Ronald Ward v. Soo Line Railroad Company et al

Filing 112

OPINION AND ORDER The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings DE # 95 is GRANTED. Count I of the complaint DE # 65 , and Count III of the Second Amended Complaint DE # 28 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Additionally, the Clerk is ORDERED to CLOSE this case. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 5/8/17. cc: previously termed parties (kjp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
RONALD WARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SOO LINE RAILROAD
COMPANY d/b/a CANADIAN
PACIFIC,
Defendant.

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CAUSE NO. 2:14-CV-00001

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, filed by Defendant, Soo Line Railroad
Company d/b/a Canadian Pacific (“CP Rail”), on February 6, 2017 (DE
#95).

For the reasons set forth below, the Motion for Judgment on

the Pleadings (DE #95) is GRANTED. Count I of the complaint (DE
#65-1), and Count III of the Second Amended Complaint (DE #28) are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Additionally, the Clerk is ORDERED to

CLOSE this case.

BACKGROUND
As set forth in this Court’s previous order dated June 21,
2016 (DE #73), this case has a lengthy history.

Plaintiff Ronald

Ward (“Ward”) alleges he was injured on June 8, 2013, while sitting
on a locomotive engineer’s seat that collapsed.

Ward was then

employed by defendant CP Rail, and was assigned to operate a
locomotive on a job commonly known as the “Windsor (Canada) to
Elkhart (Indiana)” job.

Ward’s injury allegedly occurred in

Windsor, Ontario, Canada.
On January 2, 2014, Ward filed a federal complaint against CP
Rail under Cause Number 2:14-CV-1.

The Court later granted Soo

Line’s uncontested motion for judgment on the pleadings, and
dismissed Counts I and II of Ward’s Second Amended Complaint.
#40.)

(DE

Count III of the Second Amended Complaint remained pending

against CP Rail, and is the subject of the instant motion for
judgment on the pleadings.
On June 3, 2015, Ward filed a separate cause of action in
Illinois state court, alleging claims against: (1) CP Rail, (2)
Nordic, (3) Seats, (4) GE, and (5) Knoedler, Inc. d/b/a Knoedler
Manufacturers, Inc. (“Knoedler”).

(DE #65-1.)

The state court

complaint (“Complaint”) was removed to federal court, transferred
to this division of the Northern District of Indiana, and opened as
Cause Number 2:15-CV-400.

Cause Numbers 2:14-CV-1 and 2:15-CV-400

were consolidated, with all filings to be filed only in Cause
Number 2:14-CV-1.

Count I of the Complaint alleged negligence

against Soo Line.

Count II alleged strict product liability,

manufacturer defect, and design defect of the locomotive seat
against Seats. Count III alleged negligence against Seats. Counts
VI and VII alleged the same theories of liability, respectively,

2

against Nordic.

Count VIII alleged that GE negligently installed

the locomotive seat that injured Ward, and failed to report
problems with the seat and its installation instructions.
Seats, Nordic and GE filed a motion to dismiss with this Court
(DE #55), arguing that the Locomotive Inspection Act (“LIA”), 49
U.S.C. § 20701, et seq., preempts all of Ward’s claims against
them. This Court entered an order granting that motion on June 21,
2016 (DE #73), dismissing Counts II, III, VI, VII, and VIII of the
complaint (DE #65-1) because they were preempted by the LIA. Count
I of the complaint (DE #65-1) remained pending.
In front of the Court now is CP Rail’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings for Count I of the complaint (DE #65-1), stating a
claim for negligence against CP Rail; and Count III of the Second
Amended Complaint (DE #28), stating a very similar claim for
negligence against CP Rail. CP Rail’s argument in its initial
memorandum is in its entirety:
Plaintiff’s state common law negligence claims
against CP Rail center on a broken locomotive seat.
These negligence claims are no different than the
claims he asserted against Seats, Inc. and GE.
Those claims failed because this Court determined
that Plaintiff asserted “state law claims alleging
[. . .] negligence, with no mention of any federal
standard of care, or any violation thereof.”
Plaintiff’s negligence claims against CP Rail also
contain “no mention of any federal standard of
care, or any violation thereof.” His state common
law claims against CP Rail are therefore preempted
by the LIA.
(DE #96 at 2-3.)

