Holland v. Cerberus Capital Management LP et al
Filing
103
OPINION AND ORDER: Defendants Cerberus Capital Management, LP, Stephen Feinberg, and Robert Nardellis Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Verified Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and (b)(2) 28 , is GRANTED. The Clerk is ORDERED to DISMISS t he federal claims against these defendants, Cerberus Capital Management, LP, Stephen Feinberg, and Robert Nardelli, WITH PREJUDICE and the state claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Motion for Oral Argument on Cerberus Defendants Motion to Di smiss Plaintiffs Verified Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(B)(6) and (B)(2) 65 is DENIED. Defendants, Bosak Motors Auto Dealership, et al.s Motion to Dismiss 57 is GRANTED. The Clerk is ORDERED to DISMISS the federal claims against these defendants, Bosak Motors Auto Dealership, Mr. and Mrs. Skip Bosak, John Schultheis, Jonathan Jeffries, and Mike Grzbowski WITH PREJUDICE and the state claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendants Motion to Dismiss 69 is GRANTED. The Clerk i s ORDERED to DISMISS the federal claims against theseDefendants, Kimberly Johnson and TD Auto Finance LLC, Successor in interest to Chrysler Financial LLC, WITH PREJUDICE and the state claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendants Motion to Dism iss 70 , is duplicative and therefore DENIED AS MOOT. The Request for Default Judgment Sum Certain by the Clerk of the Court, 71 is DENIED. The Request for Clerks Entry ofDefault Judgment, 37 is DENIED. The Clerk is ALSO ORDERED to DISMISS th e federal claims against these defendants, Paul Davis, Bull Dog Towing, and the CEO of Bull Dog Towing, WITH PREJUDICE and DISMISS the state claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Application for Judgment by Default Sum Certain 99 , is DENIED. The Request for the Court to Issue an Order for the Defendants toRemove Damaging Credit Information From the Credit Reporting Agencies, 100 is DENIED. The relief requested in the Brief on Treble Damages Pursuant to State Law, 101 is DENIED. Finally, the Clerk is ORDERED to CLOSE THIS CASE. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 11/18/2014. (cc: Holland) (rmn)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
ROBERT HOLLAND
)
)
)
)
) No. 2:13-cv-00491
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
vs.
CERBERUS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT,
et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the: (1) Defendants’
Cerberus Capital Management, LP, Stephen Feinberg, and Robert
Nardelli’s
Pursuant
Motion
to
Fed.
to
R.
Dismiss
Civ.
P.
Plaintiff’s
12(b)(6)
and
Verified
(b)(2),
Complaint
filed
by
Defendants, Cerberus Capital Management, LP, Stephen Feinberg, and
Robert Nardelli, on June 17, 2014 (DE #28); (2) Motion for Oral
Argument on Cerberus Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Verified Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(B)(6) and (B)(2),
filed by Cerberus Capital Management, LP, Robert Nardelli, and
Stephen Feinberg, on July 23, 2014 (DE #65); (3) Defendants, Bosak
Motors Auto Dealership, et al.’s Motion to Dismiss, filed by
Defendants, Bosak Motors Auto Dealership, Mr. & Mrs. Skip Bosak,
John Schultheis, Jonathan Jeffries, and Mike Grzbowski, on July 14,
2014
(DE
#57);
(4)
Defendants’
Motion
to
Dismiss,
filed
by
Defendants, Kimberly Johnson and TD Auto Finance LLC, Successor in
interest to Chrysler Financial LLC, on July 24, 2014 (DE #69); (5)
Defendants’
Motion
to
Dismiss,
filed
by
Defendants,
Kimberly
Johnson and TD Auto Finance LLC, Successor in interest to Chrysler
Financial LLC, on July 24, 2014 (DE #70); (6) “Request for Default
Judgment
Sum
Certain
by
the
Clerk
of
the
Court,”
filed
by
Plaintiff, Robert Holland, on July 29, 2014 (DE #71); (7) “Request
for Clerk’s Entry of Default Judgment,” filed by Plaintiff, Robert
Holland, on June 19, 2014 (DE #37); (8) “Application for Judgment
by Default Sum Certain,” filed by Plaintiff, Robert Holland, on
November 10, 2014 (DE #99); (9) “Request for the Court to Issue an
Order for the Defendants to Remove Damaging Credit Information From
the Credit Reporting Agencies,” filed by Plaintiff, Robert Holland,
on November 10, 2014 (DE #100); and (10) “Brief on Treble Damages
Pursuant to State Law,” filed by Plaintiff, Robert Holland, on
November 10, 2014 (DE #101).
For the reasons set forth below: (1) Defendants’ Cerberus
Capital Management, LP, Stephen Feinberg, and Robert Nardelli’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint Pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and (b)(2) (DE #28), is GRANTED.
The Clerk is
ORDERED to DISMISS the federal claims against these defendants,
Cerberus Capital Management, LP, Stephen Feinberg, and Robert
Nardelli, WITH PREJUDICE and the state claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. (2) The Motion for Oral Argument on Cerberus Defendants’
2
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint Pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(B)(6) and (B)(2) (DE #65) is DENIED. (3) Defendants,
Bosak Motors Auto Dealership, et al.’s Motion to Dismiss (DE #57)
is GRANTED.
The Clerk is ORDERED to DISMISS the federal claims
against these defendants, Bosak Motors Auto Dealership, Mr. and
Mrs. Skip Bosak, John Schultheis, Jonathan Jeffries, and Mike
Grzbowski WITH PREJUDICE and the state claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. (4) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (DE #69) is GRANTED.
