Williams v. Horseshoe Hammond LLC et al
Filing
48
OPINION AND ORDER granting 31 Motion to Dismiss Defendants Indiana Gaming Commission, Madayag, and Drohosky with prejudice. John Doe Defendant is ORDERED STRICKEN. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 9/16/11. (mc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
KATRINA WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HORSESHOE HAMMOND LLC., et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 2:10-CV-317
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss,
filed by Defendants Indiana Gaming Commission (“IGC”), Karl Madayag
(“Madayag”), and Mike Drohosky (“Drohosky”), on February 1, 2011.
For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
The
Clerk
is
ORDERED
to
DISMISS
Defendants
Indiana
Gaming
Commission, Madayag, and Drohosky with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
On June 30, 2010, Katrina Williams (“Williams”) filed a
complaint naming as Defendants Horseshoe Hammond LLC (“Horseshoe”),
and “John Doe, John Doe, Jane Roe Private Security Police Officers
who at all times acted under the color of state law.”
Williams’
complaint concerns events occurring at Horseshoe on November 12,
2008, and, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983, claims violations of
her First, Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The
body of the complaint suggests that the Doe and Roe defendants are
Private Security Police Officers from the IGC, but the IGC is not
listed as a Defendant.
The complaint mentions “Officer States1” by
name and badge number (Badge #108), and even lists “Officer States”
in the “parties” section of the complaint, but does not include
“Officer States” in the caption.
federal court and filed an answer.
Horseshoe removed the case to
An amended answer was filed
with leave of Court on September 28, 2010.
On November 17, 2010, Williams filed an amended complaint
adding Myiesha Spates, Karl Madayag, Mike Drohosky and the IGC as
Defendants.
That complaint was filed more than 21 days after the
initial complaint and without leave of court or the written consent
of the opposing party.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
Accordingly,
the amended complaint was stricken.
On November 29, 2010, Williams filed a “Joint Stipulation for
Leave to Amend Complaint” which represented that opposing counsel
did not object to amendment of the complaint.
The motion was not,
however, filed jointly, as it lacks the signature of counsel for
Horseshoe.
The Court granted Williams’ request to file an amended
complaint, and the amended complaint was filed on November 30,
2010.
After the amended complaint was filed, Horseshoe’s attorney
indicated in writing that he had not been notified that a joint
1
This appears to be a misspelling referencing the laternamed Defendant, Myiesha Spates, although even when Spates was
named in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff continued to list a
John Doe defendant utilizing badge number 108.
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motion was going to be filed and did not authorize the filing of a
joint motion.
The instant motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of three of
the four defendants who were first named in the amended complaint.2
The motion alleges that IGC is entitled to sovereign immunity and
is
not
a
“person”
subject
to
suit
under
section
1983.
Additionally, the motion alleges that all of Williams’ claims are
barred by operation of the applicable statute of limitations.
The
motion is now fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.
DISCUSSION
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be granted if the
complaint fails to include sufficient facts to state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face.
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
A complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 561 (2007).
2
The attorneys appearing on behalf of the moving defendants
also initially appeared on behalf of Myiesha Spates as well and
then realized that the appearance was entered in error. Attorneys
Voight and Branic were allowed to withdraw, and the instant
motion is therefore not made on behalf of Spates.
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Sovereign Immunity
Williams concedes that the IGC is not a “person” under section
1983 and that it is entitled to sovereign immunity.
Accordingly,
IGC is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Statute of Limitations and Relation Back of the Amended Complaint
Defendants Madayag and Drohosky argue that the suit must be
dismissed against them as well, as the amended complaint was filed
outside of the applicable statute of limitations, and the complaint
does not relate back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).
Each of the Plaintiff’s claims is brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. section 1983 and stem from an incident that occurred on
November 12, 2008.
The statute of limitations for claims made
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 in Indiana is two years.
See
Logan v. Wilkins, 644 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir. 2011); see also
Bailey v. Faulkner, 765 F.2d 102, 103 (7th Cir. 1985).
The parties
agree that Williams’ claims accrued on the date Williams was
allegedly falsely arrested and/or imprisoned.3
citing
(See DE 32 at 8,
Wallace v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 421, 427 (7th Cir.
3
Defendants IGC, Madayag and Drohosky argue that each and
every claim against them must be dismissed because the claims
were filed outside of the applicable statute of limitation and do
not relate back. The only accrual date discussed by the parties
is the date of the alleged false arrest and/or imprisonment,
November 12, 2008. Because Plaintiff does not suggest any
alternative accrual date for any of her claims, it is presumed
that Plaintiff concedes that all claims accrued on November 12,
2008.
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2006); DE 35 at 3, citing Johnson v. Blackwell, 885 N.E.2d 25, 30
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008)).
Williams’ complaint asserts that she was
falsely arrested and imprisoned on November 12, 2008.
The first
attempt to amend the complaint to add the IGC, Madayag and Drohosky
was on November 17, 2010, and the complaint was not successfully
filed until November 30, 2010 (more than two years after the
alleged false arrest).
Accordingly, Williams’ section 1983 claims
against IGC, Madayag, and Drohosky were first filed after the
statute of limitations for section 1983 claims elapsed, and the
complaint must be dismissed unless it relates back to the original
complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).4
Rule 15(c) provides the following:
(1) When an Amendment Relates Back. An
amendment to a pleading relates back to the
date of the original pleading when:
(A) the law that provides the applicable
statute of limitations allows relation back;
(B) the amendment asserts a claim or
defense that arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set out - or
attempted to be set out - in the original
pleading; or
(C) the amendment changes the party or
the naming of the party against whom a claim
is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied
4
Defendants IGC, Madayag and Drohosky assert that Plaintiff
has an obligation to allege facts supporting relation back at the
time she seeks leave to amend her complaint, and that she cannot
now argue that the complaint relates back. IGC, Madayag and
Drohosky do not, however, provide this Court with any law showing
that the Plaintiff may not argue relation back now. This Court
will not do the parties work for them and this argument is
considered waived. See Donnelly v. Chicago Park Dist., 417
F.Supp.2d, 992, 993-94 (Feb. 24, 2006).
