas v. U.S., 317 F.3d 751, 752 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 909, 124 S. Ct.
282, 157 L. Ed.2d 197 (2003); Tenner v. Zurek, 168 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 1999).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s failure to respond to their Motion should result in summary
disposition in their favor. Because Plaintiff is pro se, Defendants provided notice to him of the
pending Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, including the time and manner in which he was
required to respond, and assert that Plaintiff’s failure to respond despite this notice warrants
dismissal of the action. The Court declines to enter a summary ruling in this instance and will
instead address the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on its merits.
B.
Judgment on the Pleadings
In their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Defendants request that the Court enter
judgment in their favor because (1) the Plaintiff’s ADEA claims are barred by the applicable statute
of limitations and (2) the Plaintiff has not made a prima facie case of race or gender discrimination
under Title VII or § 1981.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed–but
early enough not to delay trial–a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(c). The Court applies the same standard to a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule
12(c) as is used to determine motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See
Guise v. BWM Mortg., LLC, 377 F.3d 795, 798 (7th Cir. 2004). When a party moves for judgment
on the pleadings, “the motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the
nonmoving party cannot prove facts sufficient to support his position.” Hous. Auth. Risk Retention
Group, Inc. v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 378 F.3d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing All Am. Ins. Co. v.
Broeren Russo Const., Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 723, 728 (C.D. Ill. 2000)). When ruling on a 12(c)
motion, the Court considers only the pleadings, “which consist of the complaint, the answer, and any
written instruments attached as exhibits.” Id. (citing N. Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City
of South Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998)). However, “[a] document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed . . . and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
1. Age Discrimination
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s ADEA claim is barred because of his failure to timely file
a charge of age discrimination with the EEOC. The discrimination allegedly occurred when
Defendants denied Plaintiff two promotions in November 2009. “A plaintiff must file a timely
charge with the EEOC encompassing the acts complained of as a prerequisite to filing suit in federal
court.” Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 863 (7th Cir. Ind. 1985) (citing Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974)). “A person who seeks relief under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act must ... file with the EEOC a charge of discrimination ‘within
180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred.’” O'Rourke v. Continental Casualty Co., 983
F.2d 94, 95 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)). Requiring a plaintiff to first file with
the EEOC “serves two purposes: affording the EEOC the opportunity to settle the dispute between
the employee and employer, and putting the employer on notice of the charges against it.” Sitar v.
Ind. DOT, 344 F.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 2003)(citations omitted). There is an exception for “claims
that are ‘like or reasonably related’ to the EEOC charge, and can be reasonably expected to grow
out of an EEOC investigation of the charges. Those claims may also be brought.” Id. (quoting
Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc)).
Although Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination December 15, 2009, well within the time
period allowed, his EEOC Charge only claimed discrimination based on sex, race, and retaliation.
Plaintiff stated that he believed he suffered discrimination “in retaliation of filing an EEOC
complaint and based on my race/black and my sex/male in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended.” Nowhere in the Charge, either in the text included by Plaintiff or in the
boxes for indicating the bases of discrimination, is there any notice of an age discrimination
complaint. In fact, the document contains no mention of Plaintiff’s age whatsoever, giving no
indication that an age discrimination claim may be reasonably related to or grow out of an
investigation of his charges of race and gender discrimination.
Plaintiff failed to file a charge of age discrimination with the EEOC. Therefore, Plaintiff’s
age discrimination claims must be dismissed.
2. Gender Discrimination
In order to establish a prima facie case for reverse sex discrimination under Title VII, the
Plaintiff will have to show that (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was meeting his
employer’s legitimate job expectations; (3) he was subjected to a materially adverse employment
action; and (4) others outside the protected class were more favorably treated. Farr v. St. Francis
Hosp. and Health Ctrs., 570 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2009). However, he need not show all four
elements in order to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings; Plaintiff need only allege that
“the employer instituted a (specified) adverse employment action against the plaintiff on the basis
of [his] sex.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008).
The Plaintiff indicates in his Complaint that he is a male, which is a protected class under
Title VII. Farr, 570 F.3d at 833. He also alleges that he suffered “discrimination ... concerning
Asst. Head Custodian position at Merrillville High School and a Head Custodian position at Saulk
[sic] elementary school” and goes on to allege that he suffered “discrimination of seniority due to
race and gender.” Compl. ¶¶ I, VI. These statements sufficiently allege that Plaintiff’s employer
instituted an adverse employment action, by passing him over for specific jobs, and that the action
was taken based on his gender. Therefore, his claims of gender discrimination survive the motion
for judgment on the pleadings.
3. Race Discrimination
Likewise, “a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex or some
other factor governed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 may allege the defendant's intent quite generally: ‘”I
was turned down for a job because of my race” is all a complaint has to say’” in the liberal notice
pleading system. EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., 496 F.3d 773, 781 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998)). As mentioned above, Plaintiff alleges
exactly that: that he was turned down for the head custodian positions because of his race and
gender. Compl. ¶¶ I, VI. The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiff’s race
discrimination claims is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part
Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [DE 8] and DENIES the Motion for Summary
Disposition [DE 13].
So ORDERED this 24th day of November, 2010.
s/ Paul R. Cherry
MAGISTRATE JUDGE PAUL R. CHERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
cc:
All counsel of record
Plaintiff, pro se
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