The Clerk is ORDERED to DISMISS the federal claims against these
Defendants, Kimberly Johnson and TD Auto Finance LLC, Successor in
interest to Chrysler Financial LLC, WITH PREJUDICE and the state
claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
(5) Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (DE #70), is duplicative and therefore DENIED AS MOOT; (6)
The “Request for Default Judgment Sum Certain by the Clerk of the
Court,” (DE #71), is DENIED. (7) The “Request for Clerk’s Entry of
Default Judgment,” (DE #37), is DENIED.
The Clerk is ALSO ORDERED
to DISMISS the federal claims against these defendants, Paul Davis,
Bull Dog Towing, and the CEO of Bull Dog Towing, WITH PREJUDICE and
DISMISS the state claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
(8) The “Application
for Judgment by Default Sum Certain” (DE #99), is DENIED.
(9) The
“Request for the Court to Issue an Order for the Defendants to
Remove
Damaging
Credit
Information
Agencies,” (DE #100), is DENIED.
From
the
Credit
Reporting
(10) The relief requested in the
3
“Brief on Treble Damages Pursuant to State Law,” (DE #101), is
DENIED.
Finally, the Clerk is ORDERED to CLOSE THIS CASE.
BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff, Robert Holland, filed his complaint against
multiple defendants on December 30, 2013 (DE #1). In his difficult
to read and rambling 35- page complaint, he sets forth several
different allegations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”) violations.
Holland is no stranger to
the Court and has been accused by this Court before of filing cases
that are “fantastic,” “delusional,” and “malicious.”
See, e.g.,
Holland v. City of Gary, No. 2:12-CV-62-TS, 2012 WL 974882, at *3
(N.D. Ind. Mar. 21, 2012).
In a nutshell, the allegations of the complaint are as
follows.
In October 2007, Holland purchased a 2006 Chrysler 300
plus
extended
an
warranty
from
Defendant,
Bosak
Motors
in
Merrillville, Indiana, and obtained financing for the purchase
through Defendant, Chrysler Financial, LLC.
Holland
alleges
he
relied
on
“express
(Compl. ¶¶ 53, 61.)
representations
and
warranties” made by Defendant, Mike Grzbowski (a Bosak salesman)
about the financial condition of Chrysler and the dependability of
the Chrysler 300 and that it did not have any problems and/or major
manufacturing defects.
(Id. ¶¶ 54-55, 61.)
Plaintiff alleges
that Bosak knew at the time of sale that the vehicle “had numerous
4
repeated mechanical problems under normal driving conditions . . .
.”
(Id. ¶ 62.)
Holland claims on February 27, 2009, his Chrysler 300 was
towed to Bosak for repair to its ignition switch, and after Bosak’s
repair department was unable to secure a new ignition switch part
after the car had been in the shop for a month, one was retrieved
from the junk yard and used to fix his car on March 27, 2009.
¶¶ 81, 105-06.)
Plaintiff alleges he was “not compensated for the
manufacturing problems and had to pay for the repairs.”
113.)
(Id.
(Id. ¶
He also alleges that on July 3, 2010, Chrysler Financial
directed that his Chrysler 300 be repossessed by Defendant, Bull
Dog Towing, despite Plaintiff’s claim that he made his monthly car
payment the day before his car was towed.
(Id. ¶¶ 125, 129.)
Finally, he alleges the Chrysler 300 was sold at auction without
compensation to him.
(Id. ¶¶ 146-47.)
These facts basically
comprise Plaintiff’s claim that he financed the purchase of a car,
the car had mechanical problems, and it was repossessed for
nonpayment despite the fact that he allegedly made payment the day
before his car was towed.
(Id. ¶¶ 61, 78, 131.)
Plaintiff’s theory of recovery is much more convoluted.
To
support his RICO claims, Plaintiff has alleged that in May 2007,
Cerberus acquired a majority stake in Chrysler, an investment he
conclusorily
asserts
was
made
to
“establish
.
.
.
illegal
fraudulent strong arm policies and practices with [Chrysler’s]
5
customers, dealers and suppliers, etc. in order to increase cash
flows and reduce expenses.”
alleges
that
the
$7.4
(Id. ¶¶ 28, 31.)
billion
acquisition
was
Plaintiff also
not
for
any
legitimate business purpose, but “to establish and/or maintain[] an
entirely new business with new aggressive illegal operational
policies and procedures” and that Cerberus “used the Chrysler and
Chrysler Financial Enterprises (and their appearance of legitimacy
to perpetrate more, and less easily discovered, criminal acts than
it could do on it[s] own) to obtain money, property and other
assets generated by a pattern of racketeering activity.”
(Id. ¶¶
37-38.)
Holland
Cerberus,
also
along
alleges
with
all
that
the
after
other
it
acquired
Defendants,
Chrysler,
comprised
an
unlawful association-in-fact and “seized influence and/or control
of
Chrysler
companies
as
objectives.”
and
a
Chrysler
criminal
(Id. ¶ 42.)
Financial
enterprise
Assets
to
and
further
utilized
its
the
criminal
In furtherance of the supposed scheme,
Plaintiff suggests that Defendant Stephen Feinberg, the CEO of
Cerberus, installed Defendant Robert Nardelli “to head Chrysler .
. . and implement Cerberus’ new policies and practices” and that
those policies and practices led to “considerable pressure from
Chrysler and Chrysler Financial CEO Robert Nardelli through . . .
