Williams v. United States Steel Corporation et al

Filing 30

OPINION AND ORDER granting 18 Motion to Dismiss as to Defendant Lucas McElfresh only. Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul R Cherry on 3/13/13. cc: Williams (mc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
PATRICE M. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES STEEL
CORPORATION and
LUCAS McELFRESH,
Defendants.

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CAUSE NO.: 2:12-CV-402-PRC

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant McElfresh’s Motion to Dismiss [DE 18], filed
by Defendant Lucas McElfresh on January 8, 2013. For the reasons set forth in this Opinion and
Order, the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss.
BACKGROUND
On October 5, 2012, Plaintiff Patrice Williams filed a pro se Complaint against Defendants
United States Steel Corporation (“U.S. Steel”) and Lucas McElfresh. Williams, an employee of U.S.
Steel, alleges various violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.1 The Complaint asserts that
McElfresh, a Labor Relations Specialist employed by U.S. Steel, denied Williams reasonable
accommodations for her religious practices and observances while agreeing to similar
accommodations for one of Williams’ male colleagues.2 On January 8, 2013, McElfresh filed the
instant Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). On January 17, 2013, Williams filed her

1

Williams' complaint was submitted on a standardized form utilized by pro se plaintiffs alleging violations of
42 U.S.C § 1983. However, the Complaint lists no state actors as defendants and specifies Title VII as the basis of the
suit.
2

Williams' Brief in Summary to Deny McElfresh's Motion to Dismiss suggests that her Complaint includes a
Title VII retaliation claim. To the extent she is alleging such a claim, it is subject to the same analysis on the instant
Motion to Dismiss as are her claims of religious and gender discrimination.

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Response, which she titled Motion to Deny McElfresh’s Motion to Dismiss. McElfresh has not filed
a reply, and the time to do so has passed.
The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate
Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case.
Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the
sufficiency of the complaint and not the merits of the suit. See Gibson v. City of Chi., 910 F.2d
1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In ruling on such a motion, the Court accepts as true all of the wellpleaded facts alleged by the plaintiff and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. See
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007); see also Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526
F.3d 1074, 1082 (7th Cir. 2008).
To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint must first
comply with Rule 8(a) by providing “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), such that the defendant is given “fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009).
Second, the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see
also Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1082. The Supreme Court explained that the “plaintiff’s obligation to
provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d
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574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
requires the Court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Two weeks after deciding Twombly and in the context of pro se litigation, the Supreme Court
again addressed the notice pleading standard, reiterating that “[s]pecific facts are not necessary” to
meet the requirements of Rule 8(a). Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). The Supreme
Court reaffirmed that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed . . . and a pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Id. at 94 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
ANALYSIS
Defendant Lucas McElfresh seeks dismissal of Plaintiff Patrice Williams’ complaint, arguing
that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against him because Title VII does not
provide for suits against supervisors in their individual capacity. Williams’ response does not
address the legal merits of the motion.
Title VII provides a cause of action against “employers” who discriminate “against any
individual with respect to her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2. Under Title
VII, an employer is “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees . . . and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b). While the literal language
of this definition suggests that a individual can be subject to suits under Title VII as an employer’s
agent, the Seventh Circuit has analyzed the provision and found that “a supervisor does not, in his
individual capacity, fall within Title VII’s definition of employer.” Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d
552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995). Instead, the “term ‘employer’ as used in Title VII is a statutory expression
of traditional principles of respondeat superior liability.” Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317,
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332 n.9 (7th Cir. 2003). As a consequence of supervisors being excluded from the definition of
employer, the Seventh Circuit’s “case law is clear that a supervisor cannot be held liable in his
individual capacity under . . . Title VII.” Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 797 n.5 (7th Cir.
1999).
McElfresh contends that the aforesaid Seventh Circuit precedent requires dismissal of the
suit given his status as a Labor Relations Specialist employed by U.S. Steel. The Court agrees.
After taking into account the fact that Williams is proceeding pro se and liberally construing the
Complaint for a plausible claim for relief, the Court understands Williams to be seeking to impose
liability on McElfresh under Title VII for his actions as her supervisor. As noted above, the Seventh
Circuit has made clear that such a suit is not tenable.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant McElfresh’s Motion to
Dismiss [DE 18] and ORDERS that Plaintiff’s Complaint as to Defendant Lucas McElfresh only
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED this 13th day of March, 2013.

s/ Paul R. Cherry
MAGISTRATE JUDGE PAUL R. CHERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
cc:

All counsel of record
Pro se Plaintiff

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