Holland v. Gary The City of et al

Filing 203

OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 135 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul R Cherry on 12/27/11. cc:pltf (kjp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
ROBERT HOLLAND,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE CITY OF GARY, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CAUSE NO.: 2:10-CV-454-PRC

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment by All Gary Defendants
[DE 135], filed by the City of Gary, Mayor Rudy Clay, City of Gary Chief of Police, Officer Johnny
Gill, and Officer Williams (the “Gary Defendants”) on August 26, 2011.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Robert Holland, proceeding in this matter pro se, filed his Complaint in this Court
on November 15, 2010. The Complaint includes two counts of police misconduct alleged against
seven defendants, including municipal entities and officers in their official capacities. It includes
claims against the Gary Defendants for numerous constitutional violations stemming out of the arrest
of Holland and subsequent court proceedings.
On September 29, 2011, Holland filed a response, titled a Motion to Deny the Motion for
Summary Judgment Filed by the City of Gary Defendants, and the Gary Defendants filed a reply on
October 14, 2011. The Court ordered supplemental briefing on the sole issue of the legal
responsibility of the City of Gary for Gary City Court employees. On November 28, 2011, the Gary
Defendants filed their supplemental brief, and Holland filed his supplemental brief on December 12,
2011.
The parties orally agreed on the record to have this case assigned to a United States

Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this
case. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that motions for summary judgment be
granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 further requires the entry
of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party “who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate – in fact, is mandated –
where there are no disputed issues of material fact and the movant must prevail as a matter of law.
In other words, the record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.”
Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations and
quotations omitted).
A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of
the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, that it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party may discharge its initial responsibility by simply “‘showing’ – that
is, pointing out to the district court – that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. When the nonmoving party would have the burden of proof
at trial, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar

2

materials negating the opponent’s claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 325; Green v. Whiteco Indus.,
Inc., 17 F.3d 199, 201 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994); Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 916 F.2d 1254,
1256 (7th Cir. 1990). However, the moving party, if it chooses, may support its motion for summary
judgment with affidavits or other materials, and, if the moving party has “produced sufficient
evidence to support a conclusion that there are no genuine issues for trial,” then the burden shifts
to the nonmoving party to show that an issue of material fact exists. Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill
Assoc., 914 F.2d 107, 110-111 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Hong v. Children’s
Mem’l Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1993).
Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the non-moving party
cannot resist the motion and withstand summary judgment by merely resting on its pleadings. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994). Rule 56(e)
provides that “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address
another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact
undisputed for purposes of the motion [or] grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting
materials – including the facts considered undisputed – show that the movant is entitled to it . . . ”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), (3); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986).
Thus, to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact, the nonmoving party must “do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” but must “come forward with
‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)) (emphasis in original).
In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all
facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences in favor

3

of that party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir.
2009); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-Am., Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1995). A court’s role is not
to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth
of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. See Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249-50.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On March 3, 2010, in the late afternoon, the Gary police were called to the home of
Holland’s mother. Holland was standing outside the home when Officer Johnny Gill arrived.
Holland’s mother and other witnesses informed Officer Gill and Officer Williams, who arrived a few
minutes after Gill, that Holland had become enraged and ranted and raved at his wheelchair-bound
mother, poking her in the head with his finger and spitting in her face. The witnesses also reported
that Holland threatened his mother, telling her that if he went to jail, she would end up in the
morgue. Officer Gill arrested Holland, who was taken to the Gary Police Department where he was
booked at 4:00 pm on March 3, 2010. Holland was taken to the Lake County Jail on March 5, 2010,
and the court found probable cause the same day. Holland’s initial hearing in court was held on
Saturday, March 6, 2010, at around 10:30 a.m.
ANALYSIS
The Gary Defendants argue that the Gary police had probable cause to arrest Holland, such
that his Fourth Amendment, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims
cannot survive. Holland does not provide any argument about the merits of the case or describe any
factual dispute, but argues that the instant Motion is premature, based on argument, not supported
by proper evidence, and not based on personal knowledge. The Gary Defendants also argue that

4

many of the claims are not properly against the City of Gary, Mayor Rudy Clay, Chief of Police
Gary Carter, Officer Johnny Gill or Officer Williams. They argue that neither the City of Gary nor
the individually-named Defendants are legally responsible for the actions of the Gary City Court
Clerk, the Gary City Court Judge, or the Lake County Prosecuting Attorney, and that the Gary
Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on numerous claims alleging acts for which
they are not responsible.
A.

