Jackson-Bey v. USA

Filing 1

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence (2255). This case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 1/23/12. cc: petnr(kjp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
HANEEF JACKSON-BEY,
Defendant/Petitioner.

NO. 2:09-cr-43
2:11-cv-307

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the: (1) Motion Under 28
U.S.C. Section 2255 To Vacate, Set Aside, Or Correct Sentence By a
Person in Federal Custody, filed by Petitioner, Haneef Jackson-Bey,
on August 23, 2011 (DE #402).

For the reasons set forth below, the

section 2255 motion is DENIED.
this

case

WITH

PREJUDICE.

The Clerk is ORDERED to DISMISS

The

Clerk

is

FURTHER

ORDERED

to

distribute a copy of this order to Haneef Jackson-Bey, #206738,
Miami Correctional Facility-BH/IN, 3038 West 850 South, Bunker
Hill, IN 46914-9810, or to such other more current address that may
be on file for the Petitioner.

BACKGROUND
On July 2, 2009, a superseding indictment was filed against
Defendant, Haneef Jackson-Bey, and four other defendants.

(DE

#35.)

Count 1 alleged a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 to commit

violations of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2, 1591(a)(1) and (b)(2), 2421,
and 2423(a).

Jackson-Bey was also charged in Count 16, with 2 co-

defendants, for recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting,
providing and obtaining by any means L.G., an adult, knowing that
force, fraud and coercion would be used to cause her to engage in
a commercial sex act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1591(a)(1)
and (b)(1).
The week before the trial setting in this case, Defendant had
a change of plea hearing on October 30, 2009.

However, during the

hearing, Defendant stated he would not honor the agreement to
cooperate with the Government (contained in the plea agreement), so
the Court denied Defendant’s plea.
26.)

(DE #166, see DE #386, pp. 24-

The next week, Defendant contracted MRSA, and on November 3,

2009, counsel filed an emergency motion to sever Jackson-Bey from
the trial of his co-defendants.

(DE #177.)

The trial was

continued until November 9, 2009, and Jackson-Bey’s motion to sever
was granted.

Co-Defendants, Justin Cephus, Jovon Stewart, and

Stanton Cephus, were later convicted by a jury on all counts in the
superseding indictment.

(DE #203.)

On February 25, 2010, Jackson-Bey signed a new plea agreement
with the Government.

(DE #273.)

In it, Jackson-Bey agreed to

plead guilty to Count 16 of the superseding indictment, and the
Government agreed to move to dismiss Count 1 at the time of the

2

sentencing.
Defendant

Id., ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(c)(ii).

agreed

in

the

plea

that

a

The Government and

sentence

of

15

years

incarceration, which represented the mandatory minimum sentence
that Defendant could receive for his conviction in Count 16, “is an
appropriate sentence based upon my conduct in this case.”
7(c)(iii).

Id., ¶

Additionally, they agreed that if Defendant continued

to accept responsibility for his criminal conduct, he should
receive a two point, and if eligible, and additional one point
reduction in his Guideline offense level.

Id., ¶ 7(c)(I).

In

exchange for these benefits, the plea agreement contained the
following wavier:
I understand that the law gives a convicted person
the right to appeal the conviction and the sentence
imposed; I also understand that no one can predict
the precise sentence that will be imposed, and that
the Court has jurisdiction and authority to impose
any sentence within the statutory maximum set for
my offense(s) as set forth in this plea agreement;
with this understanding and in consideration of the
government’s entry into this plea agreement, I
expressly waive my right to appeal or to contest my
conviction and my sentence imposed or the manner in
which my conviction or my sentence was determined
or imposed, to any Court on any ground, including
any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
unless the claimed ineffective assistance of
counsel relates directly to this waiver or its
negotiation, including any appeal under Title 18,
Unites States Code, Section 3742 or any postconviction proceeding, including but not limited
to, a proceeding under Title 28, Unites States
Code, Section 2255.
Id., ¶ 7(e).
Further, the plea also stated that “[e]ach of the parties
3

reserve the right to argue if the sentence imposed upon me in this
cause shall be served either concurrent or consecutive, to any
other state or federal term of incarceration.”

Id., ¶ 7(c)(v).

