Ronald Ward v. Soo Line Railroad Company et al
Filing
73
OPINION AND ORDER: Court GRANTS 53 Nordic's Motion to Dismiss; GRANTS 55 GE's Motion to Dismiss. Counts II, III, VI, VII, and VIII of the Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Count I of the Complaint and Count III of the Second Amended Complaint, remain pending. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 6/21/2016. (tc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
RONALD WARD
Plaintiff,
vs.
SOO LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
d/b/a Canadian Pacific Railway,
Ltd., a foreign corporation,
SEATS, INCORPORATED, a foreign
corporation; KNOEDLER, INC.,
d/b/a Knoedler Manufacturers,
Inc., a foreign corporation,
NORDIC GROUP OF COMPANIES, LTD.,
a foreign corporation, GE
TRANSPORTATION, a division of
GE,INC., a foreign corporation.
Defendants.
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NO. 2:14–CV-00001
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), filed by
Defendants Nordic Group of Companies, Ltd. (“Nordic”) and Seats,
Incorporated (“Seats”) on November 3, 2015 (DE #53), and Defendant
General Electric Company’s (“GE”) Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), filed on November 11, 2015 (DE #55).
For the
reasons set forth below, Nordic and Seat’s Motion to Dismiss (DE
#53) is GRANTED, and GE’s Motion to Dismiss (DE #55) is GRANTED.
The Clerk is ORDERED to DISMISS Counts II, III, VI, VII, and VIII
of the Complaint (DE #65-1) WITH PREJUDICE.
‐1‐
Count I of the
Complaint (DE #65-1), and Count III of the Second Amended Complaint
(DE #28), remain pending.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Ronald Ward (“Ward”) allegedly was injured on June
8, 2013, while sitting on a locomotive engineer’s seat that
collapsed.
At that time, Ward was employed by defendant Soo Line
Railroad Company d/b/a Canadian Pacific Railway, Ltd. (“Soo Line”)
and was assigned to operate a locomotive on a job commonly known
as the “Windsor (Canada) to Elkhart (Indiana)” job.
allegedly occurred in Windsor, Ontario, Canada.
Ward’s injury
On January 2,
2014, Ward filed a federal complaint against Soo Line under Cause
Number 2:14-CV-1.
The Court later granted Soo Line’s uncontested
motion for judgment on the pleadings, and dismissed Counts I and
II of Ward’s Second Amended Complaint.
(DE #40.)
Count III of
the Second Amended Complaint remains pending against Soo Line, and
is not the subject of the instant motions to dismiss.
(See DE
#28.)
On June 3, 2015, Ward filed a separate cause of action in
Illinois state court, alleging claims against (1) Soo Line, (2)
Nordic, (3) Seats, (4) GE, and (5) Knoedler, Inc. d/b/a Knoedler
Manufacturers, Inc. (“Knoedler”).
(DE #65-1.)
The state court
complaint (“Complaint”) was removed to federal court, transferred
to this division of the Northern District of Indiana, and opened
‐2‐
as Cause Number 2:15-CV-400.
Cause Numbers 2:14-CV-1 and 2:15-
CV-400 have since been consolidated, with all filings to be filed
only in Cause Number 2:14-CV-1.
Count I of the Complaint alleges
negligence against Soo Line.
liability,
manufacturer
Count II alleges strict product
defect,
locomotive seat against Seats.
against Seats.
and
design
defect
of
the
Count III alleges negligence
Counts VI and VII allege the same theories of
liability, respectively, against Nordic.
Count VIII alleges that
GE negligently installed the locomotive seat that injured Ward,
and failed to report problems with the seat and its installation
instructions.1
In the pending motions to dismiss, Seats, Nordic and GE
(together, “Defendants”) argue that the Locomotive Inspection Act,
49 U.S.C. § 20701, et seq., preempts all of Ward’s claims against
them.
The parties have fully briefed these motions.
Soo Line
also submitted a brief opposing the motions to dismiss.
The
motions are now ripe for adjudication.
DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the
dismissal of a complaint, or any portion of a complaint, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
“To
1
Ward voluntarily dismissed its claims against Knoedler (Counts IV
and V of the Complaint) in September 2015.
‐3‐
(DE #49.)
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (internal quotations
omitted); see also Ray v. City of Chicago, 629 F.3d 660, 662-63
(7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) (“While the federal pleading
standard is quite forgiving . . . the complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”).
