Iqbal v. Patel et al

Filing 31

OPINION AND ORDER denying 27 Verified Motion Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56(d). Iqbals response to the defendants motion for summary judgment shall be filed within 21 days of this Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Andrew P Rodovich on 12/13/12. (mc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
MIR S. IQBAL,

)
)
Plaintiff
)
)
v.
)
)
TEJASKUMAR M. PATEL, WARREN
)
JOHNSON, S-MART PETROLEUM, INC.,)
)
Defendant
)
********************************)
WARREN JOHNSON, S-MART
)
PETROLEUM, INC.,
)
)
Counter Claimants
)
)
v.
)
)
MIR S. IQBAL,
)
)
Counter Defendant
)

CIVIL NO. 2:12 cv 56

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on the Verified Motion
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56(d) filed by the
plaintiff, Mir S. Iqbal, on June 15, 2012.

For the reasons set

forth below, the motion is DENIED.
Background
The plaintiff, Mir S. Iqbal, filed his complaint in the
present case on February 3, 2012, claiming fraud and violations
of the RICO Act on the part of Tejashkumar M. Patel, Warren
Johnson, and S-Mart Petroleum.

The complaint was based on the

actions taken by the defendants when the parties entered a Motor

Fuel Sales Agreement and the defendants sold him motor fuels
pursuant to the agreement.

Iqbal complains that these actions

were part of a scheme to defraud him.
Discovery was stayed on May 11, 2012, pending the filing of
motions for summary judgment.

A few days later, the defendants

filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Iqbal’s claims
are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and accord and
satisfaction.

The defendants contend that S-Mart Petroleum

obtained a judgment against Iqbal, S-M-1, and M & U in two
separate cases before the Tippecanoe Superior Court II.

S-Mart’s

judgment against Iqbal and S-M-1 was entered pursuant to a
settlement agreement.

The defendants maintain that if Iqbal

desired to pursue the issues raised in his current complaint,
they should have been raised during the litigation before the
Tippecanoe Superior Court II.

Iqbal responded by filing the

present motion for additional discovery.

Iqbal complains that he

needs additional discovery to contradict the affidavits submitted
by the defendants.
Discussion
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) states1, "If a party

1

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 was amended in 2010. Subsection
(d) was carried forward without substantial change from prior subdivision (f).
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Therefore, some of the cases the
court cites may refer to Rule 56(f), but the current Rule 56(d) analysis is
essentially the same.

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opposing the motion shows by affidavit or declaration that, for
specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify
its opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion
or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations
or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order."
In order to succeed on a Rule 56(d) motion, the plaintiff must
identify the specific evidence which would create a genuine issue
of fact. American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 538
F.3d 736, 740 (7th Cir. 2008) (overturned on other grounds).
"Summary judgment should not be entered 'until the party opposing
the motion has had a fair opportunity to conduct such discovery
as may be necessary to meet the factual basis for the motion.'"

Chalimoniuk v. Interstate Brands Corporation, 172 F.Supp.2d 1055,
1057–58 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 326, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).

Rule

56(d) is not meant to allow a party to block summary judgment
simply by offering generalities about the need for further
discovery. Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 990–91 (7th
Cir. 2001).

"Rule [56(d)] does not operate to protect parties

who are dilatory in the pursuit of discovery." Allan Block Corp.

v. County Materials Corp., 588 F.Supp.2d 976, 980 (W.D. Wis.
2008) (citing Doty v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 162 F.3d 460, 461–62
(7th Cir. 1998)).

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A court may grant a Rule 56(d) motion on the grounds that
issues of material fact exist and that the requesting party is
entitled to conduct discovery. See Chalimoniuk, 172 F.Supp.2d at
1057–58 (granting Rule 56(d) motion when plaintiff moved for
summary judgment before any discovery had taken place). Likewise,
when issues material to the outcome are in question, the full
benefit of discovery is preferable. Chalimoniuk, 172 F.Supp.2d at
1059.
However, a court may deny a Rule 56(d) motion when a party
fails to pursue discovery in the allotted time frame. See Allan

Block Corporation, 588 F.Supp.2d at 980–81 ("It would be . . .
inappropriate to continue trial to permit yet another period of
discovery when plaintiff has failed to take full advantage of two
lengthy opportunities for discovery."). See also Hu v. Park

National Bank, 333 Fed.Appx. 87, 89–90 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming
denial of Rule 56(d) motion because the plaintiff "did nothing
during discovery" and waited until two months after Park National
Bank had filed its motion for summary judgment to ask for additional time for discovery).

