Williams v. United States Steel Corporation et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER: Court DENIES 23 Motion to Cease and Desist Denial of Regularly Scheduled Off Days and Vacation Days and 32 Motion for a Temporary "Real" Sabbath Accommodation. Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul R Cherry on 9/20/2013. cc: Williams (tc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
PATRICE M. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES STEEL
CORPORATION,
Defendant.
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CAUSE NO.: 2:12-CV-402-PRC
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Cease and Desist Denial of Regularly
Scheduled Off Days and Vacation Days [DE 23], filed by pro se Plaintiff Patrice Williams on
January 23, 2013, and on a Motion for a Temporary “Real” Sabbath Accommodation [DE 32], filed
by Plaintiff on April 2, 2013. Defendant United States Steel Corporation filed a response to the
Motion to Cease and Desist Denial of Regularly Scheduled Off Days and Vacation Days on
February 11, 2013. Plaintiff filed a reply on March 6, 2013. Defendant did not file a response to
the Motion for a Temporary “Real” Sabbath Accommodation, and the time to do so has passed.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Patrice Williams filed this suit on October 5, 2012, alleging that Defendant United
States Steel Corporation violated— and continues to violate—Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., by failing to accommodate her religious practices and
discriminating against her on account of her gender. On January 8, 2013, Defendant filed its Answer
and Affirmatives Defenses. On April 18, 2013, the Court held a pretrial conference and determined
that Plaintiff’s Motion to Cease and Desist Denial of Regularly Scheduled Off Days and Vacation
Days and her Motion for a Temporary “Real” Sabbath Accommodation were requests for a
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preliminary injunction. The Court held an evidentiary hearing and, ruling from the bench, denied
Plaintiff’s motions. This Order is intended to provide the parties with a more complete explanation
of the decision.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Patrice Williams has been employed by Defendant United States Steel Corporation
since October 2008 and remains currently employed as a crane operator. As a member of the United
Steelworkers Union, the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment are governed by a collective
bargaining agreement between the Union and US Steel. The CBA contains provisions governing
overtime, wages, and seniority, among other things. Plaintiff is currently classified as a Labor Grade
2 employee under the CBA.
At the time Plaintiff applied for her current position, she was aware that US Steel operates
24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and that crane operators are scheduled to work on a neutral, rotating
shift basis. Under this system, the work schedule for crane operators changes from week-to-week
with respect to the shifts worked (7:00 a.m to 3:00 p.m., 3:00 p.m. to 10 p.m., or 11:00 p.m. to 7:00
a.m.) and the days of the week worked (which may included Saturdays and Sundays).
The facts giving rise to this litigation began on September 7, 2011. On that day, Plaintiff,
a Seventh-Day Adventist, presented a letter to her supervisor requesting that she not be scheduled
to work on the Sabbath. Seventh-Day Adventists believe that the Sabbath runs from sundown
Friday to sundown Saturday. One tenet of Plaintiff’s religion is that work cannot be performed on
the Sabbath. Although Plaintiff has been a Seventh-Day Adventist her whole life, she became more
devout in 2011 and adopted the practice of abstaining from work on the Sabbath. Plaintiff’s
supervisor told her that she could “call-off” (i.e., inform Defendant that she would not work her
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assigned shift) whenever she was scheduled to work on the Sabbath. This accommodation was
already being provided to DeJuan Lee, another employee in Plaintiff’s department.
However, on October 6, 2011, Plaintiff and Mr. Lee were informed that the accommodation
was no longer available. Going forward, if they wanted to avoid working a scheduled shift on the
Sabbath, they would be required to use a vacation day or find a co-worker to cover the shift.
Following this change in policy, Mr. Lee, who was a Labor Grade 1 employee earning less than
Plaintiff, was no longer scheduled to work on the Sabbath. Plaintiff, however, continued to be
scheduled on the Sabbath when it was her turn under the rotating schedule.
In the sixteen months since Plaintiff was told that she could no longer call-off on the
Sabbath, Plaintiff has not worked on the Sabbath. She has accomplished this through a combination
of swapping shifts with co-workers, using vacations days, using sick days, scheduling doctors
appointments, and other means.
In 2012, Plaintiff filed, in addition to this suit, a grievance against US Steel with the Union.
Plaintiff’s grievance seeks to prohibit Defendant from scheduling her to work on the Sabbath. The
grievance is currently pending at step two of a three-step procedure.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction that, for the duration of this litigation, prohibits
Defendant from scheduling her to work on the Sabbath, or, in the alternative, from requiring her to
work on the Sabbath when the rotating schedule provides that she is not scheduled.
