Taylor v. USA
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER: Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence under 28 USC 2255 is DENIED. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 1/30/2012. (cc: Taylor)(rmn) Modified on 1/30/2012 to reflect Opinion and Order (rmn).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
DARRYL D. TAYLOR,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
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NOS.
2:11-CV-11
(2:08-CR-88)
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Motion Under 28 U.S.C
§ 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in
Federal Custody (DE #517) filed by Defendant, Darryl D. Taylor, on
January 6, 2011. For the reasons set forth below, this motion is
DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Defendant, Darryl D. Taylor (“Taylor”), was charged with one
count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and
distribute methamphetamine.
On September 11, 2009, Taylor entered
into a plea agreement with the Government, whereby Taylor agreed to
plead guilty to the above charge and also to waive his right to
appeal the conviction and sentence imposed, including the right to
contest any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the
claimed ineffective assistance of counsel related directly to the
waiver or its negotiation. In exchange, the Government agreed to
make a non-binding recommendation to the Court that Taylor be
sentenced to the ten year minimum mandatory sentence. In addition,
the Government agreed to withdraw its previously filed information
regarding enhanced penalties under 21 U.S.C. section 851.
A change of plea hearing took place on September 14, 2009.
During that hearing, Taylor was placed under oath and stated that
he was satisfied with the representation he had received by his
counsel, Attorney William Padula. Additionally, Taylor confirmed
that he understood and agreed to each of the terms of the plea
agreement and that he wanted to plead guilty pursuant to the
agreement with the Government. Taylor acknowledged numerous times
that he understood the waiver of his right to appeal his conviction
and sentence. When the Court invited questions or requests for
clarification from Taylor, on multiple occasions, he indicated that
he had none. On January 11, 2010, Taylor was sentenced to ten years
incarceration, to be followed by five years of supervised release.
Subsequently, Taylor filed the instant section 2255 petition
arguing that his guilty plea and conviction were obtained in
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because Attorney
Padula failed to consult with him on major decisions in his case,
failed to provide him with discovery in a timely manner, and failed
to request a continuance so that Taylor could adequately review the
tendered discovery documents. Additionally, Taylor argues that
Attorney Padula failed to “make a reasonable investigation” in that
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he failed to note that “the U.S. Governments [sic] witnesses change
their ‘statements’ many times during their proffers” and in that he
also failed to review a Kansas traffic stop that led to government
agents questioning Taylor regarding the sale and manufacture of
narcotics. Taylor argues that Attorney Padula “had not only the
right but the duty to subpoena the traffic stop which he did not
accomplish.”
Taylor contends that Attorney Padula “did not follow
up with any of the information that [Taylor] provided him which
clearly discredit[ed] the indivuals [sic] that the U.S. Government
used to give proffers.” Finally, Taylor argues that Attorney Padula
“also did not contest the amount of time that the U.S. Government
took
from
the
incarceration
time
to
of
[his]
[his]
final
initial
arrest
sentencing”
which
and
period
Taylor
of
argues
violated the Speedy Trial Act. The Government posits that Taylor
waived any rights to appeal his conviction or sentence and thus his
section 2255 petition is barred by the appellate waiver contained
in his plea agreement.
Taylor Disagrees.
DISCUSSION
Section 2255 Petition
Habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. section 2255 is reserved
for “extraordinary situations.”
812, 816 (7th Cir. 1996).
Prewitt v. United States, 83 F.3d
In order to proceed on a habeas corpus
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2255, a federal prisoner
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must show that the district court sentenced him in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the sentence was
in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject
to collateral attack. Id.
In assessing Taylor’s motion, the Court is mindful of the
well-settled
principle
that,
when
interpreting
a
pro
se
petitioner's complaint or section 2255 motion, district courts have
a “special responsibility” to construe such pleadings liberally.
Donald v. Cook County Sheriff's Dep’t., 95 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir.
1996); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (a “pro se
complaint, ‘however inartfully pleaded’ must be held to ‘less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers’”)
(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)); Brown v. Roe, 279
F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2002) (“pro se habeas petitioners are to be
afforded ‘the benefit of any doubt’”) (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773
F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)).
In other words:
The mandated liberal construction afforded to
pro se pleadings “means that if the court can
reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid
claim on which the [petitioner] could prevail,
it should do so despite the [petitioner’s]
failure to cite proper legal authority, his
confusion of various legal theories, his poor
syntax and sentence construction, or his
unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.”
Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999) (habeas
petition from state court conviction) (alterations in original)
(quoting Hall
v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991)).
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On the other hand, “a district court should not ‘assume the role of
advocate for the pro se litigant’ and may ‘not rewrite a petition
to include claims that were never presented.’” Id.
Preclusive Effect of Plea Agreement Waiver
Taylor’s plea agreement contained an appeal waiver, where
Taylor agreed to waive appeal of his conviction or sentence.
A
waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right.
United States v. Sumner, 265 F.3d 532, 537 (7th Cir. 2001).
The Seventh Circuit has held that a waiver to file a section 2255
petition contained in a plea agreement is enforceable only if it
is: (1) knowing and voluntary and (2) if the defendant cannot
establish
a
claim
for
ineffective
assistance
of
counsel
in
connection with negotiating the agreement. Mason v. United States,
211 F.3d 1065 (7th Cir. 2000); Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d
1142 (7th Cir. 1999).
