Craig v. Lane et al

Filing 44

OPINION AND ORDER: Court DENIES 17 Motion for a Preliminary Injunction; DENIES 32 Motion for "contempt"; and DENIES 16 Motion to Reconsider. Signed by Judge Joseph S Van Bokkelen on 7/25/2013. cc: Craig (tc)

United States District Court
Northern District of Indiana
JASON R. CRAIG,

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Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID LANE, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:13-CV-92 JVB

OPINION AND ORDER
Jason R. Craig, a pro se prisoner, filed a motion for preliminary injunction and a motion
to reconsider the screening order. (DE 16, 17.) The court addresses each in turn.
I.

Motion for Preliminary Injunction
In his motion for a preliminary injunction, Craig complains that he has serious medical

problems that have been ignored since his arrival at the Porter County Jail, specifically, that he is
not receiving adequate treatment for sciatica and mental health issues. (DE 17.) He moves for an
order requiring David Lain (incorrectly sued as “David Lane”), the Sheriff of Porter County, to
arrange for immediate “examinations and a plan of treatment by a qualified specialist in pain, and
one in mental health,” and to carry out whatever treatment they recommend. (DE 17-1 at 3.) Sheriff
Lain has responded to the motion. (DE 28.) The deadline has passed for Craig to file a reply, and
to date, none has been received. Instead, Craig filed a motion asking that the Sheriff be held in
“contempt” for failing to file a timely response.1 (DE 32.) The Sheriff did file a timely response,
however, so this motion will be denied.

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It appears that Craig’s motion crossed in the mail with the Sheriff’s response, which was mailed to Craig
at the jail on July 1, 2013. (DE 28 at 15.) The court waited 14 days beyond the deadline for Craig’s reply, but as
stated none has been received, although he filed various documents pertaining to other issues during this period. (See
DE 30, 31, 32, 33, 39.)

“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be
granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v.
Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, the moving party must
demonstrate that he or she has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, lacks an adequate
remedy at law, and will suffer irreparable harm if immediate relief is not granted. Girl Scouts of
Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of U.S., Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1086 (7th Cir. 2008).
Under the Eighth Amendment, inmates are entitled to adequate medical care.2 Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To establish liability, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective
and subjective component by showing: (1) his medical need was objectively serious; and (2) the
defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that medical need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834 (1994). A medical need is “serious” if it is one that a physician has diagnosed as mandating
treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for
a doctor’s attention. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Deliberate indifference
means that the defendant “acted in an intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant
must have known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do
anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily done so.” Board v.
Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted).
For a medical professional to be deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical needs, he or
she must make a decision that represents “such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base

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The complaint reflects that during part of these events Craig was a pretrial detainee, during which time
the Fourteenth rather than the Eighth Amendment applied. Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 473 (7th Cir. 2009). The
governing standards are functionally equivalent, however, and “anything that would violate the Eighth Amendment
would also violate the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.

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the decision on such a judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). A mere
disagreement with medical professionals about the best course of treatment does not establish
deliberate indifference, nor does negligence or even medical practice, since “the Eighth Amendment
does not codify common law torts.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011). Moreover,
prisoners are not entitled to demand specific types of medical care, nor are they entitled to the “best
care possible.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Maggert v. Hanks, 131
F.3d 670, 671-72 (7th Cir. 1997) (“A prison is not required by the Eighth Amendment to give a
prisoner care that is as good as he would receive if he were a free person, let alone an affluent free
person.”). When an inmate has received some form of treatment for a medical condition, to establish
deliberate indifference he must show that this treatment was “so blatantly inappropriate as to
evidence intentional mistreatment likely to seriously aggravate his condition.” Arnett, 658 F.3d at
751.
Here, the evidence shows that upon Craig’s arrival at the jail in September 2012, he reported
to a nurse that he was on several medications: Thorazine, Xanax, Neurontin, Wellbutrin, Norco,
Soma, and Cymbalta. (DE 28-2, Harris Aff. ¶ 10.) Nursing staff called several different pharmacies
to confirm current prescriptions for these medications, and they were able to confirm all but the
Neurontin. (Id.) Craig was later seen and prescribed Thorazine by the jail physician, Dr. Nadir AlShami, who diagnosed him with schizoid affective disorder and drug addiction.3 (Id. ¶ 11.)
Thorazine is a drug commonly used to treat schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders. (Id.) A few
weeks later, Craig complained of some side effects from the Thorazine, including facial twitching,

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Jail medical records reflect that Craig has a history of heroin and cocaine abuse. (DE 28-2, Medical
Records at 22, 33.) A few days after his arrival at the jail, a nurse noted that he appeared to be having withdrawal
symptoms. (Id. at 8.) The doctor prescribed two medications to address his withdrawal symptoms, and he was also
monitored by nursing staff twice a day during a five-day period. (Id.; DE 28-2, Harris Aff. ¶¶ 8-9.)

