Scott v. Lear Corporation et al
Filing
33
OPINION AND ORDER: Court DENIES 16 Lear Corporation's Partial Motion to Dismiss; GRANTS 19 Individual Defendants Motion to Dismiss. The Individual Defendants Larry Payne, Barbara Sacha, Ryan Brueckner and Darrel Harper are DISMISSED from this lawsuit. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 11/4/2014. cc: David A Scott, Jr (tc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
DAVID A. SCOTT, JR.,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
vs.
LEAR CORPORATION, DARRELL
HARPER, LARRY PAYNE, BARBARA
SACHA, and RYAN BRUCKNER
Defendants.
NO. 2:14–CV-107
OPINION AND ORDER
This
matter
is
before
the
Court
on
Defendant
Lear
Corporation’s (“Lear”) Partial Motion to Dismiss, and Defendants
Larry Payne, Barbara Sacha, Ryan Brueckner and Darrell Harper’s
(together, “Individual Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss, filed on
June 17, 2014.
motion
to
For the reasons set forth below, Lear’s partial
dismiss
is
DENIED,
and
motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
the
Individual
Defendants’
The Individual Defendants are
hereby DISMISSED from this case.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff David A. Scott, Jr. (“Scott”) was employed by
Lear in its plant in Hammond, Indiana, between October 2010 and
April 2013.
filed
a
(See DE# 1-9.)
Charge
of
On or about August 11, 2013, Scott
Discrimination
with
the
Equal
Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against Lear, alleging that he
-1‐
sustained a workplace injury and was required to work light duty
assignments, but that Lear denied him reasonable accommodation,
and eventually terminated his employment after he complained (1)
about
his
treatment
and
(2)
that
Lear
had
afforded
female
employees with medical conditions more favorable treatment than
male employees.
(See id.)
The EEOC issued its Dismissal and
Notice of Rights on March 19, 2014.
(DE #1 at 8.)
Proceeding pro se, Scott filed his complaint in this Court
on April 4, 2014, using a preprinted “Employment Discrimination
Complaint.”
(DE #1.)
Scott’s claims are being made pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (42 U.S.C. § 12101),
and
Title
VII
of
the
Civil
Rights
Act
(“Title VII”) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-s).
of
1964,
Lear
and
“Defendants”),
and
discrimination,
termination.
the
Individual
alleges
Defendants
violations
retaliation,
amended
Jurisdiction for these
claims is based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a).
names
as
of
harassment,
The complaint
(together,
the
ADA,
and
gender
wrongful
Regarding Scott’s wrongful termination claim, the
complaint states in part:
On April 23, 2013 the defendants wrongfully terminated
the plaintiff because of medical leave that they put
me on because of a pending work related injury and
wouldn’t allow me to return to work under their policy
so a grievance was filed on my behalf on the 24th of
April 2013 but no steps or meetings were held for 320
day[s] and no contact to myself but straight to
mediation and a denial of my grievance and being told
that there [were] no other steps after mediation
-2‐
the
except to agree to this $4,000 settlement and drop all
pending charges I have against the defendants and the
union.
My grievance was for being terminated for
medical leave and didn’t have anything to do with my
other complaints or charges. . . .
(DE# 1 at 7.)
On June 17, 2014, Lear filed a partial motion to dismiss,
seeking dismissal of Scott’s wrongful discharge claim.
16.)
to
(DE#
On the same day, the Individual Defendants filed a motion
dismiss
support
of
Scott’s
both
complaint
motions,
against
the
them.
Defendants
(DE#
19.)
submitted
In
unsigned
copies of the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) entered
into
by
Lear’s
Hammond
Indiana
Plant
and
the
International
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America, UAW, and its affiliated Local Union 2335 (“Union”).
(See DE## 21, 21-1, 22, 22-1.)
The CBA was not attached to
Scott’s complaint.
Scott
filed
September 2, 2014.
responses
to
both
(DE## 25, 26.)
motions
to
dismiss
on
In those responses, Scott
acknowledged the existence of the CBA and asked that “the CBA
agreement be added in for support of my complaints.”