Cerberus to increase performance through its illegal collections
activities, cost reductions, through directives to its dealerships
6
to help increase revenues, decrease expenses (and costs) and
efforts to obtain favorable financing for operations.” (Id. ¶¶ 44,
50.)
Supposedly acting in concert, Plaintiff claims Defendants
committed the following alleged predicate acts of racketeering
activity giving his to his RICO claims: (1) making “materially
false deceptive misrepresentations” to induce Plaintiff to buy a
car (id. ¶ 52); (2) holding his car hostage, in bad faith, for a
month to make repairs to his ignition switch (id. ¶¶ 68, 106-07);
(3) committing extortionate trespass, wrongful repossession and
theft/conversion
by
repossessing
the
car
despite
Plaintiff’s
assurances he was not delinquent in his payment (id. ¶¶ 119, 132);
and (4) unlawful collection of a debt, defamation and damage to
credit resulting from the repossession (id. ¶ 155).
further
asserts
Defendants
participated
in
a
Plaintiff
wide-ranging
conspiracy because they “were NOT acting in the course and scope of
their employment in the traditional rendering of their services but
were acting in concert committing predicate acts of racketeering
that all occurred in a related concerted fashion in connection to
the Chrysler 300, its repairs and warranties.” Id. ¶ 179 (emphasis
in original).
The instant motions to dismiss were filed by Defendants,
Cerberus Capital Management, LP, Stephen Feinberg, and Robert
Nardelli (hereinafter “Cerberus Defendants”) (DE #28) pursuant to
7
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and (b)(2)1; Defendants,
Bosak Motors Auto Dealership, Mr. and Mrs. Skip Bosak, John
Schultheis, Jonathan Jeffries, and Mike Grzbowski (hereinafter
“Bosak
Defendants”)
(DE
#57)
pursuant
to
Rule
12(b)(6);
and
Defendants, Kimberly Johnson and TD Auto Finance, LLC, Successor in
interest to Chrysler Financial LLC (hereinafter “TDAF”) (DE #69)
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).2
They move to dismiss all the claims
in the complaint: Count I for violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. §
1962(a) and Indiana Civil Rico; Count II for violation of RICO, 18
U.S.C.
§
1962(c)
and
Indiana
Civil
RICO;
and
Count
III
for
violation of RICO 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) and Indiana Civil RICO.
The
motions to dismiss are fully briefed and ready for adjudication.3
Three parties in this case have not appeared.
Defendants,
Paul Davis, “CEO Bull Dog Towing,” and Bull Dog Towing.
made
an
entry
of
default
as
to
Paul
Davis.
The Clerk
(DE
#60.)
Additionally, this Court made an entry of default as to the CEO of
1
The Cerberus Defendants argue that to the extent that a claim based
upon the Indiana RICO might survive, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction
over the Cerberus Defendants, and the Court should dismiss under Rule
12(b)(2). As elucidated later in this Order, the Court finds that Plaintiff
failed to properly state federal RICO claims, thus all the federal claims have
been dismissed prior to trial. It is this Court’s practice to dismiss without
prejudice state supplemental claims whenever all federal claims have been
dismissed. See Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999).
Thus, the Court need not address this argument under Rule 12(b)(2), and this
case will be analyzed under the 12(b)(6) standard.
2
Defendants, Kimberly Johnson and TD Auto Finance, LLC, Successor in
interest to Chrysler Financial LLC (“TDAF”) filed another motion to dismiss,
also dated July 24, 2014 (DE #70). It appears to be word for word the same as
the document at DE #69, and is therefore denied as moot.
3
Plaintiff also filed a “Rico Case Statement,” on July 31, 2014 (DE
#78), and this Court has given it the weight to which it is entitled.
8
Bull Dog Towing and Bull Dog Towing on October 8, 2014 (DE #94).
Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment as to Defendants, the
CEO of Bull Dog Towing and Bull Dog Towing on June 19, 2014 (DE
#37).
He also filed a motion for default judgment against Paul
Davis on July 29, 2014 (DE #71).
In support of these motions,
Plaintiff filed a lengthy affidavit with attachments detailing his
alleged damages.
$41,833,455
in
defendants.
Id.
(DE #32.)
total
Plaintiff stated he was seeking
punitive
damages
against
the
various
On November 4, 2014, this Court held a hearing
that was set aside for Plaintiff to prove his damages for the
defaulted defendants, at which Plaintiff appeared but Paul Davis,
the CEO of Bull Dog Towing, and Bull Dog Towing did not appear.
However, the Court informed Plaintiff at this hearing that it
believed the allegations of the complaint were not sufficient to
establish legal claims.
Plaintiff then filed another application
for default judgment on November 10, 2014, this time seeking
damages in the amount of $66,123,878.90.
(DE #99.)
DISCUSSION
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the
dismissal of a complaint, or any portion of a complaint, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
“To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
9
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal quotations omitted); see also Ray v. City of
Chicago, 629 F.3d 660, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted)
(“While the federal pleading standard is quite forgiving . . . the
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”).
A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561 (2007)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Plus, Iqbal
requires that a plaintiff plead content which allows this Court to
draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
alleged misconduct.
556 U.S. at 678.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal
Rule
of
Civil
reasonable
Procedure
inferences
12(b)(6),
that
favor
the
the
court
must
plaintiff,
draw
all
construe
the
allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff,
and
accept
as
true
allegations in the complaint.
Regulation,
300
F.3d
750,
all
well-pleaded
a
motion
to
and
Thompson v. Ill. Dep't of Prof'l
753
(7th
Cir.
