Holland v. Gary City of et al

Filing 11

OPINION AND ORDER: Court DENIES 2 Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees; DISMISSES 8 the Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); DENIES 9 Request for an Injunction and DENIES 10 Request for Counsel. Signed by Judge Theresa L Springmann on 3/21/2012. cc: Holland (tc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
ROBERT HOLLAND,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF GARY, et al.,
Defendants.

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CAUSE NO.: 2:12-CV-62-TS

OPINION AND ORDER
Robert Holland, proceeding pro se, filed an Amended Complaint [ECF No. 8] and an
Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit (in forma pauperis) [ECF No.
2]. For the reasons set forth below, the Plaintiff’s Application is DENIED, and his Amended
Complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

DISCUSSION
Ordinarily, a plaintiff must pay a statutory filing fee of $350 to bring an action in federal
court. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915,
provides indigent litigants an opportunity for meaningful access to the federal courts despite
their inability to pay the costs and fees associated with that access. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319 (1989). To authorize a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must make two
determinations: first, whether the litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing the action, 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); and second, whether the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Under the first inquiry, an indigent party may commence an action in federal court,
without prepayment of costs and fees, upon submission of an affidavit asserting an inability “to
pay such costs or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Here, the Plaintiff contends that
he receives approximately $425 per month in disability payments. He reports that he has
approximately $50 cash on hand and no dependents. Based on this income information, the
Court finds that the Plaintiff is financially eligible for in forma pauperis status. See Annual
Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 77 FED. REG. 4035 (Jan. 26, 2012).
The inquiry does not end there, however. District courts have an obligation under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints before service on the defendants, and must dismiss
the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Dismissal under the in forma
pauperis statute is an exercise of the Court’s discretion. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34
(1992). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard
as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See
Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal under federal
pleading standards,
[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quotation marks and citations
omitted). Thus, a “plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of
an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened to her that might be redressed
by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original).
2

In evaluating whether a complaint is frivolous for purposes of the in forma pauperis
statute, the Court need not “accept without question the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations.”
Denton, 504 U.S. at 32–33. Instead, the statute “accords judges not only the authority to dismiss
a claim based on an undisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the
veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are
clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. This includes allegations that are “fantastic” or
“delusional.” Id. at 328.
Here, the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is an unwieldy 213 pages. His original
complaint was 167 pages long and was stricken on the ground that it failed to conform with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. (Order, ECF No. 4.) The Plaintiff was granted an opportunity
to submit an amended complaint and was instructed to submit a short, plain statement showing
that he is entitled to relief. (Id.) He responded by filing an amended complaint that is even longer
and more convoluted than the original. Because it appears from the nature and content of the
Plaintiff’s filings that granting him another opportunity to replead his claims will not result in a
more viable complaint, the Court has undertaken to discern the Plaintiff’s claims from his
present filing.
The Plaintiff is suing a total of 58 defendants, including his mother, the City of Gary, the
current and former mayors of Gary, the current and former Gary chiefs of police, several state
judges, police officers from Gary, the Gary city attorney, the Town of Merrillville, several
Merrillville police officers, the “1999 Warden of the Lake County Jail,” several guards at the
jail, the Lake County Board of Commissioners, various private attorneys, hospitals, a
psychiatrist, and others. (Am. Compl. 1–18, ECF No. 8.) He alleges that all these Defendants are

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part of a vast conspiracy, the purpose of which is to violate his rights under the “First, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments[.]” (Id. at 26.) He claims that in furtherance of
this conspiracy, the Defendants have engaged in a pattern of “racketeering” over the past 20
years, which he describes as follows: “[V]iolating the rights of Robert Holland under color of
state law without probable cause or even reasonable suspicion of commission of a crime, illegal
search, illegal seizure, false arrest, false imprisonment, filing of fraudulent charges, acts of
intimidation, acts of harassment, defamation, involuntary commitment, malicious prosecution
and abuse of process to injure his business and professional reputation.”1 (Id.) As evidence of
this conspiracy, he describes several incidents dating back to 1991 in which he was arrested on
various charges—usually at the behest of his mother or other family members following
altercations in his mother’s home—and detained, prosecuted, or held over for mental evaluation.
He also describes a more recent incident in which he unsuccessfully sought to have his law
license reinstated.2 He believes that everyone associated with these incidents conspired together
to torment him, defame him, and violate his rights. Among other relief, he seeks money damages
for violations of the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18
U.S.C. § 1962, and various forms of injunctive relief. (Id. at 207–08; ECF No. 9 at 3–4.)
Upon review, the Court finds the Plaintiff’s allegations about a vast conspiracy involving
his family members, officials from different towns, private hospitals, and multiple state court

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He asserts that many of the defendants are members of an organization he refers to as
“MEGWITHANIA,” which he believes to have vast influence over Lake County government. (See Am.
Compl. at 48–52.)
2

According to the public records of the Indiana State Bar, the Plaintiff was admitted to practice
law in 1997 but was suspended in October 2009 and has not been reinstated. See
http://hats2.courts.state.in.us/rollatty/roa2_out.jsp?sel=10.