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and also complained about back pain. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) On October 9, 2012, he was seen again by the
doctor, who prescribed Artane to address the side effects of Thorazine. (Id. ¶ 13.) The doctor
examined Craig’s back but did not find any limitation in his range of motion. (Id.)
In January 2013, the doctor saw Craig again to assess his progress, and decided to change
his medication from Thorazine to Haldol, an anti-psychotic medication also used to treat
schizophrenia. (Id. ¶ 14.) His notes reflect that he also diagnosed Craig with a personality disorder.
(Id.) A few weeks later Craig complained about side effects of Haldol, and in response Dr. Al-Shami
ordered an increase in the Artane. (Id. ¶ 15.) Craig was seen again by the doctor in February 2013,
and complained that he was not doing well on Haldol. (Id. ¶ 16.) The doctor put him back on
Thorazine, and also prescribed Neurontin, an anti-inflammatory pain medication, to address what
Craig described as shooting pains in his back. (Id.)
On March 4, 2013, Craig sent a letter to Sheriff Lain asking to be seen by a psychiatrist. (DE
28-1, Lain Aff. ¶ 3.) In response, on March 11, 2013, Craig was taken to be evaluated by an outside
mental health provider, Porter Starke Services, Inc. (“PSS”). (Id. ¶ 4; DE 28-2, Harris Aff. ¶ 18.) A
doctor at PSS recommended that Craig be treated with monthly injections of Risperdal, a powerful
anti-psychotic medication. (DE 28-2, Harris Aff. ¶ 19.) The jail complied with that recommendation,
and since that date Craig has been receiving regular injections of the drug. (Id.; DE 28-2, Medical
Records at 9-21.)
In April 2013, Craig was seen again by Dr. Al-Shami and reported that he wanted the
Neurontin increased due to increased pain in his back. (DE 28-2, Harris Aff. ¶ 17.) In response, Dr.
Al-Shami increased the dosage. (Id.) Craig was seen again by Dr. Al-Shami in June 2013, and
reported increased pain in his right leg and back, although the doctor’s notes reflect that during his

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assessment, Craig did not appear to be in acute distress. (Id. ¶ 18.) His diagnosis was sciatica,
“chronic pain—not serious.” (Id.) The doctor prescribed ibuprofen in addition to the Neurontin for
pain. (Id.)
In May 2013, Craig was seen again by a doctor from PSS, who recommended that the
Risperdal be continued, and that he also be given Wellbutrin. (Id. ¶ 20.) The jail complied with these
recommendations and gave him the additional medication. (Id.) Craig was seen again at PSS on June
18, 2013, and it was determined that his Wellbutrin should be increased. (Id. ¶ 21.) The jail complied
with this recommendation. (Id.)
As of July 1, 2013, the jail has a new medical care provider, Correctional Care Solutions
(“CCS”), which will provide a registered nurse to be on duty 24 hours a day; licensed practical
nurses to be on duty during day and evening hours; a nurse practitioner who will be at the jail twice
a week; a mental health counselor who will be present at the jail 40 hours a week; and a physician
and psychiatrist who will be on call 24 hours a day. (Id. ¶ 24; DE 28-1, Lain Aff. ¶¶ 5-7.) Craig will
be receiving care from these providers during his remaining time at the jail. (DE 28-2, Lain Aff. ¶ 7.)
Based on the above, Craig has not demonstrated that he is entitled to the extraordinary
remedy of a preliminary injunction. Far from establishing that his medical problems are being
ignored, the record shows that he is presently under the care of medical professionals and is
receiving several medications to address his health issues. Craig apparently disagrees with the
medical judgments of these providers and believes they should be doing more for him. However,
the Constitution does not entitle him to the medical treatment of his choice, nor does it entitle him
to care that is good as he would receive if he were a free person, let alone an affluent free person.
Maggert, 131 F.3d at 671-72; Forbes, 112 F.3d at 267. Based on the documents before the court,

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Craig has not demonstrated that the treatment he is presently receiving is “so blatantly inappropriate
as to evidence intentional mistreatment likely to seriously aggravate his condition.” Arnett, 658 F.3d
at 751. Accordingly, his motion for a preliminary injunction will be denied.
II.

Motion to Reconsider
Craig also moves for reconsideration of the screening order, specifically, the dismissal of his

claim alleging denial of access to the courts. (DE 16.) As was fully explained in the screening order,
a prisoner can only proceed on a claim for denial of access to the courts if he identifies some
prejudice to a potentially meritorious legal claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); Marshall
v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2006). Craig did not do so in his complaint, nor does he do
so in the present motion.
If Craig’s complaint left any doubt, his motion makes clear that he is complaining about a
temporary lack of access to writing materials and the delay of his legal mail during a two-week
period when he was housed in segregation for disciplinary reasons. (DE 16-1.) In his motion he
argues that he was prejudiced by these conditions because the lack of writing materials caused him
to file a “hastily prepared complaint” in this case. (DE 16-1 at 2.) The record belies this argument.
Craig states that he was released from segregation on April 16, 2013 (DE 16-1 at 2), and his
amended complaint was not due until May 1, 2013. (See DE 7.) He could have requested additional
time to prepare his complaint if he felt it was needed, but he did not do so; instead he filed it on
April 26, 2013, several days prior to the deadline. (DE 9.) This pleading cannot reasonably be
characterized as “hastily prepared.” It was 55 pages long with attachments, cogent, and highly
detailed. Based on Craig’s allegations, the court permitted him to proceed on claims against nine
individual defendants, including the sheriff, and on a policy claim against the private company that

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provided medical care at the jail. (DE 13.) Under these circumstances, Craig has not plausibly
alleged that his right of access to the courts was denied. See Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422,
1430 (7th Cir. 1996) (inmate’s ability to file current lawsuit demonstrated that his right of access
to the courts had not been unlawfully infringed). In short, the court finds no basis in the motion to
warrant reconsideration of the screening order.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) DENIES the motion for a preliminary injunction (DE 17);
(2) DENIES the motion for “contempt” (DE 32); and
(3) DENIES the motion to reconsider (DE 16).
SO ORDERED on July 25, 2013.
s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen
Joseph S. Van Bokkelen
United States District Judge
Hammond Division

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