Finally, Defendant agreed that his attorney had “done all that
anyone could do to counsel and assist me,” that he was offering his
guilty plea “freely and voluntarily and of [his] own accord,” that
“no promises [had] been made to [him] other than those contained in
[the] agreement,” and that he had not been “threatened in any way
by anyone to cause [him] to plead guilty in accordance with [the]
agreement.”

Id., ¶¶ 9, 10.

Jackson-Bey’s final change of plea hearing was held on March
19, 2010.

(See transcript, DE #384.)

When asked whether he was

“fully satisfied with the counsel, representation, and advice given
to you in this case by . . . your attorney?” Jackson-Bey replied
“yes.” (DE #384, p. 12.) After Jackson-Bey read through paragraph
7 of his plea agreement, the Court asked him whether he read it
previously, understood it, agreed with it, and was asking the Court
to

approve

questions.

it.

Jackson-Bey

(Id., pp. 12-13.)

answered

yes

to

each

of

these

Jackson-Bey acknowledged repeatedly

that he agreed with the individual and collective terms of the plea
agreement, and confirmed that he wanted to plead guilty under the
agreement.

(Id., pp. 13-47.)

for

16,

Count

“the

most

The Court informed Jackson-Bey that

that

you

could

get

would

be

life

imprisonment, a fine of up to $250,000, or a combination of both of

4

those,

up

to

life

supervised

release,

and

a

$100

assessment,” and Defendant answered that he understood.
17; see also p. 28.)

special
(Id., p.

Additionally, the Court advised Defendant

that “[t]he least you could get would be 15 years in jail, no fine,
five years of supervised release, and a special assessment,” and
Defendant indicated that he understood.
During

the

hearing,

this

Court

(Id., p. 17.)
questioned

Jackson-Bey

extensively about his voluntary waiver of his right to appeal,
including the following excerpts from that colloquy:
Q:

Subparagraph (e) talks about appeals,
Jackson-Bey.
Do you understand that in
criminal cases a defendant has a right
appeal any conviction or sentence that he
receive?

Mr.
all
to
may

A: Yes.
Q: In this case, you have agreed that I have the
jurisdiction and authority to sentence you up
to the maximum provided for by the statute; do
you understand that?
A: Yes.
Q: And do you recall you and I talked about that
before? That’s when I told you that you are
facing up to life imprisonment, a fine of up
to $250,000, or a combination of both of
those, up to life supervised release, and a
$100 special assessment, do you understand?
A: Yes.
Q: What you’re basically doing in this paragraph,
Mr. Jackson-Bey, is that you’re giving up all
of your rights to an appeal; do you understand
that?
A: Yes.
5

Q: That includes the manner in which you were found
guilty or any sentence that you may receive;
do you understand that?
A: Yes.
Q: So down the road you won’t be able to tell Mr.
Bosch that you want to appeal your sentence
because you thought it was too high, or you
want to appeal some of the rulings that I have
made because you don’t like them; do you
understand that?
A: Yes.
Q: For all intents and purposes, it’s all of your
rights to an appeal. There’s a few that you
keep, like jurisdiction, but almost all of the
other ones you waive; do you understand that?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you understand that the government is not
giving up any of their rights to an appeal?
A: Yes.
Q: Are you sure this is what you want to do?
A: Yes.
Q: Are you doing it knowingly and voluntarily?
A: Yes.
Q: Did anybody force you to do it?
A: No.
Q: Did you consult with your attorney before making
this decision?
A: Yes.
Q: Did anybody force you to do it?
A: No.
6

*

*

*

*

*

*

Q: You’re good. Okay.
Are you sure you want to
waive all of your rights to an appeal?
A: Yes.
Q: That includes any appeals under Title 18, United
States Code, Section 3742, and Title 28,
United States Code, Section 2255; do you
understand that?
A: Yes.
Q: Did your attorney go over those statutes?
A: Yes.
Q: Are you asking me to approve this as part of
your plea agreement?
A: Yes.
*

*

*

*

*

*

Q: Okay. Going back to that waiver of appeal, do
you understand that that also includes any
allegation of ineffective assistance of
counsel, unless it relates to this waiver or
its negotiation; do you understand that?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you still want to waive your rights to an
appeal?
A: Yes.
(Id., pp. 27-32.)

