Iqbal v. Patel et al

Filing 39

OPINION AND ORDER re 23 MOTION for Summary Judgment: the parties are given until January 27, 2014 to respond to the courts analysis in this order. If neither party responds, the court will dismiss Iqbals claims for lack of subject matter jur isdiction. Defendants Johnson and S-Mart are also given until January 27, 2014 to file a brief explaining whether the court retains jurisdiction over their counterclaim if the court dismisses Iqbals claims. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 12/27/13. (mc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
MIR S. IQBAL,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
TEJASKUMAR M. PATEL, WARREN )
JOHNSON, S-MART PETROLEUM, )
INC.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
WARREN JOHNSON, S-MART
)
PETROLEUM, INC.,
)
)
Counter Claimants,
)
)
v.
)
)
MIR S. IQBAL,
)
)
Counter Defendant
)

No. 2:12 CV 56

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendants Warren Johnson and S-Mart
Petroleum (“defendants”) Inc.’s motion for summary judgment. (DE # 23.)

I.

Background and Facts
Plaintiff Mir Iqbal (“Iqbal”) was a partner in S-M-1 Acquisition Corp (“S-M-1").1

(DE # 23 at 3.) In March of 2007, Iqbal was approached by defendant Warren Johnson,
the president of S-Mart Petroleum (“S-Mart”), and Johnson’s real estate broker, S.P
Singh, who recommended that Iqbal purchase a gas station in Lafayette, Indiana (“the
gas station”). (DE # 1 at 3.) Through his company, S-M-1, Iqbal purchased the gas
station. (Id.) S-M-1 then entered into a Motor Fuel Sales Agreement with S-Mart. (Id.) In
the agreement, S-M-1 agreed to purchase at least 120,000 gallons of motor fuel per
month from S-Mart from April 1, 2007 until March 31, 2013. (DE # 23 at 3.) Iqbal and Ali
Ahmed2 signed a personal guaranty in connection with the Motor Fuel Sales
Agreement. (Id. at 4.)
Iqbal, who lived in Illinois at the time that he purchased the gas station, had no
intention of running the gas station himself. (DE # 1 at 3.) Around the time that Iqbal
purchased the gas station, defendant Johnson and Singh introduced Iqbal to Tejaskumar
Patel. (Id.) After being introduced to Patel, Iqbal and Patel entered into an agreement

1

The following facts, which will be construed in the light most favorable to Iqbal,
are taken from Johnson and S-Mart’s statement of undisputed facts (DE # 23 at 3),
which Iqbal has incorporated into his response to Johnson and S-Mart’s motion for
summary judgment (DE # 36 at 2), Iqbal’s affidavit attached to his response to Johnson
and S-Mart’s motion for summary judgment (DE # 35-1), and the factual allegations in
Iqbal’s verified complaint (DE # 1). See Ford v. Wilson, 90 F.3d 245, 246-47 (facts in
verified complaints declared true under the penalty for perjury treated the same as facts
in an affidavit).
2

Ahmed was also a partner in S-M-1. (DE # 23-2 at 1.)
2

whereby Patel would have complete operational and financial control over the gas
station. (Id.) After Patel began running the gas station and the gas station had received
gas from S-Mart, S-M-1 failed to pay for the gas as set out in the Motor Fuel Sales
Agreement. (DE # 23 at 4.) Johnson allowed Patel to skip gas payments for five
consecutive weeks, but Iqbal had no knowledge of this practice until after the five-week
period was over. (DE # 1 at 4.) At that point, Patel left his position at the gas station,
and Johnson stopped delivering the gas. (Id.)
By October 1, 2008, the unpaid amount owed on the gas totaled $67,829.58.
(DE # 23 at 4.) S-Mart eventually filed suit against S-M-1, Iqbal, and Ali Ahmed in
Indiana state court to recover the money it was owed under the Motor Fuels Sales
Agreement. (Id.) On April 14, 2009, the Tippecanoe Superior Court, entered summary
judgment in favor of S-Mart. (Id.; see also DE # 23-5.) On October 1, 2009, S-Mart entered
into a settlement agreement with Iqbal, S-M-1, and Ali Ahmed to settle the judgment
from the Tippecanoe Superior Court. (DE # 23 at 4; see also DE # 23-1 at 18-19.) Pursuant
to the settlement agreement, Iqbal, M&U, LLC,3 and SGTC II, Inc.4 executed a
promissory note payable to S-Mart in the amount of $75,000.00. (DE # 23-4 at 5;
DE # 23-1 at 18-19.) Additionally, SGTC, II, Inc. entered into a new Motor Fuel Sales
Agreement with S-Mart. (DE # 23 at 5; DE # 23-1 at 18-19.)

