Ashley v. Mollenhauer et al

Filing 8

OPINION AND ORDER: GRANTS the Plaintiff leave to proceed against DefendantsMollenhauer and Bell for damages; DISMISSES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, all other claims, and DISMISSES Defendants Steve Vance and the MunicipalBoard of LaPorte Count y: ORDERS that Defendants Mollenhauer and Bell respond to the complaint; DIRECTS the Marshals Service to effect service of process on Defendants Mollenhauer and Bell on the Plaintiffs behalf. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 1/31/2013. (cc: Ashley and RDC Plainfield)(rmn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
JOHN D. ASHLEY,

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)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL F. MOLLENHAUER,
Sheriff, et al.,
Defendants.

CAUSE NO. 2:12-CV-468

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court sua sponte pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
GRANTS

the

Plaintiff

leave

to

proceed

against

Defendants

Mollenhauer and Bell for damages on his Eighth Amendment claim that
they required him to sleep on the floor and that conditions
established by them caused him to contract an infectious disease,
DISMISSES,

pursuant

to

Section

1915A,

all

other

claims,

and

DISMISSES Defendants Steve Vance and the Municipal Board of LaPorte
County.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff

John

Ashley

(“Ashley”),

a

prisoner

currently

committed to the Indiana Department of Correction, filed his
complaint while he was confined at the LaPorte County Jail. The
defendants are the LaPorte County Municipal Board, LaPorte County
Sheriff Michael Mollenhauer, and jail officials Scott Bell and
Steve Vance (collectively, “Defendants”). Ashley alleges that the

Defendants violated rights protected by the United States Constitution’s Eighth Amendment by subjecting him to unpleasant conditions
of confinement at the LaPorte County jail. He also alleges that the
jail’s grievance officer neglected to answer his grievances or have
necessary work done concerning his grievances.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), district courts must review
the merits of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner
seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of
a governmental entity,” and dismiss it if the action is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides for the
dismissal of a complaint, or any portion of a complaint, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Courts
apply the same standard under § 1915A as when addressing a motion
under Rule 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th
Cir. 2006).
The pleading standards in the context of a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim are that the “plaintiff’s obligation
to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A court should assume the
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veracity of a complaint’s allegations, and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009).
In the context of pro se litigation, the Supreme Court has
stated that “[s]pecific facts are not necessary” to meet the
requirements of Rule 8(a). The Court has further noted that a
“document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se
complaint,

however

inartfully

pleaded,

must

be

held

to

less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
To state a valid cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States, and must show that a person acting under
color of state law committed the alleged deprivation. West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988). The first inquiry in every § 1983 case
is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States. Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979).
CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT CLAIMS AGAINST
DEFENDANTS MOLLENHAUER AND BELL
Ashley alleges that Defendants Mollenhauer and Bell violated
rights

protected

by

the

Constitution’s

Eighth

Amendment.

In

addressing a claim brought under § 1983, analysis begins by
identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed

3

by the defendants’ actions. Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 394,
(1989). The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause protects
pretrial detainees and the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual
punishments clause protects the rights of those convicted of
crimes. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1979). But
“[a]lthough

the

Eighth

Amendment

only

applies

to

convicted

prisoners . . . the same standard applies to pretrial detainees
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.” Williams v.
Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 401 (7th Cir. 2007).
Ashley states in his complaint that he was at the jail as a
pretrial detainee and after conviction while serving a sentence (DE
1 at 1). Accordingly, this Court will evaluate his claims under
both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
A violation of the cruel and unusual punishments clause
consists of two elements: (1) objectively, whether the injury is
sufficiently

serious

to

deprive

the

prisoner

of

the

minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities, and (2) subjectively,
whether the official’s actual state of mind was one of “deliberate
indifference” to the deprivation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). “Not all prison
conditions trigger Eighth amendment scrutiny — only deprivations of
basic human needs like food, medical care, sanitation, and physical
safety.”

James

v.

Milwaukee

County,

956

F.2d

696,

699

(7th

Cir.1992). Although the Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from

4

cruel and unusual living conditions, an inmate is not entitled to
relief simply because of exposure to uncomfortable, restrictive, or
inconvenient conditions of confinement, for, “[t]o the extent that
such conditions are restrictive or even harsh, they are part of the
penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
“Obduracy and wantonness rather than inadvertence or mere
negligence characterize conduct prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, [the plaintiff] must,
at minimum, allege facts sufficient to establish that the defendants possessed a total unconcern for [his] welfare in the face of
serious risks.”

McNeil v. Lane, 16 F.3d 123, 124 (7th Cir. 1994).