The

Court

also

confirmed that Defendant

understood that the Court would ultimately decide Defendant’s
sentence, and that the Guidelines were not binding.

(Id., pp. 17-

20, 23, 24, 35.)
On September 8, 2010, the Court had Defendant’s sentencing

7

hearing.

(See transcript, DE #390.)

objections

to

the

Guideline

There were no written

calculation

set

forth

in

the

Presentence Report (see DE #390, p. 4); however, the parties argued
about

whether

Defendant’s

sentence

on

Count

16

should

run

concurrent or consecutive to the state court sentence he was
currently serving.

(Id., pp. 5-29.)

The Court sentenced Jackson-

Bey to imprisonment for 180 months (equal to the 15 years that the
parties agreed would be a fair sentence in the plea agreement), to
be served consecutive to Defendant’s state sentences in Lake
County.

(Id., pp. 35-36.)

Government’s
indictment.
15, 2010.

motion

to

Additionally, the Court granted the

dismiss

(DE ##325, 326.)

Count

1

of

the

superseding

Judgment was entered on September

Jackson-Bey did not file a direct appeal with the

Seventh Circuit.
Jackson-Bey filed the instant petition under section 2255 on
August

23,

2011,

setting

Defendant’s

guilty

plea

was

forth

four

unlawfully

major

arguments:

induced

and

not

(1)
made

voluntarily because he did not understand the consequences of the
plea; (2) his plea was wrongfully coerced because his attorney
promised Defendant he would not be charged with sex trafficking and
he would not have to register as a sex offender; (3) his privilege
against self incrimination was violated; and (4) the prosecution
wrongfully failed to disclose favorable evidence.

(See Section

2255 Mot., DE #402, pp. 5-6.) In response, the Government contends

8

that most of Jackson-Bey’s arguments were waived, and even those
that can be liberally construed as ineffective assistance of
counsel, fail on the merits.

(See DE #406, p. 7.)

Jackson-Bey

filed a reply, and memorandum in support of the reply, on October
31, 2011 (DE ##407, 408.)

Therefore, this motion is fully briefed

and ripe for adjudication.

DISCUSSION
Habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. section 2255 is reserved
for "extraordinary situations."
812, 816 (7th Cir. 1996).

Prewitt v. United States, 83 F.3d

In order to proceed on a habeas corpus

petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2255, a federal prisoner
must show that the district court sentenced him in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the sentence was
in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject
to collateral attack.
A

section

2255

Id.
motion

is

recapitulation of a direct appeal.

neither

a

substitute

for

nor

Id.; Belford v. United States,

975 F.2d 310, 313 (7th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by
Castellanos v. United States, 26 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1994).
result:
[T]here are three types of issues that a
section 2255 motion cannot raise: (1) issues
that were raised on direct appeal, absent a
showing
of
changed
circumstances;
(2)
nonconstitutional issues that could have been
but were not raised on direct appeal; and (3)
9

As a

constitutional issues that were not raised on
direct appeal, unless the section 2255
petitioner
demonstrates
cause
for
the
procedural default as well as actual prejudice
from the failure to appeal.
Belford, 975 F.2d at 313.

Additionally, aside from demonstrating

"cause" and "prejudice" from the failure to raise constitutional
errors

on

direct

appeal,

a

section

2255

petitioner

may

alternatively pursue such errors after demonstrating that the
district court's refusal to consider the claims would lead to a
fundamental miscarriage of justice.

McCleese v. United States, 75

F.3d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1996).
In assessing Defendant's motion, the Court is mindful of the
well-settled

principle

that,

when

interpreting

a

pro

se

petitioner's complaint or section 2255 motion, district courts have
a "special responsibility" to construe such pleadings liberally.
Donald v. Cook County Sheriff's Dep't, 95 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir.
1996); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (a "pro se
complaint, 'however inartfully pleaded' must be held to 'less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers'")
(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)); Brown v. Roe, 279
F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2002) ("pro se habeas petitioners are to be
afforded 'the benefit of any doubt'") (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773
F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)).