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judges to be in the vein of “fantastic” or “delusional,” warranting dismissal of the complaint as
frivolous. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; Gladney v. Pendleton Corr. Facility, 302 F.3d 773 (7th
Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal of complaint as frivolous where the plaintiff alleged that over a
span of three years, multiple guards at three different prisons left his cell door unlocked at night
while he was sleeping so that other inmates could come in his cell and assault him); see also
Schottler v. Wisconsin, 388 Fed. Appx. 547 (7th Cir. Jul. 28, 2010) (affirming dismissal of
complaint as frivolous, where plaintiff alleged that someone had inserted a metal pin in his head
and various state officials and police officers had purposely ignored his pleas for help);
Lawrence v. Interstate Brands, 278 Fed. Appx. 681, 684 (7th Cir. May 22, 2008) (“Lawrence’s
allegations—that the Illinois legal system is controlled by the Ku Klux Klan and that a vast
network composed of lawyers, judges, and his former employers have conspired over the past 20
years to deny him equal protection of the laws, harass him on the basis of his race, and defraud
him—are frivolous under this standard.”).
Furthermore, at least some of the allegations in the complaint mirror those in another
lawsuit brought by the Plaintiff, which remains pending in this Court. See Holland v. City of
Gary, et al., No. 2:10-CV-454 (N.D. Ind. filed Nov. 15, 2010.) He sues several of the same
defendants, and in both suits he complains about his arrest and detention in March 2010 as a
result of an incident in which he allegedly spit in his mother’s face during an argument. (See id;
see also Am. Compl. at 143–45.) It is malicious for Holland to file more than one suit against the
same defendants based on the same set of facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; Lindell v. McCallum,
352 F.3d 1107, 1109 (7th Cir. 2003) (suit is “malicious” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 if it is
intended to harass or is otherwise abusive of the judicial process); Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d

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994, 994–95 (5th Cir. 1993) (malicious for a plaintiff with in forma pauperis status to file a
lawsuit that duplicates allegations of another pending lawsuit brought by the same plaintiff). The
Plaintiff therefore cannot proceed with such claims in this lawsuit.
The Court notes that the Plaintiff was previously instructed that he cannot raise unrelated
claims against unrelated defendants in one lawsuit. (Order 2, ECF No. 4.) In repleading his
claims he presents the same allegations, which he views as related because they involve a vast
conspiracy, despite that they involve different defendants, different time periods, and different
underlying events. The Court declines to parse through the 213-page complaint in search of
potential claims arising from the discrete incidents he describes, including his various arrests,
detentions, mental evaluations, and his suspension from the practice of law. See United States ex
rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Rule 8(a) requires
parties to make their pleadings straightforward, so that judges and adverse parties need not try to
fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud.”); Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1436 (7th Cir. 1990)
(complaint “must be presented with sufficient clarity to avoid requiring a district court or
opposing party to forever sift through its pages” to determine whether it states a valid claim).
Moreover, aside from the fact that the individual claims cannot be brought in one lawsuit,
George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007), many of the incidents the Plaintiff describes
occurred years ago and would be time-barred, See Behavioral Inst. of Ind., LLC v. Hobart City of
Common Council, 406 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2005) (statute of limitations for a Section 1983
claim arising in Indiana is two years). Because there is no plausible basis for inferring the
existence of a conspiracy, the Plaintiff cannot sue the various private actors listed in the
complaint. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2009) (private

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entities cannot be sued for constitutional violations under Section 1983). Many of the state
actors, including the judges, prosecutors, and any non-judicial decision maker acting in a judicial
capacity, would be immune from suit. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (judicial
immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976) (prosecutorial immunity); Heyde v.
Pittenger, 633 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2011) (immunity extended to members of county board of
review); Killinger v. Johnson, 389 F.3d 765, 770 (7th Cir. 2004) (immunity extended to mayor).
Furthermore, this Court has no authority to review or otherwise alter the orders issued in the
state court cases the Plaintiff references. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
U.S. 280, 284 (2005); In re Campbell, 264 F.3d 730, 731–32 (7th Cir. 2001).
For all these reasons, the Court declines to authorize the Plaintiff to proceed with this
lawsuit under the in forma pauperis statute. Because the case is being dismissed, the Plaintiff’s
request for preliminary injunctive relief is also denied. [ECF No. 9.] The Court also denies the
Plaintiff’s request that counsel be appointed to assist him due to the “large number of
defendants” and “complexity of the case.” [ECF No. 10.]

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed
Without Prepayment of Fees [ECF No. 2], and DISMISSES the Amended Complaint [ECF No.
8] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court DENIES the Plaintiff’s request for an
injunction [ECF No. 9] and his request for counsel [ECF No. 10].
SO ORDERED on March 21, 2012.
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
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