Mathewson et al v. Lafayette Indiana City of et al
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER denying 15 Motion for Reconsideration. The courts prior order dismissing the federal claims with prejudice and the state law claim without prejudice stands unchanged. Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 5/30/12. (mc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
KINZIE MATHEWSON, et al.,
PLAINTIFFS,
VS.
CITY OF LAFAYETTE INDIANA, et al.,
DEFENDANTS.
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CAUSE NO. 2:11-CV-456-RLM-PRC
OPINION and ORDER
On March 5, 2012, the court granted a motion to dismiss filed by
defendants City of Lafayette, Indiana, Lafayette Police Department, Chief of
Police Don Rouch, and Officer Matthew Gard. The order noted that the
plaintiffs Kinzie Mathewson and Damon Mathewson hadn’t responded to the
motion, but also noted that a response wasn’t necessary and that a plaintiff
can choose to stand on his pleadings in the face of a motion to dismiss.
The Mathewsons have moved the court to re-open and reconsider the
matter under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The Mathewsons’ counsel
has shown that a clerical error led to a situation in which a response to
Lafayette’s motion to dismiss was prepared but never received by the court.
This minor and inadvertent mistake is understandable and excusable and the
court will reconsider the motion, factoring in the Mathewsons’ response, as
attached to the Rule 60(b) motion. Lafayette hasn’t responded to the motion to
reconsider, although a response isn’t necessary; the court can rely on the
positions taken by Lafayette in its motion to dismiss.
Even considering the Mathewsons’ memorandum in response to the
motion to dismiss, the court denies the motion to reconsider and leaves the
previous dismissal unchanged.
A.
The Mathewsons don’t dispute Lafayette’s contention that the Fourth
Amendment claims must be dismissed and that the Lafayette Police
Department isn’t an entity that can be sued separately from the City of
Lafayette.
B.
The Mathewsons have clarified their claim that they were deprived of
their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In the March 5 opinion, the
court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment claim might be either a claim of
incorporation, in which the Fourth Amendment was incorporated against state
actors (which wouldn’t survive the analysis that there was no Fourth
Amendment violation) or a standalone claim of a violation of substantive due
process (which, the court said, wasn’t articulated in the complaint with enough
specificity to survive the pleading standard explained in Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)).
The Mathewsons’ response to the motion makes clear that they were
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proceeding under a claim of denial of substantive due process and have
provided the court with more specificity.
The Mathewsons rely heavily on Frye v. Town of Akron, 759 F. Supp.
1320 (N.D. Ind. 1991). In that case, this court found that a substantive due
process claim could be brought when a plaintiff was an unintended victim of
police force. The court had to consider whether a police officer forcing a fleeing
motorcycle off the road and, as a result, killing the passenger, amounted to a
denial
of
substantive
due
process
(that
is,
violated
the
Fourteenth
Amendment.) Id. at 1322. The court took issue with the defendant town’s
dismissal motion’s contention that “the mere pursuit of a vehicle cannot rise to
the level of recklessness required for a substantive due process violation.” Id. at
1324-1325. The court reiterated its stance that “recklessness” was the
standard being applied in analyzing Akron’s motion to dismiss. “Taking the
factual allegations of the plaintiffs' complaint as true, the court finds that it
does not appear beyond doubt that plaintiffs will not be able to prove that
Deputy Moore acted so recklessly that he deprived Karrie Darnell of her
substantive due process rights.” Id. at 1325. Relating this to the facts of their
case, the Mathewsons ask the court to allow a jury to decide whether the
actions of the Lafayette police similarly violated substantive due process.
Whatever the law might have appeared to be twenty years ago, the court
can’t apply the Frye standard of evaluating violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment today. Instead, the applicable Fourteenth Amendment analysis
centers on whether the Mathewsons can show that the conduct of the police
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“shocked the conscience.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846
(1998) (“for half a century now we have spoken of the cognizable level of
executive abuse of power as that which shocks the conscience.”). Further, “the
constitutional concept of conscience shocking duplicates no traditional
category of common-law fault, but rather points clearly away from liability, or
clearly toward it, only at the ends of the tort law's spectrum of culpability.” Id.
at 848. This leads the court to move away from the Frye tort-based
recklessness standard and seek an application of the Fourteenth Amendment
shocks-the-conscience standard that would fit the facts of the conduct of the
Lafayette police leading to the accident with the Mathewsons.
In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, the Supreme Court wrestled with two
versions of shocks-the-conscience analysis. On one hand, in some cases,
deliberate indifference to another’s life and well-being shocked the conscience.
For example, ignoring the medical needs of prisoners can rise to the level of
deliberate
indifference
necessary
to
shock
the
conscience.
County
of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850. On the other hand, when circumstances
leave no opportunity to be deliberately indifferent, that is, the events in
question didn’t include time to ignore another’s plight but instead happened
more quickly, only behavior that was intended to harm can be called shocking
to the conscience. Id. at 854. Police pursuits most typically fall squarely into
this second category. “Just as a purpose to cause harm is needed for Eighth
Amendment liability in a riot case, so it ought to be needed for due process
liability in a pursuit case. Accordingly, we hold that high-speed chases with no
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intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight do not give
rise to liability under the Fourteenth Amendment, redressible by an action
under § 1983.” Id. at 854.
Sacramento v. Lewis sets a high bar for a Fourteenth Amendment claim
based on a police chase. The Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens not from
all harms inflicted by governmental actors, but from only the most egregious
official conduct. Bublitz v. Cottey, 327 F.3d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 2003) quoting
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846. The police must have substantial
culpability, which is a much greater standard than tort liability. Bublitz v.