3

Iqbal is the sole member and sole manager of M&U, LLC. (DE # 23 at 6.)

4

Iqbal is the president and majority shareholder of SGTC II, Inc.. (DE # 24 at 2-3.)
3

On August 25, 2009, M&U, LLC purchased the gas station and real estate that SM-1 had owned.5 (DE # 23 at 6.) M&U, LLC executed a mortgage in favor of S-Mart on
October 1, 2009. (Id.) The mortgage granted S-Mart a first mortgage lien on the gas
station located at the Lafayette property M&U, LLC had purchased. (Id.; DE # 23-2 at
37-49.) S-Mart eventually filed suit against Iqbal, M&U, LLC, and SGTC II, Inc. in
Tippecanoe Superior Court to enforce the settlement agreement, collect on the
promissory note, foreclose the mortgage, and collect damages for breach of the second
Motor Fuel Sales Agreement. (DE # 23 at 7; DE # 23-6 at 1.) On June 28, 2010, the
Tippecanoe Superior Court entered summary judgment in favor of S-Mart and against
Iqbal, M&U, LLC, and SGTC II, Inc.. (DE # 23 at 7.) That summary judgment order
included an order of foreclosure on the gas station. (DE # 23-8 at 4.) On October 6, 2010,
M&U, LLC filed for bankruptcy. (Id. at 8.) On December 1, 2011, the bankruptcy court
approved an agreement between M&U, LLC and S-Mart to lift the automatic
bankruptcy stay on the gas station. (Id.; see also DE # 23-11.) On March 7, 2012, a
Sheriff’s sale was held and the gas station was sold to Big Boom, Inc.. (DE # 23 at 9.)
In January 2012, Iqbal learned from J.P. Singh that defendants Patel and Johnson
were doing business together at several other gas stations throughout Indiana.
(DE # 35-1.) Up until that point, Iqbal was unaware that Johnson and Patel knew each
other. (Id.) Iqbal learned from Singh that Johnson and Patel had been working together

5

This purchase was made through a Sheriff’s sale. (DE # 23 at 6.) Neither party
addresses this issue, but it appears that the gas station and property were foreclosed on
by the Bank of Indiana prior to the sheriff’s sale. (DE # 23-1 at 34-35.)
4

with the goal of running Iqbal’s gas station into the ground, so Johnson could foreclose
on the property. (Id.) After learning this information, Iqbal filed the present suit,
alleging Civil Rico violations, fraud, and unjust enrichment. (DE # 1.) Defendants
Johnson and S-Mart have now moved for summary judgment on all of Iqbal’s claims.6
(DE # 23.)
II.

Analysis
Although neither party raises this matter in their briefs, the court must address

the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Wernsing v. Thompson, 423 F.3d 732, 743 (7th Cir.
2005) (“[N]ot only may the federal courts police subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte,
they must.” (citation and quotation omitted)). Specifically, the court must address the
impact of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine on the facts of this case. Crawford v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., 647 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The district court correctly
considered the Rooker–Feldman doctrine sua sponte . . . .”).
“Rooker–Feldman prevents the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction
over cases brought by state-court losers’ challenging state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced.” Brown v. Bowman, 668 F.3d 437, 442
(7th Cir. 2012) (citation and quotation omitted). “The reason, quite simply, is that no
matter how erroneous or unconstitutional the state court judgment may be, only the

6

The third defendant in this case, Tejaskumar Patel, did not move for summary
judgment. The analysis outlined below, however, applies equally to Iqbal’s claims
against Patel.
5

Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction to review it.” Id. The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine bars claims in two situations:
The first involves a plaintiff’s request of a federal district court to overturn
an adverse state court judgment. The second, and more difficult instance,
involves federal claims that were not raised in state court or do not on their
face require review of a state court’s decision. Taylor, 374 F.3d at 532–33. In
this latter instance, Rooker–Feldman will act as a jurisdictional bar if those
claims are “inextricably intertwined” with a state court judgment. Id. at 533.
Though sometimes understandably labeled a “metaphysical concept,” the
thrust of the “inextricably intertwined” inquiry asks whether “the district
court is in essence being called upon to review the state-court decision.” Id.;
see also Young v. Murphy, 90 F.3d 1225, 1231 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[C]onstitutional
claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with state court judgments of
necessity call upon the district court to review the state court decision and
are thus beyond the district court’s jurisdiction.”). The determination of
whether a federal claim is “inextricably intertwined” hinges on whether it
alleges that the supposed injury was caused by the state court judgment, or,
alternatively, whether the federal claim alleges an independent prior injury
that the state court failed to remedy. See Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d
548, 555 (7th Cir. 1999).
Id.
Even if a court concludes that a claim is “inextricably intertwined” with a state
court judgment, the court must still consider whether the plaintiff “did or did not have
a reasonable opportunity to raise the issue in state court proceedings.” Id. (citation and
quotation omitted). “If the plaintiff could have raised the issue in state court, the claim
is barred under Rooker–Feldman.”Id.
Two Seventh Circuit cases illustrate these principles. In Taylor v. Federal National
Mortgage Association, the plaintiff’s home was foreclosed on in state court, and instead of
appealing that judgment, the plaintiff sued multiple defendants, including the
mortgage company that foreclosed on her home and the law firm that handled the
6

matter, in state court. 374 F.3d 529, 531-32 (7th Cir. 2004). The defendants then removed
the case to federal district court. Id. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendants had engaged in a conspiracy to deprive her of her home, and that they had
committed a fraud upon the court in the process. Id. at 532-34. The plaintiff also brought
claims under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Id. at 532.
The relief that the plaintiff sought was the return of her home and punitive damages. Id.
at 533. The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the suit under RookerFeldman. Id. at 532.
The plaintiff appealed, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision. With regard to plaintiff’s claim that defendants had committed fraud on the
court, the court noted that the relief granted when a claim of fraud on the court
succeeds is that the party making the claim is relieved of the judgment. Id. at 533. The
Seventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s request for the recovery of her home was
“tantamount to a request to vacate the state court’s judgment of foreclosure . . . .” Id. As
for the plaintiff’s claim under section 1985, the court noted that the fact the plaintiff was
claiming damages in the amount of the value of her home “demonstrates that her
asserted injury is the loss of her home due to the Defendants’ conspiracy to deprive her
of her home, not an independent injury arising from acts of the Defendants.” Id. at 534.
In Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., a former tenant sued her landlord, the
landlord’s parent company, and the landlord’s counsel claiming she was unlawfully
evicted through a state court proceeding. 182 F.3d 548, 551-53. The plaintiff brought

7

claims against the defendants in federal district court alleging violations of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”); the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act; and the Chicago Landlord Tenant Ordinance. Id. at 553.
Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that defendants were liable for violating her rights
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, breach of contract, and common law
fraud. Id. The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint after concluding that
Rooker-Feldman divested it of jurisdiction. Id. at 553-54.
The plaintiff appealed, and the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment,
distinguishing between the plaintiff’s FDCPA claim and her constitutional claim. Id. at
555-60. As for the plaintiff’s FDCPA claim, the court noted that the alleged FDCPA
violation was “independent of and complete prior to the entry of the eviction order.” Id.
at 556. In contrast, the court concluded that plaintiff’s claim under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments could not be considered separate from the eviction order:
For if the proceedings in the Circuit Court resulted in her favor . . . it seems
unlikely that she would have been evicted or lost all of her possessions,
custody of her daughter, and her job. In essence, she would not have been
deprived of her property as she complains. Even [the plaintiff] states in her
complaint that [the defendants] deprived her of her property (the leased
premises) by initiating and prosecuting a baseless lawsuit and by deceiving
her into waiving a valid and meritorious defense. For these reasons, [the
plaintiff’s] pursuit of her due process claim bears a close resemblance to cases
in which we have found the Rooker–Feldman doctrine to apply . . . .
Id. The Seventh Circuit ultimately reversed the district court’s decision regarding the
plaintiff’s constitutional claim because the plaintiff did not have a reasonable
opportunity to raise her claims in the state eviction proceeding. Id. at 557-60.

