Pramuk v. Northwestern Medical Imaging

Filing 28

OPINION AND ORDER: Court GRANTS 21 Motion to Dismiss. The complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 12/23/2013. cc: Pramuk (tc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
SUSAN E. PRAMUK

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
VS.
)
)
NORTHWESTERN MEDICAL IMAGING, )
)
Defendant.
)

CAUSE NO.2:13-CV-068

OPINION AND ORDER
This

matter

is

before

the

Court

Dismiss, filed on August 28, 2013.

on

Defendant's

(DE #21).

Motion

to

For the reasons set

forth below, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the complaint is
DISMISSED with prejudice.

BACKGROUND
Pro
U.S.C.

§

se

plaintiff

1983

action,

Susan

E.

Pramuk

utilizing

a

(“Pramuk”),

form

provided

filed
by

the

this

42

Clerk’s

Office, against Northwestern Medical Imaging (“NMI”) on February 19,
2013.

(DE #1).

The complaint states the following:

Exploiting my results of MRI, to Cheryl Montalbow
Rahmany, possibly removing frames from moving
pictures and deleting specific frames, as to
conseal [sic] results, so that I would not
receive medical treatment.
I am a legal pro se
in the Court. Cheryl Montalbow Rahmany knows to
stay out of my medical.
-1-

(Comp. ¶ 1, pg. 2).
Pramuk then lists the following statutes as authority for the
suit:
VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000
et seq. Section Rehabilitation of Civil Rights
1973 29 U.S.C. Education Amendments of 1972 20
U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.)
Section 794, 8555 (ii) Title VI and XVI of the
Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. §§291 et seq
HIPAA 1996 (42 U.S.C. § 132 od-2)
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996
HIPAA (42 USC §1320 d-2)
(DE #1, pg. 2).
Pramuk asks for $500,000 in damages “plus all the monies to heal
this problem within my person.”

(DE #1, pg. 3).

Pramuk also asks

for the “arrest for the Northwestern Medical Imaging for changing
films an [sic] concealing evidence of worm larvae poisoning.”

(Id.).

On March 8, 2013, the Court dismissed the complaint for nonpayment of the filing fee.

(DE #4).

The suit was re-opened on April

5, 2013, after Pramuk paid the filing fee.

(DE #9).

instant Motion to Dismiss on August 28, 2013.

NMI filed the

(DE #21).

NMI asks

the Court to dismiss Pramuk's complaint for failure to state a claim
for

three

reasons:

(1)

Pramuk’s

complaint

does

not

comply

with

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8’s requirement that the complaint be
presented with intelligibility sufficient for counsel to determine
whether a valid claim is alleged and what it is; (2) NMI is not a
state actor, and (3) Pramuk has failed to state any claims against

-2-

NMI for violations of the multiple statutes listed in her complaint.
Pramuk did not file a response brief within the time allotted, and
the matter is now ripe for adjudication.

DISCUSSION
In determining the propriety of dismissal under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all facts alleged in
the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.
520 (7th Cir. 2001).

Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519,

A complaint is not required to contain detailed

factual allegations, but it is not enough merely that there might be
some conceivable set of facts that entitles the plaintiff to relief.
Bell

Atlantic

Corp.

v.

Twombly,

127

S.Ct.

1955,

1964-65

(2007),

abrogating in part Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

A

plaintiff has an obligation under Rule 8(a)(2) to provide the grounds
of his entitlement to relief, which requires more than labels and
conclusions.

Id. at 1965.

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should

be granted if the complaint fails to include sufficient facts to
state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

Ashcroft v.

Factual allegations, taken as

true, must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.

Id.

Moreover, a plaintiff may plead himself out of court if

the complaint includes allegations that show he cannot possibly be

-3-

entitled to the relief sought.

Jefferson v. Ambroz, 90 F.3d 1291,

1296-97 (7th Cir. 1996).
The Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
which

provides

a

cause

of

action

to

redress

the

violation

of

federally secured rights by a person acting under color of state law.
Burrell v. City of Mattoon, 378 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2004).