Improper Defendants

The Gary Defendants argue that they had nothing to do with the events that occurred after
Holland’s initial arrest, and that they are entitled to summary judgment on the claims that should
have been brought against the Gary City Court Clerk, the Gary City Court Judge, the Lake County
Prosecuting Attorney, or other actors who are not one of the individually named Gary Defendants
or part of the legal entity that is the City of Gary. Holland argues that the City of Gary is legally
responsible for Gary City Court employees because their actions created or were the result of official
City of Gary policy and there was an employer-employee relationship between the City of Gary and
the Gary Court.
“[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its
employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts
the injury that the government is responsible under § 1983.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978). However, even if there was a policy or custom of the Gary City Court or the
court’s clerk staff that inflicted a constitutional injury on Holland, the City of Gary would only be
liable for that injury if the Judge, clerk staff, and prosecuting attorney are “policymaker[s] with final
policymaking authority for th[e Gary] municipalit[y] under state law.” Woods v. Mich. City, 940

5

F.2d 275, 27 (7th Cir. 1991). The Court must look to state law to determine whether these parties
had final policy making authority. Id. (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123
(1988)) (other citations omitted). “Indiana law reveals that judges of Indiana's circuit, superior and
county courts are judicial officers of the State judicial system: ‘they are not county officials.’
County courts in Indiana are exclusively units of the judicial branch of the state's constitutional
system.” Id. (quoting Pruitt v. Kimbrough, 536 F. Supp. 764, 766 (N.D. Ind.1982)) (citing Parsons
v. Bourff, 739 F. Supp. 1266 (S.D. Ind. 1989); State ex rel. McClure v. Marion Superior Court, 158
N.E.2d 264 (Ind. 1959)). The court system is separate from the other branches of the City of Gary
government, and the judges, clerk of court, and prosecuting attorneys are not officers of the city
government. Ind. Const. Art. 3, § 1; Pruitt, 536 F. Supp. at 766; McClure, 158 N.E.2d at 268, n.2
(“We therefore have a distinct recognition by the legislature that the office of clerk of the circuit
court is not a county office. n2 The same is true of judges of the circuit court, as well as prosecuting
attorneys.”) (citing State v. Patterson, 105 N.E. 228 (Ind. 1914); State ex rel. Pitman v. Tucker, 46
Ind. 355 (1874)); State ex rel. Gibson v. Friedley, 34 N.E. 872, 874 (Ind. 1893) (“The judge and
prosecuting attorney are constitutional officers; they are so designated in the organic law, and are
neither State nor county officers.”).
Holland argues that the City of Gary funds the Gary City Court as it does other city
departments, and that therefore the court staff are employees of the City of Gary. However, “Indiana
law has long required that county government directly finance the operation of the state trial court
system,” including “the entire salaries of support court personnel. Despite this system of funding,
it is without question that Indiana's circuit, superior and county courts are exclusively units of the
judicial branch of the state's constitutional system and as such are not units of county government.”

6

J.A.W. v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1142, 1150-1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Pruitt, 536 F. Supp. at 766;
Ind. Code § 31-6-9-1; Ind. Code § 33-10.5-8-3; Ind. Code § 31-6-9-4(a); Ind. Const. art. 3, § 1, art.
7 § 1; Woods, 940 F.2d at 279; McClure, 158 N.E.2d at 268-69). Accordingly, “[n]o municipal
liability attaches in this case because the judge under Indiana law is not such an official vis a vis the
city and county. The city . . . cannot be held liable under § 1983” for the acts of the judges,
employees of the clerks office, or the prosecuting attorneys, because they are not final policymakers
for the City of Gary. Woods, 940 F.2d at 279.
Therefore, the Gary Defendants are entitled to summary judgment for all claims filed against
them that seek recovery for the actions of non-Gary employees: denial of a public hearing, denial
of speedy trial by jury, denial of the right to counsel, denial of hearing on bail, denial of the right
to discovery, and denial of the right to freedom of speech. To the extent that Holland is also
bringing claims of cruel and unusual punishment against the Gary Defendants for actions that
occurred while Holland was at the Lake County Jail, these claims are also for actions of individuals
other than those for whom any of the Gary Defendants are legally responsible, and the Gary
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the cruel and unusual punishment claim.
B.

Probable Cause as bar to Fourth Amendment Claims

Holland claims that he was falsely arrested, falsely imprisoned, and suffered from malicious
prosecution. The Gary Defendants argue that there was probable cause to arrest Holland, barring
these claims.
“Probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to any claim under Section 1983 against
police officers for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution.” Mustafa v. City
of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Potts v. City of Lafayette, 121 F.3d 1106, 1113

