Lucas v. JP Morgan Chase Bank

Filing 9

OPINION AND ORDER granting 7 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by JP Morgan Chase Bank. This case is dismissed without prejudice. ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Theresa L Springmann on 3/11/13. cc:pltf(kjp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
LISA A. LUCAS,
Plaintiff,
v.
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CAUSE NO.: 2:12-CV-349-TLS

OPINION AND ORDER
On August 31, 2012, the Plaintiff, Lisa A. Lucas, filed a pro se Complaint entitled
Declaratory Judgment for Verification of Debt [ECF No. 1]. In her Complaint, the Plaintiff
alleged, generally, that the Defendant, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., is wrongfully attempting to
enforce a promissory note. The Plaintiff therefore requested a declaratory judgment compelling
the Defendant to produce proof of its claim to the note. The Defendant responded on October 5
with a Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 7], in which it argued that the Court must dismiss the
Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees.

BACKGROUND
On August 9, 2010, the Defendant filed a complaint for mortgage foreclosure in Lake
Superior Court, Lake County, Indiana, seeking to foreclose against the Plaintiff’s property in
Merrillville, Indiana. The Plaintiff did not answer or otherwise defend in that action, and on
December 6, 2011, the court entered a Default Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure [ECF No. 87] against the Plaintiff and in favor of the Defendant. Meanwhile, on September 9, 2011, the
Plaintiff filed a complaint in Lake Superior Court alleging breach of contract, gross negligence,

intentional violation of the duty of good faith, wrongful foreclosure, abuse of process, violations
of the Truth in Lending Act, and violations of real estate and settlement procedures, all against
the Defendant. The Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint in October 2011, and the Lake
Superior Court finally dismissed the case with prejudice in February 2012 when the Plaintiff
appeared in person to argue her case. (See Order, ECF No. 8-4.) Although the Lake Superior
Court included no analysis in its Order, the Defendant states that the case “was dismissed, in
large part, pursuant to res judicata based on” the prior entry of foreclosure. (Def.’s Br. in Supp.
of Mot. to Dismiss 3, ECF No. 8.)
The Plaintiff filed her present case with this Court on August 31, 2012. Her Complaint
relates to a $100,000 promissory note and mortgage executed by the Plaintiff on October 8,
2002, and securing her property in Merrillville, Indiana. The Plaintiff originally signed the note
to GN Mortgage Corporation, but it appears that GN Mortgage Corporation later assigned the
note to the Defendant. (See Assignment of Mortgage, ECF No. 1 at 22.) The Plaintiff requests
that the Court order the Defendant to produce the original document assigning GN Mortgage
Corporation’s interest to the Defendant. The Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 7]
on October 5, 2012, arguing that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the RookerFeldman doctrine because to award relief in the Plaintiff’s favor the Court would have to review
and reverse the two underlying Lake Superior Court judgments. The Plaintiff did not file a
response, and the time in which to do so has expired.

DISCUSSION

2

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the
decisions of state courts in civil cases. Gilbert v. Ill. Bd. of Educ., 591 F.3d 896, 900 (7th Cir.
2010) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283–84 (2005);
Johnson v. Orr, 551 F.3d 564, 568 (7th Cir. 2008)). In essence, the doctrine “prevents a statecourt loser from bringing suit in federal court in order effectively to set aside the state-court
judgment.” Id. (citing Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284). The doctrine applies “even though
the state court judgment might be erroneous or even unconstitutional.” Gilbert, 591 F.3d at 900
(quotation marks omitted). In essence, the doctrine “bars federal claims in two instances. The
first involves a plaintiff’s request of a federal district court to overturn an adverse state court
judgment. The second, and more difficult instance, involves federal claims that were not raised
in state court or do not on their face require review of a state court’s decision.” Brown v.
Bowman, 668 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Taylor v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d
529, 532–33 (7th Cir. 2004)). In the second case, “Rooker-Feldman will act as a jurisdictional
bar if those claims are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court judgment.” Id. (quoting
Taylor, 374 F.3d at 533). Although the Seventh Circuit has described the inextricably
intertwined inquiry as “a somewhat metaphysical concept,” a district court must determine
whether it “is in essence being called upon to review the state-court decision.” Taylor, 374 F.3d
at 533 (quotation marks omitted). If a court finds that a new cause of action is inextricably
intertwined with the prior state court action, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine will only bar the new
federal case if the plaintiff had “a reasonable opportunity to raise [the new federal claim] in state
court proceedings.” Brown, 668 F.3d at 442 (quoting Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 667 (7th
Cir. 2002)).

3

In this case, the Plaintiff’s Complaint runs afoul of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. It
appears that the Plaintiff filed this federal case after the Lake Superior Court entered foreclosure
against her in the first instance, and dismissed her challenges to that foreclosure in the second
case. She now requests this Court to review—and, in effect, undo—these two judgments from
Indiana state courts. The Court has no jurisdiction to do what she asks.
Because the Lake Superior Court in the first action implicitly determined that the
Defendant was able to enforce the promissary note at issue, the Complaint appears to be a direct
challenge to the Lake Superior Court’s Default Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure. Further, the
Lake Superior Court in the second action dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful
foreclosure, suggesting that the Complaint is also a direct challenge to the state court decision in
that action. The Plaintiff does not actually request this Court to overturn either Lake Superior
Court decision. However, the Court finds that her Complaint is inextricably intertwined with the
previous state court judgments because it is “in essence” a request that this Court “review the
state-court decision[s].” Brown, 668 F.3d at 442. Moreover, the Court finds that the Plaintiff had
opportunity to bring the claims in her Complaint as part of the foreclosure action or as part of her
second state court filing. Therefore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests this Court of
jurisdiction to hear the claim in her Complaint.

4

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 7] and
DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE1 the Plaintiff’s Complaint entitled Declaratory Judgment
for Verification of Debt [ECF No. 1].
SO ORDERED on March 11, 2013.
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FORT WAYNE DIVISION

1

“A court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction cannot dismiss a case with prejudice.” Murray v.
Conseco, Inc., 467 F.3d 602, 605 (7th Cir. 2006).

5