3

In response, Plaintiff argues that the common law negligence
claims against CP Rail are not preempted by the LIA, FELA, or any
other

federal

statutes.

(DE

#101

at

3.)

He

contends

the

negligence claims are completely different than the barred claims
of strict products liability, manufacturer defect, and design
defect of the locomotive seat.

(DE #101 at 5.)

CP Rail filed a reply on April 7, 2017 (DE #104).

In its

reply, CP Rail relies heavily upon Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods.
Corp., 565 U.S. 625, 631 (2012), arguing that the claims of
negligent maintenance and inspection of the seat, and failure to
warn Plaintiff that the seat was dangerous, are claims that focus
on the locomotive seat, and are preempted by the LIA.
Plaintiff filed a sur-reply on April 10, 2017, arguing that
the LIA “does not preempt state law claims for failure to warn an
employee of a dangerous, unsafe condition of an engineer’s seat.”
(DE #105-1 at 1.)

Finally, CP Rail filed a response to the sur-

reply, citing to Kurns, and arguing that Court found state law
failure to warn claims are specifically preempted by the LIA.

(DE

#110.) This motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.

DISCUSSION
A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(c) “is reviewed under the same standard as a
motion to dismiss under 12(b) . . . .”
4

Flenner v. Sheahan, 107

F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1997); see also R.J. Corman Derailment
Servs., LLC v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local Union 150,
335 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003).

Where a party moves for

judgment on the pleadings, “the motion should not be granted unless
it appears beyond doubt that the non-moving party cannot prove
facts sufficient to support his position.”

Housing Auth. Risk

Retention Group, Inc. v. Chicago Housing Auth., 378 F.3d 596, 600
(7th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).
In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court
must accept as true “all well-pleaded allegations” and view them in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, as well as accept
as true all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the allegations.
R.J. Corman, 335 F.3d at 647; see also Forseth v. Village of
Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 2000).
In granting the motions to dismiss filed earlier in this case
by Nordic, Seats, and GE, this Court set forth the purpose of the
LIA and its preemptive effect.

(DE #73 at 5-17.)

standards

its

for

locomotives

and

“parts

and

The LIA sets

appurtenances,”

generally requiring them to be “in proper condition and safe to
operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury.”
§ 20701(1).

49 U.S.C.

The Supreme Court held in Napier v. Atlantic Coast

Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926), that the Boiler Inspection Act
(“BIA,”

which

is

LIA’s

predecessor),

“occupied

the

field

of

regulating locomotive equipment . . . so as to preclude state

5

legislation . . . .[and] was intended to occupy the field . . .
[and] extends to the design, the construction, and the material of
every part of the locomotive and tender and of all appurtenances.”
Id. at 607, 611.
In Kurns, the Supreme Court reiterated that the LIA preempts
the whole field of regulating locomotive equipment.

565 U.S. 625.

That case involved a plaintiff who alleged state common-law claims
of defective design and failure to warn of the dangers posed by
asbestos in locomotives and locomotive parts.
directly

decided

the

issue

of

“whether

The Court in Kurns
the

LIA

pre-empts

petitioners’ state-law claims that respondents defectively designed
locomotive

parts

associated

with

and
those

failed

to

parts.”

warn
Id.

[plaintiff]

at

630.

It

of

dangers

found

that

“Petitioners’ common-law claims for defective design and failure to
warn are aimed at the equipment of locomotives.

Because those

claims ‘are directed to the same subject’ as the LIA, Napier
dictates that they fall within the pre-empted field.”

Id. at 634.

The Supreme Court directly addressed the failure to warn claim, and
reasoned that the “gravamen” of the plaintiff’s failure to warn
claims was still that he suffered harmful consequences resulting
from his exposure to asbestos contained in locomotive parts.

Id.

at 635. “Because petitioners’ failure-to-warn claims are therefore
directed at the equipment of locomotives, they fall within the preempted field defined by Napier.”

Id. at 635.