In other words:

The mandated liberal construction afforded to
pro se pleadings "means that if the court can
reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid
claim on which the [petitioner] could prevail,
10

it should do so despite the [petitioner's]
failure to cite proper legal authority, his
confusion of various legal theories, his poor
syntax and sentence construction, or his
unfamiliarity with pleading requirements."
Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999) (habeas
petition from state court conviction) (alterations in original)
(quoting Hall

v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991)).

On the other hand, "a district court should not 'assume the role of
advocate for the pro se litigant' and may 'not rewrite a petition
to include claims that were never presented.'"

Id.

Here, the

Court assessed Jackson-Bey’s claims with these guidelines in mind.

Waiver
The Seventh Circuit has recognized the validity of plea
agreement waivers, and will enforce the waiver unless there is a
claim that the waiver was entered into involuntarily, or that the
waiver was a result of the ineffective assistance of counsel during
the negotiation of the waiver. In Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d
1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 1999), the Seventh Circuit held that only two
claims could be raised on a section 2255 motion by an individual
who waived his right to appeal:

(1) the defendant received

ineffective assistance of counsel in negotiating the waiver; or (2)
that the waiver was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
stated that courts should be:
[m]indful of the limited reach of this
holding, we reiterate that waivers are
11

Jones

enforceable as a general rule; the right to
mount a collateral attack pursuant to § 2255
survives only with respect to those discrete
claims
which
relate
directly
to
the
negotiation of the waiver.
Id. at 1145.

In Mason v. United States, 211 F.3d 1065, 1069 (7th

Cir. 2000), the Seventh Circuit applied its holding in Jones to bar
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that related only to the
petitioner's performance with respect to sentencing.

The Court

found that "[b]ecause the challenge has nothing to do with the
issue of a deficient negotiation of the waiver, [petitioner] has
waived

his

right

to

seek

post-conviction

relief."

Id.

Additionally, the Court stated that the following analysis should
be considered in determining whether a claim has been waived:
can the petitioner establish that the waiver
was not knowingly or voluntarily made, and/or
can he demonstrate ineffective assistance of
counsel with respect to the negotiation of the
waiver?
Id.
It is undisputed that in his plea agreement, Jackson-Bey
waived his right to appeal or contest his conviction and sentence
“to any Court on any ground, including any claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel unless the claimed ineffective assistance of
counsel

relates

directly

to

this

waiver

or

its

negotiation,

including any appeal under . . . Title 28, United States Code,
Section

2255.”

(Plea

Agreement,

DE

#273,

¶

7(e).)

Thus,

Defendant’s claims of a “coerced confess[ion],” violation of the

12

privilege

against

self-incrimination,

and

failure

of

the

prosecution to disclose certain evidence (DE #402, p. 5), are
waived.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant’s first main argument is as follows:
Conviction obtained by plea of guilty which was
unlawfully induced or made voluntarily or without
understanding of the nature of the charge and the
consequences of the plea.
I was told by my
attorney that both my conspiracy count and single
count held the same time and in order for me not to
be sentenced to a minimum of 30 yrs if found
convicted that I should plead to count 16 because
as the count is written the alleged victim was not
a minor.
(2255 Mot., DE #402, p. 4.) In an attempt to construe Petitioner’s
section 2255 motion liberally, as this Court must, the Court will
interpret Jackson-Bey’s claim to be that he did not enter into the
plea

agreement

knowingly

or

voluntarily

because

he

received

ineffective assistance of counsel.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by
the 2-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984).

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, the Defendant must first show the specific acts or omissions
of

his

attorney

"fell

below

an

objective

standard

of

reasonableness" and were "outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance."

Barker v. United States, 7 F.3d 629, 633

(7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 690); see
13

also Hardamon v. United States, 319 F.3d 943, 948 (7th Cir. 2003);
Anderson v. Sternes, 243 F.3d 1049, 1057 (7th Cir. 2001).

The

second Strickland prong requires the Defendant to show prejudice,
which entails showing by "a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Regarding the deficient-performance prong, great deference is
given to counsel's performance and the defendant has a heavy burden
to

overcome

the

strong

presumption

of

effective

performance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; Coleman v. United States, 318 F.3d
754, 758 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

Defendant must

establish specific acts or admissions to fall below professional
norms.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

If one prong is not

satisfied, it is unnecessary to reach the merits of the second
prong.
The

Id. at 697.
Seventh

Circuit

has

held

that

“[o]nly

those

habeas

petitioners who can prove under Strickland that they have been
denied a fair trial by the gross incompetence of their attorneys
will be granted the writ.”
(7th Cir. 2005).

