Heavilin v. Madison National Life Ins Co et al
Filing
21
OPINION AND ORDER: Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE 15 Motion to Compel. Signed by Magistrate Judge Andrew P Rodovich on 1/26/2012. (tc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
DIANNA HEAVILIN,
)
)
Plaintiff
)
)
v.
)
)
MADISON NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE )
CO.; DISABILITY REINSURANCE
)
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.,
)
)
Defendants
)
CIVIL NO. 2:10 cv 505
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on the Motion to Compel [DE
15] filed by the plaintiff, Dianna Heavilin, on September 21,
2011.
For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
Background
The plaintiff, Dianna Heavilin, was employed as a guidance
counselor with South Central Community School Corporation for 16
years.
Heavilin’s treating physician determined that she was
totally disabled on May 16, 2009, as a result of fibromyalgia,
degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, sleep apnea, adult
stress reaction, and depression.
At the time she was found to be
disabled, Heavilin was insured under a long-term disability
policy with Madison National Life Insurance Company.
Heavilin
applied for and was approved for long-term disability benefits
beginning May 20, 2009.
Disability Reinsurance Management
Service (DRMS) served as the third-party administrator for
Heavilin’s disability policy.
On July 15, 2009, Madison National terminated Heavilin’s
disability benefits.
Heavilin proceeded to file this lawsuit,
seeking damages for breach of the insurance policy and breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Heavilin served
interrogatories and requests for production of documents on both
defendants.
The defendants responded, explaining that it did not
have possession of some of the information requested and that the
information sought was irrelevant.
Upon request, Madison agreed
to supplement some of its responses as they related to Heavilin’s
claim but would not provide information related to other claims.
Heavilin argues that this will exclude relevant information
explaining the claims process and financial incentives offered to
reviewing physicians who assisted in terminating Heavilin’s
claim.
Heavilin’s counsel sent a letter to DRMS and Madison on July
15 and 19, 2011, demanding supplementation of the interrogatories
and requests for production.
DRMS and Madison responded on
August 2, 2011, addresssing each of Heavilin’s demands and explaining why they were not obligated to supplement their responses.
The defendants requested a detailed explanation from
Heavilin why she believed the information was relevant and should
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be produced.
Heavilin’s counsel did not send a written response
to the August 2 letter, and did not produce any case authority to
show why the information sought should be produced.
On August 9,
2011, the parties had a telephonic conference to discuss the
discovery issues.
The defendants’ counsel suggested going
through the requests in detail, but Heavilin’s counsel opposed
this approach and only wanted to know whether defense counsel
would supplement each request.
The defendants state that they
informed Heavilin’s counsel that if an explanation of relevance
and supporting authority was provided the defendants would
reconsider their positions on the requests.
On August 11, 2011, Heavilin deposed three of Madison’s
employees.
At the depositions, Madison’s counsel asked Heavilin
if the deposition had resolved some or all of the outstanding
discovery issues.
Heavilin’s counsel stated that she would think
about it and get back to the defendants’ counsel with a response.
The defendants’ counsel made the same inquiry after the August
23, 2011 deposition, but Heavilin’s counsel did not provide a
substantive response.
Heavilin proceeded to file this motion to
compel.
Discussion
A party may "obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any
3
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible
things."
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1).
For discov-
ery purposes, relevancy is construed broadly to encompass "any
matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other
matter[s] that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the
case."
Chavez v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 206 F.R.D. 615, 619
(S.D. Ind. 2002)(quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437
U.S. 340, 351, 98 S.Ct. 2380, 2389, 57 L.Ed.2d 253 (1978)).
Even
when information is not directly related to the claims or defenses identified in the pleadings, the information still may be
relevant to the broader subject matter at hand and meet the
rule’s good cause standard. Borom v. Town of Merrillville, 2009
WL 1617085, *1 (N.D. Ind. June 8, 2009) (citing Sanyo Laser
Prods., Inc. v. Arista Records, Inc., 214 F.R.D. 496, 502 (S.D.
Ind. 2003)).
See also Adams v. Target, 2001 WL 987853, *1 (S.D.
Ind. July 30, 2001)("For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the
action."); Shapo v. Engle, 2001 WL 629303, *2 (N.D. Ill. May 25,
2001)("Discovery is a search for the truth.").
A party may seek an order to compel discovery when an opposing party fails to respond to discovery requests or has provided
evasive or incomplete responses.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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37(a)(2)-(3).
The burden "rests upon the objecting party to show
why a particular discovery request is improper."
Gregg v. Local
305 IBEW, 2009 WL 1325103, *8 (N.D. Ind. May 13, 2009)(citing
Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Protection Dist., 235 F.R.D. 447,
449-50 (N.D. Ill. 2006)); McGrath v. Everest Nat. Ins. Co., 2009
WL 1325405, *3 (N.D. Ind. May 13, 2009)(internal citations omitted); Carlson Restaurants Worldwide, Inc. v. Hammond Professional
Cleaning Services, 2009 WL 692224, *5 (N.D. Ind. March 12, 2009)
(internal citations omitted).