3; DE# 26 at 4.)
“Motion
in
(DE# 25 at
On September 11, 2014, Scott also filed a
Response
to
Lear
Corporation
and
Defendants
Submission in Support to Dismiss,” in which he asserted that
-3‐
Lear and the Union never supplied him with a copy of the CBA
during his employment.1
(DE# 27.)
The Defendants filed their reply briefs on September 30,
2014, attaching copies of two charges Scott had filed with the
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) and the EEOC against the
Union in 2012 and 2013, respectively.
On
October
9,
2014,
Scott
(DE## 29, 30.)
filed
two
surreply
briefs,
attaching three more NLRB charges that Scott had filed against
Lear and the Union in 2014, as well as his correspondence with
the NLRB and the Union president.
(DE## 31, 32.)
DISCUSSION
Motion to Dismiss Standard
In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil
alleged
Procedure
in
the
12(b)(6),
the
complaint
as
Court
true,
must
and
accept
draw
all
all
facts
reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
See
Parish v. City of Elkhart, 614 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 2010)
(citation
omitted).
While
a
complaint
is
not
required
to
contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege
facts that state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
1
While entitled a “Motion,” this two-page document seeks a denial
of the Defendants’ motions to dismiss, and therefore, will be
treated as a supplemental brief in response to the motions to
dismiss.
-4‐
face.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”
Id. at 678.
“While a complaint . . . does not
need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to
provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires
more than labels and conclusions. . . .
Factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level
on
the
assumption
complaint are true.”
that
all
the
allegations
in
the
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
A pro se complaint, “however
inartfully pleaded,” must be construed liberally, and is “held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197,
167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (quotation omitted); see Ambrose v.
Roeckeman, 749 F.3d 615, 618 (7th Cir. 2014).
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court generally
considers
the
factual
allegations
of
the
complaint
and
any
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those allegations.
See Gessert v. United States, 703 F.3d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir.
2013).
The
court
may
examine
information
from
documents
attached to a motion to dismiss “if they are referred to in the
plaintiff’s complaint and are central to his claim.”
-5‐
Adams v.
City
of
Indianapolis,
(quotation omitted).
742
F.3d
720,
729
(7th
Cir.
2014)
Such documents may be considered by the
court in ruling on the motion to dismiss without converting the
motion into a motion for summary judgment.
Wabash
Venture,
LLC,
714
F.3d
501,
505
See Burke v. 401 N.
(7th
Cir.
2013).
However, this is a “narrow exception” to the general rule that
consideration of extraneous material requires conversion to a
summary judgment motion.
188 LLC v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 300
F.3d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 2002).
When extraneous materials are
presented, it is within the court’s discretion either to exclude
the materials and handle the case as a straightforward motion to
dismiss, or to consider the materials and convert to summary
judgment.
See Levenstein v. Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 347 (7th
Cir. 1998).
If the court chooses conversion, the parties must
have “a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that
is pertinent to the motion.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
Documents Submitted In Connection with the Motions to Dismiss
The
parties
submitted
several
documents
for
the
Court’s
consideration in ruling on the Defendants’ motions to dismiss:
the CBA; multiple EEOC and NLRB charges filed by Scott against
Lear and the Union; a letter from the NRLB to Scott; and email
correspondence between Scott and the Union’s president.
-6‐
(DE##
21, 22, 29-1, 29-2, 30-1, 30-2, 32-1, 32-2.)
None of these
documents were attached to or mentioned in Scott’s complaint.
The Defendants ask the Court to consider the CBA, arguing
that
it
Courts
is
central
have
to
considered
Scott’s
wrongful
collective
termination
bargaining
claim.
agreements
in
ruling on motions to dismiss, even when they were not attached
to a plaintiff’s complaint.
See Minch v. City of Chicago, 486
F.3d 294, 300 n.3 (7th Cir. 2007) (considering a collective
bargaining agreement in resolving a motion to dismiss although
it was not mentioned in the complaint, where plaintiffs’ due
process claim rested upon the agreement’s provisions); Anastos
v.
