Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes v. Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER DENYING re 45 MOTION for Reconsideration re 41 Opinion and Order, Terminate Motions, . Signed by Chief Judge Philip P Simon on 10/7/14. (eml)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE
OF WAY EMPLOYEES DIVISION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
INDIANA HARBOR BELT
RAILROAD COMPANY,
Defendant.
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2:13 CV 18-PPS-APR
OPINION AND ORDER
Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company asks me to reconsider my ruling partially
denying its motion to dismiss. (DE 45) In that ruling, I held that Plaintiff Brotherhood of
Maintenance of Way Employees Division of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
had associational standing to pursue injunctive remedies on its claims of racial
discrimination and harassment in the workplace against the railroad. (DE 41) After
reviewing the parties’ extensive briefing and hearing argument regarding this motion,
for the reasons below, I now DENY Indiana Harbor Belt’s Motion for Reconsideration
(DE 45).
BACKGROUND
The facts as alleged in the complaint have already been discussed in detail in my
previous order (DE 41), so I’ll provide only a short recap here. The Union alleges that
its African American members have suffered from various discriminatory practices in
the Indiana Harbor Belt workplace. For example, the Union alleges that its African
American members have not received the same training and employment opportunities
as white employees, have been disciplined more harshly than white employees for the
same relatively minor infractions, and have had to endure such disturbing incidents as
repeated use of the N-word and seeing a noose hanging in a company vehicle. (See
generally DE 34) All of this has created “a hostile work environment of such intensity as
to result in their constructive discharge” (id. ¶ 13), resulting in a workforce whose racial
makeup is disproportionate to the racial composition of the relevant labor market.
The Union’s first complaint sought damages and injunctive relief; the Union also
sought to certify the case as a class action. (DE 1) Indiana Harbor Belt first moved to
dismiss the class allegations and the Union responded by dropping them. (DE 34)
Indiana Harbor Belt then moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the grounds that
the Union lacked standing to pursue claims on behalf of its members because it failed
the third-prong of the three-part test for associational standing set forth in Hunt v.
Washington, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (holding associational standing exists only where
an association can show that “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in
their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's
purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the
participation of individual members in the lawsuit”), superceded by statute on other
grounds. (DE 35-36) Indiana Harbor Belt told me that the suit would require too much
individual participation of the members, as forbidden by Hunt. (Id.) I agreed regarding
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the Union’s claim for damages, but I allowed the pattern-or-practice claim for injunctive
relief to go forward because such a claim would not require a problematic amount of
individual participation. (DE 41) Indiana Harbor Belt requests that I reconsider that
ruling telling me that the Union does not have standing to pursue pattern-or-practice
claims in the absence of class certification. (DE 45)
DISCUSSION
Motions for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) are
utilized for a very limited purpose: to correct manifest errors of law or fact, to present
newly discovered evidence, or to address an intervening and substantial change in the
controlling law since the submission of the issues to the district court. Caisse Nationale
de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269-70 (7th Cir. 1996); Bank of
Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990). A party
moving for reconsideration bears a heavy burden; and for that reason, such motions are
rarely granted. Bank of Waunakee, 906 F.2d at 1191.
Indiana Harbor Belt claims it was a manifest error of law to allow the Union to
pursue a pattern-or-practice claim in the absence of class certification. Title VII
authorizes the issuance of an injunction to stem a pattern-or-practice of discrimination.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a). But according to Indiana Harbor Belt, “all Circuits that have
addressed the issue” have held that a plaintiff may not pursue non-class claims under a
pattern-or-practice theory. (DE 46 at 1) That’s only partially true. What is true is that
the vast majority of circuits have held that an individual plaintiff cannot pursue a
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pattern-or-practice theory for non-class claims.1 But as best I can tell, no circuit court
has addressed the precise question with which I am confronted — whether an
association acting as a representative of its members may pursue such claims? After
evaluating the full body of caselaw that comes at least close to addressing this issue, I
am not convinced that there is any per se rule forbidding the Union from pursuing these
claims without class certification. Therefore, I do not believe I made a manifest error of
law in allowing these claims to move forward.