2002);
Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1991).
withstand
facts
dismiss,
10
a
complaint
must
Perkins
v.
In order to
allege
the
“operative facts” upon which each claim is based.
Kyle v. Morton
High Sch., 144 F.3d 448, 454-55 (7th Cir. 1998); Lucien v. Preiner,
967 F.2d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 1992).
A plaintiff is required to
include allegations in the complaint that “plausibly suggest that
the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above
a ‘speculative level’ ” and “if they do not, the plaintiff pleads
itself out of court.”
E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc.,
496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting in part Twombly, 550
U.S. at 569 n. 14 (2007)).
“Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even
if doubtful in fact).”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotation marks,
ellipsis, citations and footnote omitted). Thus, a “plaintiff must
do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of
an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened to
her that might be redressed by the law.”
Swanson v. Citibank,
N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original).
The Court notes that Plaintiff is appearing pro se in this
matter. Generally, although "pro se litigants are masters of their
own complaints," and "[d]istrict judges have no obligation to act
as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants," Myles v. United
States, 416 F.3d 551, 552 (7th Cir. 2005), a document filed pro se
is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
11
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007). However, “on a motion to dismiss, courts are not
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (quotation marks omitted)). In this case,
the Court notes that Holland was a former attorney and purports to
have been “an attorney that practices law in the state of Indiana”
“at all material time relevant in [his] complaint.”
According
to
the
Seventh
Circuit,
“[a]s
a
(Compl. ¶ 6.)
former
attorney,
[Holland] has only the most tenuous claim to the more forgiving
pleading standards we afford typical pro se plaintiffs.”). Weston
v. Illinois Dep’t Of Human Services, 433 Fed. Appx. 480, 482 n.1
(7th Cir. 2011).
No matter what, even a liberal construction of
the complaint is not “an invitation to apply RICO to new purposes
that Congress never intended.”
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S.
170, 183 (1993).
This Court recently noted that “RICO was never intended to
turn garden-variety state law fraud claims into federal RICO
actions.”
Evan v. JP Morgan Chase Credit Cards, No. 2:10-CV-246,
2011 WL 2946134, at *3 (N.D. Ind. July 21, 2011) (citing Jennings
v. Auto Meter Prods., Inc., 495 F.3d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 2007)).
Yet, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has done exactly that.
Plaintiff Fails To State a Claim Under 1962(c) Because There
12
Are No Adequately Pled Predicate Acts of Racketeering
Activity
It appears from the complaint that Plaintiff has charged all
Defendants in Count II with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c),
which makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly
or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through
a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.”
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
The necessary elements of a RICO claim under
section 1962(c) are: “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through
a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.”
Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge
Merchant Servs., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 778 (7th Cir. 1994) (quotation
omitted); see also Crissen v. Gupta, No. 2:12-CV-00355, 2014 WL
301615, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 28, 2014) (reciting same elements).
Additionally, a plaintiff must allege and prove the existence of
two distinct entities: (1) a person; and (2) an enterprise. Cedric
Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161 (2001).
First, Defendants argue that this count must be dismissed due
to Plaintiffs' failure to adequately plead acts of mail fraud or
any predicate acts of racketeering activity.4
4
Not every alleged
The Court pauses to note that the three counts of action are contained
in 2 pages of the 35-page complaint. (Compl., pp. 33-34.) Plaintiff merely
recites the statutory language of RICO, and incorporates hundreds of earlier
paragraphs of the complaint (for example, paragraphs 1 - 190 are incorporated
in Count II) (Compl. ¶ 191). This is simply insufficient under Rule 8(a)(2)
and Rule 9(b)’s requirement of particularity regarding fraud. See, e.g.,
13
bad act constitutes racketeering activity under RICO - the federal
RICO statute enumerates an exclusive list of specific offenses that
qualify as predicate acts of “racketeering activity” for purposes
of RICO liability. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1); McDonald v. Schencker,
18 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal of RICO claim
where plaintiff failed to plead a racketeering activity under
Section 1961(1)).
Regarding the Cerberus Defendants, Plaintiff has failed to
plead that any of them committed even a single predicate act of
racketeering activity themselves, thus they cannot be liable as
RICO defendants.
(Pls.’ Mem., pp. 8-12.)
See Pringle v. Garcia,
No. 2:09-cv-022-PPS-PRC, 2014 WL 1651976, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 23,
2014) (dismissing RICO claim where plaintiff failed to plead that
defendant personally committed requisite predicate acts).
In response, Plaintiff merely states that his predicate acts
were “clearly stated in the Complaint. . . and included mail fraud,
wire
fraud,
collection
of
bank
debt,
fraud,
extortion,
harassment,
fraud,
intimidation,
conversion,
unlawful
etc.”
and
contends “Indiana Civil RICO requir[es] less stringent claims.”
Arnold v. Alphatec Spine, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-714, 2014 WL 2896838, at *11 n.15
(S.D. Ohio June 26, 2014) (“incorporation into a single claim of approximately
100 incoherently pled paragraphs wholly fails to provide ‘a short and plain
statement of the claim;’” citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); Sterling Nat’l
Mortg., Co., Inc. v. Infinite Title Solutions, LLC, No. 10-22147, 2011 WL
1303225, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2011) (“even if [the Court] were able to
find the makings of a conspiracy somewhere within the 217 paragraphs
[plaintiff] incorporates by reference in [the RICO conspiracy count], it would
be insufficient to satisfy [plaintiff’s] obligations under Rule 9(b).”).
