Parker v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
22
OPINION AND ORDER: The final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is AFFIRMED. Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 11/5/2015. (lhc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
IV’LEANIA PARKER,
Plaintiff
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CAUSE NO. 2:14-CV-10 RLM
OPINION AND ORDER
Iv’leania Parker seeks judicial review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security denying her applications for disability insurance
benefits and Supplemental Security Income under the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 423 and 1381. The court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). For the reasons that follow, the court affirms
the Commissioner's decision.
Ms. Parker previously applied for disability benefits in July 2008. After a
hearing and a supplemental hearing in 2010, an ALJ determined that while Ms.
Parker was disabled during the period March 2007 through February 2009,
medical improvement occurred, and her disability ended, as of March 1, 2009. In
her current petition, Ms. Parker asserts disability as of May 5, 2011, due to
several physical impairments. Her application for benefits was denied initially, on
reconsideration, and after an administrative hearing on June 11, 2013, where she
was represented by counsel.
In evaluating Ms. Parker’s new disability claim, the ALJ considered the
documentary evidence presented at the hearing and testimony from Ms. Parker
and vocational expert Clifford M. Brady. Applying the agency’s standard five-step
analysis (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520), the ALJ found that Ms. Parker
(1)
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 5, 2011;
(2)
had severe physical impairments, including status-post bilateral
mastectomy and reconstruction, degenerative disc disease of the
cervical spine, and fibromyalgia;
(3)
didn’t have an impairment or combination of impairments that met
or equaled the severity of any impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpt. P, App’x 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526,
416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926); and
(4)
had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as
defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a), with some
physical limitations,1 and could perform her past relevant work as a
1
The ALJ concluded that Ms. Parker “has the residual functional capacity to perform
sedentary work . . . as [she] can lift and/or carry 10 pounds occasionally and lesser weights
frequently; stand and/or walk for up to 2 hours in an 8-hour workday; and sit for up to 6 hours
in an 8-hour workday. [She] can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds but can occasionally climb
ramps and stairs; and occasionally balance, stoop, and crouch but never kneel or crawl. [Ms.
Parker] must avoid concentrated exposure to wetness, including slippery, uneven surfaces, and
concentrated exposure to hazards, including unprotected heights and dangerous machinery.” Rec.,
at 25 [ALJ Decision (Aug. 15, 2013), at 5].
2
loan interviewer and a correspondence review clerk (20 C.F.R. §§
404.1565 and 416.965), as well as other occupations, including, but
not limited to, a telephone solicitor (7,500 jobs regionally and
650,000 nationally) and a receptionist (8,500 jobs regionally and
750,000 nationally).
The ALJ concluded that Ms. Parker wasn’t disabled within the meaning of
the Act and wasn’t entitled to benefits. When the Appeals Council denied her
request for review in December 2013, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107 (2000);
Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). This appeal followed.
Ms. Parker contends that the ALJ ignored important evidence in the record,
that his findings aren’t supported by substantial evidence, and that he improperly
minimized the effects of her fibromyalgia. She asks the court to either reverse the
Commissioner's decision and award benefits or remand the case for further
proceedings.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue before the court isn’t whether Ms. Parker is disabled, but whether
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that she is not. Scott v. Astrue,
647 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2011); Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir.
2009). Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
3
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). In
reviewing the ALJ’s decision, the court can’t reweigh the evidence, make
independent findings of fact, decide credibility, or substitute its own judgment for
that of the Commissioner, Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 513 (7th Cir. 2009);
Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 434-435 (7th Cir. 2000), but, instead, “will conduct
a critical review of the evidence, considering both the evidence that supports, as
well as the evidence that detracts from, the Commissioner’s decision.” Briscoe v.
Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). While the ALJ isn’t required “to
address every piece of evidence or testimony presented, he must provide a ‘logical
bridge’ between the evidence and the conclusions so that [the court] can assess
the validity of the agency’s ultimate findings and afford the claimant meaningful
judicial review.” Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010).
II. DISCUSSION
A.
Ms. Parker first claims the ALJ “completely ignored important evidence in
the record for no apparent reason,” specifically complaining that the ALJ’s
decision didn’t mention the results of the MRI of her brain (dated April 4, 2013)
or her CT scan (dated April 16, 2013). Ms. Parker says “[t]he conclusion of both
tests was demyelination, a degenerative process that causes problems with nerve
4
impulse conduction, and more particularly multiple sclerosis,” Pltf. Memo., at 910, and the ALJ’s failure to mention the MRI and CT scan “is a failure to consider
all relevant evidence and should result in a remand.” The court can’t agree.