Canaan v. McBride, 395 F.3d 376, 385-86

Additionally, trial counsel “is entitled to a

‘strong presumption’ that his performance fell ‘within the range of
reasonable professional assistance’ and will not be judged with the
benefit of hindsight.’”

Almonacid v. United States, 476 F.3d 518,

521 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
14

Jackson-Bey

contends

that

it

was

improper

for

the

plea

agreement and Count 16 of the superseding indictment not to mention
“a minor or under age of 14 years,” and that his trial counsel
incorrectly advised him to plead guilty “for a crime that did not
exist.”
the

(2255 Reply, DE #408, pp. 2-3.)

elements

of

the

charge

in

Count

Defendant has confused
16.

Count

16

of

the

superseding indictment alleged:
Between on or about October 1, 2007 and on or about
May 31, 2008, in the Northern District of Indiana
and elsewhere, [Defendant and his co-defendants]
did
knowingly,
in
and
affecting
interstate
commerce, recruit, entice, harbor, transport,
provide and obtain by any means L.G., knowing that
force, fraud and coercion would be used to cause
L.G. to engage in a commercial sex act.
This is consistent with the statute that requires the Government to
prove either that the victim was a minor or that Defendant knew
that force, fraud, or coercion would be used to cause the victim to
engage in a commercial sex act:
Whoever knowingly – (1) in or affecting interstate
or foreign commerce, recruits, entices, harbors,
transports, provides, obtains, or maintains by any
means a person . . .
knowing or in reckless
disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats
of force, fraud, coercion described in subsection
(e)(2), or any combination of such means will be
used to cause the person to engage in a commercial
sex act, or that the person has not attained the
age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a
commercial sex act, shall be punished . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (emphasis added).
Thus, the fact that L.G., the victim, was an adult at the time
Defendant

committed

the

offense
15

set

forth

in

Count

16

is

irrelevant, and it certainly does not render it a “crime that did
not exist,” as argued by Defendant.

(DE #408, p. 3.)

Moreover,

this Court specifically advised Defendant during his change of plea
hearing of the essential elements of the offense:
[I]n other words, what the government would have to
prove at trial beyond a reasonable doubt, are:
First, that you knowingly; second, in or affecting
interstate commerce; third, recruited enticed,
harbored, transported, provided, or obtained by any
means the person named in the superseding
indictment; fourth, knowing that force, fraud, or
coercion would be used to cause the person to
engage in a commercial sex act; and, fifth, that
the offense was affected by means of force, fraud,
or coercion.
(DE #384, p. 38.)

Therefore, there was nothing deficient in Mr.

Bosch’s performance.
ineffective

Jackson-Bey’s argument that Mr. Bosch gave

assistance

of

counsel

when

he

told

Defendant

“wouldnt be charged with sex trafficking children” fails.

he
The

charge in the superseding indictment, and the one discussed in the
plea agreement and at the change of plea hearing, all contained the
same

accurate

information

(which

mimicked

counsel’s

advice),

advising Jackson-Bey that he was pleading guilty to sex trafficking
by means of force, fraud, and coercion.

Under 18 U.S.C. §

1591(a)(1), the Government did not have to prove that the victim
was under 14 years of age, and Defendant was never charged with
that offense.
Jackson-Bey argues he has suffered prejudice because state
officials

and

other

prisoners

16

have

“dub[bed]

him

as

‘sex

trafficking of a child’” (DE #408, p. 3), and that he may have to
register as a sex offender (DE #402, p. 5).

Even assuming,

arguendo, that these facts alleged by Jackson-Bey are true, they
are entirely unrelated to his trial counsel’s effective performance
in accurately advising Defendant that he was charged in Count 16 of
the superseding indictment with sex trafficking by means of force,
fraud, and coercion, and pled guilty to that count.

Moreover,

during his change of plea hearing, this Court asked Defendant
“[h]as anyone, including your own lawyer, any lawyer for the
government, any government agent, or anyone else made any other or
different promise or assurance to you of any kind in an effort to
induce or cause you to enter a plea of guilty in this case?” and
Defendant answered, “[n]o.”

