Stevens v. Levenhagen et al

Filing 6

OPINION AND ORDER: This action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Signed by Judge William C Lee on 11/16/2011. cc: Stevens (tc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
TIMOTHY A. STEVENS,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARK LEVENHAGEN, et al.,
Defendants.

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CAUSE NO. 2:11-CV-392 WL

OPINION AND ORDER
Timothy A. Stevens, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE 1.)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the
action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. In determining whether the
complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard as when deciding a motion under
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th
Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. The
court must bear in mind that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Here, Stevens alleges that he was unfairly removed from his prison job in the law library
after he tested positive for drugs. (DE 1 at 3.) He alleges that his due process rights were violated

in connection with his termination. (Id. at 3-4.) The law is clear, however, that prisoners have
neither liberty nor property interests in their prison work assignments. Dewalt v. Carter, 224
F.3d 607, 613 (7th Cir. 2000); DeTomaso v. McGinnis, 970 F.2d 211, 212 (7th Cir. 1992). Thus,
Stevens was not entitled to due process protections before being removed from his prison job.
Furthermore, to the extent Stevens is alleging that the prison failed to follow internal policies
regarding the urinalysis test, this would not state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in
any event. See Sobitan v. Glud, 589 F.3d 379, 389 (7th Cir. 2009) (“By definition, federal law,
not state law, provides the source of liability for a claim alleging the deprivation of a federal
constitutional right.”); Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing that 42
U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state statutes or
administrative regulations).
Stevens also alleges that as a result of his positive drug test his contact visitation
privileges were unfairly suspended. (DE 1 at 4.) The Supreme Court has recognized that contact
visits present particular difficulties for correctional facilities and thus can be restricted or
prohibited altogether:
That there is a valid, rational connection between a ban on contact visits and
internal security of a detention facility is too obvious to warrant extended
discussion. . . . Contact visits invite a host of security problems. They open the
institution to the introduction of drugs, weapons, and other contraband. Visitors
can easily conceal guns, knives, drugs, or other contraband in countless ways and
pass them to an inmate unnoticed by even the most vigilant observers. . . . And
these items can readily be slipped from the clothing of an innocent child, or
transferred by other visitors permitted close contact with inmates.
Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984). Although Stevens disagrees that he poses a risk
to the facility, the court must “accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of
prison administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a
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corrections system and for determining the most appropriate means to accomplish them.”
Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (upholding restriction on visitation for inmates
with substance abuse violations, which served the legitimate goal of deterring the use of drugs
and alcohol within the prison). The burden is on the prisoner to show there was no legitimate
reason for the restriction on visitation, see id., and Stevens has not done that here.
Furthermore, the Due Process Clause does not protect against every change in the
conditions of confinement having an adverse impact on a prisoner. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472, 484 (1995). Instead, a prisoner is entitled to due process protections only when the
conditions imposed work an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life. Id. Even transferring a prisoner from the general population to a
segregation unit does not present an “atypical, significant deprivation” and is “within the
expected parameters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.” Id. at 485. Here, the restriction
placed on Steven’s contact visits based on the determination that he constitutes a threat to the
safety and security of the facility falls within the discretion the Constitution affords to prison
officials. The restriction does not work an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485. Accordingly, Stevens’ allegations
fail to state a claim for relief.
For these reasons, this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: November 16, 2011

s/William C. Lee
William C. Lee, Judge
United States District Court

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