As such, it must be determined if Taylor
made a knowing and voluntary waiver and whether he has established
a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with
negotiating the agreement.
Taylor entered into the plea
agreement knowingly and voluntarily
Courts enforce a plea agreement's appellate and collateral
attack waiver “if its terms are clear and unambiguous and the
record shows that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered
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into the agreement.” U.S. v. Blinn, 490 F.3d 586, 588 (7th Cir.
2007). Courts may consider a defendant's signature on the plea
agreement and his statements during the plea colloquy as evidence
of a knowing and voluntary waiver. United States v. Jemison, 237
F.3d 911, 917-18 (7th Cir. 2001).
Taylor’s
plea
agreement
contained
the
following waiver
provision:
I understand that the law gives a convicted
person the right to appeal the conviction and
the sentence imposed; I also understand that
no one can predict the precise sentence that
will be imposed, and that the Court has
jurisdiction and authority to impose any
sentence within the statutory maximum set for
my offense as set forth in this plea
agreement; with this understanding and in
consideration of the government’s entry into
this plea agreement, I expressly waive my
right to appeal or to contest my conviction
and my sentence or the manner in which my
conviction or my sentence was determined or
imposed, to any Court on any ground, including
any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
unless the claimed ineffective assistance of
counsel relates directly to this waiver or its
negotiation, including any appeal under Title
18, United States Code, Section 3742 or any
post-conviction proceeding, including but not
limited to, a proceeding under Title 28,
United States Code, Section 2255.
(DE 331 at 4).
Notably, Taylor and his lawyer both signed the plea agreement.
(Change of Plea Hearing Transcript at 3-4.) Taylor read the waiver
provision. (Id. at 9-10.) Upon questioning from the Court, Taylor
agreed under oath that he understood it, agreed with it, and was
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giving up his rights knowingly and voluntarily. (Id. at 9-10, 23.)
He also agreed that no one had forced him to sign it. (Id. at 23.)
During the change of plea hearing, Taylor acknowledged that he was
waiving his right to file any later petition challenging his
conviction or sentence. (Id. at 23).
no questions about the waiver.
He further indicated he has
(Id.)
Following the Court’s careful explanation of the consequences
of the plea, Taylor set forth a factual basis for his guilty plea,
agreed with the prosecution version of the facts, and pleaded
guilty. (Id. 32-47.)
The Court then found that the plea was
entered knowingly and voluntarily and supported by an independent
basis in fact containing each of the essential elements of the
offense. (Id. at 47.)
From this evidence, the Court is satisfied that the appeal
waiver is enforceable. See United States v. Jemison, 237 F.3d 911,
917 (7th Cir. 2001).
Because Taylor knowingly and voluntarily
entered into the plea agreement, and because all of its provisions
– including the waivers – were explained to him at the change-ofplea hearing without any requests for further clarification or
disagreement, he is bound by it.
Taylor has not made a valid claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel
in connection with negotiating the agreement
Given this Court’s finding that the waiver provisions in his
plea agreement is enforceable, Taylor’s section 2255 petition must
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fail unless Taylor points directly to ineffective negotiation that
would
have
rendered
the
entire
plea
agreement
fundamentally unfair for the Court to enforce.
invalid
or
Taylor argues that
Attorney Padula failed in several respects but, notably, he fails
to reference any deficiencies in Padula’s negotiation of the actual
plea agreement.
Indeed, Taylor fails to make any reference to the
plea agreement negotiations themselves.
Because Taylor failed to
do so, his section 2255 petition fails.
Taylor’s failure to
indicate
was
how
or
even
if
Attorney
Padula
ineffective
in
negotiating the plea agreement is fatal to his claim.
Even if Taylor’s motion is somehow construed as containing an
allegation that Attorney Padula was ineffective in his negotiation
of the plea agreement, his claim would fail.
Because counsel is
presumed effective, a defendant bears a heavy burden in proving
that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance. United States
v. Guerrero, 938 F.2d 725, 727 (7th Cir. 1991). “Only if the
petitioner comes forward with ‘specific acts or omissions of his
counsel that constitute ineffective assistance’ will [the Court]
then consider ‘whether these acts or omissions were made outside
the wide range of professionally competent assistance.’” Hutchings
v. Unites States, 618 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Berkey
v. United States, 318 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2003). A claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel can only prevail if the defendant
satisfies the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984). Under this test, the defendant must show: (1) that the
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attorney’s representation fell well below an objective standard of
reasonableness (performance prong) and (2) that there exists a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different
(prejudice
prong).
A
reasonable
probability
is
a
probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the case.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Thus, “[t]o establish prejudice in
the pleading context, the petitioner must prove that there is a
reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty absent
his attorney’s deficient conduct.” Hutchings at 697.
To do so,
petitioner must come forward with objective evidence that he would
not have so pled. Id. Thus, even in the absence of a valid,
enforceable waiver, and even if Attorney Padula’s performance had
been deficient, Taylor’s petition would nevertheless fail because
Taylor
does
not
sufficiently
allege
prejudice;
Taylor
never
contends that but for Attorney Padula’s actions in representing
him, he would not have pled guilty pursuant to the plea agreement.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this motion is DENIED.
DATED: January 30, 2012
/s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
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