To state a

claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege violation of rights
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must
show that a person acting under color of state law committed the
alleged deprivation.

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).

The first

inquiry in every § 1983 case is whether a state actor has deprived
the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.
To state a claim under § 1983, it is essential that the person
who committed the alleged wrongful conduct was “acting under color of
state law.”

Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 284 (7th Cir. 1994).

If

the person did not act “under color of state law,” the action against
him must be dismissed.
(1982).

Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838

The United States Supreme Court defined the phrase “acting

under color of [state] law” as “misuse of power, possessed by virtue
of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed
with the authority of state law.”
(1961) (citations omitted).
actors,

and

private

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184

The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state

individuals
-4-

in

collaboration

with

state

officials, from using a “badge of authority” to deprive individuals
of rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S.

158, 161 (1992).
Here, Pramuk makes no allegations of state action by NMI.
Complaint

is

one

confusing

paragraph

followed

by

a

The

string

of

statutes, lacking any facts that could give rise to a claim under §
1983.

But even putting the state action problem aside, Pramuk has

failed to state a claim under each of the substantive statutes she
relies upon, as explained below.
Most of the statutes that Pramuk cites prohibit discrimination
in one context or another.

She cites to Title VI of Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq., which prohibits discrimination by
programs or activities that receive federal funds.

Similarly, Pramuk

cites to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681
et

seq.,

which

receiving
“Section

Federal

discrimination

financial

Rehabilitation

complaint.

by

assistance.

of

Civil

Rights

education

Pramuk
1973

29

also

programs
cites

U.S.C.”

in

to
her

The Court presumes that she intended to cite to the

Rehabilitation
prevents

prohibit

Act

of

discrimination

1973,

codified

against

those

as

29

with

U.S.C.

§

701,

disabilities

receiving federal funds under the statute.

by

which
those

There is nothing in

Pramuk’s complaint other than the citation to these statutes that
suggests

she

is

alleging

discrimination

of

any

kind,

and

her

complaint contains no allegations that NMI was receiving federal
-5-

financial assistance.
believes

NMI

would

Pramuk has wholly failed to explain why she
be

liable

under

any

of

the

aforementioned

statutes.
Pramuk additionally cites tp “Section 794, 8555 (ii) Title VI
and XVI of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 291 et seq).”
The Court presumes that Pramuk intended to cite to Sections 794 and
855 of the Public Health Services Act, which are codified as 42
U.S.C. §§ 295m and 296g, and additionally Title VI and Title XVI of
the Public Health Service Act, which are codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 291
and 300.

42 U.S.C. §§ 295m and 296g prohibit discrimination based on

sex for admissions to any school of medicine if the school wishes to
receive grants, loans, or subsidies from the federal government.
There are no allegations in the complaint that could give rise to a
claim under these statutes.

42 U.S.C. § 291 exists to improve

medical facilities, and also appears wholly irrelevant to the facts
alleged in the complaint.

Likewise, 42 U.S.C. § 300 relates to

government assistance given to family planning services, and Pramuk
makes no allegations that would give rise to any claim pursuant to §
300.
Pramuk

also

cites

the

Health

Insurance

Portability

and

Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq.
Pramuk cannot bring a claim pursuant to HIPAA because congress did
not

create

a

private

right

of

action

under

Phillip, 419 Fed.Appx. 658, 659 (7th Cir. 2011).
-6-

HIPPA.

Carpenter

v.

In

short,

Pramuk’s

complaint

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.

is

woefully

inadequate

under

It fails to include sufficient

facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face and
must be dismissed.

In fact, the complaint is not just deficient - it

is frivolous - and the dismissal will therefore be with prejudice.

CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, the Motion (DE #21) is GRANTED.
Pramuk’s complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

DATED:

December 23, 2013

/s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

-7-