6

In this case, Count I of the complaint (DE #65-1), which
contains the most exhaustive list of negligence claims, states that
CP Rail was guilty of one or more of the following acts or
omissions:
(a) Carelessly and negligently failed to provide
the Plaintiff with a reasonably safe place to work;
(b) Carelessly and negligently failed to maintain
and keep in good condition the engineer’s seat on
locomotive 8905;
(c) Carelessly and negligently failed to have its
mechanical department inspect the engineer’s seat
on locomotive 8905;
(d) Carelessly and negligently failed to warn the
Plaintiff of the dangerous and unsafe condition of
the engineer’s seat on locomotive 8905, when the
Defendant knew or in the exercise of ordinary care
should have known, of both the risk of harm and
unsafe condition of its engineer’s seat;
(e)
Carelessly and negligently permitted the
engineer’s seat on locomotive 8905 to be and remain
in an unsafe and dangerous condition;
(f) Carelessly and negligently permitted engineer’s
seats to be installed in its locomotive cabins,
including the locomotive Plaintiff was operating on
June 8, 2013, when it knew or should have known of
the dangers and unsafe conditions caused by faulty
installation;
(g) Carelessly and negligently permitted engineer’s
seats to be installed in its locomotive cabins when
it knew or should have known that the engineer’s
seats being installed were inadequate and below the
standards of the industry.
(DE #65-1 at 3.)
At first blush, these allegations seem to all be directed at
the engineer’s seat in the locomotive, which seems to be preempted
7

as part of the entire locomotive field in accordance with the LIA.
Plaintiff makes two main arguments about why the negligence claims
should not be barred by the LIA.

First, he details the purpose of

the FELA and cites to cases holding that the FELA does not reach
common law claims that do not interfere with the FELA statute’s
legislative purpose. Second, he argues the common law claims
revolve around providing a safe work place to employees; therefore,
the claims do not involve regulating locomotive equipment and are
not

preempted

by

the

LIA.

Both

of

these

arguments

are

unpersuasive.
First, Plaintiff cites to several FELA cases in its response
memorandum in an attempt to argue that the negligence claims are
not preempted by the LIA.

Plaintiff relies heavily on Harris-

Scaggs v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (E.D. Wis. 1998),
which involved an employee’s complaints of racially derogatory
comments and state law emotional distress claims. There, the court
found

that

“plaintiffs’

claims

for

negligent

and

intentional

infliction of emotional distress in this action are not cognizable
under the FELA” and the claims were thus not preempted under FELA.
Id. at 1183-86.

However, Harris-Scaggs deals with FELA preemption

which only provides conflict preemption (preempting only state law
claims which are in direct conflict with the FELA), but the LIA
provides a much more-encompassing field preemption. See Kurns, 565
U.S. at 631 (“We deal here only with the latter, so-called field

8

pre-emption.”).

Unlike FELA, the LIA “occup[ies] the entire field

of regulating locomotive equipment to the exclusion of state
regulation.”

Id. at 637.

Not only does Harris-Scaggs deal with a

different statute, but it is also distinguishable because it
involves racially derogatory comments made to a railroad employee.
Harris-Scaggs did not involve an injury sustained from locomotive
equipment.
Lancaster v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 773 F.2d 807, 815 (7th
Cir.

1985),

also

involved

the

FELA

and

a

tort

unrelated

to

locomotive equipment (supervisor’s harassing misconduct), as did
Ray v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 938 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1991)
(analyzing the FELA and supervisor’s harassment of employee).
Shaffer v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 11 C 970, 2011 WL
4916493 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2011), involved a retaliatory discharge
claim.

None of these cases shed any light on the specific issue in

this case - whether Plaintiff’s common-law claims or state safeworkplace claims are preempted by the LIA.
Plaintiff’s second main argument is that the claims against CP
Rail are for negligent acts or omissions in failing to create a
safe

work

environment,

and

thus

do

not

invoke

“regulating

locomotive equipment” like the claims previously dismissed against
the other defendants. (DE #101 at 5-7.)
complaint render this argument inaccurate.
CP Rail negligently:

9

The plain words of the
Plaintiff has alleged

failed to provide the Plaintiff with a reasonably
safe place to work . . . failed to maintain and
keep in good condition the engineer’s seat . . .
failed to have its mechanical department inspect
the engineer’s seat . . . failed to warn the
Plaintiff of the dangerous and unsafe condition of
the engineer’s seat . . . permitted the engineer’s
set on locomotive 8905 to be and remain in an
unsafe and dangerous condition . . . permitted
engineer’s seats to be installed in its locomotive
cabins . . . when it should have known of the
dangers and unsafe conditions caused by faulty
installation; [and] . . . permitted engineer’s
seats to be installed in its locomotive cabins when
it knew or should have known that the engineer’s
seats being installed were inadequate and below the
standards of the industry.
(DE #65-1 at 3.)