At the outset, as I just noted, Indiana Harbor Belt is right that an individual can’t
pursue pattern-or-practice claims in the absence of class certification. See e.g. Davis v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 516 F.3d 955, 967 (11th Cir. 2008); Daniels v. UPS, Inc., 701 F.3d
620, 632 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting every circuit that has considered the question of
whether individual plaintiffs can bring pattern-or-practice claims has answered in the
negative). And it’s easy to see why: pattern-or-practice claims generally involve claims
of classwide discrimination that a single individual (or small group of individuals)
cannot readily prove. Daniels, 701 F.3d at 633. Proof of one violation is not proof of a
pattern.
But that’s not the situation before me. Here, I have a union seeking to enjoin
various discriminatory actions against its members by their employer – something
unions have already been doing for years without first certifying a class. See e.g., Retired
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Importantly, the Seventh Circuit has not yet addressed whether an individual can bring a
pattern-or-practice claim, despite Indiana Harbor Belt’s claim to the contrary. At most, it has merely
questioned in a footnote whether allowing such claims by an individual outside of the class context is
proper, without deciding the issue. See Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 866 nn. 6 (7th Cir. 1985).
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Chi. Police Assn. v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 599-602 (7th Cir. 1993) (allowing
association to bring § 1983 claims under associational standing without certifying a
class); Local 194, Retail, Wholesale & Dept. Store Union v. Standard Brands, Inc., 540 F.2d
864, 866 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding a union is an “aggrieved person” under Title VII and
can bring suit on behalf of its members without certifying a class). That’s because even
though a union plaintiff typically can’t meet Rule 23's requirements since “[i]t is not a
member of the class of persons whose rights are to be vindicated,” Local 194, 540 F.2d at
867), it is often the best representative of litigants because it can “draw upon a
preexisting reservoir of experience, research, and capital” that can “sharpen the
presentation of issues appreciably – one of the primary concerns of the doctrine of
standing.” Retired Police, 7 F.3d at 600. As the Supreme Court put it:
The only practical judicial policy when people pool their capital, their interests,
or their activities under a name and form that will identify collective interests,
often is to permit the association or corporation in a single case to vindicate the
interests of all. The very forces that cause individuals to band together in an
association will thus provide some guarantee that the association will work to
promote their interests.
Int’l Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v.
Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 290 (1986) (allowing a union to challenge an employee benefits
policy on behalf of its members without first certifying a class) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
Indiana Harbor Belt says I should treat the union as an individual plaintiff
because Hunt holds that “an association is treated as an individual plaintiff.” (DE 52 at
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4) But Hunt never makes this leap. Instead, Hunt makes no reference to “individuals”
and states only that the first prong of associational standing is that “an association has
standing to sue on behalf of its members when . . . its members would otherwise have
standing to sue in their own right.” Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. Hunt never requires that the
members must be able to bring the claims as individuals. Certainly, the members of the
union could have brought these claims as a class action. See e.g. Mozee v. Am. Comm.
Marine Service Co., 940 F.2d 1036, 1042-44 (7th Cir. 1991) (class of employees alleging
pattern-or-practice of racial discrimination based on employer’s hiring, promotion, and
disciplinary actions, in addition to permitting a sign stating “No Nigger Riggers” to be
displayed on company property) superceded by statute on other grounds.
It is worth noting at this point that despite Indiana Harbor Belt’s claim that it is
challenging the Union’s standing under only Hunt’s third prong – forbidding too much
individual participation by members in the litigation – Indiana Harbor Belt repeatedly
references the fact that an association can bring only those claims that its members
could bring in their own right (see e.g. DE 46 at 6; DE 52 at 4), which comes instead from
Hunt’s first prong, referenced above. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. Although Indiana Harbor
Belt reiterated during oral argument that it is indeed arguing only that the Union cannot
meet the third prong, it appears to conflate these two prongs in its briefing. To be clear,
Indiana Harbor Belt conceded in its motion to dismiss that the Union satisfied Hunt’s
first two prongs. (DE 36 at 5) It is too late to argue that those same claims now violate
Hunt’s first prong in the absence of a change in law or newly discovered facts. Caisse
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Nationale, 90 F.3d at 1269-70; Bank of Waunakee, 906 F.2d at 1191. Even so, since the
Union’s members could bring these claims in their own right via a class action, as
discussed above, the Union meets Hunt’s first prong, as well.
Although the Seventh Circuit has not spoken directly on this issue, Local 194 v.