A complaint should not
be dismissed for failure to state a claim “unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929
(2007) (citation omitted).
Iqbal requires that a plaintiff plead
content which allows this Court to draw a reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.
556 U.S.
at 678.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), the court must draw all reasonable inferences that favor
the plaintiff, construe the allegations of the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept as true all wellpleaded facts and allegations in the complaint.
Thompson v. Ill.
Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2002).
In
order to withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege
‐4‐
the “operative facts” upon which each claim is based.
Kyle v.
Morton High Sch., 144 F.3d 448, 454-55 (7th Cir. 1998).
A
plaintiff is required to include allegations in the complaint that
“plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief,
raising that possibility above a ‘speculative level’” and, “if
they do not, the plaintiff pleads itself out of court.”
E.E.O.C.
v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007)
(quoting in part Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n.14 (2007)).
Defendants assert that the Locomotive Inspection Act (“LIA”),
49 U.S.C. § 20701, et seq., preempts the field of regulating
locomotive equipment, and thus bars Ward from asserting state law
claims against them.
The LIA provides that a railroad carrier may
use a locomotive “only when the locomotive . . . and its parts and
appurtenances . . . are in proper condition and safe to operate
without unnecessary danger of personal injury.”
20701(1).
49 U.S.C. §
Here, the parties agree that a locomotive cab seat is
an appurtenance of a locomotive under the LIA.
See Kelly v. Ill.
Cent. R. Co., No. 08-1052, 2010 WL 271959, at *17 (C.D. Ill. Jan.
12, 2010) (citing 49 C.F.R. § 229.119).2
2
Ward concedes that the instant case “concerns defective seats[,
which] is clearly a circumstance of failure of essential equipment
that falls within the contemplation of the LIA.” (DE #65 at 12;
DE #66 at 11 (same); see DE #65 at 12 (Ward “seeks redress for
injuries caused by a defective locomotive seat, a condition and
injury regulated and contemplated by the LIA”); DE #66 at 12
(same).)
‐5‐
While the LIA contains no express preemption clause, the
United States Supreme Court has held that the LIA’s predecessor,
the Boiler Inspection Act, “was intended to occupy the field,”
preempting
any
state
action
pertaining
to
“the
design,
the
construction, and the material of every part of the locomotive and
tender and of all appurtenances.”3
Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611, 47 S. Ct. 207, 71 L. Ed. 432 (1926).
In 2012, the Supreme Court held that the LIA preempted state law
products liability claims against railroad component manufacturers
and distributors.
Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct.
1261, 1267-68 (2012).
holding
in
Napier,
In Kurns, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its
explaining
that
the
“LIA
manifest[s]
the
intention to occupy the entire field of regulating locomotive
equipment.”
Id. at 1267 (citing Napier, 272 U.S. at 611).
The
Supreme Court determined that Napier’s “categorical conclusion
admits of no exception for state common-law duties and standards
of care.”
Id. at 1269.
Thus, “state common-law duties and
standards of care directed to the subject of locomotive equipment
are pre-empted by the LIA.”
Id. at 1270.
Because the petitioners’
claims were aimed at the equipment of locomotives, they were
3
Because the Boiler Inspection Act is the predecessor of the LIA,
the Court refers to both versions of the statute as the LIA.
‐6‐
directed to the same subject as the LIA, and fell within the
preempted field.
Id. at 1268-70.
Seats and Nordic argue that Ward’s claims against them are
preempted by the LIA because the claims allege that the locomotive
seat
at
issue
manufactured.
was
defective
and
unsafe
as
designed
and
Counts II and VI assert claims of strict product
liability, design defect, and manufacturer defect, alleging that
Seats and Nordic designed and manufactured the seat that caused
Ward’s
injuries,
that
the
seat
broke
because
of
design
and
manufacturing defects, and that Seats and Nordic placed inadequate
warnings, directions, or instructions on the proper use of the
seat affixed to or accompanying the seat.
21.)
Counts
respectively,
III
and
VII
negligently
allege
designed,
(DE #65-1 at 4-8, 17-
that
Seats
and
manufactured,
and/or sold the seat that caused Ward’s injury.
Nordic,
distributed
(Id. at 9-10, 21-
23.)