Cottey, 327 F.3d at 490. When the police acted in an emergency situation, their
behavior can only shock the conscience if they intentionally inflicted a harm.
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 851 (“Thus, attention to the markedly
different circumstances of normal pretrial custody and high-speed law
enforcement chases shows why the deliberate indifference that shocks in the
one case is less egregious in the other (even assuming that it makes sense to
speak of indifference as deliberate in the case of sudden pursuit).”).
As discussed in this court’s earlier order, the court takes the
Mathewsons’ well-pleaded allegations as true for purposes of evaluating a
motion to dismiss. Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2010). The
court’s task is to examine the Mathewsons’ claims for an allegation that the
officers intended harm when they conducted the pursuit that led to the
accident. “It is generally only deliberate action intended to harm another that is
the type of conduct targeted by the Fourteenth Amendment: ‘[C]onduct
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intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest is the
sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level.’”
Bublitz v. Cottey, 327 F.3d at 491, quoting Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. at
849.
The Mathewsons haven’t pointed to an instance where their complaint
alleges that Officer Gard (or any other member of the Lafayette Police
Department) acted with the requisite intent to harm. The Mathewsons aver that
Officer Gard began a pursuit of a fifteen-year old driver suspected of stealing a
vehicle. The officer pursued the fleeing vehicle through Lafayette, where the
driver disregarded a traffic signal and struck the Mathewsons’ car. The
Mathewsons point out that the situation was inherently dangerous, and an
underage car thief speeding through a busy area at 9 p.m. while being chased
by the police is hazardous to the suspect, the police, and bystanders such as
the Mathewsons. Yet that isn’t the standard; there must be an allegation that
the officer acted with intent to harm. See Bublitz v. Cottey, 327 F.3d at 491
(“[I]n applying the rule from Lewis, we have held that, ‘The sine qua non of
liability in cases analogous to high-speed chases, therefore, is a purpose to
cause harm.” quoting Schaefer v. Goch, 153 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 1998)).
There is no allegation of an intent to harm discernible in the Mathewsons’
complaint. Thus, the complaint doesn’t state a claim that Lafayette violated the
Mathewsons’ Fourteenth Amendment rights. The associated § 1983 claim must
be dismissed.
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C.
The Mathewsons have also brought a Monell v. New York City Dept. of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), claim against the city for failure to train
its employees. Such a claim arises when a city’s failure to train or supervise its
employees is itself a wrong that leads directly to the deprivation of someone’s
constitutional rights. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 386 (1989).
In City of Canton v. Harris, the Supreme Court wrestled with whether the
inadequacy of training could lead to “deliberate indifference to the rights of
persons with whom the police come into contact.” Id. at 388. The Mathewsons
suggest that the court construe this as setting a standard of “deliberate
indifference” when testing for Monell failure to train violations. This reading
misapprehends the meaning of City of Canton v. Harris. The Court in Harris
was tasked with analyzing whether Canton’s policy failure led to a
constitutional violation that was measured by the deliberate indifference
standard because it alleged that the police allowed an arrestee to languish in
their care without medical help. Thus, City of Canton v. Harris stands not for
the concept that “deliberate indifference” is the standard for finding a Monell
violation, but that Monell can be used to fault a city’s failure to train that leads
to a constitutional violation (as measured by whatever standard is appropriate
for judging the particular alleged constitutional violation). This position is
supported by the text of City of Canton v. Harris, which, in multiple places,
calls for an analysis of whether the failure to train led to a constitutional
violation.
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The court has noted in two prior sections that the Mathewsons haven’t
alleged facts that, viewed in a light most favorable to them, could be
understood to allege a violation of their Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Without an underlying violation, there can be no Monell violation for a
failure of training leading to the deprivation of rights.
D.
The court’s jurisdiction in this matter was based on federal question
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because the Mathewsons alleged that their
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated and brought this
action under, among other things, 28 U.S.C. § 1983. The Mathewsons also
included a count stemming from the same incident that alleged a violation of
Indiana’s tort laws and, in the earlier order, the court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law question and dismissed it without
prejudice (without weighing the merits of the claim).
The Mathewsons have asked the court to rethink its holding on
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law tort claim
because they say that the statute of limitations has run and they would have
no recourse in state court for their claims. The court can’t accept this claim on
its face; whether the Mathewsons would have recourse in an Indiana court is a
question for Indiana courts. An extension of the statute of limitations is
provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). Further, Indiana’s Journey’s Account Statute
(Ind. Code 34-11-8-1) provides an extension of time in which to bring an action
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in state court when it was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction if the plaintiff
prosecuted the action non-negligently. See, e.g. Al-Challah v. Barger Packaging,
820 N.E.2d 670, 674 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“The purpose of the Journey's
Account Statute is to provide for continuation when a plaintiff fails to obtain a
decision on the merits for some reason other than his own neglect and the
statute of limitations expires while his suit is pending.”).
Whether the Mathewsons qualify for an extension of time limits under
either the federal statute or the state statute is a question for an Indiana court
to determine in response to an affirmative defense. Nevertheless, in light of
these two statutes and a lack of any assertion that they don’t apply, this court
can’t say that the Mathewsons would have no forum in which to pursue their
tort action or that fairness dictates the action remain in the federal court. The
position of the court of appeals is quite clear: dismissal of state law claims in
matters where the federal claims were dismissed is the accepted norm and
federal courts shouldn’t generally exercise jurisdiction over the supplemental
state law claims. Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1366 (7th Cir. 1996).
E.
In conclusion, the Mathewsons’ motion to reconsider dismissal (Doc. No.
15) is DENIED. The court’s prior order dismissing the federal claims with
prejudice and the state law claim without prejudice stands unchanged.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: May 30, 2012
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/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Judge
United States District Court
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