Honeywell
Intern.,
Inc.,
No.
3:10–CV–208-TLS,
2010
WL
3526265, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 3, 2010); Pabst Brewing Co.,
Inc. v. Corrao, 176 F.R.D. 552, 556 (E.D. Wis. 1997).
While Scott’s complaint does not specifically identify the
CBA, it alleges that the Defendants fabricated that Scott had
“violated the medical leave policy” in order to terminate his
employment, and “wouldn’t allow [Scott] to return to work under
their policy.”
(DE# 1 at 6-7.)
This “policy” presumably refers
to the medical leave of absence policy provided in the CBA.
(See DE# 22-1 at 34 (“Medical Leave of Absence” provision).)
The complaint further alleges that “a grievance was filed on
[Scott’s] behalf . . . but no steps or meetings were held,”
presumably
in
violation
of
the
-7‐
CBA’s
multi-step
grievance
procedure.
(Compare DE# 1 at 7 with DE# 22-1 at 6-10 (CBA’s
“Grievance
Procedure”).)
Scott
does
not
contest
the
authenticity of the CBA submitted by the Defendants, and asks
the Court to add the CBA in support of his complaint in his
responses
to
the
motions
to
dismiss.2
(See
DE##
25,
26.)
Because Scott’s complaint repeatedly refers to terms of the CBA,
and
his
briefs
acknowledge
that
the
CBA
is
central
to
his
wrongful termination claim, the Court will consider the CBA in
ruling on the motions to dismiss.3
In
support
of
their
argument
that
Scott’s
wrongful
termination claim is untimely, the Defendants submit two charges
Scott filed against the Union in January 2012 and August 2013.
Scott submits (1) three NLRB charges he filed against the Union
2
While Scott filed a supplemental brief claiming that Lear did
not provide him with a copy of the CBA during his employment
(see DE# 27), he never asserts that he did not have a copy of
the CBA, or was unaware of the terms of the CBA.
The
complaint’s allegations indicate that Scott was aware of the
CBA’s terms at the time of his termination. (See DE# 1 at 6-7;
see also DE# 32 at 3 (arguing in a subsequent surreply brief
that Scott complied with the CBA’s terms prior to termination,
where Lear allegedly terminated Scott for not “follow[ing] [the]
CBA agreement by not turning in medical/restriction notes to
human resources which is false because [Scott] did turn in the
said medical notes”).)
3
The Defendants submitted unsigned copies of the CBA without
accompanying affidavits explaining why the CBA was not signed.
(See DE## 21, 22.)
Because Scott does not contest the CBA’s
authenticity, the Court will consider the CBA for the purpose of
these motions. In future proceedings, any party seeking to rely
upon the CBA should provide the Court with a fully executed copy
of the CBA, or an explanation as to why no such copy is
available.
-8‐
and Lear in March and May of 2014, (2) a June 2014 letter from
the NLRB to Scott, and (3) email correspondence between Scott
and the Union president in 2013-2014.
The Court finds that the
narrow exception articulated by the Seventh Circuit does not
apply to these documents, and will not consider them in deciding
the
Defendants’
Imports,
Inc.,
motions
700
F.
to
dismiss.
Supp.
2d
See
983,
988
Metz
v.
Rizza
Ill.
(N.D.
Joe
2010)
(refusing to consider documents submitted in response to motion
to dismiss because they “are not central in determining whether
Defendants engaged in these acts” alleged in the complaint).
Because consideration of these documents would not change its
analysis,
convert
the
the
judgment.
Cir.
2009)
Court
declines
motions
to
to
dismiss
exercise
into
its
motions
discretion
for
to
summary
See Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 583 (7th
(affirming
district
court’s
refusal
to
convert
a
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment based on
district court’s discretion).
Scott’s ADA and Title VII Claims against the Individual
Defendants Must Be Dismissed Because They Fail as a Matter of
Law
The Individual Defendants argue that Scott’s ADA and Title
VII claims against them should be dismissed because they were
merely
supervisors
at
Lear,
and
supervisors
cannot
individually liable under either the ADA or Title VII.