All of these claims are centered on the safety of

the locomotive seat.

Indeed, that is the only part of the

locomotive to which Plaintiff refers when alleging CP Rail failed
to provide him with a safe workplace.
Plaintiff cites Indiana Code Section 22-1-1-10, arguing the
public policy of the state is for every employer to furnish safe
employment for their employees.

(DE #101 at 7.) Yet, the Supreme

Court tackled this question head on in Napier v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926), where the Plaintiff argued a
Georgia statute which prescribed an automatic door to the firebox
and a Wisconsin statute which required a cab curtain, were not
preempted by the Boiler Inspection Act (LIA’s predecessor).

The

purpose of the Georgia statute was to protect “the health of the
fireman by protecting him from exposures to extremes of heat and
cold,” protect their eyesight, and protect the employees in the
10

event of an explosion in the fire box.

Napier, 272 U.S. at 609-10.

The purpose of the Wisconsin statute was “to protect engineers and
firemen from the weather during the winter season.”

Id. at 610.

Therefore, those statutes, like Indiana Code section 22-1-1-10,
were focused on providing a safe workplace for railroad employees.
And yet the Supreme Court found those statutes based on workplace
safety did not prevent LIA preemption.

Napier ruled that the LIA

manifests “the intention to occupy the entire field of regulating
locomotive equipment” by reserving for the federal agency the
authority to “set[] the standard” by which a locomotive’s “fitness
for service shall be determined.”

Id. at 611-12.

That Court went

on to explain the preempted field “extends to the design, the
construction, and the material of every part of the locomotive and
tender and of all appurtenances.”

Id. at 611.

And that the LIA

preempts state requirements directed at the locomotive equipment
“however commendable or however different their purpose.”

Id. at

613.
In this case, Plaintiff’s negligence claims against CP Rail
are

all

based

upon

whether

CP

Rail

failed

to

provide

safe

locomotive equipment; therefore, the claims are preempted by the
LIA.

“Because the injured engineer’s negligence and product-

liability claims may affect ‘the design, the construction, and the
material’ of locomotives, these claims would fall within the
preempted field broadly defined by Napier and Kurns.” BNSF Ry. Co.

11

v. Seats, Inc., No. 4:16-CV 3121, 2017 WL 318636, at *4 (D. Neb.
Jan. 23, 2017) (quoting Napier, 272 U.S. at 611).
The Court notes that in its sur-reply memorandum, Plaintiff
concedes that the LIA “preempts state law claims as to design,
construction, maintenance, installation of locomotive seats.”

(DE

#105-1 at 1.) However, Plaintiff still contends that the LIA “does
not preempt state law claims for failure to warn an employee of a
dangerous, unsafe condition of an engineer’s seat.”

Id.

Supreme Court directly addressed and rejected this argument.

The
In

Kurns, the petitioners argued that “even if their design-defect
claims are pre-empted, their failure-to-warn claims do not suffer
the same fate.”

Kurns, 565 U.S. at 634.

The Petitioners in Kurns

contended that claims did not fall within the LIA’s preemption
because “the basis of liability for failure to warn . . . is not
the design or manufacture of a product, but is instead the failure
to provide adequate warnings regarding the product’s risks.”
The Supreme Court could not have been clearer in finding:
We disagree. A failure-to-warn claim alleges that
the product itself is unlawfully dangerous unless
accompanied by sufficient warnings or instructions.
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability §
2(c) (1997) (A failure-to-warn claim alleges that a
product is defective “when the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product could have been reduced
or avoided by the provision of reasonable
instructions or warnings by the seller or other
distributor, . . . and the omission of the
instructions or warnings renders the product not
reasonably safe”); see also id., Comment l, at 33
(“Reasonable designs and instructions or warnings
both play important roles in the production and
12

Id.

distribution of reasonably safe products”). Thus,
the “gravamen” of petitioners’ failure-to-warn
claims “is still that [plaintiff] suffered harmful
consequences as a result of his exposure to
asbestos
contained
in
locomotive
parts
and
appurtenances.”
620 F.3d at 398, n.8.
Because
petitioner’s failure-to-warn claims are therefore
directed at the equipment of locomotives, they fall
within the pre-empted field defined by Napier, 272
U.S., at 612. . . . For the foregoing reasons, we
hold that petitioners’ state-law design-defect and
failure-to-warn claims fall within the field of
locomotive equipment regulation pre-empted by the
LIA, as that field was defined in Napier.
Kurns, 565 U.S. at 635-38.
Moreover,

the

Kurns

Court

also

directly

addressed

the

petitioners’ contention that “the LIA’s pre-emptive scope does not
extend to state common-law claims, as opposed to state legislation
or regulation.”