14
(Pl.’s Resp., DE #58, pp. 12-13.)
Nevertheless, both federal (and
Indiana Civil) RICO still only include specific listed offenses as
racketeering activity giving rise to predicate acts. See 18 U.S.C.
§
1961(1);
Ind.
Code
§
35-45-6-1(e).
Moreover,
Plaintiff’s
allegations of claims sounding in extortion, intimidation, unlawful
collection of a debt, harassment, general fraud, and conversion
against Defendants TDAF are either not in the defined terms under
the statutes, or they are inadequately pled and give no notice for
the basis of the claim.
The allegations of mail fraud, wire fraud and bank fraud, are
among the enumerated racketeering activities in § 1961(1); however,
they are subject to the heightened pleading standard set forth in
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires
a plaintiff to plead all allegations of fraud with particularity.5
See Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 597 (7th
Cir. 2001) (“allegations of fraud in a civil RICO complaint are
subject to the heightened pleading standard of Fed. R. Civ. P.
9(b), which requires a plaintiff to plead all averments of fraud
with particularity.”);
Emery v. American General Finance, Inc.,71
F.3d 1343, 1348 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating to prevail in a RICO case,
where the acts are of fraud, “the circumstances of each act must be
pleaded with particularity.”).
In other words, a plaintiff is
5
The complaint alleges “racketeering activity” of “mail fraud, wire
fraud, and bank fraud.” (Compl. ¶ 174.)
15
required to explain how the predicate act of mail fraud, wire
fraud, or bank fraud constitutes "racketeering activity." Williams
v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp., 351 F.3d 294, 298 (7th Cir. 2003).
This is done by explaining how each element of the predicate act is
satisfied.
Id. at 299.
The elements of mail and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. sections 1341
and 1343, are: "(1) the defendant's participation in a scheme to
defraud; (2) defendant's commission of the act with intent to
defraud;
and
(3)
use
of
the
mails
or
wire
communication
in
furtherance of the fraudulent scheme." United States v. Walker, 9
F.3d 1245, 1249 (7th Cir. 1993).
In order to satisfy this
standard, a RICO plaintiff must allege “the identity of the person
who made the representation, the time, place and content of the
misrepresentation, and the method by which the misrepresentation
was communicated to the plaintiff."
Slaney, 244 F.3d at 599
(citation omitted); Windy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v.
CIT Technology Financing Services, Inc., 536 F.3d 663, 668 (7th
Cir.
2008)
(reciting
the
required
circumstances
of
fraud);
Hefferman v. Bass, 467 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 2006) (also listing
facts that must be alleged in detail).
In a case involving
multiple defendants, like this one, "the complaint should inform
each defendant of the nature of his alleged participation of the
fraud." Vicom, 20 F.3d at 778 (quotation omitted).
In response to all the defendants’ arguments that he failed to
16
plead
mail
and
wire
fraud
with
the
requisite
particularity,
Plaintiff argues he met his burden because he “gave his personal
knowledge of the mail and wire fraud” and could not provide more
specifics because “[o]bviously, a person does not keep information
about every person they communicate with.” (Resp., DE #67, p. 11.)
Even pleading the entirety of one’s personal knowledge may not be
enough. See, e.g., Cox v. Sherman Capital, LLC, No. 1:12-cv-01654TWP-KJD, 2014 WL 1328147, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2014) (“One of
the purposes of the heightened pleading requirements in Rule 9(b)
is to prevent ‘fishing expeditions,’ so to excuse [a plaintiff’s]
failure to include the requisite information in the Complaint
because [he] lack[s] information that would otherwise be unearthed
in discovery would defeat the purpose behind the rule.”).
This Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plead the
alleged mail and wire fraud claims with particularity as required
by Rule 9(b).
Sweeping generalizations that “mail [and] wire . .
. fraud occurred” (Compl. ¶¶ 65, 116, 174) are insufficient without
identifying exactly which defendant engaged in the alleged fraud.
See, e.g., Vicom, 20 F.3d at 777-78 (finding allegations that
misrepresentations made “at the direction, under the supervision,
or with the knowledge and consent” of all the defendants not
specific enough); see also Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889, 893 (7th
Cir. 1990) (holding complaint properly dismissed where it “lump[ed]
all the defendants together and [did] not specify who was involved
17
in what activity”).
There are no specific allegations that any of
the defendants used the mail or wires in connection with this
action (with the exception of Plaintiff’s purported receipt of
“Chrysler Marketing and Advertising materials”) (Compl. ¶ 65), and
Plaintiff failed to specify the date, sender, or content of any
such mailing. Without specifying when he received the mailing, who
sent it, and what statements in the mailing were allegedly false or
fraudulent, such assertions cannot support a mail or wire fraud
claim.
Slaney, 244 F.3d at 599-600; see also Catlin v. Hanser, No.
1:10-CV-0451, 2011 WL 1002736, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 17, 2011)
(finding “conclusory allegations . . . are not enough to plead the
requisite pattern of fraud.”).
Plaintiff alleges he spoke to some
individuals on the phone, like Defendant Kimberly Johnson (Compl.
¶¶ 142-43), but again, he has failed to give the requisite detail
about the alleged conversations or show how they contained any
statements that constituted alleged fraudulent representations.
See Jepsen, Inc. v. Makita Corp., 34 F.3d 1321, 1328 (7th Cir.
1994)
(“loose
references
to
mailing
and
telephone
calls
in
furtherance of a purported scheme to defraud will not do.”).