The Supreme Court has held that “state-law design-defect and
failure-to-warn
claims
fall
within
the
equipment regulation pre-empted by the LIA.”
field
of
locomotive
Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at
1270; see also Bell v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 236 F. Supp. 2d 882,
890 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (“Given the national scope of the LIA’s
regulation,
it
is
axiomatic
that
state
tort
law
regarding
locomotive design, manufacture, and inspection is preempted by the
LIA.”).
Ward’s claims against Seats and Nordic fall squarely
‐7‐
within the field of locomotive equipment regulation contemplated
by the LIA.
See Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1270 (holding claim for
defective design to be preempted); Evans v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,
No. 13–cv–1732, 2015 WL 1945104, at *4 (D. Colo. Apr. 29, 2015)
(“any defective design claim is preempted by the LIA”); Estate of
Brust v. ACF Indus., LLC, 127 A.3d 729, 737 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2015)
(“state
law
claims
for
defective
design
of
the
locomotive
equipment, and for failure to warn about its risks, fall within
the field preempted by the LIA”); Bonner v. Union Pacific R.R.
Co., No. CV03-134, 2005 WL 1593635, at *10 (D. Idaho Jul. 6, 2005)
(holding LIA preempted common law claim for failure to warn); Law
v. General Motors Corp., 114 F.3d 908, 910-12 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding
LIA
preempted
railroad
employees’
claims
of
strict
liability, negligence, and failure to warn against manufacturers
of locomotive equipment).
As such, Counts II, III, VI, and VII
against Seats and Nordic are preempted by the LIA.
GE argues that the LIA also preempts Ward’s negligence claim
against it.
Count VIII alleges that GE negligently: (1) failed to
follow and adhere to the manufacturer’s instructions on the proper
installation of the locomotive seat; (2) failed to use the proper
tools and equipment for the safe installation of the seat; (3)
failed
to
train
its
employees
in
the
proper
way
to
install
locomotive seats; (4) failed to report that the seats “were
inferior and not equal to railroad industry standards;” (5) failed
‐8‐
to report that the seat’s instructions were faulty; (6) failed to
report that the seats “did not meet the performance standard for
locomotive cabin seats;” (7) failed to report that the seat
installation
instructions
were
incomplete;
(8)
continued
to
improperly install locomotive seats; and (9) failed to properly
install the seat at issue, which allegedly broke as a result of
GE’s improper installation.
Ward
argues
that
a
(DE #65-1 at 24-25.)
negligent
installation
claim
is
not
contemplated by the LIA, and therefore, his claim against GE is
not preempted.
Ward maintains that the LIA preempts the field of
“the physical composition of the locomotive equipment,” and does
not extend to installation of such equipment.
(DE #65 at 14
(quoting Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1272 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).)
He cites no authority holding that
the installation of locomotive equipment does not fall within LIA
preemption.
The Court rejects Ward’s attempt to redefine the preemption
field.
The Supreme Court has held that LIA preemption applies to
the “design, the construction, and the material of every part of
the locomotive and . . . of all appurtenances.”
at
611
(emphasis
necessarily
locomotive.
added).
includes
the
Moreover,
The
construction
installation
where
claims
of
are
Napier, 272 U.S.
of
a
equipment
aimed
at
locomotive
onto
the
locomotive
equipment, they are “directed to the same subject as the LIA,” and
‐9‐
fall within the pre-empted field.
Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1268; see
Oglesby v. Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co., 180 F.3d 458, 461 (2d Cir.
1999) (where alleging failure to provide instructional labels on
a locomotive seat, “the relevant inquiry is not whether a label
falls under the [LIA,] but whether a cab seat does”).
Here, the
locomotive seat is clearly part of the physical composition of the
locomotive.
Because
claims
of
negligent
installation
of
locomotive seats are directed at locomotive equipment, they are
preempted by the LIA.
See Oglesby, 180 F.3d at 461-62 (claim of
failure to provide instructional labels on a locomotive seat was
preempted by the LIA); Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Motive Equip.
Inc., 714 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (claim of negligent
installation of refrigerator on locomotive was preempted by the
LIA).
Therefore, Count VIII is preempted by the LIA.4
Ward attempts to avoid LIA preemption by asserting that the
LIA does not apply to this case as a matter of law.
He relies
upon the Court’s order granting Soo Line’s uncontested motion for
4
Ward does not address the Complaint allegations that GE
negligently “failed to report” problems relating to locomotive
seats.
The Court will not develop Ward’s arguments for him.
Vaughn v. King, 167 F.3d 347, 354 (7th Cir. 1999) (“It is not the
responsibility of this court to make arguments for the parties.”).