Standard Brands does present a similar set of facts that leads me to believe the Union
should have standing in this matter. There, a union sought to represent its members in
a Title VII action alleging racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices by an
employer. Local 194, 540 F.2d at 865. The court held that “a union has standing as an
‘aggrieved person’ under Title VII to represent members who are victims of
discrimination” in part because “the reference to ‘aggrieved persons’ has been taken to
indicate an intent to broaden standing rather than restrict it.” Id. at 866. The court
further found that “[p]rivate enforcement suits are an essential means of obtaining
judicial enforcement of Title VII and of vindicating the important congressional policy
against discriminatory employment practices” and that “[t]he effectiveness of these
suits can be increased by allowing unions to place their financial resources and
expertise behind the suit.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).2
In addition, one court within this circuit has allowed a group of private plaintiffs
to pursue pattern-or-practice claims without certifying a class. Gantchar v. United
Airlines, Inc., Case No. 93-C-1457, 1995 WL 137053 at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 28, 1995).
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Although Indiana Harbor Belt correctly points out that Local 194 does not explicitly say the
plaintiff was pursuing pattern-or-practice claims, given the plaintiff’s claims of discrimination in hiring
and promotion, I suspect it may have been proceeding on that basis. Even if not, the case is still highly
instructive, particularly in the absence of any on-point cases to the contrary.
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Although the Gantchar court ultimately dismissed most of the plaintiffs on other
jurisdictional grounds, the court found that “[t]he present case is a type of nonclass case
where it is probably appropriate to apply pattern or practice rules” because the case
involved up to 32 plaintiffs alleging discriminatory hiring practices, as opposed to just
one plaintiff or a small group of plaintiffs. Id.; see also Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v.
Bd. of Ed. of the City of Chicago, 950 F.Supp.2d 984, 991 (N.D.Ill. 2013) (allowing union to
pursue pattern-or-practice claims under associational standing alongside three
individual plaintiffs who expressed intention to certify a class, but a class was not yet
certified).
As was the case in Local 194, there is something different about a union pressing
these types of claims versus a single private plaintiff or small group of plaintiffs. This
is simply not a case of one or a few individuals attempting to extrapolate a pattern of
behavior from one or a few isolated experiences as forbidden in the cases cited by
Indiana Harbor Belt. Instead, the complaint paints a disturbing picture of systemic
discrimination: a work place where African-American employees can’t get the training
they need to move up, are harshly disciplined for relatively minor infractions, endure
frequent racial slurs, and have even seen a noose displayed at their workplace – all of
which Indiana Harbor Belt has allegedly turned a blind eye to. If true, this could add
up to a pattern of systemwide discrimination.
Thus, given the similarity of these claims to those in Local 194, the Local 194
court’s clear intention to broaden rather than restrict the definition of who has standing
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to pursue discrimination claims under Title VII, and the complete absence of any onpoint authority to the contrary, the Union ought to be allowed to pursue its claims
against Indiana Harbor Belt. I do, however, concede that it is a close issue. As I said in
my prior order, “the law is a bit murky” in this area. (DE 41 at 9) But just because a
matter might be a close call doesn’t mean reconsideration is appropriate. Indiana
Harbor Belt has to convince me that I committed a “manifest error” and I don’t believe
that to be the case.
Because I have found that the Union may proceed with its non-class pattern-orpractice claims, I do not need to evaluate whether those claims meet Hunt’s third prong
– I already explained why that’s the case in detail in my previous order. (See DE 41) I
do, however, feel compelled to note that Hunt’s third prong is, in any event, prudential
— in other words, it’s not constitutionally mandated. United Food & Commercial Workers
Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 555 (1996). In fact, the Supreme Court
has indicated that once you satisfy the first two prongs, you may not even need to
satisfy the third. Id. at 556. As the Court has noted, “the third prong of the associational
standing test is best seen as focusing on these matters of administrative convenience
and efficiency, not on elements of a case or controversy within the meaning of the
Constitution.” Id. Given that, I don’t see how allowing a union to represent its
members in a discrimination claim against its members’ employer would run afoul of
this prong since it is certainly more efficient and expedient to have the Union present
the full picture in one lawsuit, rather than having these claims spread out amongst
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various individual lawsuits. Overall, since Indiana Harbor Belt has already conceded
that the Union meets the first two prongs (DE 36 at 5), “it is difficult to see a
constitutional necessity for anything more.”
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, I will DENY Indiana Harbor Belt’s Motion for
Reconsideration (DE 45).
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: October 7, 2014
s/Philip P. Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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