The written reports don’t support Ms. Parker’s claim that each test resulted
in a diagnosis of demyelination:2 the MRI report3 notes a possibility of
“demyelinating plaques,” the report of the later CT scan4 doesn’t mention
“demyelinating plaques” or “demyelination,” and neither report concludes that Ms.
Parker has carpal tunnel syndrome or multiple sclerosis. But, Ms. Parker says,
even if the objective tests didn’t identify her condition as carpal tunnel syndrome,
her examining physicians believed she had that condition, so the ALJ shouldn’t
have concluded that the problems she had with her hands wasn’t a disabling
condition.
Ms. Parker complains that the ALJ didn’t mention the MRI or CT scan in his
decision, but she hasn’t explained how those reports qualify as relevant evidence.
Ms. Parker hasn’t stated that the tests resulted in any follow-up treatment by Dr.
Abu-Aita (who ordered the tests), she doesn’t claim the tests changed her course
2
Demyelination is defined as the “breakdown of the fatty sheaths that surround and
insulate nerve cells,” AMA COMPLETE MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 443 (2003).
3
Brain MRI Radiology Report, Impression: “Very few periventricular and subcortical white
matter hyperintensity foci bilaterally. This is a nonspecific finding and could represent
demyelinating plaques but could also be sequela of chronic small vessel ischemic disease.” Rec.,
at 655.
4
CT Head Scan Radiology Report, Impression: “No evidence of acute intracranial disease.
A collection of a few cortical veins in the right parasagittal convexity corresponds to possible
abnormality seen in the brain MRI. No mass or abnormal enhancement.” Rec., at 654.
5
of treatment or medications, and she hasn’t argued that the tests confirmed a
disabling condition. An ALJ isn’t required to address “every piece of evidence or
testimony in the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide some glimpse into
the reasoning behind [the] decision to deny benefits.” Simms v. Astrue, 599 F.
Supp. 2d 988, 997 (N.D. Ind. 2009); see also Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 815
(7th Cir. 2014) (“In reaching its decision, the ALJ must build a logical bridge from
the evidence to his conclusion, but he need not provide a complete written
evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence.”). The ALJ discussed Ms.
Parker’s testimony and reviewed the medical evidence in his report and based on
those considerations concluded that Ms. Parker’s hand pain wasn’t so disabling
to preclude her from performing her past relevant work. While Ms. Parker
complains that the ALJ had “tunnel vision regarding the EMG,” she hasn’t offered
any explanation about her conclusion in that regard nor has she explained how
the non-specific results of the MRI and CT scan could have affected the ALJ’s
decision. Ms. Parker hasn’t shown that the ALJ “ignored important evidence for
no apparent reason.”
B.
Ms. Parker next claims the ALJ’s findings with respect to the following
issues aren’t supported by substantial evidence.
6
Glaucoma
Ms. Parker contends the ALJ’s conclusion that her glaucoma isn’t a severe
impairment is inconsistent with the treatment records for her condition. She had
laser surgery on both eyes in 2013 and was prescribed medicated eye drops, but
even with the use of those drops, she continued to have headaches and problems
with the pressure in her eyes. Ms. Parker claims the ALJ’s statement that her
doctor “‘just recommended drops’ reflects a complete misunderstanding of
glaucoma and its treatment and is not consistent with the treatment records. . .
. The treatment options at the Deen Gross Eye Center include the use of
medicated eye drops, laser treatments and surgery. The very purpose of the
various treatments is to prevent further damage to the optic nerve.” Pltf. Memo.,
at 11.
In reviewing the medical records relating to Ms. Parker’s glaucoma, the ALJ
found that Ms. Parker:
initially went to the Deen Gross Eye Center in December 2011
complaining of blurry vision since her glaucoma surgery 10-12 years
ago. The doctor opined that [she] had POAG in her left eye and just
recommended drops. The doctor noted in March 2012 that [she]
responded well to the treatment, and he found in May 2012 that her
condition was stable. [Ms. Parker] did not return to the doctor until
March 2013 when she complained of irritation in her eye when she
rubbed it. The doctor noted that [her] vision was 20/40, and he again
prescribed drops. In May 2013, the doctor indicated that [she] had no
visual complaints and that her eyes felt okay. [She] recently
underwent two laser treatments in May and June 2013 on her left
eye, and she has just complained of a little irritation.