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). In order for the injunction to be issued,
Plaintiff must demonstrate “that [s]he is likely to succeed on the merits, that [s]he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in h[er] favor,
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and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20. The first two elements—likelihood of
success on the merits and likelihood of irreparable harm—are threshold requirements. See Ezell v.
City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 694 (7th Cir. 2011); Pro’s Sports Bar & Grill, Inc. v. City of Country
Club Hills, 589 F.3d 865 872-73 (7th Cir. 2009). If Plaintiff satisfies the threshold requirements,
the Court must “weigh[ ] the balance of harm to the parties if the injunction is granted or denied and
also evaluate[ ] the effect of an injunction on the public interest.” Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc.
v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 699 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2012). Because Plaintiff has
failed to satisfy the threshold requirements, her request for injunctive relief is denied.
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
In order for the requested injunction to issue, Plaintiff must establish a likelihood that she
will eventually prevail on the merits of one of her Title VII claims. The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has stated that “the threshold for establishing likelihood of success is low.” Michigan v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 782 (7th Cir. 2011). In order to meet the requirement,
a movant need only present “a plausible theory on the merits—not necessarily a winning one.”
Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 726 (7th Cir.
2009). Despite the low bar, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she is likely to prevail on the
merits of either her failure to accommodate or gender discrimination claim. The Court will address
each in turn.
1. Failure to Accommodate
Plaintiff’s first basis for her requested injunction is that Defendant has violated—and
continues to violate—Title VII by failing to reasonably accommodate her religious practice of
abstaining from work on the Sabbath. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
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respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. This prohibition includes “an implied duty to
accommodate employees’ religions.” Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 448
(7th Cir. 2013); see also Porter v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Title VII.
. . require[s] an employer to make reasonable efforts to accommodate the religious practices of
employees.”). In order for Plaintiff to prevail on her claim, she must first make out a prima facie
case, which requires her to demonstrate that (1) her religious practice conflicts with an employment
requirement, (2) she brought the religious practice to Defendant’s attention, and (3) the religious
practice “was the basis for her discharge or other discriminatory treatment.” Porter, 700 F.3d at 951
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If she is able to make out a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to Defendant to prove that it provided Plaintiff a reasonable accommodation or that
“any reasonable accommodation would result in undue hardship.” Id.
Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff has satisfied the first two elements of a prima facie
case, and the Court will assume that she has done so. This leaves the question of whether Plaintiff’s
refusal to work on the Sabbath led Defendant to subject Plaintiff to discriminatory treatment (there
is no question that she remains employed by Defendant). Plaintiff conceded at the evidentiary
hearing that she has not been discharged, demoted, or suffered a decrease in her rate-of-pay. The
only evidence of discriminatory treatment put forth by Plaintiff is that she was issued a three-day
suspension three months after her initial request for a Sabbath accommodation. However, the facts
surrounding her suspension support the conclusion that Plaintiff was suspended as a result of having
violated a plant safety regulation. Plaintiff has failed to provide the Court with sufficient evidence
to support a finding that the reason for the suspension was pretextual.
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Even if Plaintiff were able to make out a prima facie case, the Court would still find that
Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits of her failure to accommodate claim. Leaving aside
the more difficult question of whether Defendant reasonably accommodated Plaintiff’s religious
practices by allowing her to swap shifts with co-workers, the Court finds that any reasonable
accommodation would cause Defendant to suffer undue hardship. The Supreme Court has stated
that even a de minimis cost can create an undue hardship. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). Here, accommodating Plaintiff’s religious practice would require Defendant
to incur more than a de minimis cost. Plaintiff conceded at the evidentiary hearing and in her
submissions to the Court that there is currently a shortage of crane operators qualified to operate her
crane within her department. Plaintiff proposes that Defendant could solve this problem and never
schedule her to work on the Sabbath by removing employees who are qualified to operate her crane
from other departments. The issue with this solution is that Plaintiff is asking Defendant to remove
individuals with more seniority from their preferred positions in order to accommodate her religious
practices. If a reasonable accommodation requires a deviation from an established seniority system,
courts have generally considered the accommodation to constitute undue hardship. See Hardison,
432 U.S. at 82 (stating that an employer “was not required by Title VII to carve out a special
exception to its seniority system in order to help [the employee] to meet his religious obligations).
A second reason to find that any accommodation would cause undue hardship can be found in
Plaintiff’s concession at the evidentiary hearing that Defendant is forced to pay premium wages in
order to cover for Plaintiff when she fails to work on the Sabbath as scheduled. This has also been
found by courts to constitute undue hardship. Id. at 84.