As noted by TDAF, in addition to an adequacy of pleading
problem, Holland also has a standing issue with respect to any
allegation that any of the Defendants committed bank fraud.
18
U.S.C. § 1344 specifically defines bank fraud as defrauding “a
financial institution.”
18 U.S.C. § 1344.
18
Holland has not, and
cannot, allege that he is a financial institution.
See, e.g.,
Whitehead v. Gateway Chevrolet, No. 03 C 5684, 2004 WL 316413, at
*6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2004) (only financial institutions have
standing to allege violations of the financial institution fraud
statute as predicate acts for RICO).
Additionally, TDAF is the only Defendant which Plaintiff
alleges
conducted
money
laundering.
(Compl.
¶
152.)
The
applicable statute narrowly defines money laundering as a person
who “knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts
or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact
involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity . . . .”
U.S.C. § 1956.
18
The statute goes on to define “specified unlawful
activity” to include criminal activities like kidnapping, smuggling
of goods, etc., but does not cover the alleged criminal activity in
this
case
(money
obtained
from
repossession sale of a car).
an
auction
house
after
a
Because the facts alleged do not
constitute “specified unlawful activity” under the money laundering
statute, they are not actionable as a predicate act of racketeering
activity.
See, e.g., Starfish Inv. Corp. v. Hanson, 370 F.Supp.2d
759, 773-74 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (dismissing RICO count where complaint
failed to allege defendants engaged in activities constituting
“specified
unlawful
activity”
within
laundering statute).
19
meaning
of
the
money
Plaintiff Also Fails To State A Claim Under 1962(c) Because
There Is No Pattern of Racketeering
Plaintiff has also failed to allege sufficient facts to
demonstrate there was a pattern of racketeering activity.
The
compensable harm in a cause of action under 1962(c) “is the harm
caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a
pattern, for the essence of the violation is the commission of
those acts in connection with the conduct of an enterprise.”
Anza
v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 457 (2006) (quoting
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985)).
A
“pattern” of racketeering activity has at least two predicate acts
of racketeering committed within a ten-year time period. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(5).
specified
Those “predicate acts” must all be violations of the
list
of
criminal
laws,
as
noted
in
section
1961.
Moreover, Plaintiff must allege a pattern of racketeering activity
for each RICO defendant. See Defalco v. Bernas, 244 F.3d 286, 306
(2d Cir. 2001).
The test recognizes that, in enacting RICO,
“Congress was concerned . . . with long term criminal conduct.”
Vicom, 20 F.3d at 780.
Plaintiff has not made any cognizable or plausible allegations
that the Cerberus Defendants or the Bosak Defendants committed any
single specific predicate act of racketeering activity, much less
a pattern of racketeering activity.
RICO was never intended to
allow plaintiffs to turn garden-variety state law fraud claims into
20
federal RICO actions.
Jennings, 495 F.3d at 472.
Regarding all
the alleged wrongful activity by TDAF, the allegations allege fraud
against one victim, for one single injury arising out of one
specific event (the repossession of Plaintiff’s vehicle) - thus no
pattern of activity has been alleged for RICO purposes. See Brandt
v.
Schal
Assocs.,
Inc.,
854
F.2d
948,
952
(7th
Cir.
1988)
(plaintiff’s “allegations posit only multiple acts in furtherance
of a single episode of fraud . . . against a single victim . . .
[S]uch a scheme cannot constitute a RICO pattern.”); Lipin Enters.,
Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 323-24 (7th Cir. 1986) (upholding
dismissal of a complaint alleging racketeering acts all designed to
defraud one victim on one occasion).
Additionally, Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under 1962(c)
Because There Is No Properly Pled RICO Enterprise
Count II of the complaint fails for another reason, which is
that Plaintiff failed to adequately allege a RICO enterprise.
An
enterprise “includes any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”
U.S.C. § 1961(4).
18
Thus, an enterprise is not merely a conspiracy,
even if it involves multiple, sometimes unrelated parties.
See
Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., 116 F.3d 225, 228 (7th Cir. 1997).
Here, it seems that Plaintiff is alleging an association in
21
fact enterprise.
(Compl. ¶ 42.)
The Supreme Court in Boyle v.
United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009), held that an association
in fact enterprise must have a “structure” and must have “at least
three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those
associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit
these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.”
Id.
The
complaint in this case does not identify a purpose, relationship,
or longevity sufficient to pursue a specific purpose by the
Defendants.
The allegations do not show how the different actors
(from Chrysler, to owners of a motor dealership, to the owner of a
towing company) are associated, any plausible structure whatsoever,
or what common course of conduct they had.
warranted.
Dismissal is therefore
See, e.g., Stachon v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 229
F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal where members
failed to adequately allege existence of an “enterprise,” finding
“[W]e
cannot
accept
Appellants’
vague
allegations
of
a
RICO
enterprise made up of a string of participants, known and unknown,
lacking any distinct existence and structure.”); Fitzgerald, 116
F.3d at 228 (“where a large, reputable manufacturer [Chrysler
Corp.] deals with its dealers and other agents in the ordinary way,
so their role in the manufacturer’s [alleged] illegal acts is
entirely incidental, differing not at all from what it would be if
these agents were the employees of a totally integrated enterprise,
the manufacturer plus its dealers and other agents (or any subset
22
of the member of the corporate family) do not constitute an
enterprise within the meaning of the statute.”); United Food &
Commercial Workers Unions & Emp’rs. Midwest Health Benefits Fund v.