Negligence, gross negligence, or even “recklessness” as that term
as used in tort cases, is insufficient to constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation; “deliberate indifference amounts to criminal
recklessness-the defendant must have known that the plaintiff ‘was
at serious risk of being harmed, [and] decided not to do anything
to prevent that harm from occurring even though he could easily
have done so.’ Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 577 (7th Cir.
1998), quoting West v. Waymire, 114 F.3d 646, 651 (7th Cir. 1997).
In paragraph one of his complaint, Ashley alleges that as a
result of overcrowding at the jail, “Men were made to sleep on the
dayroom floor; cells were filled beyond intended capacity by making
inmates sleep on the floor in the cell” (DE 1 at 3). Sleeping on

5

the floor, however, does not deprive a prisoner of the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities so long as jail officials
provide a mattress. See Mann v. Smith, 796 F.2d 79, 85 (5th Cir.
1986) (Prisoners do not have a constitutional right to elevated
beds, and may be required to sleep on mattresses on the floor).
The complaint does not specifically state whether or not
Ashley himself slept on the floor, and if he did sleep on the floor
whether or not he had a mattress. But pro se complaints are to be
construed liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, and “Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8 establishes a system of notice pleading,” Nance v.
Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589, 590 (7th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, if Ashley
was forced to sleep on the floor without a mattress, the Court
cannot say that he has not stated a plausible claim for relief.
In paragraphs one and two of his complaint, Ashley claims that
the toilet in his cell:
quit working on or about 10-9-2012 to the present 10-282012. We were forced to use [the] broken toilet while
being locked in [our] cell, resulting in [a] build up of
human waste to which we were allowed to use the toilet in
the dayroom, but was (sic) never moved from the cell with
the broken toilet.
DE 1 at 3-4. Elsewhere in his complaint, Ashley states that “once
this [problem with the toilet] was reported we were allowed to use
the toilet in the dayroom, but [we were] never removed from the
cell with the broken toilet” (DE 1 at 4).

6

The Eighth Amendment does not require that prisoners enjoy
immediately available and flushable toilets at all times. See Knop
v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1013, (6th Cir. 1992) (“We do not agree
that it violates the Eighth Amendment to require prisoners to use
nonflushable toilets on occasion”). While the Constitution protects
prisoners from cruel and unusual living conditions, an inmate is
not entitled to relief because he has been exposed to uncomfortable, restrictive, or inconvenient conditions of confinement, like
a poorly-flushing toilet or unpleasant smells. See Henderson v.
Virginia, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70207, at *26, 2007 WL 2781722, at
*7 (W.D.Va. Sept.21, 2007) (unpublished).
Ashley admits in his complaint that as soon as jail officials
became aware that the toilet in his cell was not working, they made
arrangements for him and the other inmates in his cell to use
another toilet. Because jail officials made arrangements for Ashley
and his cellmates to have access to a toilet as soon as they became
aware that the commode in their cell was broken, they were not
obdurate,

their

actual

state

of

mind

was

one

of

deliberate

indifference, and they did not deprive Ashley of the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.
Finally, Ashley asserts that overcrowding at the jail “has
placed and continues to place myself and class members1 at risk for

1

Ashley sought to bring this action as a class action, but the Court
denied that request (DE 7).

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infectious diseases and we have become ill as a result” (DE 1 at
4).

Overcrowding

and

other

jail

conditions

resulting

in

an

increased “risk of spreading infections disease” might violate
“established federal constitutional rights.” Brown v. Mitchell, 327
F.Supp. 615, 635 (E.D.Va. 2004). The Court will allow Ashley to
proceed on this claim, but in order to ultimately prevail, he must
be able to establish not only that the conditions created at the
LaPorte County Jail by jail officials made it more likely that
inmates would catch infectious diseases, but also that he was one
of the inmates who “became ill as a result” of jail conditions
established or condoned by Defendants Mollenhauer and Bell.
CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT VANCE
In paragraph three of his complaint, Ashley alleges that
Sergeant Vance is the grievance officer at the jail and that he
violated Ashley’s federally protected rights because he “neglected
to answer my grievances or have the necessary work done concerning
my grievances” (DE 1 at 5). But a prisoner has no due process
rights with respect to prison or jail grievance procedures, and
that

a

grievance

official

ignores,

mishandles,

or

denies

a

prisoner’s grievance does not state a claim under § 1983. Prison or
jail grievance procedures are not mandated by the First Amendment
and do not by their very existence create interests protected by
the Due Process Clause, so the alleged mishandling of a prisoner’s
grievances by persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in
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the underlying conduct states no claim upon which relief can be
granted. Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011); see
also George v. Smith, 507 F.3d. 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Only
persons who cause or participate in the [Constitutional] violations
are responsible. Ruling against a prisoner on an administrative
complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation”).
Accordingly, Ashley’s claim that Sergeant Vance neglected to
answer his grievances states no § 1983 claim upon which relief can
be granted. Preventing a prisoner from filing a grievance or
failure to respond to a prisoner’s grievance may, however, preclude
jail officials from relying on 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), which requires
prisoners