The Court interprets Plaintiff to argue that granting her the requested accommodation would
not cause an undue hardship because Defendant is already making an identical accommodation to
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Mr. Lee. However, Mr. Lee and Plaintiff are not comparable employees. Plaintiff is a Labor Grade
2 employee. Mr. Lee is a Labor Grade 1 employee. Plaintiff thus has a higher rate-of-pay and her
position involves greater skill and responsibility. Further, as is just discussed above, there is
currently a shortage of employees in Plaintiff’s department who are capable of performing her job.
Thus, the fact that Defendant is able to accommodate Mr. Lee’s request to never be scheduled to
work on the Sabbath does not provide any support for the notion that Defendant could just as easily
accommodate Plaintiff’s request. For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Plaintiff is
unlikely to prevail on the merits of her failure to accommodate claim.
2. Gender Discrimination
Plaintiff’s second ground for injunctive relief is that Defendant has violated—and continues
to violate—Title VII’s ban on gender discrimination by accommodating Mr. Lee’s religious
practices while denying her an identical accommodation. Title VII makes it unlawful for an
employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2. A plaintiff alleging gender
discrimination under Title VII may prove the discrimination under either the “direct” method or the
“indirect, burden-shifting” method. Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 547-48 (7th
Cir. 2011). The fact that Plaintiff has failed to specify which method she relies on in bringing her
gender discrimination claim is unimportant because she has not marshaled sufficient evidence to
establish gender discrimination under either method.
Plaintiff’s sole piece of evidence supporting her claim of gender discrimination is that Mr.
Lee’s religious practices were accommodated while hers were not. Under the direct method,
Plaintiff would have to produce either (1) evidence that— standing alone— would establish that she
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was denied an accommodation on account of her gender (e.g., the decisionmaker’s admission that
gender discrimination was the cause for the denial), or (2) a “convincing mosaic of circumstantial
evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer intentional discrimination by the
decisionmaker.” Id. at 548. Plaintiff’s evidence fails to establish a likelihood of success under either
of these options. If Plaintiff were to proceed under the indirect method, she would have to make out
a prima facie case by demonstrating that “(1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) her performance
met her employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4)
similarly situated others not in her protected class received more favorable treatment.” Moser v. Ind.
Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 2005). Assuming for the purposes of this Order that
Plaintiff could satisfy the first three elements, Plaintiff has not provided the Court with sufficient
evidence that she and Mr. Lee are similarly situated. At the very least, Plaintiff needed to
demonstrate that Mr. Lee’s seniority within the Labor Grade 1 list was similar to her own (49th out
of 56 Labor Grade 2 employees). Without this information, it is impossible to determine whether
he was given preferences over more senior employees or whether Mr. Lee has sufficient seniority
to receive a preferential schedule. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of
success on her gender discrimination claim and has failed to meet the first threshold element needed
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
B. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm
Even if the Court were to find that Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
merits, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
the preliminary injunction. Irreparable harm is “harm that cannot be prevented or fully rectified by
the final judgment after trial.” Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d 470, 478 (7th Cir.
2001). Further, “the irreparable harm must . . . be likely. That is, there must be more than a mere
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possibility that the harm will come to pass.” Michigan, 667 F.3d at 769 (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at
20). Although Plaintiff has not explicitly described the irreparable harm that she will suffer without
injunctive relief, the Court understands her to argue that being forced to work on the Sabbath in
violation of her religious beliefs would constitute irreparable harm. The Court will assume for the
purposes of this Order that this would constitute irreparable harm. The problem for Plaintiff is that
she has failed to demonstrate that this harm is likely to occur during the pendency of the litigation.
In the eighteen months since Plaintiff first requested a Sabbath accommodation, she has
never worked on the Sabbath despite frequently being scheduled to do so. Plaintiff has managed this
through a mix of swapping shifts with colleagues, using vacation days, using sick days, and other
means. At the evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff presented no evidence that this situation is likely to
change before her suit is resolved. Without some indication that Plaintiff is going to be put to a
decision between her job or her religious beliefs, the Court cannot find a likelihood of irreparable
harm. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the second threshold
requirement for a preliminary injunction and, consequently, denies Plaintiff’s motions.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES the Motion to Cease and Desist Denial
of Regularly Scheduled Off Days and Vacation Days [DE 23] and the Motion for a Temporary
“Real” Sabbath Accommodation [DE 32].
SO ORDERED this 20th day of September, 2013.
s/ Paul R. Cherry
MAGISTRATE JUDGE PAUL R. CHERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
cc:
All counsel of record
Pro se Plaintiff
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