7
Rec., at 24. The ALJ noted, as well, that the records from the Deen Gross Eye
Center contain “no evidence of any decreased vision” and report that Ms. Parker
“has responded well to treatment.” Rec., at 24.
Contrary to Ms. Parker’s claim, the ALJ didn’t merely state that her
physicians had “just recommended drops” for her glaucoma; he considered her
past glaucoma surgery, her laser treatments, and her care at the Deen Gross Eye
Clinic. Ms. Parker says she has pain, blurry vision, and headaches that last all
day, but none of the treatment records from the Deen Gross Eye Clinic contain
any restrictions on, or recommendations of limitations to, her activities. She
testified at the hearing that she is able to read, watch television, and drive. Rec.,
at 55, 58. Substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s conclusion that
Ms. Parker’s glaucoma is “non-severe.” See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401 (1971) (“Substantial evidence . . . [is] more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.”).
Carpal Tunnel Syndrome
Ms. Parker contends the ALJ’s conclusion that her wrist and hand pain isn’t
a severe impairment isn’t supported by substantial evidence in the record.
As already discussed, the ALJ examined the record of Ms. Parker’s
complaints of hand pain and the treatment she received for that condition. He
8
noted that an EMG of her upper extremities showed no evidence of radiculopathy
or carpal tunnel syndrome, but that the MRI of her spine showed evidence of
cervical spondylosis; reports from the consultative examination were that she had
normal grip strength and fine finger manipulation; none of the records from her
treating physicians included any limitations on her activities; and no “medical
source has mentioned findings equivalent in severity to the criteria of any listed
impairment, either individually or in combination.” Rec., at 24.
The ALJ noted in his report that even though Ms. Parker had undergone
surgery for carpal tunnel syndrome, she reported to her doctors and testified at
the hearing that she continued to experience pain in her hands. The ALJ also
cited the following evidence in the record, which shows that
– Robert Stannard, M.D., treated Ms. Parker in March 2012 for
neck pain;
– Dr. Stannard referred her to Dr. George Abu-Aita, a
neurologist, the following month with complains of neck pain and
numbness of her hands;
– an April 2012 MRI of her spine showed cervical spondylosis
and possible neck spasms;
9
– an EMG of her upper extremities in April 2012 showed no
evidence of carpal tunnel syndrome;5
– in July 2012, Ms. Parker underwent a consultative
examination by Dr. M. Siddiqui, whose report shows that Ms. Parker
told him that she has burning pain in her hands that sometimes
radiates up to her shoulders and that she has trouble lifting and
gripping well with her hands; based on his examination, Dr. Siddiqui
found that Ms. Parker didn’t appear to be in any acute distress,
ambulated with a normal gait, had diminished range of motion in her
lumbar spine but otherwise had a full range of motion, had trouble
squatting but had no issues performing heel-to-toe walking, had
generalized muscle tenderness with normal muscle and grip strength,
and could pick up and grip coins with both hands;6
– Ms. Parker began physical therapy in August 2012 for neck
and shoulder pain, which resulted in a recommendation of continued
therapy to improve her muscle strength and mobility in her neck and
5
The following results were reported from Ms. Parker’s EMG: “[n]erve conduction studies
of both upper extremities were normal,” “[n]eedle electromyography of both upper extremities and
the lower cervical paraspinal muscles was normal,” and “[t]here is no electrodiagnostic evidence
of polyneuropathy, carpal tunnel syndrome, ulnar neuropathy, myopathy, brachial plexopathy, or
active cervical motor radiculopathy.” Rec., at 601.
6
Dr. M. Siddiqui stated in his examination report that Ms. Parker’s muscle strength was
“5/5 bilaterally,” her grip strength was “-5/+5 bilaterally,” she had positive Tinel and Phalen tests
bilaterally, and she “is able to pick [up] and grip coin well with both hands separately.” Dr. Siddiqui
found that Ms. Parker had a “possible recurrence of carpal tunnel syndrome.” Rec., at 595.
10
shoulders based on an assessment that Ms. Parker had a decreased
range of motion in her neck, diminished strength in her upper
extremities, and mild to moderate tightness in her neck;
– she was examined by Dr. Abu-Aita again in February 2013 for
neck pain and he opined that she might have fibromyalgia; and
– she went to Mark Carter, M.D. in April 2013 to establish care;
Dr. Carter noted that Ms. Parker had diffuse myalgias and greater
than 10 tender points and prescribed Cymbalta for her fibromyalgia.