8

As noted above, Iqbal, in his complaint, brings three claims against defendants in
this suit: Civil Rico, fraud, and unjust enrichment. (DE # 1.) The relief Iqbal requests in
all three claims is possession of the gas station, monetary damages for lost business and
investment, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest. (Id.) Each of the three
counts Iqbal brings against defendants make clear that Iqbal’s “asserted injury is the
loss of [his business] due to [defendants’] conspiracy to deprive [him] of [his business],
not an independent injury arising from acts of the [d]efendants.” Taylor, 374 F.3d at 534;
see also DE # 1 at 5 (Count I: “Plaintiff was injured in his business or property by reason
of the pattern of racketeering activity, in that, he lost his investment and business
operation.”); Id. at 6-7 (Count II: “Defendants Johnson and Patel were in collusion
together . . . to take over [p]laintiff’s gas station.”); Id. at 8 (Count III: “Defendants
Johnson and Patel were in collusion together . . . to take over [p]laintiff’s gas
station . . .”).7
In each of Iqbal’s claims, he is asking the court to grant him possession of the gas
station. (See DE # 1.) This request is “tantamount to a request to vacate the state court’s
judgment of foreclosure[,]” Taylor, 374 F.3d at 533, and is therefore inextricably
intertwined with the state court foreclosure judgment. Additionally, the fact that Iqbal
is also seeking monetary damages does not change this result. See Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d

7

The affidavit Iqbal submitted with his response to Johnson and S-Mart’s motion
for summary judgment also confirms this. (See DE # 35-1 at 2 (“The scheme was for
Patel, who was my employee and/or partner to cause my gas station to default so that
Johnson can [sic] foreclose on it.”).)
9

1362, 1370 (7th Cir. 1996) (“While the plaintiffs now maintain that they are seeking only
damages, this does not affect our conclusion that the Rooker– Feldman doctrine bars
jurisdiction over their case.”); see also Nora v. Residential Funding Co., LLC, No. 13–1660,
2013 WL 6171046, at *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 26, 2013) (“[A] request for review of a state-court
foreclosure decision that includes a claim for damages based on charges of defrauding
the state court does not elude Rooker–Feldman.”). The money damages Iqbal is seeking –
to compensate him for the loss of his business and his investment – “flow[] from the
foreclosure judgment itself.” Sheikhani v. Wells Fargo Bank, 526 F .App’x 705, 706 (7th Cir.
2013).
The injury Iqbal is alleging in this case, the loss of his business and his
investment in the business, was only complete when the state court entered a judgment
of foreclosure. See Geils, 82 F.3d at 1368 (“While the plaintiffs complain that the
defendants moved the proposed ditch location as an act of political retaliation against
them, the injury alleged was only complete when the state court actually condemned
the property. Thus plaintiffs are basically claiming injury at the hands of the state
court.”). Thus, like the Long plaintiff’s constitutional claim, had the state court
proceeding resulted in Iqbal’s favor, it is unlikely that he would have lost his business
and his investment. Long, 182 F.3d at 556. The court concludes, therefore, that each of

10

Iqbal’s three claims is inextricably intertwined with the state court foreclosure
judgment.8
Having determined that Iqbal’s current claims are inextricably intertwined with
the state court judgment, the court must determine whether Iqbal “did or did not have a
reasonable opportunity to raise the issue in state court proceedings.” Bowman, 668 F.3d
at 442.9 Johnson and S-Mart’s argument in their motion for summary judgment is that
Iqbal’s current claims are barred by res judicata. (DE # 24.) In response, Iqbal argued
that res judicata did not apply because he was not aware of the alleged scheme to
deprive him of his business until after the two state court suits had come to an end.
(DE # 35.) Thus, the court will assume Iqbal would make the same argument in
advocating against the application of Rooker-Feldman.
“The ‘reasonable opportunity’ inquiry focuses not on ripeness, but on difficulties
caused by ‘factor[s] independent of the actions of the opposing part[ies] that precluded’
a plaintiff from bringing federal claims in state court, such as state court rules or
procedures.” Taylor, 374 F.3d at 534-35 (quoting Long, 182 F.3d at 558.) Thus, a plaintiff
cannot “rely on the deception of her opponents to demonstrate that she was not