Likewise, a court may deny a Rule

56(d) motion because the requesting party has failed to identify
with specificity the evidence it hopes to obtain with the additional discovery and how it would create a genuine issue of
material fact.

See American Needle, Inc., 538 F.3d at 740

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(affirming district court's denial of Rule 56(d) motion). In
short, the moving party must show: (1) good cause for the discovery delays; (2) the specific discovery that is necessary to
prepare a response to the motion for summary judgment; and (3)
that the additional discovery will give rise to a genuine issue
of material fact. Bernegger v. Gray & Associates LLP, 2009 WL
3148723, *3 (E.D. Wis. 2009).
Iqbal’s motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 56.
To begin, Rule 56 sets forth specific procedural requirements and
states that the motion must be accompanied by an affidavit or
declaration showing that it cannot present facts essential to
justify its position without additional discovery. Iqbal’s motion
was not accompanied by the required affidavit or declaration. See
Rule 56(d) (explaining that the movant must show additional
discovery is necessary by affidavit or declaration); Waterloo

Furniture Components, Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc., 467 F.3d 641, 648
(7th Cir. 2006) (same); Bernegger, 2009 WL 3148723 at *4 (explaining that failure to attach an affidavit as required by Rule
56(d) was fatal to the movant's motion).

The closest Iqbal comes

to satisfying this requirement is the statement in his motion
that he needs additional facts to contradict the defendants’
affidavits.

However, even his motion is devoid of any explana-

tion of why the information he seeks is necessary to create a

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genuine issue of material fact, nor is it apparent that additional discovery is necessary.
The pending motion for summary judgment is based on the
doctrines of res judicata and accord and satisfaction. S-Mart
obtained a judgment against Iqbal and S-M-1 in Tippecanoe Superior Court II.

That judgment was entered pursuant to a settle-

ment agreement which provided for the execution of a note, mortgage, and entering a new Motor Fuel Sales Agreement.

S-Mart

Petroleum also obtained a judgment against Iqbal and M & U in the
same court.

It is the defendants’ position that the Tippecanoe

litigation was based on the same material facts as the current
complaint, and for this reason, if Iqbal desired to pursue the
issues raised in his complaint, he was required to do so in the
previous litigation.

Additionally, by settling the case, Iqbal

is barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction from proceeding with his claims.

Because the motion for summary judgment

is based entirely on the events of the previous litigation, the
defendants argue that all of the facts necessary to decide the
motion for summary judgment are contained in the pleadings of the
Tippecanoe Superior Court II.
Iqbal responded that he identified the depositions he
desires to take and hopes to obtain information about any and all
business relationships the defendants had with each other at the

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time of the events giving rise to his complaint.

Iqbal believes

this will help support his position that the defendants colluded
to take over a gas station they caused him to purchase.

However,

he does not explain how this will create a genuine issue of
material fact and help him avoid summary judgment on the issues
raised by the defendants.

It is not apparent that the collusive

activities of the defendants have any relationship to whether the
issues previously were decided, settled, or should have been
raised.

Iqbal has not satisfied his burden and explained why the

information he seeks is relevant to the issues raised in the
pending motion for summary judgment.

The court cannot rely on

his boilerplate statements that he needs additional discovery to
contradict the defendants’ affidavits without greater explanation
of the information he seeks and its importance to creating a
genuine issue of material fact.

His shortcomings are fatal to

his request.
_______________
For the foregoing reasons, the Verified Motion Pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56(d) filed by the plaintiff,
Mir S. Iqbal, on June 15, 2012, is DENIED.

Iqbal’s response to

the defendants’ motion for summary judgment shall be filed within
21 days of this Order.

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ENTERED this 13th day of December, 2012

s/ ANDREW P. RODOVICH
United States Magistrate Judge

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