Union Benefica Mexicana v. Indiana State of et al

Filing 63

OPINION AND ORDER: Court GRANTS 43 Motion for Stay of Proceedings, and 44 the Joinder in State Defendants' Motion for Stay of Proceedings. Signed by Magistrate Judge Andrew P Rodovich on 6/6/2012. (tc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
UNION BENEFICA MEXICANA,

)
)
Plaintiff
)
)
v.
)
)
STATE OF INDIANA; MITCH DANIELS,)
Governor in his official
)
capacity; GREG ZOELLER, Attorney)
General of Indiana in his
)
official capacity; BERNARD A.
)
CARTER, County Prosecutor of
)
Lake County in his official
)
capacity; JOHN BUNCICH, County )
Sheriff of Lake County in his
)
official capacity; BRIAN GENSEL,)
County Prosecutor of Porter
)
County in his official capacity;)
DAVID LAIN, County Sheriff of
)
Porter County in his official
)
capacity; BOB SZILAGYI, County )
Prosecutor of LaPorte County in )
his official capacity; MICHAEL )
MOLLENHAUER, County Sheriff of )
LaPorte County in his official )
capacity,
)
)
Defendants
)

CIVIL NO. 2:11 cv 482

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on the Motion for Stay of
Proceedings [DE 42] filed by the defendants, State of Indiana,
Governor Mitch Daniels, Prosecutor Bernard Carter, Prosecutor
Brian Bob Szilagyi, and Attorney General Greg Zoeller, on February 14, 2012, and the Joinder in State Defendants’ Motion for
Stay of Proceedings [DE 44] filed by the defendants, John Bun-

cich, David Lain, and Michael Mollenhauer, on February 16, 2012.
For the following reasons, the motions are GRANTED.
Background
On April 29, 2011, the Indiana Legislature enacted Senate
Bill 590.

One provision of SB 590, Indiana Code §22-4-29.5,

authorizes the Department of Workforce development to file civil
actions against employers to obtain reimbursement of amounts paid
as unemployment compensation to any of the employer’s workers if
it is discovered that the employer knowingly employed unauthorized aliens.

Indiana Code §22-5-6 prohibits individuals from

commencing day labor without completing an attestation of employment and provides that a law enforcement officer may submit a
complaint to USCIS concerning violations if he has probable cause
to believe an individual has violated this section.
The plaintiff, Union Benefica Mexicana, is a non-profit
membership organization whose mission is to provide cultural,
educational, and health programs to the Hispanic community in
Northwest Indiana.

The members of UBM include U.S. citizens,

legal permanent residents, and undocumented individuals, and both
business owners and workers, including day laborers.

UBM repre-

sents that its organizational goals will be negatively impacted
by SB 590 because the organization will have a more difficult
time encouraging members to partake in various activities.

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UBM

fears that its current and prospective members will be deterred
from seeking immigration relief because local law enforcement
will stop and detain them notwithstanding their application for
relief.
UBM filed a complaint on December 20, 2011, challenging the
constitutionality of Indiana Code §§22-4-39.5 and 22-5-6 and
requesting declaratory and injunctive relief.

UBM complains that

Congress has created a comprehensive system of federal laws
regulating and enforcing immigration and that the federal government has exclusive power over immigration.
The Ninth Circuit addressed a similar argument in United

States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011).

The question

before the Ninth Circuit was whether Arizona’s statute giving
state and federal officers the discretion to, "without a warrant,
. . . arrest a person if the officer has probable cause to
believe . . . [t]he person to be arrested has committed any
public offense that makes the person removable from the United
States," was preempted by federal law.
61.

Arizona, 641 F.3d at 360-

The matter is now pending before the Supreme Court.

The

defendants move to stay this case pending the Supreme Court’s
ruling on this matter.
Discussion
A court has incidental power to stay proceedings, which

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stems from its inherent power to manage its docket.

Landis v.

North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55, 57 S.Ct. 163, 166, 81
L.Ed. 153 (1936); Walker v. Monsanto Co. Pension Plan, 472
F.Supp.2d 1053, 1054 (S.D. Ill. 2006).