8

It is possible that granting Iqbal’s requested relief would also undo the original
judgment issued by the state court. Because the relief requested in Iqbal’s current suit
most directly undermines the second judgment, however, the court will focus on that
judgment in this analysis.
9

The Seventh Circuit has questioned the validity of the “reasonable opportunity”
exception to Rooker-Feldman. Kelley v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 607 (7th Cir.
2008).
11

afforded a reasonable opportunity to raise her [claims]” in state court. Long, 182 F.3d at
559; see also Beth-El All Nations Church v. City of Chicago, 486 F.3d 286, 292 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“In deciding whether [a plaintiff] lacked a reasonable opportunity to present its claims
in state court, we focus on difficulties caused not by opposing parties, but by state-court
rules or procedures.”). “A plaintiff lacks a reasonable opportunity to raise a claim only
if state court procedures have erected an impenetrable barrier that ‘litigants are
incapable of overcoming in order to present certain claims to the state court.’”
Hochstetler v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 3:12–cv–772, 2013 WL 3756502, at *3 (N.
D. Ind. July 16, 2013) (quoting Long, 182 F.3d at 558).
In this case, there were two separate state court actions. The first, a breach of
contract action filed by S-Mart against S-M-1, Iqbal, and Ahmed, was filed in
Tippecanoe County Superior Court. (DE # 23-3.) That case ultimately ended with a
settlement agreement between the parties, and the court entered judgment in favor of SMart. (DE # 23-5.) The second suit, an action seeking enforcement of the settlement
agreement and foreclosure of the gas station property, was brought by S-Mart against
Iqbal, M&U, LLC, and SGTC, II, Inc., in Tippecanoe County Superior Court. (DE # 23-6.)
That case ended with the court entering a damages judgment against Iqbal and a
judgment of foreclosure on the gas station. (DE # 23-8.) Iqbal filed an answer and
affirmative defenses in both of these suits. (DE # 23-4; DE # DE # 23-7.)
Superior Courts in Indiana are not limited in their jurisdiction in either civil or
criminal cases. IND. CODE § 33-29-1-1.5 (“All standard superior courts have . . . original

12

and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil cases and in all criminal cases[.]” Additionally,
“[f]oreclosure actions are essentially equitable in nature, and trial courts have full
discretion to fashion equitable remedies that are complete and fair to all parties
involved.” Hochstetler, 2013 WL 3756502, at *3 (citing City Sav. Bank v. Eby Const., LLC,
954 N.E.2d 459, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “‘As a general rule, any defense that shows
that the mortgagee is not entitled to foreclose may be set up in an action to foreclose.’”
Id. (citing Ind. Law Encyclopedia § 105). Thus, it does not appear that either the Indiana
state court rules or procedures in place would have prevented Iqbal from bringing his
claims in either of the state court suits.10
It is possible that the state court rules and procedures presented Iqbal with some
obstacle to bringing his claims. But there is no evidence in the record to indicate that is
the case.11 Without any evidence indicating that a state rule or procedure prevented
Iqbal from bringing his claims in state court, however, Iqbal had a “reasonable
opportunity” to bring his claims in the state court foreclosure action. See, e.g., Sheikhani,
526 F .App’x at 707 (“And no state law prevented a challenge in the foreclosure
proceedings to the validity of the assignment to [defendant]. . . . The district court’s
dismissal thus was proper regardless of any fraud [defendant] may have committed.”).

10

Although Iqbal is currently bringing a civil Rico claim, “state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO claims.” Sage Popovich, Inc. v. Colt Int’l, Inc., 588
F. Supp. 2d 913, 917 (N.D. Ind. 2008); see also Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006,
1027 n.19 (9th Cir. 2013) (“State courts do have concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO
claims . . . .”)
11

