Borkholder v. Lemmon et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER: Court GRANTS Pltf leave to proceed against the Dfts in their official capacities; ORDERS that Dfts respond to the complaint as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and GRANTS Pltf's 3 Request for service by the United States Marshals Service, DIRECTS the Marshals Service to effect service of process on the Dfts. Signed by Chief Judge Philip P Simon on 10/26/2012. cc: USMS, Borkholder (tc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
JOSHUS BORKHOLDER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BRUCE LEMMON, Commissioner,
Indiana Department of Correction, et al.,
Defendants.
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CAUSE NO. 2:12-CV-309 PS
OPINION AND ORDER
Joshus Borkholder is a prisoner confined at the Miami Correctional Facility (“MCF”)
who alleges that MCF officials took away his Vegan religious diet without valid grounds. The
defendants are Indiana Department of Correction (“IDOC”) Commissioner Bruce Lemmon,
MCF Superintendent Mark Sevier, MCF Religious Director Stephen Hall, and MCF
Administrative Assistant Clair Barnes. The complaint seeks only declaratory and injunctive
relief, there is no request for damages [DE 1 at 3].
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, I must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and
dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, or any portion of a complaint, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Courts apply the same standard under §
1915A as when addressing a motion under RULE 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d
621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006).
In the context of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the United States
Supreme Court has stated that the “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement
to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of
action’s elements will not do.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). Instead the
Supreme Court held that the factual allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 545. In Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), the
Court also took up the issue of pleading standards, but this time in the context of pro se
litigation. In Erickson, the Court stated that “[s]pecific facts are not necessary” to meet the
requirements of Rule 8(a). Id. at 94. The Court further noted that a “document filed pro se is to
be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. at 94. In an effort to reconcile
Twombly and Erickson the Seventh Circuit has read those cases together to mean that “at some
point the factual detail in a complaint may be so sketchy that the complaint does not provide the
type of notice of the claim to which the defendant is entitled under Rule 8.”Airborne Beepers &
Video, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007). In the end, a complaint, to
withstand a motion to dismiss, must be plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
Borkholder brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action to
redress the violation of federally secured rights by a person acting under color of state law.
Burrell v. City of Mattoon, 378 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2004). To state a claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege violation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States,
and must show that a person acting under color of state law committed the alleged deprivation.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988). The first inquiry in every § 1983 case is whether the plaintiff
has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979).
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Borkholder states that he was given a Vegan diet at the MCF on religious grounds, but
that on June 15, 2012, he received notice that his diet was being revoked because he had ordered
Raman Noodles from the commissary [DE 1 at 3]. According to the complaint, Defendant Barnes
believed that the Raman Noodle order constituted a breach of Borkholder’s Vegan diet because it
was a meat product [Id.]. Borkholder contested this, pointing out that the Raman Noodles “have
no meat products in it, and the soup base comes in a small seasoning packet, which I do not eat. .
. . So I am not violating any Vegan diet principles” [DE 1 at 3-4] (emphasis in original).
Borkholder alleges that the Defendants’ actions violate the First Amendment free exercise of
religion clause and 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, and also violates the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).
Prison administrators must permit inmates a reasonable opportunity to exercise religious
freedom. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n. 2 (1972). Under the First Amendment, prisoners
“retain the right to practice their religion to the extent that such practice is compatible with the
legitimate penological demands of the state.” Al-Alamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir.
1991). A prison regulation or policy that might otherwise unconstitutionally impinge on an
inmate’s First Amendment rights will survive a challenge if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) and O’Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987).
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act provides that “[n]o
government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or
confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). “[A] substantial burden on religious exercise is one that necessarily bears
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direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise . . . effectively
impracticable.” Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th
Cir. 2003). Under RLUIPA, a substantial burden may be justified only if “the government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person – (1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
“Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 establishes a system of notice pleading,” and a claim may not be
dismissed at the pleadings stage “unless no relief could be granted ‘under any set of facts that
could be proved consistent with the allegations.’” Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589, 590 (7th Cir.
1998), quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). Giving Borkholder the
benefit of the inferences to which he is entitled at the pleadings stage, his claim that IDOC
officials interfered with the exercise of his religion by revoking his religious diet states a
plausible First Amendment free exercise claim as well as a plausible RLUIPA claim.
For the Foregoing reasons, I:
(1) GRANT the Plaintiff leave to proceed against the Defendants in their official
capacities for declaratory and injunctive relief on his claim that their actions interfered with the
exercise of his religion in violation of the First Amendment’s free exercise clause and on his
claim that the Defendants’ actions violated the provisions of RLUIPA by placing an
unreasonable and substantial burden on the exercise of his religion;
(2) Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), ORDERS that the Defendants respond to the
complaint as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and
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(3) GRANTS the Plaintiff’s Request for service by the United States Marshals Service
(DE 3), DIRECTS the Marshals Service to effect service of process on the Defendants, and
DIRECTS the clerk’s office to ensure that a copy of this order is served on them along with the
summons and complaint.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: October 26, 2012
s/ Philip P. Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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