Rec., at 24, 26-28. The ALJ noted, too, that Ms. Parker had no “persistent
inflammation, deformity of one major peripheral joint, ankylosing spondylitis[,] or
repeated manifestations of inflammatory arthritis.” Rec., at 25.
In support of her claim that the ALJ’s opinion isn’t supported by substantial
evidence, Ms. Parker cites to medical records that she says evidences her hand
pain; the ALJ reviewed that same medical evidence in his decision. Ms. Parker
claims her wrists and hands constitute a severe problem that “is completely
documented by the treating physicians, the consultative physician, and physical
therapist,” Pltf. Memo., at 12; the ALJ recognized that she complained about hand
pain to her physicians and those physicians noted her complaints and
recommended treatment for her condition. And while Ms. Parker disagrees with
the ALJ’s conclusion that the medical evidence didn’t support her claim of
disabling pain or a requirement of limitations beyond those set forth in his
11
decision, the court can’t “reweigh the evidence or substitute [its] own judgment for
that of the ALJ; if reasonable minds can differ over whether the applicant is
disabled, [the court] must uphold the decision under review.” Shideler v. Astrue,
688 F.3d 306, 310 (7th Cir. 2012). The ALJ’s review of the medical evidence and
Ms. Parker’s complaints of continued hand pain supports a finding that his
determination in this regard is grounded in substantial evidence in the record.
Medical Evidence Listing
Ms. Parker next claims that although the ALJ considered listing 13.10 for
her breast cancer, he failed to apply listing 1.08 in 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpt. P, app.
1. Ms. Parker reports that between October 2011 and December 2012 she had
eight breast reconstruction surgeries. She maintains she equaled listing 1.08, and
“[b]ased on this consideration alone the case should be remanded with
instructions to pay [her] for at least a closed period of disability due to breast
cancer and its related treatment.” Pltf. Memo., at 14.
To meet listing 1.08, Ms. Parker must demonstrate “[s]oft tissue injury (e.g.,
burns) of an upper or lower extremity, trunk, or face and head, under continuing
surgical management . . . directed toward the salvage or restoration of major
function, and such major function was not restored or expected to be restored
within 12 months of onset.” 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpt. P, app. 1 § 1.08. Ms. Parker
claimed an upper body injury met the listing, so she was required to prove “an
12
extreme loss of function of both upper extremities . . . that interferes very
seriously with [her] ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete
activities” such as “prepar[ing] a simple meal and feed[ing herself] . . . tak[ing] care
of personal” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.00(B)(2)(c).
The ALJ cited evidence in the record demonstrating that Ms. Parker had no
such extreme loss of function. The ALJ noted that Dr. Siddiqui found that Ms.
Parker had “full strength in her extremities.” Rec., at 25. Dr. Siddiqui opined that
Ms. Parker had normal muscle strength and intact grip strength and she was able
to pick up and grip a coin with both hands. Rec., at 595. Furthermore, as the ALJ
noted, Ms. Parker testified at the hearing that she cooked simple meals,
straightened up the house, and did the laundry. Rec., at 54. Finally, the ALJ
noted that no medical source found that Ms. Parker met any listing. Rec., at 24.
Ms. Parker bears the burden of demonstrating that she meets the criteria
specified in the listing. See Ribaudo v. Barnhart, 458 F.3d 580, 583 (7th
Cir.2006). In deciding whether Ms. Parker meets a listing, the ALJ must
adequately articulate the foundation for his conclusions. See Scott v. Barnhart,
297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir.2002).
The ALJ adequately articulated a basis for concluding that Ms. Parker did
not meet listing 1.08. The ALJ analyzed medical evidence and testimony relevant
to listing 1.08 and noted that no medical source found that Ms. Parker met any
listing. The ALJ discussed relevant medical evidence about muscle and grip
13
strength and considered Ms. Parker’s activities of daily living. While the ALJ didn’t
specifically discuss listing 1.08 in his opinion, such a failure alone doesn’t
necessitate remand unless the ALJ's analysis was perfunctory. See Ribaudo v.
Barnhart, 458 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir.2006). The ALJ’s analysis in this case was
not perfunctory. Rather, the ALJ adequately articulated a basis for concluding
that Ms. Parker didn’t meet listing 1.08.
Credibility Determination
Ms. Parker next claims that the ALJ improperly discredited her testimony
and credibility, “disparag[ing] her testimony with the all too common and
unhelpful ‘not entirely credible’ remark.” Pltf. Memo., at 14. Ms. Parker claims
that “there is no explanation in the decision of why Ms. Parker’s credibility should
be questioned.” Pltf. Memo., at 15. According to Ms. Parker, the ALJ’s “faulty
credibility assessment, standing alone, should cause a remand of this case.” Pltf.