Iqbal will be given an opportunity to present arguments on this issue.
13

Put simply, each of Iqbal’s claims in this case asks this court to review and reject
the state court foreclosure judgment. But that is precisely what Rooker-Feldman
prohibits. Wallis v. Fifth Third Bank, 443 F. App’x 202, 204 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Despite his
argument to the contrary, some of [plaintiff’s] contentions-such as his disagreement
with the foreclosure judgment—ask us to review and reject rulings that the state court
made against him in the foreclosure suit; as the district court correctly ruled, the Rooker
– Feldman doctrine blocks a federal district court from entertaining those contentions.”).
Thus, the court concludes that barring some evidence that a state court procedure or
rule prevented Iqbal from bringing his claims in state court, it lacks jurisdiction over
Iqbal’s claims.
Numerous other courts throughout the Seventh Circuit have reached the same
conclusion in similar cases. Nora v. Residential Funding Co., LLC, No. 13–1660, 2013 WL
6171046, at *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 26, 2013) (“By alleging that the fraudulent assignment to
[defendant] allowed it to succeed in foreclosing on her property in state court, [plaintiff]
is impermissibly asking a federal district court to review and reject the state court’s
judgment of foreclosure of her property.”); Sheikhani, 526 F. App’x at 706-07 (“The
injury [the plaintiff] complains of on his wife’s behalf—the loss of her house to
foreclosure—flows from the foreclosure judgment itself. . . . The district court’s
dismissal thus was proper regardless of any fraud [the defendant] may have committed.”);
Ross-West v. Bank of New York Mellon Corp., 523 F. App’x 395, 396 (7th Cir. 2013) (“No
matter how the [plaintiffs] frame their complaint, the district court could not grant the

14

requested relief—a judgment declaring them to be the rightful owners of the
home—without disturbing the state court’s foreclosure judgment. Their suit thus
challenges the adverse state judgment and is barred in federal court by
Rooker–Feldman.”); Stanley v. Hollingsworth, 307 F. App’x 6, 9 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[The
plaintiff’s] malicious-prosecution claim, and his other claims of misconduct during the
state-court proceedings, ask the federal district court to rule that the state court erred in
its foreclosure judgment because of the misconduct of his litigation adversaries. RookerFeldman prohibits the district court from so doing.”); Crestview Vill. Apartments v. United
States Dep’t Hous. & Urban Dev., 383 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir. 2004) (“A finding by the
district court that defendants did, as [the plaintiff] alleges, conspire to bring
unsubstantiated lawsuits would undermine the state court’s implicit holding that the
state action was justified.”); Downs v. Indy Mac Mortg. Services, FSB, No. 13–cv–858, 2013
WL 5201602, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2013) (“Finally, it is clear to the Court that at the
heart of [the plaintiff’s] claims is her desire that this Court hold the state court judgment
of foreclosure invalid. To this extent, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine divests this Court of
jurisdiction over [the plaintiff’s] claims.”); Hochstetler, 2013 WL 3756502, at *4
(“Ordering Defendants to pay back Plaintiffs and to give them their house back would
require overturning the foreclosure judgment of the state court. Therefore, the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine prevents this Court from granting Plaintiffs’ requested relief
because it would require this Court to “set aside” the state court judgment.”).

15

Because neither side has addressed the Rooker-Feldman issue in their briefs,
however, the parties will be granted 30 days in which to respond to the analysis
outlined in this order. If neither party files a brief within that time period, the court will
dismiss Iqbal’s claims for lack of jurisdiction. Defendants Johnson and S-Mart have also
filed a counterclaim against Iqbal. Johnson and S-Mart are granted thirty days to
address the issue of whether, if the court dismisses Iqbal’s claims, the court retains
jurisdiction over the counterclaim.12
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the parties are given until January 27, 2014 to respond

to the court’s analysis in this order. If neither party responds, the court will dismiss
Iqbal’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants Johnson and S-Mart are
also given until January 27, 2014 to file a brief explaining whether the court retains
jurisdiction over their counterclaim if the court dismisses Iqbal’s claims.
SO ORDERED.
Date: December 27, 2013
s/James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

12

Defendants Johnson and S-Mart have also requested attorneys’ fees under IND.
CODE § 34-52-1-1, which allows attorneys’ fees to be awarded to the prevailing party if a
claim is found to be frivolous or brought in bad faith. (DE # 8 at 17-18.) If the court
dismisses Iqbal’s claims under Rooker-Feldman, it will not reach the merits of Iqbal’s
claims, and a determination that Iqbal’s claims were frivolous or being litigated in bad
faith would be inappropriate.