-9‐
be
held
It
is
well-established
individuals
who
do
not
in
the
independently
Seventh
meet
Circuit
the
that
statutory
definition of “employer” cannot be held liable under Title VII
or the ADA.
See, e.g., EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd.,
55 F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[I]ndividuals who do not
otherwise meet the statutory definition of ‘employer’ cannot be
liable under the ADA.”).
Under both Title VII and the ADA, an
employer is “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such
person.”
4
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).
A
supervisor, in his individual capacity, does not fall within
this definition of “employer.”
552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995).
See Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d
Thus, a “supervisor cannot be held
liable in his individual capacity under the ADA or under Title
VII.”
Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 797 n.5 (7th Cir.
1999).
While the Individual Defendants are not referenced in the
body of Scott’s complaint, the complaint does refer to “Lear’s
management
team,”
“[Scott’s]
supervisor,
human
resources,”
4
The language designating “any agent of such person” as an
“employer” was not intended to create liability for every agent
of an employer. See DeVito v. Chicago Park Dist., 83 F.3d 878,
882 (7th Cir. 1996).
Agents are liable only if they otherwise
meet the statutory definition of an “employer.”
“For example,
an agent of an employer is not liable under the ADA unless it
has the requisite number of employees and is engaged in an
industry affecting commerce.”
Id. (internal quotations and
brackets omitted).
-10‐
“Lear[’]s
management
team
of
supervisors
and
formans
[sic],”
“Lear’s team of supervisors, formans [sic] and Human Resources.”
(DE#
1
at
3,
4.)
In
his
response
brief,
Scott
identifies
defendants Larry Payne as “Plant Superintendent”, Darrell Harper
as
“Production
Resources,”
Manager,”
and
(DE# 25 at 2.)
Barbara
Ryan
Sacha
Brueckner
as
“Human
as
“Director-Human
Resources
Manager.”
Scott argues that the Individual Defendants were
not his supervisors, but rather, “people in management positions
to
protect
the
rights
of
employees
when
it
comes
to
Lear’s
company policies, civil rights and the employee/employer signed
contract under the [CBA]. . . .”
(Id.; see also DE# 31 at 1
(arguing the Individual Defendants “were not supervisors they
were
higher
up
in
management”).)
Regardless
of
Scott’s
terminology, his complaint does not allege any facts suggesting
that Scott was employed by any of the Individual Defendants, or
that
they
otherwise
Title VII or the ADA.
none
of
Because
the
the
meet
the
definition
of
“employer”
under
Thus, the Court can reasonably infer that
Individual
Individual
Defendants
Defendants
were
cannot
Scott’s
be
held
employer.
personally
liable for the alleged Title VII or ADA violations, these claims
against the Individual Defendants are DISMISSED.
-11‐
Scott’s Wrongful Termination Claim
The
claim
Defendants
is
preempted
Relations
Section
Act
by
(“LMRA”),
301/fair
claim”).
argue
that
Scott’s
Section
29
301
U.S.C.
representation
of
§
wrongful
the
185,
claim
termination
Labor
and
is
(“hybrid
Management
a
“hybrid”
Section
301
As such, they assert that this claim is subject to a
six-month statute of limitations.
The Court will first consider
whether Scott’s wrongful termination claim is a hybrid Section
301 claim before turning to the statute of limitations issue.
Scott’s Wrongful Termination Claim Is a Hybrid Section 301
Claim
National labor policy strongly favors private over judicial
resolution
agreement.
of
disputes
arising
under
a
collective
bargaining
See Truhlar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 600 F.3d 888, 891
(7th Cir. 2010) (citing Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S.
650, 652–53, 85 S. Ct. 614, 13 L. Ed. 2d 580 (1965)).
where
an
employer
and
a
union
have
contracted
to
Thus,
resolve
disputes through a grievance and arbitration process, a union
member-employee must avail himself of these dispute-resolution
mechanisms before turning to the courts for relief.