7

(7th Cir. 1997)). Probable cause exists if ‘at the time of the arrest, the facts and circumstances
within the officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable
caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing,
or is about to commit an offense.’” Mucha v. Vill. of Oak Brook, 650 F.3d 1053, 1056-1057 (7th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 537 (7th Cir. 2009)) (other citations
omitted); see also Earles v. Perkins, 788 N.E.2d 1260, 1265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The court
measures probable cause “not on the facts as an omniscient observer would perceive them,” but “as
they would have appeared to a reasonable person in the position of the arresting officer.” Kelley v.
Myler, 149 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 1998) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Woods v. City
of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 987 (7th Cir. 2000). If “a reasonable officer would have believed the
person had committed a crime,” then “the arrest is lawful even if the belief would have been
mistaken.” Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d 1054, 1057-1058 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). A
“jury should determine the existence of probable cause only if ‘there is room for a difference of
opinion concerning the facts or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them.’” Mucha, 650
F.3d at 1056-1057 (quoting Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 537) (other citations omitted).
In this case, Gary Defendants argue that the officers had probable cause to arrest Holland for
intimidation under Indiana Code 35-45-2-1. It holds that “(a) A person who communicates a threat
to another person, with the intent: . . . (2) that the other person be placed in fear of retaliation for a
prior lawful act; . . . commits intimidation, a Class A misdemeanor.” Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(2).
A “threat” is defined as “an expression, by words or action, of an intention to: . . unlawfully injure
the person threatened; . . . [or] unlawfully withhold testimony or information with respect to another
person’s legal claim or defense. . .” Ind. Code §§ 35-45-2-1(c)(1), (5). The arrest report reflects that

8

Holland told the complainant that if he was sent to jail, “the complaintant [sic] would end up in the
morgue,” and the same information appears on the probable cause affidavit.
In Holland’s response, he does not argue that any of the facts presented by the Gary
Defendants are incorrect. Instead, he argues that the Gary Defendants’ Motion is untimely because
he has not had adequate time for discovery. However, “Defendants may seek summary judgment
‘at any time.’” Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 775 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(b)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) provides, “If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or
declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the
court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or
declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
Holland states that he believes further discovery “will support my allegations of lack of probable
cause,” but does not say what evidence he expects to uncover or what facts are contested. To the
extent that Holland’s response is construed as a Rule 56(d) motion, his allegations are insufficient
to avoid a ruling on the motion for summary judgment at this time.
“Rule 56(d) ‘is not a shield that can be raised to block a motion for summary judgment
without even the slightest showing by the opposing party that his opposition is meritorious,’” but
the party invoking it, even a pro se party, must show “‘how postponement of a ruling on the motion
will enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant's showing of the absence of a
genuine issue of fact.’” Yuan Xie v. Hospira, Inc., No. 10 C 6777, 2011 WL 1575530, at *2, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45215, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2011) (quoting Lamb's Patio Theatre v.
Universal Film Exch., 582 F.2d 1068, 1071 (7th Cir. 1978)) (other citations omitted). Holland must

9

set forth specific evidence that he might obtain from further discovery that would create a genuine
issue as to a specific material fact. Davis v. G.N. Mortg. Corp., 396 F.3d 869, 885 (7th Cir. 2005).

Holland does not provide any specific evidence. He only states, “The basis for my belief that
discovery will disclose such facts is that witness [sic] that are competent to testify will support my
allegations of lack of probable cause, by affidavit, for my arrests,” and that he is “currently unable
to locate individuals that witnesses [sic] [his] arrest.” He does not specifically refer to any particular
facts or identify any likely or potential witnesses, nor does he explain why he needs discovery from
Defendants in order to obtain affidavits from these witnesses, some of whom are presumably
members of his own family who were present at the time of his arrest. Holland’s assumption that
there is someone, as yet unknown, who will testify on his behalf “is based on nothing more than
mere speculation and would amount to a fishing expedition, which is an entirely improper basis for
. . . a decision to deny a Rule 56([d]) motion.” Davis, 396 F.3d at 885 (citing Grayson v. O'Neill,
308 F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir.2002); United States v. On Leong Chinese Merch. Assoc. Bldg., 918 F.2d
1289, 1294-95 (7th Cir. 1990)); see also Smith v. State Farm Ins. Co., 347 Fed. Appx. 228, 230-231
(7th Cir. 2009) (“Without the information about “what allegations th[e] affidavit would have
contradicted or who the witness was, . . . it is impossible to evaluate whether the vanished testimony
was actually material to the case or otherwise admissible, and therefore whether [the plaintiff] was
prejudiced by its absence.”).
Holland has failed to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether the officers had probable cause to arrest him, and has failed to show that further discovery
might reveal evidence of a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, Holland’s Fourth

10

Amendment claims against the Gary Defendants for wrongful arrest, unreasonable search and
seizure, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, cannot succeed. Because Holland’s claim
for Failure to Investigate is also premised on lack of probable cause, summary judgment is also
granted in the Gary Defendants’ favor on that count.
C.