Ward’s failure to develop an argument regarding these allegations
results in waiver.
Moreover, because GE’s alleged failure to
report problems with the seats is “directed at the equipment of
locomotives,” such claims are preempted by the LIA. Kurns, 132 S.
Ct. at 1268 (holding the LIA preempted “failure-to-warn” claims
because they were directed at locomotive equipment).
‐10‐
judgment on the pleadings of Ward’s Second Amended Complaint.
In
that order, the Court dismissed two claims against Soo Line based
on the LIA and the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), 45
U.S.C. § 51 et seq.
(DE #40.)
The Court dismissed Ward’s LIA
claim because a plaintiff cannot maintain a stand-alone action
under the LIA.
(Id. at 2-3.)
The LIA “does not create a right to
sue but merely establishes a safety standard.”
Coffey v. Ne.
Illinois Reg’l Commuter R. Corp. (METRA), 479 F.3d 472, 477 (7th
Cir. 2007) (citing Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 188-89 & n.30,
69 S. Ct. 1018, 93 L. Ed. 1282 (1949)).
Contrary to Ward’s
assertion, the Court did not hold that the LIA does not apply to
this matter.
The Court dismissed Ward’s FELA claim because his injury
allegedly occurred in Canada.
(DE #40 at 2.)
The FELA provides
in part that every railroad carrier “while engaging in commerce
between . . . any of the States . . . and any foreign nation or
nations, shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury
while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce.”
§ 51.
45 U.S.C.
The FELA does not provide a remedy for railroad employees
who are injured outside the United States.
New York Cent. R.R.
Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 31, 45 S. Ct. 402, 69 L. Ed. 828
(1925).
Ward argues that because the FELA has no extraterritorial
effect, “the LIA which can only be brought under the FELA likewise
‐11‐
has no application.”
(DE #65 at 6; DE #66 at 5 (same).)
Courts
have held that a railroad employee alleging a LIA violation against
his employer must bring a FELA claim.
See, e.g., Urie, 337 U.S.
at 188 n.30 (“an employee injury suit alleging violation of the
[LIA] is brought under the [FELA]”).
However, Ward cites no case
law holding that where a railroad employee is unable to assert a
FELA claim against his employer, the LIA does not apply to state
law claims against a manufacturer or installer of locomotive
equipment.5
Nor does Ward cite any other authority in support of
this proposition.
The Court is unpersuaded by Ward’s argument.
The LIA does
not create a right to sue, but it does establish a national safety
standard for locomotive equipment.
Coffey, 479 F.3d at 477.
In
enacting the LIA, Congress “manifest[ed] the intention to occupy
the entire field of regulating locomotive equipment.”
S. Ct. at 1266.
Kurns, 132
“[T]he LIA’s broad preemptive sweep is necessary
to maintain uniformity of railroad operating standards across
5
The Court notes that even if Ward could assert a FELA claim against
his employer, he could not assert FELA claims against Defendants.
FELA claims may only be asserted against railroad operators, not
manufacturers. Law, 114 F.3d at 912; Stevenson v. Union Pacific
R.R. Co., 4:07-CV-522, 2009 WL 129916, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 20,
2009) (noting railroad employee “could not bring an action against
Seats under the LIA, or under the FELA, which does not apply to
manufacturers”); Union Pacific, 714 N.W.2d at 246 (“LIA applies to
manufacturers, but FELA does not.”) (citations omitted); Bonner,
2005 WL 1593635, at *9 (Congress “specifically drafted FELA as
only applying to carriers and not manufacturers”).
‐12‐
state lines.”
Bell, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 890.
As the Ninth Circuit
explained, “[t]he virtue of uniform national regulation is selfevident:
locomotive companies need only concern themselves with
one set of equipment regulations and need not be prepared to remove
or add equipment as they travel from state to state.”
Law, 114
F.3d at 910 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Ward’s
claims against Defendants seek to impose legal duties concerning
the design, manufacture, and installation of locomotive seats,
which clearly fall under the LIA.
claims
would
undermine
Congress’s
regulation of locomotive equipment.
that
if
states
standards,
were
to
“Congress’s
adopt
goal
If allowed to proceed, such
goal
of
regulation would be undermined”).
national
Law, 114 F.3d at 911 (noting
different
of
uniform
liability-triggering
uniform,
federal
railroad
For these reasons, the Court
declines to hold that the LIA does not apply to the claims against
Defendants.