See Bell v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 547 F.3d 796, 803 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting
litigation is “the last resort in resolving such disputes”).
If
the union takes an employee’s grievance to arbitration, both the
-12‐
employee and the employer are “bound by the result subject only
to extremely narrow judicial review.”
Id. at 804.
Section 301 is an exception to the national labor policy,
in that it allows an employee to seek relief in federal court
when a union breaches its duty to represent him fairly during
private
dispute
resolution.5
See
id.
at
803-04.
Thus,
an
employee may bring a Section 301 claim if “his union completely
bungles (or intentionally sabotages) an otherwise meritorious
grievance” during the arbitration process.
891 (citation omitted).
Truhlar, 600 F.3d at
In such case, the employee may file a
“hybrid” suit alleging that his union breached its duty of fair
representation
bargaining
and
that
agreement.
his
employer
See
breached
DelCostello
v.
the
Int'l
collective
Bhd.
of
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 76 L. Ed. 2d
476 (1983).
The two claims are “inextricably interdependent.”
Id. at 164.
To prevail against the employer or the union, the
employee “must not only show that [his] discharge was contrary
to the contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating
a breach of duty by the Union.”
Id. at 165 (quotation omitted).
5
Section 301 of the LMRA states in part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in
any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties. . . .
29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
-13‐
The employee need not sue both the union and the employer, but
he must make the showing against the union to proceed.
See id.
Where an employee brings a state law claim, Section 301
preempts the application of state law “only if such application
requires
the
agreement.”
interpretation
of
a
collective-bargaining
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S.
399, 413, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1988); see In re
Bentz Metal Prods. Co., Inc., 253 F.3d 283, 285–286 (7th Cir.
2004) (“preemption can extend beyond contract disputes to other
state law claims if resolution of those claims is sufficiently
dependent on an interpretation of a CBA”).
Wrongful termination
claims have been preempted by Section 301 where the claim’s
resolution
turned
on
the
bargaining agreement.
Chemical
Co.
&
Oil,
interpretation
of
a
collective
See, e.g., Chapple v. Nat’l Starch &
178
F.3d
501,
508–09
(7th
Cir.
1999)
(wrongful discharge claim preempted where the claim required the
court to decide if the employer was acting within the scope of
the collective bargaining agreement).
Applying these principals, the Court concludes that Scott’s
wrongful discharge claim is preempted by Section 301, and is
properly
complaint
characterized
alleges
“violat[ing]
the
as
that
medical
a
hybrid
Scott
was
leave
Section
wrongfully
policy,”
and
allowed to return to work “under their policy.”
-14‐
301
claim.
The
terminated
for
that
he
wasn’t
(DE# 1 at 6-7.)
The complaint asserts that “a grievance was filed” the day after
Scott was terminated, “but no steps or meetings were held for
320 day[s],” and the parties went “straight to mediation.”
at 7.)
(Id.
According to the complaint, Scott’s grievance was denied
and Scott was told there were “no other steps” after mediation
except to agree to a settlement pursuant to which he had to
“drop all pending charges . . . against the defendants and the
union.”
(Id.)
These allegations allude to breaches of the
terms of the CBA by both the Defendants and the Union, including
the CBA’s “Medical Leave of Absence” policy (see DE# 22-1 at
34), and its “Grievance Procedure,” which sets forth multiple
“Grievance
Steps.”
(See
id.
at
6-10.)
As
such,
these
allegations demonstrate that Scott’s wrongful termination claim
is
inextricably
terms.
intertwined
Because
the
CBA
with
consideration
includes
provisions
of
for
the
CBA’s
resolving
employment disputes, Scott’s claim is not actionable apart from
a successful claim that the Union breached its duty of fair
representation.
See Filippo v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Corp., Inc.,
141 F.3d 744, 748 (7th Cir. 1998).
Thus,
Scott’s
wrongful
termination
Section 301 claim.
