Anderson v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 24

OPINION AND ORDER remanding case for further proceedings consistent with this order. Signed by Chief Judge Philip P Simon on 4/15/13. (mc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
DAMON C. ANDERSON,

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Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

2:12-cv-196

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Damon Anderson appeals the Social Security Administration’s decision to deny
his application for disability insurance benefits. An administrative law judge found that
Anderson was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. As explained in detail
below, I find that the ALJ made an erroneous factual finding in the course of analyzing
Anderson’s credibility and will therefore remand this matter to the ALJ to fully and properly
develop the administrative record.
BACKGROUND
Readers looking for a detailed discussion of Anderson’s medical record are directed to
the detailed summaries in the ALJ’s decision [R. 12-24] and in Anderson’s opening brief [DE 17
at 2-11]. Rather than simply reiterating those summaries, I will give a brief overview of the
history of Anderson’s health issues.
Anderson applied for Supplemental Security Income in October 2008. His alleged onset
date was September 22, 2008, a day that he was admitted to the hospital for respiratory problems
that were sufficiently severe that he had to have a tracheotomy. He was also diagnosed with

anti-social personality traits and substance dependence (he was formerly a cocaine addict). Over
the course of the next 14 months he had various doctors appointments regarding health problems
that included, among other things, confusion, memory loss, depression, swallowing problems,
difficulty talking, difficulty walking and balancing, and various respiratory issues.
Anderson’s disability claim was denied initially on March 23, 2009, and upon
reconsideration on August 11, 2009. Anderson requested a hearing, which took place on
November 22, 2010. Anderson’s testimony at his hearing also reflected his health difficulties.
He testified to having difficulty walking, standing, sitting, balancing, and breathing. He testified
that he used a cane that had been prescribed by a doctor. He testified about his depression and
memory problems. His case manager at a mental health center, who had worked with him for
about a year, also testified that he had constant breathing problems, had difficulty standing and
sitting, and used a cane. A vocational expert also testified as to the various jobs available when
given different hypotheticals by the ALJ.
The ALJ issued a decision denying benefits on December 17, 2010. [R. 12-24.] The ALJ
employed the standard five-step analysis. At step one, the ALJ confirmed that Anderson had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since his application date. At step two, the ALJ found
Anderson suffered severe impairments of a tracheal implant, degeneration of the lumbar spine
and knees, history of polysubstance abuse, depression, and obesity. At step three the ALJ found
that Anderson’s conditions did not satisfy any listed impairment. At step four, in analyzing
Anderson’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ found that Anderson could perform sedentary
work with: no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasional balancing, stooping,
crouching, crawling, kneeling, and climbing of stairs and ramps; no concentrated exposure to

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cold, wetness, humidity, and respiratory irritants; simple routine repetitive tasks that involve no
more than occasional decision making and changes in the work setting; no fast paced production;
and minimal redirection in order to finish tasks. At step five, the ALJ found that Anderson could
not perform past relevant work but that there were a sufficiently significant number of jobs in the
national economy that he could perform.
The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the
Commissioner. Anderson timely sought review of that decision by filing this case.
DISCUSSION
My review of an ALJ’s decision to deny social security benefits is limited to determining
whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995,
1001 (7th Cir. 2004). “Evidence is substantial if a reasonable person would accept it as adequate
to support the conclusion.” Id. In other words, the ALJ’s decision, if supported by substantial
evidence and reached under the correct legal standard, will be upheld even if reasonable minds
could differ as to the appropriate conclusion. See Schmidt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 970, 972 (7th Cir.
2000). It is not my job to re-weigh evidence, choose among conflicting versions of events,
decide questions of credibility, or substitute my own judgment for the ALJ’s. Young, 362 F.3d at
1001.
To receive disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must be
“disabled” as defined by the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). A claimant qualifies as disabled if
she is unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42

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U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Moreover, a claimant’s physical or mental impairment or impairments
must be of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
Anderson objects to the ALJ’s decision on six grounds:
1. The ALJ overlooked critical treating physician evidence in erroneously
concluding that Mr. Anderson did not require a cane.
2. The ALJ failed to properly consider Mr. Anderson’s need to clean his
tracheostomy tube, his sitting restrictions, and his need to rest.
3. The ALJ failed to properly consider the combined impact of Mr. Anderson’s
many impairments.
4. The numerous errors in the ALJ’s credibility assessment render the decision
legally insufficient and require remand.
5. The ALJ failed to properly evaluate the statements from Mr. Anderson’s
mother.
6. The ALJ erred by failing to properly assess Mr. Anderson’s mental condition.
[DE 17 at 2.]
From my perspective, there is simply no getting around the first of these issues –
Anderson’s use of a cane. The ALJ concluded, in the context of “not fully credit[ing] the
claimant’s allegations,” that “there is no evidence in the record that a doctor prescribed a cane
for the claimant, and the objective evidence fails to indicate that he has a condition that would
require a cane.” [R. 20-21.] This is simply a factual error: there are two prescriptions for a cane
from his treating physician in the record. [R. 224-25.] Straight factual errors like this obviously
cannot stand – “the ALJ may not simply ignore evidence.” Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 676
(7th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). See also Shauger v. Astrue, 675 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2012) (ALJ
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erred by overlooking supporting evidence in the record and “the agency may not bolster the
ruling with evidence the ALJ did not rely on.”); Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir.
2010) (“[W]e cannot uphold an administrative decision that fails to mention highly pertinent
evidence.”).
The government argues that the ALJ’s error in overlooking the two prescriptions was
harmless error. Specifically, the government argues that “[a]lthough the ALJ overlooked [the
two] prescription[s] for a cane, this error was harmless considering the additional finding that the
objective evidence failed to indicate the need for a cane.” [DE 20 at 3.] The problem with this
argument, however, is that the ALJ’s “additional finding” was entirely inadequate because the
decision failed to provide any factual support for his conclusion that “the objective evidence fails
to indicate that he has a condition that would require a cane.” See Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d
631, 637 (7th Cir. 2013) (“But the Commissioner cannot defend the ALJ’s decision using this
rationale directly, or by invoking an overly broad conception of harmless error, because the ALJ
did not employ the rationale in his opinion. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87-88
(1943).”). The ALJ did not provide any “logical bridge” between this conclusion and the
evidence he summarized earlier in his opinion. See Getch v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir.
2008) (the ALJ must provide a “logical bridge” from consideration of evidence); Groves v.
Apfel, 148 F.3d 809, 811 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[the ALJ’s] opinion fails to build a bridge from the
evidence to the conclusion and is thus analytically inadequate – in a word, unreasoned – we
cannot uphold his decision.”). The Commissioner’s response brief attempts to do build that
bridge for the ALJ, but that sort of post hoc analysis won’t do. See Roddy, 705 F.3d at 637.

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Based on the ALJ’s erroneous analysis on this issue alone, then, this case requires
remand. Because remand is necessary on this issue, I need not address Anderson’s other
arguments. Eskew v. Astrue, 462 Fed. App’x. 613, 615 (7th Cir. 2011) (given the court’s remand
on one of claimant’s arguments, it “need not address [her] remaining arguments”); Fike v.
Astrue, 2012 WL 1200670, at *10, n.6 (N.D. Ind. 2012). On remand the ALJ should revisit
Anderson’s other arguments as appropriate.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this cause is REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with this order.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: April 15, 2013

s/ Philip P. Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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