Prompt Determination of Probable Cause and Prompt Initial Hearing

Holland argues that he was arrested on a Wednesday but did not have an initial hearing in
court until Saturday, violating his constitutional right to a prompt initial hearing. The Gary
Defendants assert that there was no constitutional violation because Holland was arrested in the late
afternoon of Wednesday, March 3, 2010, the Court found probable cause on March 5, and the
charges were filed and approved the same day, less than 48 hours after Holland’s arrest. At that
point Holland was entitled to post bond. In his Complaint, Holland indicates that his initial hearing
was held on Saturday morning at about 10:30 a.m., which was less than 72 hours after his arrest.
The Supreme Court has held that a judicial officer must make a “fair and reliable
determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and
this determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest.”
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 124-125 (1975).

“[A] jurisdiction that provides judicial

determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the
promptness requirement of Gerstein. For this reason, such jurisdictions will be immune from
systemic challenges.” Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (citing Gerstein,
420 U.S. at 114); see also Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 538 (Ind. 1996). Accordingly, the
probable cause determination was timely.
Holland’s initial hearing was also held in accord with Indiana and federal law. The Indiana

11

Code provides that “[a] person arrested without a warrant for a crime shall be taken promptly before
a judicial officer.” Ind. Code § 35-33-7-1(a). An initial hearing is sufficiently prompt if it is held
within 72 hours of the defendant’s arrest. Schmidt v. State, 746 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001) (citing Ind. Code § 35-33-7-1); see also Burton v. McCormick, No. 3:11CV026, 2011 WL
1157557, at *3, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33540, at *7 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2011) (An “initial hearing
held within 72 hours of arrest is deemed proper under Ind. Code 35-33-7-1(a).”). Because Holland’s
initial hearing occurred within 72 hours of his arrest, it was timely. Accordingly, the Gary
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Holland’s claim that he was denied a prompt initial
hearing.
D.

Failure to Train

Holland’s failure to train and other related § 1983 claims also fail to survive summary
judgment. The United States Supreme Court has held that a municipality may be held liable under
§ 1983 for constitutional violations arising from a failure to train, see, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989), but it is only “when execution of a government’s policy or custom . . .
inflicts the injury that the government is responsible under § 1983.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. To
establish liability under § 1983, “a plaintiff . . . must demonstrate a direct causal link between the
municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.” Bd. of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 404 (1997).
As set forth above, Holland has failed to raise any issue of material fact that he suffered a
constitutional deprivation. Because there is no underlying constitutional deprivation, the Court need
not reach the Monell issues related to the liability of the Gary Defendants for the alleged
constitutional violation. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986); Sallenger v.

12

City of Springfield, 630 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2010); Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 492 (7th
Cir. 2007). The Gary Defendants are entitled to on Holland’s Monell claims in paragraphs 27, 28,
29, and 30 of the Complaint.
E.

Abuse of Process and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Holland has also asserted claims for abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional
distress against the Gary Defendants. Under Indiana law, “[t]he elements of abuse of process are
1) an ulterior purpose, and 2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct
of the proceeding.” Lindsay v. Jenkins, 574 N.E.2d 324, 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Groen v.
Elkins, 551 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); see also Golden Years Homestead, Inc. v.
Buckland, 557 F.3d 457 (7th Cir. 2009). Success in “an action for abuse of process ‘does not require
proof that the action was brought without probable cause or that the action would have terminated
in favor of the party asserting abuse of process.’” Lindsay, 574 N.E.2d at 326 (quoting Central Nat'l
Bank v. Shoup, 501 N.E.2d 1090, 1095 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)) (other citations omitted).
The Gary Defendants do not include any arguments regarding the abuse of process claim,
and since it is not barred by the existence of probable cause, summary judgment is inappropriate on
this claim at this time. Similarly, the Gary Defendants make no argument regarding a possible grant
of summary judgment on Holland’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, so
summary judgment will likewise not be granted on that claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the
Motion for Summary Judgment by All Gary Defendants [DE 135]. Plaintiff Holland’s claims of
battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment; failure to investigate; lack of due process in arrest and

13

seizure; denial of prompt initial hearing; denial of public hearing; denial of speedy trial by jury;
denial of the right to counsel; denial of hearing on bail; cruel and unusual punishment; denial of
discovery; denial of freedom of speech; malicious prosecution; and inadequate training or
supervision alleged in Count I against the City of Gary, Mayor Rudy Clay, City of Gary Chief of
Police, Officer Johnny Gill, and Officer Williams are DISMISSED . Plaintiff Holland’s claims for
abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress REMAIN PENDING.
So ORDERED this 27th day of December, 2011.
s/ Paul R. Cherry
MAGISTRATE JUDGE PAUL R. CHERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
cc:

All counsel of record
Plaintiff, pro se

14