-15‐
claim
is
a
hybrid
Scott’s Claim, as Pled, Is Not Barred by the Statute of
Limitations
Having determined that Scott’s wrongful termination claim
is
indeed
a
hybrid
Section
301
claim,
the
Court
considers
whether Scott has plead facts that show this claim is barred by
the appropriate statute of limitations.
limitations
defense
is
not
usually
Although a statute of
part
of
a
Rule
12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, “when the allegations of the complaint reveal
that relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations,
the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a
claim.”
A
Logan v. Wilkins, 644 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 2011).
hybrid
statute
of
Chapple,
Section
301
limitations.
claim
See
178 F.3d at 505.
is
governed
DelCostello,
by
462
a
U.S.
six-month
at
172;
The six-month limitations period
begins to run when “a final decision on a plaintiff’s grievance
has been made or from the time the plaintiff discovers, or in
the
that
exercise
no
Chapple,
omitted).
of
further
178
reasonable
action
F.3d
at
diligence
would
505
be
should
taken
(internal
on
have
discovered,
his
grievance.”
quotation
and
citation
The application of the statute of limitations “‘seems
straightforward enough when a grievance has run its full course
. . .’ suggesting that the statute begins running at the time
the award is handed down.”
Freeman v. Local Union No. 135
Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers, 746 F.2d 1316,
-16‐
1319 n.5 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 166
n.16
(claim
accrued
when
grievance
committee’s
decision
rendered)).
The limitations period “is tolled until intraunion remedies
are exhausted, even if those remedies are ultimately determined
to have been futile.”
Frandsen v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S.
Clerks, Freight Handlers, Exp. & Station Employees, & Mo. Pac.
R.R. Co., 782 F.2d 674, 684 (7th Cir. 1986).
while
a
plaintiff
pursues
specific
“[T]olling occurs
internal
union
remedies
through the designated channels; it does not occur while the
plaintiff seeks whatever relief might be available.”
Pantoja v.
Holland Motor Exp., Inc., 965 F.2d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 1992).
The policy behind the tolling rule is “to allow plaintiffs to
exhaust internal union remedies without fear that later suits
against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation
will be time barred.”
Id. at 328; see also Frandsen, 782 F.2d
at 681 (noting “the national labor policy of encouraging workers
to
pursue
internal
union
remedies,
while
ensuring
them
a
judicial forum in which to resolve disputes”); Stevens v. Nw.
Ind. Dist. Council, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 20 F.3d 720, 730
(7th Cir. 1994) (“A union may be willing to address and remedy a
violation raised in even an untimely complaint . . . but would
seldom
have
that
opportunity
if
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the
complaining
member
has
everything
to
lose
and
nothing
gain
by
staying
within
the
system.”).
Because Scott’s hybrid Section 301 claim alleges that a
grievance was filed on his behalf, the six-month statute of
limitations is to be tolled until Scott’s intra-union remedies
are exhausted, even if those remedies were ultimately futile.
See Frandsen, 782 F.2d at 684.
April 4, 2014.
(DE# 1.)
Scott filed the complaint on
If the complaint alleges that Scott’s
intra-union remedies were exhausted within the six months prior
to filing (that is, sometime after October 4, 2013), it will not
run afoul of the statute of limitations.
Unfortunately,
the
exact
timing
of
Scott’s intra-union remedies is unclear.
the
exhaustion
of
The complaint alleges
that: (1) Scott’s grievance was filed on April 24, 2013; (2) a
period of 320 days passed during which Scott was not contacted;
(3) mediation occurred; and (4) Scott’s grievance was denied.
(DE#
1
at
7.)
The
complaint
does
not
allege
when
Scott’s
grievance was denied.6
Drawing
all
reasonable
inferences
in
the
light
most
favorable to Scott, his pro se complaint can be read as alleging
that his grievance was mediated 320 days after it was filed - in
6
While the Court has determined that it will not consider any
documents submitted by the parties other than the CBA, the Court
notes that even if it had considered these documents, they do
not provide the date the grievance was denied.