Kurns, 565 U.S. at 637.

It found that Napier held

the LIA “occup[ied] the entire field of regulating locomotive
equipment” to the exclusion of state regulation.
Napier, 272 U.S. at 611-12.).

Id. (quoting

And “[t]hat categorical conclusion

admits of no exception for state common-law duties and standards of
care.”

Kurns, 565 U.S. at 637.

The Kurns Court therefore

“conclude[d] that state common-law duties and standards of care
directed to the subject of locomotive equipment are pre-empted by
the LIA.”

Id.

As such, the failure to warn claims fell within the

field of locomotive equipment regulation and were pre-empted by the
LIA.

Id.
Similarly, in this case, the gravamen of Plaintiff’s failure

to warn claims is that he suffered harm as a result of the
13

engineer’s seat in the locomotive.

These claims fall within LIA’s

preemption, as dictated by Kurns.

Moreover, this is consistent

with this Court’s earlier ruling on June 21, 2016, on the previous
motion to dismiss, where this Court already acknowledged that
“[t]he Supreme Court has held that ‘state-law design-defect and
failure-to-warn

claims

fall

within

the

field

equipment regulation pre-empted by the LIA.’”

of

locomotive

Ward v. Soo Line

R.R. Co., No. 2:14-cv-00001, 2016 WL 3402772, at *3 (N.D. Ind. June
21, 2016).

This Court concluded that Plaintiff’s claims against

Seats and Nordic fell “squarely within the field of locomotive
equipment regulation contemplated by the LIA” and cited, inter
alia, Estate of Brust v. ACF Indus., LLC, 127 A.3d 729, 737 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 2015) (“state law claims for defective design of the
locomotive equipment, and for failure to warn about its risks, fall
within the field preempted by the LIA”); Bonner v. Union Pacific
R.R. Co., No. CV03-134, 2005 WL 1593635, at *10 (D. Idaho Jul. 6,
2005) (holding LIA preempted common law claim for failure to warn);
Law v. General Motors Corp., 114 F.3d 908, 910-12 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding LIA preempted claims including failure to warn).

Id. at

*3.
Plaintiff starts off his response brief by arguing that if his
claims are preempted, he would be deprived of a valid claim against
his employer, which would be a violation of his constitutional
right of access to the courts.

(DE #101 at 1-2.)

14

This argument

was considered by the Court in Mehl v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 417
F.Supp.2d 1104, 1120 (D. N.D. 2006), where injured residents of a
community near railroad tracks brought an action against railway
companies stemming from a train derailment. In analyzing whether
the state law tort claims against the railroad were preempted by
the Federal Railroad Safety Act and pertinent regulations, the
Court reasoned:
While federal preemption often means that there is
no remedy to a claimant, in many instances
unfortunately this result is necessary to vindicate
the intent of Congress. By pervasively legislating
the field of railroad safety, Congress demonstrated
its intent to create national standards and to
preempt state regulation of railroads.
If state
common law tort claims were permitted to proceed
despite this Congressional intent, on the ground
that the purported tortfeasor had in some way
allegedly failed to comply with the federal
standards, then manufacturers would inevitably b[e]
subjected to varying interpretation of the federal
regulations in the different states. Inevitably,
these tort actions would generate precisely those
inconsistencies in railroad safety standards that
congressional action was intended to avoid.
Mehl, 417 F.Supp.2d at 1120 (quoting Ouellete v. Union Tank Car
Co., 902 F.Supp. 5, 10 (D. Mass. 1995)).

This Court concurs with

the logic articulated in Mehl.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings (DE #95) is GRANTED. Count I of the complaint (DE
#65-1), and Count III of the Second Amended Complaint (DE #28) are
15

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Additionally, the Clerk is ORDERED to

CLOSE this case.

DATED: May 8, 2017

/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

16