Walgreen Co., 719 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding no
enterprise where allegations were “only that the defendants had a
commercial relationship, not that they had joined together to
create a distinct entity. . . .”).
Here, Plaintiff has made no
allegations of organization between the defendant individuals and
corporations, with no set of specific goals to be reached outside
of the alleged frauds committed against Plaintiff. The allegations
simply do not rise to the definition of “enterprise” in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(4).
See, e.g., Holland v. Lake Cnty. Mun. Gov’t., No. 2:13-
CV-179-TLS, 2013 WL 5230242, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 16, 2013)
(finding same Plaintiff’s RICO claims failed to state claims upon
which relief can be granted because Plaintiff failed to plausibly
plead the existence of a criminal enterprise under 18 U.S.C. §
1962(c)).
The Defendants have set forth other arguments for why the
complaint fails to properly set forth any federal RICO claims under
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
Having already found the complaint is
deficient because it fails to plead predicate acts, the mail/wire
fraud claims are not pled with particularity, Plaintiff lacks
standing to bring a bank fraud claim, there is no pattern of
racketeering, and a RICO enterprise has not been sufficiently
23
alleged, the Court declines to elaborate upon other reasons why the
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
However, the Court notes that Plaintiff has also failed to properly
plead the collection of an unlawful debt and that all Defendants
conducted the affairs of a RICO enterprise, which constitute
additional reasons to dismiss the federal RICO claims under section
1962(c).
Plaintiff Has Also Failed to State a Claim Under § 1962(a)
Count I of the complaint alleges violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1962(a), which prohibits use of income derived from a pattern of
racketeering activity to be used in the furtherance of activity and
further allows redress if injury is caused by the use or investment
of racketeering income in the enterprise.
Again, the complaint
fails to identify a “pattern” of racketeering activity, and fails
to allege any facts supporting the speculation that proceeds from
any racketeering activity were used or invested in the acquisition
of an enterprise, and further that Plaintiff sustained any injury
proximately caused by the use or investment.
See RAO v. BP Prods.
N.A., 589 F.3d 389, 399 (affirming dismissal of claim where
complaint merely restated the elements of section 1962(a) “in
boilerplate fashion and contains no suggestion that money was used
or invested in the operation of an enterprise or that he suffered
an
injury
caused
by
the
use
or
24
investment
of
racketeering
income.”); Vicom, 20 F.3d at 778.
Consequently, Count I is also
dismissed.
Plaintiff Failed to Plead Any Agreement to Conspire Under 18
U.S.C. § 1962(d)
Plaintiff’s claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) in Count III of
the complaint also fail.
To state a RICO conspiracy claim under
section 1962(d), a plaintiff must allege “(1) that each defendant
agreed to maintain an interest in or control of an enterprise or to
participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity and (2) that each defendant further agreed
that someone would commit at least two predicate acts to accomplish
those goals.” Lachmund v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 777,
784 (7th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted).
There are no allegations
in the complaint demonstrating Defendants made an agreement to
commit
RICO
violations.
Although
he
generally
alleges
the
Defendants “agreed, as alleged and evidenced by their concerted
false statements, false representations, ‘activities’ and omissions
to act that all have a common goal and purpose to injure Robert
Holland in his person” (Compl. ¶ 196), Plaintiff fails to provide
specific facts indicating each Defendant entered into an agreement
to violate RICO.
See Goren v. New Vision Int’l, Inc., 156 F.3d
721, 732-33 (7th Cir. 1998)(dismissing where “complaint is utterly
devoid of allegations indicating either a specific agreement by
these defendants to participate in the affairs of the enterprise or
25
an agreement to the commission of two specific predicate acts”).
Moreover, “[s]ince [Plaintiff] fail[s] to establish a violation of
section 1962(c), [his] 1962(d) claim based on the same facts must
fail as well.”
Stachon v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 229 F.3d
673,
Cir.
677
(7th
2000).
Consequently,
Count
III
is
also
dismissed.
Indiana State RICO Claims And Any Other Remaining State
Claims
The complaint also states claims for violation of the Indiana
Civil RICO statute.
(DE #1, pp. 33-34.)
Upon due consideration,
the state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE because the
federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.
28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3); Groce, 193 F.3d at 501 (“[I]t is the well-established
law of this circuit that the usual practice is to dismiss without
prejudice state supplemental claims whenever all federal claims
have been dismissed prior to trial.”).
Default Judgment
Plaintiff has moved for default judgment against Defendants,
Paul Davis, the CEO of Bull Dog Towing, and Bull Dog Towing, first
seeking
$41,833,455.00
(DE
$66,123,878.90 (DE #99).
#32)
in
damages,
then
requesting
This Court acknowledges the Seventh
Circuit’s well established rule that “the well-pleaded allegations
of the complaint relating to liability are taken as true[.]”
26
Merrill Lynch Mortg. Corp. v. Narayan, 908 F.2d 246, 253 (7th Cir.
1990)(quotation omitted).
However, pleadings that are “nothing
more than conclusions” are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. This includes legal conclusions couched
as factual allegations, see Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461,
465 (7th Cir. 2010), and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The entry of default judgment lies within
the sound discretion of the trial Court and is not automatic.
Duling
v.
Markun,
231
F.2d
833,
836
(7th
Cir.
1956).
“In
determining whether to enter a default judgment, the court may
consider a number of factors including whether there is a material
issue of fact, whether the default is largely technical, whether
the plaintiffs were substantially prejudiced, and how harsh an
effect a default judgment might have.”