-18‐
or about March 2014, and that the grievance was denied sometime
during or after mediation.7
See Ambrose, 749 F.3d at 618 (courts
are to construe pro se complaints liberally).
allegation
that
Scott
was
told
there
was
The complaint’s
“a
denial
of
my
grievance and . . . no other steps after mediation” other than
settlement infers that the denial was a final decision.
at 7.)
(DE# 1
Because the complaint can reasonably be read as alleging
that a final decision regarding Scott’s grievance occurred after
October 4, 2013, Scott has not plead facts that show his claim
is barred by Section 301’s six-month statute of limitations.
The Defendants argue that Scott’s claim is untimely because
Scott
filed
his
complaint
“more
than
six
months
after
the
Union’s prolonged inaction put him on notice that it would not
pursue his grievance.”
concede
that
a
(DE# 17 at 5, DE# 20 at 6.)
grievance
was
filed,
but
focus
on
They
Scott’s
allegation that no steps or meetings were held for 320 days
after filing, and argue that Scott knew or should have known by
August 2013 that the Union would not process his grievance.
(See DE# 29 at 3, DE# 30 at 4 (asserting that Scott’s August 30,
2013 EEOC charge against the Union demonstrates his knowledge
7
Scott’s last surreply brief states the mediation occurred on
March 17, 2014 (DE# 32 at 2).
See Help at Home, Inc. v. Med.
Capital, L.L.C., 260 F.3d 748, 752-53 (7th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff
“may add [facts] by affidavit or brief in order to defeat a
motion to dismiss if the facts are consistent with the
allegations of the complaint.”).
-19‐
“that
the
Union
grievance”).)
would
take
no
further
action
on
his
The Defendants do not address the allegations of
the mediation or the denial of Scott’s grievance in any of their
briefs.
The Defendants cite to Metz v. Tootsie Roll Indus., Inc.,
715 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1983), and Christiansen v. APV Crepaco,
Inc.,
178
issue.
F.3d
910
(7th
Cir.
1999),
as
dispositive
on
this
The Court finds these opinions to be inapposite.
In
both Metz and Christiansen, the unions failed to file grievances
on behalf of the plaintiffs within a specific time period set
forth
in
Circuit
the
held
collective
that
bargaining
“when
a
agreements.
collective
The
bargaining
Seventh
agreement
requires that all grievances be brought within a certain time
period, ‘under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement,
the
failure
and
refusal
of
the
Union
to
file
the
grievance
within the specified time period amounted to a final decision.’”
Christiansen, 178 F.3d at 914 (quoting Metz, 715 F.2d at 303).
Here, in contrast, the complaint alleges that a grievance
was filed on Scott’s behalf.
The complaint further alleges that
this grievance was mediated (albeit, after a significant delay),
and was eventually denied.
Union
was
involved
Scott’s grievance.
in
both
It is reasonable to infer that the
the
mediation
and
the
denial
of
Thus, while Defendants argue that Scott knew
or should have known that the Union would take no further action
-20‐
on his grievance after it was filed, the complaint alleges that
the Union did, indeed, take such action.
Construed liberally, the pro se complaint can be read as
asserting that, during the alleged “320 day” period prior to
mediation, the Defendants and the Union failed to follow the
proper procedures in processing Scott’s grievance; it does not
necessarily allege that the Defendants and the Union failed to
process Scott’s grievance at all.
See Konen v. Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 255 F.3d 402, 406 (7th Cir. 2001) (claim was not time
barred where evidence “was sufficiently vague about whether the
Union
had
whether
no
decided
further
not
to
action
proceed
would
to
be
arbitration,
taken
on
and
thus
[plaintiff’s]
grievance”) (quotation omitted); see also Frandsen, 782 F.2d at
682 (“In hindsight it may seem perfectly clear whether or not a
claim could have been resolved by the union itself.
But that
clarity may be illusory to the layman in the midst of unfolding
events.”).
The Court finds that Scott has not plead facts that show
his hybrid Section 301 claim is barred by Section 301’s sixmonth
statute
of
limitations.