Memo., at 17.
An ALJ’s credibility finding is afforded “considerable deference” and will be
overturned only if “patently wrong.” Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir.
2009). The ALJ must consider “the claimant’s level of pain, medication, treatment,
daily activities, and limitations” while also “justify[ing] the credibility finding with
specific reasons supported by the record.” Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 477 (7th
14
Cir. 2009). A reviewing court “merely examine[s] whether the ALJ’s determination
was reasoned and supported.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008).
In the course of his opinion, the ALJ discussed Ms. Parker’s level of pain,
medication, treatment, daily activities, and limitations and found discrepancies
that justified his credibility determination. The ALJ noted that while Ms. Parker
claimed that she suffered from constant weakness throughout her body following
her bilateral mastectomy, her physician reported that she was “doing well” after
her reconstructive surgeries and indicated she had “no major concerns.” Rec., at
27, 606. The ALJ noted that Ms. Parker testified at the hearing that she had
generalized pain that radiated throughout her body. Rec., at 27. The ALJ also
noted that Ms. Parker cooked simple meals, visited her family in Chicago, had full
strength in her extremities, and had an intact gait. Rec., at 27-28. Finally, the ALJ
noted that Ms. Parker claimed she carried everything with two hands and
regularly drops objects due to her carpal tunnel syndrome. Rec., at 26. The ALJ
noted that an EMG of her upper extremities demonstrated no evidence of carpal
tunnel syndrom. The ALJ noted, as well, that Dr. Siddiqui found that Ms. Parker
had intact grip strength and was “able to pick [up] and grip coin well with both
hands separately.” Rec., at 28, 595.
Ms. Parker claims that the ALJ’s credibility determination was insufficiently
articulated, but the inconsistencies between Ms. Parker’s statements about the
limiting effects of her impairments and the medical evidence in the record cited
15
by the ALJ provide the support required for a credibility determination. “It is only
when the ALJ’s [credibility] determination lacks any explanation or support that
we will declare it to be patently wrong.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th
Cir. 2008). The ALJ’s analysis of the inconsistencies between Ms. Parker’s
statements and the medical evidence is sufficient so his credibility determination
is not patently wrong.
Age Determination
Ms. Parker next claims that the ALJ erred in considering her age in relation
to her ability to work. Ms. Parker notes the ALJ found that she was 48 years old
at the time of her disability’s alleged onset date, but stated that she wasn’t
disabled “through the date of this decision,” more than two years after the alleged
onset date, at which time she had reached 51 years of age. Rec., at 29–30. Ms.
Parker says age is highly relevant to disability determinations, so the ALJ’s
consideration of her age in his decision constitutes an error. Pltf. Memo., at 17.
Under the Social Security Administration’s regulations, a 48-year-old is a
“younger individual,” whereas a 51-year-old is a “person closely approaching
advanced age.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d–e). Ms. Parker correctly notes that the
difference between a “younger individual” and a “person closely approaching
advanced age” can be significant for some disability determinations. The age
classification is particularly relevant to Ms. Parker’s case because the ALJ limited
16
her to sedentary work, a limitation that triggers a disability determination for
people over 50 in some circumstances. Rec., at 25; see also 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,
subpt. P, app. 2, § 201.00(g) (under the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, a person
approaching advanced age and limited to sedentary work will ordinarily be found
to be disabled if that person has no transferable skills and cannot perform
relevant past work). The relevance of age categories under the regulations,
however, relates only to the ability of a claimant to adjust to new work. See 20
C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, § 201.00(g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563 (noting that the
Social Security Administration considers advancing age to be a significant factor
in the claimant’s ability to adjust to a new type of work); Tom v. Heckler, 779 F.2d
1250, 1256 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming that “[u]nder the regulations, age plays an
important role in the determination of whether or not skills are transferable”). The
ALJ found Ms. Parker capable of performing past relevant work as a loan
interviewer and a correspondence review clerk. Rec., at 28. The ALJ’s finding that
Ms. Parker could perform past relevant work was a sound basis for his
determination that she wasn’t disabled at the alleged onset date, when she was
48 years old, and at the date of his decision, when she was 51 years of age. The
ALJ didn’t err when considering Ms. Parker’s age in his disability determination.
C.