Wolf Lake Terminals, Inc.
v. Mut. Marine Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 2d 933, 941 (N.D. Ind.
2005)(citation omitted).
Plaintiffs seeking default judgment must
demonstrate they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Cass
Cnty. Music Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 263, 265 (7th Cir. 1995).
“Precedent supports the principle that default judgment is
only appropriate if the well-pleaded allegations, along with any
evidence submitted to the court, are sufficient to establish a
legal claim.” Rosenbaum v. Seybold, No. 1:06-CV-352-TLS, 2013 WL
2285946, at *5 (N.D. Ind. May 23, 2013) (citing, inter alia,
27
Wagstaff-EL v. Carlton Press Co., 913 F.2d 56, 57-58 (2d Cir. 1990)
(default judgment properly vacated where plaintiff’s claims were
facially invalid or utterly unsupported); Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v.
Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[A]
defendant’s default does not in itself warrant the court in
entering a default judgment.
There must be a sufficient basis in
the pleadings for the judgment entered.”); Days Inn WorldWide, Inc.
v. Mayu & Roshan, LLC, No. 06-cv-1581, 2007 WL 1674485, at *4 (D.
N.J. June 8, 2007) (“Default judgment is inappropriate, even where
defendants have failed to appear, unless the plaintiff has provided
well pleaded facts sufficient to establish a claim.”); Terio v.
Great W. Bank, 166 B.R. 213, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“The conclusion
that the complaint is subject to dismissal strongly militates
against
granting
judgment.”)).
[the]
Plaintiff’s
application
for
a
default
“Default judgment is appropriate only if the well-
pleaded allegations of the complaint are sufficient to establish a
legal claim.”
Franko v. All About Travel, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-233,
2014 WL 2803987, at *1 (N.D. Ind. June 19, 2014) (citing Gard v. B
& T Fin. Serv., No. 2:12-CV-5, 2013 WL 228816, at *1 (N.D. Ind.
Jan. 22, 2013); Marshall v. Baggett, 616 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir.
2010) (vacating default judgment)).
Here, as discussed earlier in this Order, Plaintiff has failed
to plausibly plead RICO claims against Defendants, including Bull
Dog Towing, the CEO of Bull Dog Towing, and Paul Davis, and he has
28
failed to show he has set forth a proper legal claim.
Plaintiff
failed to properly plead predicate acts of racketeering activity,
there is no pattern of racketeering activity, Plaintiff failed to
adequately allege a RICO enterprise, and he has failed to properly
state a RICO conspiracy claim.
Pleading requirements are to be
strictly enforced when default judgment is sought under RICO. Alan
Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1393 (9th Cir.
1988).
The insufficiency of the complaint to state RICO claims
against the defendants that failed to appear warrants denial of the
motions for default judgment and dismissal of the federal claims
against them with prejudice.
See, e.g., Hargrave v. Chief Asian,
LC, 479 Fed. Appx. 827, 2012 WL 1573632 (10th Cir. May 7, 2012)
(affirming denial of motion for default judgment and dismissing
suit with prejudice); Husain v. Casino Control Comm’n, 265 Fed.
Appx. 130, 2008 WL 449763, at *1 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 2008) (affirming
district
court’s
denial
of
motion
dismissing complaint with prejudice).
for
default
judgment
and
Like the other defendants,
the state claims against the defaulted defendants will be dismissed
without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, (1) Defendants’ Cerberus Capital
Management, LP, Stephen Feinberg, and Robert Nardelli’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
29
12(b)(6) and (b)(2) (DE #28), is GRANTED.
The Clerk is ORDERED to
DISMISS the federal claims against these defendants, Cerberus
Capital Management, LP, Stephen Feinberg, and Robert Nardelli, WITH
PREJUDICE and the state claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. (2)
The Motion for Oral Argument on Cerberus Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(B)(6) and (B)(2) (DE #65) is DENIED. (3) Defendants, Bosak
Motors Auto Dealership, et al.’s Motion to Dismiss (DE #57) is
GRANTED.
The Clerk is ORDERED to DISMISS the federal claims
against these defendants, Bosak Motors Auto Dealership, Mr. and
Mrs. Skip Bosak, John Schultheis, Jonathan Jeffries, and Mike
Grzbowski WITH PREJUDICE and the state claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. (4) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (DE #69) is GRANTED.
The Clerk is ORDERED to DISMISS the federal claims against these
Defendants, Kimberly Johnson and TD Auto Finance LLC, Successor in
interest to Chrysler Financial LLC, WITH PREJUDICE and the state
claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
(5) Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (DE #70), is duplicative and therefore DENIED AS MOOT; (6)
The “Request for Default Judgment Sum Certain by the Clerk of the
Court,” (DE #71), is DENIED. (7) The “Request for Clerk’s Entry of
Default Judgment,” (DE #37), is DENIED.
The Clerk is ALSO ORDERED
to DISMISS the federal claims against these defendants, Paul Davis,
Bull Dog Towing, and the CEO of Bull Dog Towing, WITH PREJUDICE and
30
DISMISS the state claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
(8) The “Application
for Judgment by Default Sum Certain” (DE #99), is DENIED.
(9) The
“Request for the Court to Issue an Order for the Defendants to
Remove
Damaging
Credit
Information
Agencies,” (DE #100), is DENIED.
From
the
Credit
Reporting
(10) The relief requested in the
“Brief on Treble Damages Pursuant to State Law,” (DE #101), is
DENIED.
Finally, the Clerk is ORDERED to CLOSE THIS CASE.
DATED: November 18, 2014
/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
31
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?