Frohwerk v. Ofc Armstrong
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER: This action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1915A. Signed by Judge William C Lee on 6/20/2011. cc: Frohwerk (tc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
DAVID FROHWERK,
Plaintiff,
v.
OFFICER ARMSTRONG,
Defendant.
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CAUSE NO. 2:11-CV-202 WL
OPINION AND ORDER
David Frohwerk, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE 1.)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the
action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b).
In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard as when
deciding a motion under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston,
463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir.
2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. at 603. The court must bear in mind, however, that “[a] document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007).
Here, Frohwerk is suing Officer Armstrong, a correctional officer at Westville
Correctional Facility (“Westville”). He alleges that on an unspecified date, Officer Armstrong
woke him up with the following announcement, “Get up and go to church if you want to eat,
because there ain’t no lunch today! . . . Go get your cookies!” (DE 1 at 3.) Frohwerk alleges that
he then proceeded to a Christian religious service because he wanted some cookies, even though
he did not “share the same opinion as those persons appearing and preaching.” (Id.) He asserts
that he felt “dehumanized and morally fractured by attending a religious service just to get
something to eat.” (Id.) He asserts that Officer Armstrong’s actions violated his right to adequate
food under the Eighth Amendment, and his right to the free exercise of religion under the First
Amendment. (See id. at 3-4.)
The Eighth Amendment is implicated only when a prisoner is forced to endure
deprivations of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992). Prisoners have a right to a nutritionally adequate diet. Antonelli v. Sheahan,
81 F.3d 1422, 1432 (7th Cir. 1996). While a substantial deprivation of food may amount to a
constitutional violation, missing a few meals on occasion does not. Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d
849, 853-54 (7th Cir. 1999), Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507-08 (5th Cir. 1999). At most
Frohwerk alleges that he was not given a lunch on one particular day and that he had some
cookies instead for this meal. He does not allege, nor can it be plausibly inferred from the
complaint, that he suffered any adverse health effects as a result. Frohwerk’s allegations fall far
short of alleging an Eighth Amendment violation.
As for Frohwerk’s First Amendment claim, an inmate cannot be forced to attend religious
services. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91
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(1971). However, it is apparent from the complaint that Frohwerk was not forced to attend the
service; he chose to do so because he wanted some cookies. While Frohwerk could not
permissibly be required to choose between adequate nutrition and his religious beliefs on a
regular basis, see Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46 (7th Cir. 1990), it is apparent from the
complaint that this was a one-time incident. Frohwerk could have simply decided to forego the
cookies if he did not want to sit through the service, and the type of isolated incident he
describes does not amount to a First Amendment violation. See Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999,
1006 n.4 (7th Cir. 1999) (“De minimis burdens on the free exercise of religion are not of
constitutional dimension.”); Hadi v. Horn, 830 F.2d 779, 784, 787-88 (7th Cir. 1987) (occasional
disruption of inmate’s exercise of religion through cancellation of religious services did not
violate the First Amendment).
For the reasons set forth above, this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: June 20, 2011
s/William C. Lee
William C. Lee, Judge
United States District Court
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