Swoope v. Gary Community School Corporation et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Philip P Simon on 4/28/2016. (tc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
DR. DAVID L. SWOOPE JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
GARY COMMUNITY SCHOOL
CORPORATION, DR. MYRTLE
CAMPBELL, DR. CORDIA MOORE,
Defendants.
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Cause No. 2:10-cv-423
OPINION
David L. Swoope, Jr. brought this action against his former employer, Gary
Community School Corporation, and two of its officials, Myrtle Campbell and Cordia
Moore. After serving three years on the job, Swoope was terminated from his position
as an assistant principal with Gary Community School Corporation. Swoope alleged
that the defendants prevented him from completing a licensing program at Indiana
University Northwest because he is male. Swoope also claimed that the Gary
Community School Corporation terminated him because he complained about gender
discrimination. Finally, Swoope claimed that he was denied due process of law when he
was terminated. At the close of Swoope’s case in chief, the defendants moved under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) for judgment as a matter of law. I granted the
motion with respect to Swoope’s section 1983 equal protection claims against Gary
Community School Corporation and his section 1983 due process claims against all
defendants. This opinion sets out my reasons for doing so.
DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) authorizes me to enter judgment as a
matter of law in favor of the defendants if I find that “a reasonable jury would not have
a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for” Swoope on an issue.
Section 1983 Equal Protection/Disparate Treatment Claims
Swoope brought disparate treatment claims against Campbell and Moore in their
individual capacities and Gary Community School Corporation under section 1983.
There is no respondeat superior liability against municipalities (including municipal
school corporations) for the unconstitutional acts of employees under section 1983.
Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (“Congress did not intend
municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of
some nature caused a constitutional tort.”). As a result, the school corporation could not
be held liable, unless Swoope showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the
school corporation had “(1) an express policy that causes a constitutional deprivation
when enforced; (2) a widespread practice that is so permanent and well-settled that it
constitutes a custom or practice; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was
caused by a person with final policymaking authority.” Teesdale v. City of Chicago, 690
F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Swoope presented no evidence during his case in chief that the school
corporation had an express policy or a widespread practice that led to the purported
violations of his equal protection rights. In addition, Swoope presented no evidence that
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defendant Campbell or Moore had “final policymaking authority” with respect to his
completion of the licensing program or with respect to his termination. By contrast,
testimony presented during his case in chief suggested that the final policymaker with
respect to these actions was the school board of trustees, which set policy regarding the
use of vacation and sick time (for any purpose, including to pursue licensing) and
ultimately decided which employment contracts would be renewed. For this reason,
there was insufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have found the
Gary Community School Corporation liable under section 1983 for disparate treatment
on the basis of gender, and the school corporation was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
Section 1983 Due Process Claims
Swoope brought due process claims against defendants Campbell and Moore in
their individual capacities and against Gary Community School Corporation under
section 1983. Defendants argued they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
these claims because the evidence showed that Swoope was given notice and requested
and a full and fair hearing and because Swoope presented no evidence that the hearing
was unfair. I agree, but I have a more fundamental problem with Swoope’s due process
claim: that Swoope presented no evidence of a property interest that was protected
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause prohibits deprivations of
certain property without due process of law, but not all property interests are protected.
Protected property interests arise from “an independent source such as a state law
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securing certain benefits or a clearly implied promise of continued employment.”
Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683, 692 (7th Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted); see also
Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir. 2003). In 2009, Indiana state law gave
school administrators the right to continued employment only when they were not
notified of non-renewal by February 1st. See Ind. Code §§ 20-28-8-3 (2008). Swoope was
notified on January 28, 2009 that his contract would not be renewed, and so state law
did not entitle him to continue working for the school corporation beyond the term of
his contract. In addition, Swoope presented no evidence that the school corporation
made a “clearly implied promise” to continued employment. As a result, Swoope
simply failed to show that he had a property interest that was protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and no reasonable jury could have found
that the defendants violated his due process rights.
Even if Swoope had shown a protected interest in continued employment, there
was no violation of Swoope’s right to due process before he was terminated. As I noted
in court, the evidence presented during his case in chief showed that the school
corporation sent Swoope a preliminary notification that his contract may not be
renewed (Pl.’s Ex. 6) and final notice once the school board had voted to terminate him
(Pl.’s Ex. 5.). After that, Swoope requested a meeting with the board of trustees to
appeal the decision (Defs.’ Ex. F) and was heard on the issue at a meeting with at least
one board member and several administrators. Swoope presented no evidence showing
that the hearing he received was not full and fair. As a result, he received all the process
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to which he was entitled and probably more. For this reason, the defendants were
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Swoope’s due process claims.
Dated: April 28, 2016
s/ Philip P. Simon
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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