The objecting party must show with
specificity that the request is improper.
Cunningham v. Smith-
kline Beecham, 255 F.R.D. 474, 478 (N.D. Ind. 2009)(citing Graham
v. Casey’s General Stores, 206 F.R.D. 253, 254 (S.D. Ind. 2002)).
That burden cannot be met by "a reflexive invocation of the same
baseless, often abused litany that the requested discovery is
vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome or that it is
neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
Cunningham, 255 F.R.D. at 478
(citing Burkybile v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 2006 WL 2325506, *6
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2006))(internal quotations and citations omitted).
Rather, the court, under its broad discretion, considers
“the totality of the circumstances, weighing the value of material sought against the burden of providing it, and taking into
account society’s interest in furthering the truth-seeking
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function in the particular case before the court.”
Berning v.
UAW Local 2209, 242 F.R.D. 510, 512 (N.D. Ind. 2007)(examining
Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 681 (7th Cir.
2002))(internal quotations and citations omitted).
When a party files a discovery motion, he must submit a
certification explaining his good faith efforts to confer and
resolve the discovery dispute without seeking court intervention.
Rule 37(a)(1); Local Rule 37.1. The requirement to meet-and-confer must be taken seriously, because the court must find that the
parties made a good faith effort to resolve the dispute before
the court can rule on the merits of the motion. See Robinson v.
Potter, 453 F.3d 990, 994–95 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Naviant
Mktg. Solutions, Inc. v. Larry Tucker, Inc., 339 F.3d 180, 186
(3rd Cir. 2003)). See Shoppell v. Schrader, 2009 WL 2515817, *1
(N.D. Ind. August 13, 2009) (finding good faith certification of
a single letter and a brief telephone conversation inadequate).
Courts have broad discretion in determining whether the moving
party has satisfied the meet-and-confer component of Rule
37(a)(1) and Local Rule 37.1.
Mintel Intern. Group, Ltd. v.
Neerghen, 2008 WL 4936745, *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2008). In
making this determination, the court will consider the totality
of the circumstances.
Kidwiler v. Progressive Paloverde Ins.
Co., 192 F.R.D. 193 (N.D. W.Va. 2000). One correspondence can
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meet this requirement when it is detailed and continued contact
likely would not have been successful in resolving the discovery
dispute. Kidwiler, 192 F.R.D. at 198. See also Alloc, Inc. v.
Unilin Beheer B.V., 2006 WL 757871, *1 (E.D. Wis. March 24, 2006)
(finding that several letters exchanged between the two parties
satisfied the meet and confer requirement of Rule 37).
The defendants argue that Heavilin did not comply with Rule
37 and make a good faith effort to resolve the dispute before
seeking court intervention.
The defendants contend that they
would have reconsidered their position if Heavilin would have
come forward with authority supporting production of the requested information.
The correspondence the defendants received
and the telephonic conference were superficial and did not
address the legal merits of demanding production.
Upon review of the correspondence Heavilin sent to the
defendants in an effort to amicably resolve the discovery dispute, it does not appear that Heavilin made a good faith effort.
Her correspondence states nothing more than the "Plaintiff
maintains her request" and that the information sought is not
subject to the defense the defendants raised to the respective
interrogatory.
Heavilin did not offer any explanation or engage
in any discussion to show why the information sought was not
subject to the respective defenses.
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For example, Heavilin stated
that she maintained her request for the information considered in
interrogatory five and that the information was relevant to the
bad faith count.
Heavilin did not engage in any discussion of
how the requested information related to her claim. Her requests
for the information omitted from each contested interrogatory
were equally deficient.
The defendants also allege that the telephonic conference
held to discuss the discovery issues was equally deficient.
Heavilin has not contested this statement, and given the lack of
explanation contained in her written correspondence, the court
believes that her reluctance carried over to the telephonic conference.
Moreover, Heavilin should not have ended the discus-
sions by stating she would get back to the defendants, and then
proceed to file a motion to compel without making one last
attempt.
The record reflects that the defendants were willing to
consider production, but Heavilin was unwilling to provide them
with any reason to do so.
Because the record suggests that
further discussion may have led to resolution, the court finds
that Heavilin did not make a good faith effort to resolve the
discovery dispute.
For this reason, the court need not turn to
the merits of the dispute.
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_______________
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Compel [DE 15]
filed by the plaintiff, Dianna Heavilin, on September 21, 2011,
is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Heavilin must engage in a discus-
sion of the legal merits of her requests with the defendants and
make a good faith effort to resolve the dispute.
ENTERED this 26th day of January, 2012
s/ ANDREW P. RODOVICH
United States Magistrate Judge
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