to

exhaust

any

available

institutional

grievance

procedure before they may file a § 1983 claims regarding conditions
of confinement.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE LAPORTE COUNTY MUNICIPAL BOARD
In paragraph four of his complaint, Ashley alleges that the
Laporte County Municipal Board is the “overseer of county funding
for [the] jail,” and that the board “has failed and continues to
fail to provide and ensure adequate funding to [the] jail to ensure
[that the] jail maintains [a] healthful and safe environment for
detainees” (DE 1 at 5). He also alleges that the board’s “custom
and policy” of “not ensuring funding for jail upkeep required by
A.C.A. . . . also directly violates IC 11-11-6-1 of Indiana law
prohibiting substantial jail environments” (DE 1 at 6).
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The

first

inquiry

in

every

§

1983

case

is

whether

the

plaintiff has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. at 140.
To state a claim under § 1983, a Plaintiff must establish that a
defendant deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, so his allegation that the Laporte
County Municipal Board may have violated provisions of Indiana law
states no claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983.
In regard to Ashley’s claim that the municipal board’s failure
to provide more funding to the LaPorte County Jail resulted in
conditions that harmed him, “[a] governmental body’s policies must
be the moving force behind the constitutional violation before we
can impose liability under Monell.” Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff’s
Dept. 604 F.3d 293, 306 (7th Cir. 2010), citing Woodward v.
Correctional Medical Services, 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004)
(“a municipal policy or practice must be the ‘direct cause’ or
‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation . . . In other
words, ‘it is when execution of a government's policy or custom ...
inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible
under § 1983”).
“Obduracy and wantonness rather than inadvertence or mere
negligence characterize conduct prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, [the plaintiff] must,
at minimum, allege facts sufficient to establish that the defen-

10

dants possessed a total unconcern for [his] welfare in the face of
serious risks.”

McNeil v. Lane, 16 F.3d at 124. Negligence, gross

negligence, or even “recklessness” as that term as used in tort
cases, is insufficient to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.
See Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d at 577. Nothing in the
complaint suggests that the LaPorte County Municipal Board was
obdurate wanton, or that they adopted a funding formula with the
intent to harm Ashley and the other inmates at the jail.
INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF CLAIMS

Ashley’s complaint seeks damages and injunctive and declaratory relief (DE 1 at 7). Ashley was housed at the LaPorte County
Jail when the events he complains of occurred, but he has since
been transferred to the custody of the Indiana Department of
Correction, and is no longer confined at the LaPorte County Jail.
If a prisoner is released or transferred to another facility, his
request for injunctive relief against officials of the first
facility is moot unless “he can demonstrate that he is likely to”
return to the first facility. Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 811
(7th Cir. 1996), quoting Moore v. Thieret, 862 F.2d 148, 150 (7th
Cir. 1988). A prisoner’s transfer or release also renders his
claims for declaratory relief moot. Higgason v. Farley , 83 F.3d at
811, citing Murphy v. Hunt , 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (applying the
capable-of-repetition

doctrine

without

discrimination

between

claims for declaratory relief and claims for injunctive relief).

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Because Ashley is no longer confined at the LaPorte County
Jail, his requests for injunctive and declaratory relief against
LaPorte County officials are moot. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488, 495 (1974); Martin v. Davies, 917 F.2d 336, 339 (7th Cir.
1990), cert. denied 501 U.S. 1208 (1991). It is possible that
Ashley could return to the jail in the future, but the mere
possibility of re-transfer is insufficient. The standard to be
applied here is whether he is “likely” to return to the jail. There
is no reasonable basis for the court to conclude that Ashley is
likely to return to the LaPorte County Jail.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court:
(1) GRANTS the Plaintiff leave to proceed against Defendants
Mollenhauer and Bell for damages on his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims that they required him to sleep on the floor and
that conditions established by them caused him to contract an
infectious disease;
(2) DISMISSES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, all other
claims, and DISMISSES Defendants Steve Vance and the Municipal
Board of LaPorte County;
(3) Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), ORDERS that Defendants Mollenhauer and Bell respond to the complaint as provided for in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
(4) DIRECTS the Marshals Service to effect service of process
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on Defendants Mollenhauer and Bell on the Plaintiff’s behalf, and
DIRECTS the Clerk’s Office to ensure that a copy of this order is
served on them along with the summons and complaint; and
(5) DIRECTS the Clerk to mail a copy of the Court’s order
granting the Plaintiff in forma pauperis status (DE 4) to the
Superintendent of the facility at which the Plaintiff is now
confined.
DATED: January 31, 2013

S/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

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