Ward and Soo Line rely on Delaware & Hudson Railway Company,
Inc. v. Knoedler Manufacturers, Inc., 781 F.3d 656 (3d Cir. 2015),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 54, 193 L. Ed. 2d 30 (2015), to argue
that the LIA does not preempt Ward’s claims against Defendants.
They assert that the LIA does not preempt a state law action that
is based upon a federal standard of care.
In Knoedler, the
railroad had settled lawsuits brought by employees who had suffered
injuries from defective locomotive seats.
‐13‐
Id. at 658.
The
railroad then filed an action against the locomotive seat supplier
and
maintenance
service,
violations of the LIA.
alleging
Id. at 659.
state
law
claims
based
on
Upon the defendants’ motions
to dismiss, the federal district court held that the railroad’s
claims for contribution, indemnification, and breach of contract
were preempted by the LIA.
Id. at 660.
On appeal, the Third
Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court’s holdings in Napier and
Kurns that “a state may not impose its own duties and standards of
care on the manufacture and maintenance of locomotive equipment.”
Id. at 662.
“The question left unanswered by Napier and Kurns is
whether the LIA preempts a state claim that is premised on a
violation of the duties and standards of care stemming from the
LIA itself.”
Id.
Knoedler found that enforcement under state law
of a federal standard of care, i.e., the LIA, does not undermine
national uniformity.
Id. at 666.
Knoedler held that the LIA did
not
railroad’s
claims
preempt
the
of
indemnification,
contribution, and breach of contract, which were based on the LIA.
Id. at 669; but see Roth v. I & M Rail Link, L.L.C., 179 F. Supp.
2d 1054, 1064 (S.D. Iowa 2001) (holding state law claims based on
LIA violations were preempted, noting “states’ various liabilitycreating-premises in common-law claims based on violations of
safety statutes can, in some instances, create non-uniform results
and conflict with federal requirements for enforcement of the LIA
under FELA”).
‐14‐
Knoedler is distinguishable from the instant action.
a
railroad
employee
brings
state
law
claims
manufacturers and installer of locomotive equipment.
against
Here,
the
In Knoedler,
the employees had settled their claims against the railroad, and
the railroad brought state law claims against the supplier and
servicer of locomotive equipment.
Knoedler distinguished the
claims of employees from the claims of the railroad, noting that
employees must bring claims for injuries against their employers
under the FELA.
781 F.3d at 659 (“an injured employee must bring
an action against his employer under the [FELA]”); id. at 663
(“railroad employees can only enforce [the LIA] through the FELA”).
Knoedler determined that the railroad could assert contribution
and indemnification claims based on LIA violations against the
supplier and servicer.
Id. at 669.
Because Knoedler did not
address whether the LIA preempts a railroad employee’s claims
against a locomotive equipment manufacturer or installer, it is
inapposite to the claims at issue here.
Moreover, Knoedler addressed state law claims that differ
from those asserted by Ward.
In Knoedler, the railroad had
withdrawn its negligence and product liability claims, and had
amended its complaint to clarify that its remaining claims were
based on violations of the LIA.
781 F.3d at 660 n.3.
Circuit
which
distinguished
cases
in
the
plaintiffs
The Third
asserted
contribution and indemnification claims based on LIA violations
‐15‐
from
cases
in
which
the
claims
were
based
on
negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty.
theories
of
Id. at 666
n.15 (citing Stevenson, 2009 WL 129916, at *1, and Union Pacific,
714 N.W.2d at 234).
Here, the Complaint asserts state law claims
alleging strict product liability, manufacturer defect, design
defect, and negligence, with no mention of any federal standard of
care, or any violation thereof.
Ward concedes that the Complaint does not mention the LIA,
but maintains that his claims against Defendants are “premised on
a violation of the duties and standards of care stemming from the
LIA itself.”
(DE #65 at 10; DE #66 at 10 (same); see DE #67 (Soo
Line’s objection to motions to dismiss).)6
Ward does not identify
any Complaint paragraphs indicating that his claims against Seats
and Nordic are based on the LIA, but rather, cites the Complaint
in its entirety.
(DE #66 at 10.)
Regarding GE, the Complaint
alleges that GE negligently “failed to report” that the seats “were
inferior and not equal to railroad industry standards” and “did
not meet the performance standard required of locomotive cabin
6
Ward sought to amend the Complaint to “conform with the recent
Third Circuit decision in [Knoedler],” after the parties had agreed
on a briefing schedule for the instant motions to dismiss. (DE
#51 at 2.)
