Lampley v. Buss et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER, GRANTING 79 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by J Parker, D Daugherty, George Payne, Ofc Buckmon, Mark Levinhagen, Zimmermon. ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Theresa L Springmann on 9/5/12. cc:pltf (kjp)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TOMMY LAMPLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
ED BUSS, Commissioner, Indiana
Department of Correction, et al.,
Defendants.
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CAUSE NO.: 2:10-CV-338-TLS
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 79] filed
by the Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In support of their Motion, the
Defendants submitted a Memorandum in Support [ECF No. 80] and their own declarations and
documentation relating to temperatures in the Westville Control Unit while the Plaintiff was
housed there. The Defendants gave Notice [ECF No. 82] to the pro se Plaintiff pursuant to
Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 1992), Timms v. Frank, 953 F.2d 281, 285–86 (7th
Cir. 1992), and Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1982), informing the Plaintiff how to
respond to their Motion for Summary Judgment. But as of the date of this Opinion and Order, the
Plaintiff has not responded or otherwise opposed the Defendant’s Motion. Indeed, the Plaintiff
stated in his June 27, 2012, Notice to the Court that he “wish[ed] to withdraw this action and not
pursue it any further.” (Notice of Withdrawal of Compl., ECF No. 85.) The Court denied that
request, affording the Plaintiff until August 16, 2012, to either file a response to the Motion for
Summary Judgment or to file a motion to dismiss this action with prejudice. (Order, ECF No.
86.) As of the date of this Opinion and Order, the Plaintiff has done neither.
BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff, Tommy Lampley, a prisoner currently confined at Indiana State Prison,
filed this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Indiana Department of
Correction (IDOC) officials violated his federally protected rights while he was confined at the
Westville Correctional Facility (WCF). The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants withheld two
books from him on the grounds that they threatened the safety and security of the facility and
that they placed him in a cold cell without adequate blankets or clothing. The Court screened the
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and granted the Plaintiff leave to proceed against
Defendants Debra Daugherty, Mark Levenhagen, Jason Parker, Gerald Buckmon, Roy
Zimmermon, and George Payne on his First Amendment claim dealing with denial of
publications, and on his Eighth Amendment claim dealing with conditions he says he suffered
while confined in a segregation unit. (See Opinion & Order 11–12, ECF No. 13.)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that motions for summary judgment should
be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of
material fact exists when “‘there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury
to return a verdict for that party.’” AA Sales & Assocs. v. Coni-Seal, Inc., 550 F.3d 605, 608–09
(7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). Under Rule
56(c), a party “asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion
by citing to particular parts of materials in the record, . . . or showing that the materials cited do
not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot
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produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” If appropriate, summary judgment should be
entered against a party who fails to respond. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (holding that a court should enter summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery, against a party “who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial”). A court’s role on summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence,
make credibility determinations, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts, but instead to
determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255;
Washington v. Haupert, 481 F.3d 543, 550 (7th Cir. 2007); Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770
(7th Cir. 2003).
Thus, a court in ruling on a summary judgment motion construes all facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
AA Sales & Assocs., 550 F.3d at 609. Under Local Rule 56-1(b), a party opposing summary
judgment must identify the material facts that the party contends are genuinely disputed in a
section labeled “Statement of Genuine Disputes.”
DISCUSSION
The Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action
to redress the violation of federally secured rights by a person acting under color of state law. To
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege violation of rights secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and must show that a person acting under color of state law
committed the alleged deprivation. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
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A.
The Plaintiff’s First Amendment Claim
The Plaintiff alleges that on May 21, 2010, Defendant Daugherty sent him a Notice and
Report of Action Taken on Correspondence, stating that the facility was withholding two
publications, The Art of Seduction and The Art of Making Money, from him “because they are a
‘threat to safety and security’ at Westville Correctional Facility.” (Compl. 1, ECF No. 1.)
As a prisoner, the Plaintiff “retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent
with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections
system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). The First Amendment guarantees the right
to be free from certain interference with correspondence. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91
(1987). Regulations governing receipt of publications by prisoners are analyzed under the
reasonableness standard, and prison regulations are valid if they are reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests, such as security. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 40
(1989).
[S]everal factors are relevant in determining the reasonableness of the regulation at
issue. First, there must be a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation
and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it. Thus, a regulation
cannot be sustained where the logical connection between the regulation and the
asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational. . . .
A second factor relevant in determining the reasonableness of a prison restriction . . .
is whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to
prison inmates. Where other avenues remain available for the exercise of the asserted
right, courts should be particularly conscious of the ‘measure of judicial deference
owed to the corrections officials in gauging the validity of the regulation.
A third consideration is the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right
will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources
generally. . . . When accommodation of an asserted right will have a significant ripple
effect on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be particularly deferential
to the informed discretion of corrections officials.
Finally, the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison
regulation. By the same token, the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be
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evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an exaggerated response to prison
concerns. . . . [I]f an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully
accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimus cost to valid penological interests,
a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the
reasonable relationship standard.
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–91 (quotation marks, citations, and ellipsis omitted).
The Defendants’ submissions establish that Defendant Daugherty is a Mail Clerk at the
WCF and that part of her job is to examine incoming mail to determine whether the contents
must be prohibited from entering the facility (Daugherty Decl. ¶¶ 2 & 6, ECF No. 81-1.)
Pursuant to IDOC Policy # 02-01-103, any printed matter which threatens the security of the
facility must be excluded. (Id. ¶¶ 4 & 7.) Publications that encourage or instruct the commission
of criminal activity are considered threats to security. (Id. ¶ 8.)