17
Ms. Parker lastly argues that even though the ALJ found that her
fibromyalgia was a severe impairment, he wrongfully minimized its effects and
failed to follow Social Security Rule 12-2p, which provides guidance on evaluating
fibromyalgia in disability claims. Ms. Parker specifically alleges that the ALJ failed
to follow SSR 12-2p when determining whether her condition met or medically
equaled a listing and in determining her residual functional capacity.
First, the court must examine the ALJ’s consideration of Ms. Parker’s
fibromyalgia in his determination that she did not meet a listing. Because
fibromyalgia isn’t a listed impairment, Social Security Rule 12-2p requires an ALJ
to determine whether a claimant’s fibromyalgia medically equals a listing alone or
in combination with another medically determinable impairment, SSR 12-2p, and
adequately articulate the foundation for his conclusions. Scott v. Barnhart, 297
F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002). Ms. Parker bears the burden of demonstrating that
she meets the criteria specified in a listing. Ribaudo v. Barnhart, 458 F.3d 580,
583 (7th Cir. 2006).
The ALJ adequately articulated the foundation for his conclusion that Ms.
Parker did not meet a listing, despite his finding that her fibromyalgia was a
severe impairment. Even though the ALJ noted that no medical source found that
Ms. Parker met any listing, Rec., at 24, he analyzed whether Ms. Parker met
relevant listings, including 1.04 (disorders of the spine) and 14.09 (inflammatory
arthritis). Rec., at 24. While the ALJ didn’t mention her fibromyalgia in his
18
analysis, he stated elsewhere in his opinion that he considered SSR 12-2p as it
relates to fibromyalgia. Rec., at 24. Furthermore, the ALJ considered listing 14.09,
the listing suggested by SSR 12-2p. The ALJ’s consideration of SSR 12-2p,
relevant listings, and the opinions of medical sources indicating that Ms. Parker
didn’t meet any listing constitutes an adequate articulation of a foundation for his
conclusion that Ms. Parker’s fibromyalgia didn’t medically equal a listing alone or
in combination with another medically determinable impairment.
The court next examines the ALJ’s consideration of Ms. Parker’s
fibromyalgia in his residual functional capacity determination. The residual
functional capacity “represents the maximum a person can do – despite [her]
limitations – on a regular and continuing basis.” Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351,
362 (7th Cir. 2013). A court must uphold an ALJ’s residual functional capacity
determination “if the evidence supports the decision and the ALJ explains his
analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful
review.” Arnett v. Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 591–592 (7th Cir. 2012).
Social Security Rule 12-2p adds a requirement to the ALJ’s residual
functional capacity determination when fibromyalgia is found. The rule requires
that the ALJ “consider a longitudinal record whenever possible because the
symptoms of [fibromyalgia] can wax and wane so that a person may have bad days
and good days.” SSR 12-2p; Ingram v. Colvin, No. 1:13-CV-01081-SLD, 2014 WL
3704816, at *4 (C.D. Ill. July 25, 2014).
19
The ALJ noted medical evidence that indicated Ms. Parker suffered from
“generalized weakness due to her fibromyalgia and history of breast cancer,” so
he limited her standing and walking requirements. Rec., at 28. Recognizing that
the medical evidence indicated Ms. Parker’s fibromyalgia “restricts her ability to
lift heavier objects,” the ALJ limited her lifting requirements. Rec., at 28. And the
ALJ noted medical evidence indicating that pain from Ms. Parker’s fibromyalgia
required postural limitations, which he included in his findings. Rec., at 28.
Ms. Parker claims that “the only consideration of her fibromyalgia during
the assessment of her residual functional capacity was to find [that] her
statements were ‘not entirely credible.’” Pltf. Memo., at 19. Despite Ms. Parker’s
claim that the ALJ failed to adequately consider her fibromyalgia in his residual
functional capacity determination, the ALJ’s decision was based on substantial
evidence, he considered the longitudinal record, and he sufficiently explained his
analysis. Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination, and he
articulated his analysis with sufficient detail and clarity to permit meaningful
review, this court may not overturn it.
III. CONCLUSION
The ALJ did not ignore important evidence in the record; his findings that
Ms. Parker’s glaucoma as well as her wrist and hand pain were non-severe was
based on substantial evidence; he adequately articulated his determination that
20
Ms. Parker didn’t meet or medically equal a listing; his credibility determination
was not patently wrong; his age determination was not in error; and he adequately
considered Ms. Parker’s fibromyalgia when determining whether she met or
medically equaled a listing and her residual functional capacity. Accordingly, the
final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED:
November 5, 2015
/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Judge, United States District Court
21
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?