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and if, within the period provided by Rule
4(m) for serving the summons and complaint,
the party to be brought in by amendment:
(i) received such notice of the
action
that
it
will
not
be
prejudiced in defending on the
merits; and
(ii) knew or should have known that
the action would have been brought
against it, but for a mistake
concerning
the
proper
party’s
identity.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
The initial complaint was filed on June 30, 2010, within the
two year statute of limitations.
Under Rule 4(m), Williams was
allowed 120 days to serve Defendants.
have elapsed on October 28, 2010.
Williams’ 120 days would
Accordingly, the question this
Court must decide is whether Defendants Madayag and Drohosky
“received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced
in defending on the merits” before October 28, 2010, and “knew or
should have known that the action would have been brought against
[them], but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.”
Plaintiff argues that the reference to “Officer States (Badge
#108)” in the initial complaint constitutes naming Officer Myiesha
Spates as a Defendant, and somehow constitutes notice to not only
Spates,
but
also
IGC,
Madayag,
and
Drohosky.
According
to
Plaintiff, Spates was an employee of IGC and therefore its agent,
and notice to Spates constitutes notice to IGC. Myiesha Spates was
not named as a Defendant with any specificity in the initial
complaint.
Even when Spates was later identified in the amended
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complaint, the amended complaint still attempted to save a place
for the officer with badge number 108 by naming “John Doe, (Badge
#108).”
Apparently, Spates was not the officer with badge number
108 after all.
The mere naming of Officer States in the original
complaint, without service or any other notice to Myiesha Spates,
cannot support Williams’ theory that IGC and its employees had the
notice contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).
The
plaintiff points to nothing showing that Spates, Madayag, Drohosky
or IGC had notice of this action prior to October 28, 2010, 120
days after the original complaint was filed.5
Without a showing of
some notice, and a showing that these Defendants should have known
that the action would have been brought against it, but for a
mistake concerning the proper party’s identity, the complaint
cannot relate back.
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(c).
Williams also cites a number of cases in which relation back
was allowed due to an identity of interest between the originally
named defendants and subsequently named defendants. Unfortunately,
5
Plaintiff notes that in his February 1, 2011, order
allowing Counsel for Myiesha Spates to withdraw from this case,
Magistrate Judge Cherry ordered that the time limit for Plaintiff
to serve Myiesha Spates pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(m) would be calculated from the date of his order.
Plaintiff cites to this fact, but also concedes that the new
defendant must have received notice of the institution of the
action within 120 days of the filing of the initial compliant.
Whatever time Magistrate Cherry allowed for Plaintiff to serve
Myiesha Spates is not relevant to the question of whether the
complaint relates back because Myiesha Spates was not named with
any specificity until the filing of the amended complaint on
November 30, 2010.
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Williams fails to develop this argument.
She stops short of
alleging that there is an identity of interest between Horseshoe
and IGS, and that is the only identity of interest that could
support a finding that the amended complaint relates back.
To the
extent she is suggesting that an identity of interest between
Myiesha Spates and IGC supports relation back, she is mistaken,
because this Court has already noted that Myiesha Spates was not
named with sufficient specificity in the initial complaint.
Although all of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the two year
statute of limitation governing section 1983 claims, IGC, Madayag
and Drohosky nonetheless addresses the merits of Williams’ claims
under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth amendments separately. IGC,
Madayag and Drohosky’s entire argument for why these claims should
be dismissed is as follows:
It should be noted that the Plaintiff’s First
(claiming a privacy right in her personal
effects) and Fourteenth Amendment (claiming no
due process was afforded to her during the
detention) claims arising under the facts
alleged
in
her
Amended
Complaint
are
unavailing. The facts of this case give rise
only to Fourth Amendment claims. See Brooks
v. City of Chicago, 564 F.3d 830, 833 (7th
Cir.
2009)(stating,
“[h]ere,
Brooks’
complaints about the conduct of the defendant
officers leading to his 2004 arrest are merely
improper attempts to recast his untimely
unlawful arrest claim as a due process claim.”
The Plaintiff also brings an Eighth Amendment
claim. The Eighth Amendment claim is improper
under the context of the facts alleged because
the Eighth Amendment is concerned with
treatment of post-trial detainees, after the
state has obtained conviction.
Ingraham v.
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Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 n. 40(1977).
(DE 32 at 8).
Nothing more is provided, and Williams does not
address these argument in her response at all.
Williams’ claims
under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth amendment may warrant
dismissal on the grounds referenced above, but IGC, Madayag and
Drohosky have not sufficiently developed these arguments, and this
Court
will
not
do
F.Supp.2d at 993-94.
the
parties
work
for
them.
Donnelly,
417
In this circumstance, the failure to develop
these arguments has no effect on the outcome as all claims against
the moving defendants must be dismissed on other grounds.
John Doe Defendants
Plaintiff concedes in her brief that the naming of John Doe
Defendants as a placeholder is pointless. See Wudtke v. Davel, 128
F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1997).
Accordingly, the John Doe
Defendant is ORDERED STRICKEN.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED.
The Clerk is ORDERED to DISMISS Defendants Indiana
Gaming Commission, Madayag, and Drohosky with prejudice.
DATED: September 16, 2011
/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
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