The Court denied Ward’s motion as untimely, noting
that Knoedler was issued almost a full year before Ward filed his
motion. (DE #63 at 4.) Because the Court finds that Knoedler is
distinguishable, even if the Magistrate Judge had found the
amendment to be timely, the amendment likely would have failed
because of futility.
‐16‐
seats,” without indicating to whom GE was to report.
24.)
(DE #65-1 at
Even if these allegations asserted state law claims based on
LIA violations, the differences between Knoedler and the instant
action cannot be ignored.
The Court will not stretch Knoedler’s
non-precedential holding to apply to state law claims asserted by
a railroad employee.7
Ward also relies on case law cited in Knoedler regarding the
Safety Appliance Acts (“SAAs”), 49 U.S.C. § 20301, et seq., to
assert that the LIA does not preempt his claims.
As Knoedler
notes, both the SAAs and the LIA regulate locomotive equipment,
and neither statute provides for private enforcement; instead,
injured employees must seek a remedy under the FELA.
663.
781 F.3d at
In Crane v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Railway Company, the
Supreme Court held that while a railroad employee can enforce a
violation of the SAAs through the FELA, “the nonemployee must look
for his remedy to a commonlaw action in tort.”
89 S. Ct. 1706, 23 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1969).
395 U.S. 164, 166,
In Tipton v. Atchison
Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, the Supreme Court held that the
7
Ward also argues that the Complaint alleges conduct, conditions
and injury “consistent with” the standards promulgated by the LIA.
(DE #66 at 10; see DE #65 at 13 (maintaining that his claims of
injury due to a defective seat are “entirely consistent with the
policy, purpose and scheme of the LIA”).) But consistency is not
the test for LIA preemption. See Roth, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1063
(“When Congress intends a statute to have a broad preemptive
effect, however, preemption is not precluded simply because a state
law is consistent with the statute’s substantive requirements.”)
(citations and internal quotations omitted).
‐17‐
SAAs “do not give a right of action for their breach, but leave
the genesis and regulation of such action to the law of the
states.”
298 U.S. 141, 147-48, 56 S. Ct. 715, 80 L. Ed. 1091
(1936) (employee who was not engaged in interstate commerce could
assert state law claim against railroad for injury resulting from
a SAAs violation).
The Court finds Crane and Tipton to be
distinguishable because neither holds that a railroad employee may
bring
state
law
claims
against
a
manufacturer
of
locomotive
equipment based on a violation of the SAAs. Moreover, other courts
have noted that “the SAA does not have the same broad preemptive
effect that the LIA has.”
Roth, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1062 (citing
Napier, 272 U.S. at 611); see also Knoedler, 781 F.3d at 673 (“The
effect of the [SAA] cases on the LIA is at least questionable after
Kurns.”) (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
Finally, Soo Line objects to the dismissal of Seats and GE,
asserting that it has pled the affirmative defense of nonparty
fault of Seats and GE in its answer to Ward’s complaint.
Ind.
Code
this
§
34-51-2-14.
objection.
None
of
the
parties
responded
to
In Indiana, a defendant may preserve its right to
assert a nonparty defense against a dismissed defendant by making
a timely objection that asserts an intent to assert a nonparty
defense against the dismissed defendant.
Bloemker v. Detroit
Diesel Corp., 687 N.E.2d 358, 359–60 (Ind. 1997).
The Court finds
that Soo Line has preserved its right to assert a nonparty defense
‐18‐
as to Seats and GE.
See Henderson v. Prerovsky, No. 1:08–cv–0717,
2009 WL 1311095, at *1 (S.D. Ind. May 11, 2009) (holding that by
making an objection, a defendant had “properly preserved its right
to assert nonparty defenses with respect to [other defendants],
but that objection will not preclude their dismissal”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Nordic’s Motion to Dismiss
(DE #53) is GRANTED, and GE’s Motion to Dismiss (DE #55) is
GRANTED.
The Clerk is ORDERED to DISMISS Counts II, III, VI, VII,
and VIII of the Complaint (DE #65-1) WITH PREJUDICE.
Count I of
the Complaint (DE #65-1), and Count III of the Second Amended
Complaint (DE #28), remain pending.
DATED:
June 21, 2016
/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
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