The Art of Making Money “instructs readers on how to counterfeit United States
Currency.” (Id. ¶ 9.) The Art of Seduction is “instructive on how to ‘victimize’ others and
manipulate them against [their] will.” (Id. ¶ 10.) The Defendants concluded that these works
were not “appropriate for a correctional environment where the Department is attempting to
reform convicted felons.” (Id. ¶ 11.)
Because the Defendants met their initial obligation under Rule 56, the burden shifts to
the Plaintiff to come forth with evidence sufficient to allow a factfinder to decide in his favor the
question of whether the Defendants improperly withheld these publications from him. Although
the Defendants provided the Plaintiff with an extensive warning of the consequences of not
submitting an affidavit stating facts opposing their dispositive motion, he has not responded to
their motion. Because the Plaintiff has not responded to the Defendants’ summary judgment
motion, the Court accepts the Defendants’ uncontested sworn statements of fact as true.
The evidence before the Court establishes that The Art of Making Money instructs readers
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how to commit the crime of counterfeiting U.S. currency, while The Art of Seduction instructs
readers how to victimize others and manipulate them against their will. Accordingly, there is a
valid and rational connection between the regulation under which these publications were barred
from entering the WCF and the governmental interest the Defendants used to justify the decision
to bar these publications. The IDOC has a strong interest in keeping potentially dangerous or
counter-reformative materials out of the hands of prisoners, and both of these books counter the
IDOC’s goal of rehabilitation of convicted felons. Accordingly, the Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on the Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim.
B.
The Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claim
The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated rights protected by the Constitution’s
Eighth Amendment by depriving him of adequate clothing and placing him in a cell where:
the ventilation system air condition was blowing out cold air all day and at night the
tempatures dropped with cold air blowing through vents was brutal, and he had no
adequate clothing to combat the cold. Plaintiff had only one cotten blanket with
holes, one sheet, one pair of pants, one shirt, no long john underwear, no cap, no
clothes that were clean, no gloves, no extra blankets, no clean socks, no clean boxers,
and no coat to combat the cold. The cell windows in the back of the Plaintiff’s room
was blowing cold air in at night because the insolation filler around the windows
frame has been removed, so this is broken, and the night time temperatures in the cell
with air condition on, and cold air coming in through [the] back window were
freezing.
(Compl. 10 (quotation marks omitted).)
“Prison conditions may be harsh and uncomfortable without violating the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.” Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d
640, 642 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833–34 (1997)). “Prisoners
are, however, entitled to ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’ including
adequate shelter. For this reason, prisoners have a right to protection from extreme cold.”
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Dixon, 114 F.3d at 644 (citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court has noted that:
Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation “in
combination” when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually
enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need
such as food, warmth, or exercise-for example, a low cell temperature at night
combined with a failure to issue blankets.
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991).
The Defendants’ submissions establish that Defendants Buckman, Zimmerman, and
Parker are correctional officers assigned the WCF’s Westville Control Unit (WCU) (Buckman
Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 81-4; Zimmerman Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 81-5; Parker Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 81-6.)
The WCU has four climate controlled housing pods, heated in winter and air conditioned in
summer (Payne Decl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 81-3.) The WCU maintained daily temperature and
humidity logs during the period that the Plaintiff was confined there (id. ¶ 11), and the
Defendants attached these records to their Motion for Summary Judgment (see id.). According to
these records, the lowest temperature recorded during that period was 64.6 degrees Fahrenheit,
the highest temperature was 76.1 degrees Fahrenheit, and the average temperature was about 70
degrees Fahrenheit. (Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 12, ECF No. 80.)
Defendants Buckman, Zimmerman, and Parker state that they are, at times, responsible
for distributing and collecting offender clothing and bedding. (Buckman Decl. ¶ 5; Zimmerman
Decl. ¶ 5; Parker Decl. ¶ 5.) These Defendants deny that they subjected the Plaintiff to inhumane
temperatures, and they state in their declarations that they had no intent to leave the Plaintiff
without adequate clothing or bedding at any time, nor did they believe that the Plaintiff thought
he had inadequate clothing or bedding. (Buckman Decl. ¶¶ 6–9; Zimmerman Decl. ¶¶ 6–9;
Parker Decl. ¶¶ 6–9.) Defendants Levenhagen and Payne were supervisors who were not
personally responsible for distributing clothing and bedding to offenders (Levenhagen Decl. ¶
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10, ECF No. 81-2; Payne Decl. ¶ 12.) Defendants Levenhagen and Payne state that they had no
knowledge that the Plaintiff believed he did not have adequate clothing or bedding, nor did they
direct the correctional officers to leave the Plaintiff with an inadequate amount of clothing or
bedding. (Levenhagen Decl. ¶¶ 11–13; Payne Decl. ¶¶ 13–15.) Because the Plaintiff has not
responded to the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court accepts their
uncontested sworn statements of fact as true.
The Defendants’ submissions rebut the Complaint’s allegations that the Plaintiff was
subjected to conditions of confinement that constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The
Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to uncomfortably low temperatures over a long period of
time, but the documentation concerning temperatures on the unit in which the Plaintiff was
housed establishes that temperatures ranged from a low of 64.6 degrees Fahrenheit, to as high as
76.1 degrees Fahrenheit, with an average temperature of about 70 degrees Fahrenheit.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff was not subjected to excessively cold temperatures. Nor is there
evidence in the record from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the Defendants
deprived the Plaintiff of adequate clothing or bedding. Accordingly, the Defendants are entitled
to summary judgment on the Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.
CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 79], and DIRECTS the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of the Defendants
and against the Plaintiff.
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SO ORDERED on September 5, 2012.
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
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