The decision to grant a

stay is committed to the sound discretion of the court and must
be exercised consistent with principles of fairness and judicial
economy.

Brooks v. Merck & Co., 443 F.Supp.2d 994, 997 (S.D.

Ill. 2006); Rutherford v. Merck & Co., 428 F.Supp.2d 842, 845
(S.D. Ill. 2006); George v. Kraft Foods Global, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 92886, *4 (S.D. Ill. 2006).

"Courts often consider the

following factors when deciding whether to stay an action: (i)
whether a stay will unduly prejudice or tactically disadvantage
the non-moving party, (ii) whether a stay will simplify the
issues in question and streamline the trial, and (iii) whether a
stay will reduce the burden of litigation on the parties and on
the court."

Abbott Laboratories v. Matrix Laboratories, Inc.,

2009 WL 3719214, *2 (N.D. Ill. 2009). "The general test for
imposing a stay requires the court to 'balance interests favoring
a stay against interests frustrated by the action' in light of
the 'court's paramount obligation to exercise jurisdiction timely
in cases properly before it.'" SanDisk Corp. v. Phison Electron-

ics Corp., 538 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1066 (W.D. Wis. 2008) (citing

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Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. United States, 124 F.3d 1413, 1416
(Fed. Cir. 1997)).
It is within the court’s discretion to stay a case pending
the resolution of a matter between different litigants in another
tribunal that may be dispositive of the issues before the court.

See Landis, 299 U.S. at 255, 57 S.Ct. at 166.

The pending

litigation in the alternate tribunal need not involve the same
parties or resolve every question of law or fact, provided the
issues are substantially similar.

When the litigants are not the

same in the action before the other tribunal, the moving party
must make a "clear case of hardship or inequity in being required
to go forward" if the non-moving party can establish that it
would be harmed by delay.

It is rare that "a litigant in one

cause [will] be compelled to stand aside while a litigant in
another settles the rule of law that will define the rights of

See Landis, 299 U.S. at 255, 57 S.Ct. at 166.

both."

The plaintiff argues that its members will continue to
suffer serious violations of their constitutional rights if this
matter is subject to stay pending the Supreme Court’s ruling in

Arizona.

Its members who are employers may be subject to civil

actions by the government to obtain reimbursement for unemployment payments, and other members may be forced to complete an
attestation of employment authorization to perform day labor.

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The prospective harm appears speculative at best.

The plaintiff

does not allege that its members currently are facing the threat
of civil litigation or penalty for failing to sign an attestation.

The fact that at some unknown time in the future its

members may be harmed does not demonstrate that the plaintiff
will face a continuing harm if this matter is not expedited.
The plaintiff’s primary theory is that the federal government has exclusive power over immigration.

This is the very

issue before the Supreme Court in Arizona.

The plaintiff tries

to distinguish its argument because Arizona addresses the question of preemption in the context of law enforcement, whereas
this matter concerns preemption in the employment context.

In

any case, regardless of the outcome, the Supreme Court’s decision
will provide significant guidance on whether federal law preempts
SB 580 and will govern how the parties choose to proceed.

The

Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Arizona on April 25, 2012,
and a decision should be reached this month.

The minimal delay

will promote the efficient resolution of this matter.

Issuing a

stay not only will streamline the issues, but once the parties
are aware of how the issues will be defined in light of the
Supreme Court’s ruling, it will reduce the burden of litigation.
Rather than subject the parties to ongoing litigation that may
prove unnecessary upon the Supreme Court’s ruling, the court

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finds that it is in the best interest to stay this matter pending
the decision in Arizona.
_______________
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Stay of
Proceedings [DE 42] filed by the defendants, State of Indiana,
Governor Mitch Daniels, Prosecutor Bernard Carter, Prosecutor
Brian Bob Szilagyi, and Attorney General Greg Zoeller, on February 14, 2012, and the Joinder in State Defendants’ Motion for
Stay of Proceedings [DE 44] filed by the defendants, John Buncich, David Lain, and Michael Mollenhauer, on February 16, 2012,
are GRANTED.
ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2012

s/ ANDREW P. RODOVICH
United States Magistrate Judge

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