(DE #384, p. 33.)

It is unclear from Defendant’s section 2255 motion, but he may
also be arguing that Mr. Bosch was ineffective because he allowed
Defendant to plea to Count 16, instead of reaching a plea agreement
on Count 1 (the conspiracy charge under 18 U.S.C. § 371, which
carried a statutory maximum sentence of 5 years).

However, as the

Government points out, a prosecutor has no obligation to offer a
defendant any plea agreement, much less an agreement with or
without particular terms.

See United States v. Brookshire, No.

1:07-CR-92-TLS, 2011 WL 2447714, at *5 (N.D. Ind. June 15, 2011)
(citing United States v. Hall, 212 F.3d 1016, 1022 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“the successful negotiation of a plea agreement involves factors

17

beyond the control of counsel, including . . . the cooperation of
the

prosecutor

agreement.”)).

who

has

no

obligation

to

offer

such

an

The Court in Brookshire held that “[b]ecause there

is no evidence that the prosecutor would have offered a conditional
plea, the Defendant cannot show that his counsel was ineffective
for failing to secure such a deal.

Counsel cannot be faulted for

failing to achieve the impossible.” Brookshire, 2011 WL 244714, at
*5.

Similarly, there is no evidence in this case that the

prosecutor was willing to offer a plea on Count 1.

Therefore, Mr.

Bosch cannot be deemed ineffective merely because he obtained a
plea on Count 16 instead of Count 1.

See, e.g., Tanner v. United

States, Nos. 2:09-CV085, 2:04-CR-80, 2010 WL 148312, at *4 (N.D.
Ind. Jan. 12, 2010) (“The mere allegation that counsel failed to
secure a better plea agreement does not, without more, indicate
deficient counsel.”).

As such, Defendant has failed to show that

his trial counsel’s actions were objectively unreasonable under
Strickland, or that Defendant suffered any prejudice due to his
counsel’s performance.
Additionally, although Defendant does not argue that his
counsel

performed

ineffectively

at

sentencing

when

the

Court

decided that Defendant’s sentence would be served consecutive to
the state sentence, the Court notes that this type of argument
would also be waived.

See, e.g., Bridgeman v. United States, 229

F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating ineffective assistance of

18

counsel claims that relate to anything other than plea negotiation,
for example, those related to counsel’s performance at sentencing,
are barred by an enforceable waiver).
Finally, this Court is satisfied that Defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to seek post-conviction relief.
See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 348 F. Supp. 2d 964, 966 (N.D.
Ind. 2004) (finding a similar section 2255 waiver sufficient,
ruling defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
file a section 2255 motion.)

To the extent that Defendant now

argues that his “attorney [] talk[ed] [him] into signing the plea
agreement,” (DE #402, p. 5), “[s]elf-serving statements offered
after the plea hearing generally fall in the face of contradictory
voluntary statements made by the defendant during a plea hearing the latter are presumed to be true.”

United States v. Mosley, 35

F.3d 569, 1994 WL 503016, at *3 (7th Cir. Sept. 14, 1994) (citing,
inter alia, United States v. Scott, 929 F.2d 313, 315 (7th Cir.
1991) (“To allow [defendant] to withdraw his plea because of secret
expectations

that

he

harbored

in

the

face

of

his

directly

contradictory sworn testimony would undermine the strong societal
interest in the finality of guilty pleas.”)). As set forth by this
Court earlier in this opinion, Defendant repeatedly testified
during his hearing that he was satisfied with his counsel’s
performance, that he was knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty,
and that he understood the charges against him and the possible

19

sentence he was facing.

As such, the Court is satisfied that he

knowingly and intelligently entered into the plea agreement.

CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant’s section 2255
motion is DENIED.
PREJUDICE.

The Clerk is ORDERED to DISMISS this case WITH

The Clerk is FURTHER ORDERED to distribute a copy of

this order to Haneef Jackson-Bey, #206738, Miami Correctional
Facility-BH/IN, 3038 West 850 South, Bunker Hill, IN 46914-9810, or
to such other more current address that may be on file for the
Petitioner.

DATED: January 23, 2012

/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

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