Therefore,
Lear
and
the
Individual Defendants’ motions to dismiss this claim are DENIED.
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Scott’s Hybrid Section 301 Claim against the Individual
Defendants Must Be Dismissed Because It Fails as a Matter of Law
As
explained
above,
the
Court
finds
Scott’s
wrongful
termination claim to be a hybrid Section 301 claim because it is
inextricably intertwined with consideration of the CBA’s terms.
Section
301
claims
“are
confined
to
defendants
who
are
signatories of the collective bargaining agreement under which
they are brought. . . .
personal
liability
on
[The LMRA] was not designed to impose
employees
of
corporate
organizations.”
Loss v. Blankenship, 673 F.2d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 1982) (quoting
Ramsey v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 631 F.2d 1210, 1212 (5th
Cir. 1980)); see Baker v. Fleet Maintenance, Inc., 409 F.2d 551,
554 (7th Cir. 1969) (affirming dismissal of wrongful discharge
claim in violation of a collective bargaining agreement where
defendant was not a party to the agreement); see also Teamsters
Nat’l Auto. Transporters Indust. Negotiating Comm. v. Troha, 328
F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Since only parties to a contract
can violate it, a plaintiff cannot possibly allege that a nonparty violated a collective bargaining agreement”).
Here,
the
complaint
does
not
allege
that
Individual Defendants are parties to the CBA.8
any
of
the
The complaint
does not describe any of the Individual Defendants, but rather,
8
The Court observes that the CBA identifies Lear and the Union
as “both parties” and “the two parties” to the CBA. (DE# 22-1
at 1, 2.)
-22‐
refers
generally
to
“supervisors,”
“formans”
management team,” and “Human Resources.”
[sic],
“Lear’s
(DE# 1 at 3, 4.)
In
his response brief, Scott asserts that the Individual Defendants
are “people in management positions.”
(DE# 25 at 2.)
Because
the complaint lacks allegations that could bring the Individual
Defendants within the scope of Section 301, it fails to state a
claim for which relief could be granted.
See Loss, 673 F.2d at
946-47
301(a)
(affirming
dismissal
of
Section
individual
defendant
because
collective
bargaining
agreement).9
Section
301
claim
against
he
the
was
not
a
Therefore,
Individual
claim
party
Scott’s
against
to
the
hybrid
Defendants
is
DISMISSED.
9
The Court observes that the CBA’s unsigned signature page
includes individual defendant “Ryan Brueckner, Division Human
Resource Director” (“Brueckner”) as one of several signatories
for Lear. (DE# 22-1 at 41.) The introductory paragraph of the
CBA states that Lear and the Union entered into the CBA “through
the duly authorized representatives of both parties.”
(Id. at
1.) “[W]here a CBA is executed on behalf of a corporation by an
individual for whom the corporation is an alter ego, the
controlling individual is the real employer and may be liable
for breaches of the agreement on that basis.”
Delange v.
Curbow, 2:06-CV-379-PPS-APR, 2010 WL 1936202, at *2 (N.D. Ind.
May 12, 2010) (citing Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 933
F.2d 449, 460 (7th Cir. 1991) and Int'l Union of Operating
Eng’r, Local 150, AFL–CIO v. Centor Contractors, Inc., 831 F.2d
1309, 1312–13 (7th Cir. 1987)).
Here, the complaint does not
contain any allegations inferring that Lear was Brueckner’s
alter ego, or other allegations that would warrant piercing the
corporate veil.
See id. at *3, *4 (dismissing LMRA claim
against individual defendant who “signed the CBA only as an
agent of [the party to the CBA], not in her individual
capacity”).
-23‐
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Lear Corporation’s Partial
Motion to Dismiss (DE# 16) is DENIED.
Individual Defendants
Larry Payne, Barbara Sacha, Ryan Brueckner and Darrell Harper’s
Motion
to
Dismiss
(DE#
19)
is
GRANTED.
The
Individual
Defendants are hereby DISMISSED from this lawsuit.
DATED:
November 4, 2014
/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
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