Clark v. Djukic et al

Filing 80

OPINION AND ORDER granting 75 Motion to Dismiss. The court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and the remaining claims are DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 7/31/18. (mlc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
WILLIAM B. CLARK,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANCISCAN ALLIANCE, INC.,
d/b/a St. Margaret Mercy Hospital,
Defendant.

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No. 2:14 CV 160

OPINION and ORDER
On June 4, 2018, plaintiff William B. Clark filed a notice of settlement with
defendants Matthew Djukic and the Town of Schererville. (DE # 73.) Following the
notice, the court issued an order dismissing those defendants. (DE # 74.) Now,
Franciscan Alliance, Inc. (“Franciscan”) is the only defendant remaining in the case. The
case is set for trial on August 20, 2018. (DE # 71.)
The matter is now before the court on Franciscan’s motion to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (DE # 75.) A motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(1) asserts that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. A
party may challenge the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction at any time. City of Milwaukee
v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 1976). “If the court determines at any time that it
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3).
Initially, this court’s jurisdiction was based on a federal question. Plaintiff stated
federal claims against defendants Matthew Djukic, Damian Murks, and the Town of
Schererville, giving this court subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (See DE

# 1.) Additionally, plaintiff brought state-law claims against Franciscan for assault,
battery, and failure to properly train its employees. (Id. at 15–16.) The court had
supplement jurisdiction over those state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
After the recent dismissal, however, all of the defendants subject to the federal
claims have been dismissed from the case. With the federal claims resolved, only the
state law claims against Franciscan remain. In its motion, Franciscan asks the court to
“relinquish jurisdiction and dismiss [the] state law claims.” (DE # 76 at 3.)
The supplemental jurisdiction statute provides that the district court “may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over state-law claims if the court “has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The
court has broad discretion in making this decision. RWJ Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. BP Prods. N.
Am., Inc., 672 F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 2012) (“When federal claims drop out of the case,
leaving only state-law claims, the district court has broad discretion to decide whether
to keep the case or relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.”).
Furthermore, there is a “presumption” that courts will relinquish jurisdiction over
supplemental state-law claims where the federal claims drop out of the case. Id. at 479.
“The presumption is rebuttable, but it should not be lightly abandoned, as it is based on
a legitimate and substantial concern with minimizing federal intrusion into areas of
purely state law.” Id.
The Seventh Circuit has identified three situations that may displace the
presumption, namely:

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(1) the statute of limitations has run on the pendent claim,
precluding the filing of a separate suit in state court; (2)
substantial judicial resources have already been committed,
so that sending the case to another court will cause a
substantial duplication of effort; or (3) when it is absolutely
clear how the pendent claims can be decided.
Sharp Elecs. Corp v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 578 F.3d 505, 514–15 (7th Cir. 2009). Neither party
argues that either the first or third exceptions should apply here. Nevertheless,
regarding the first exception, defendant correctly points out that plaintiff may refile this
action in state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) and Indiana Code § 34-11-8-1.
As to the third exception, the court notes that it has not yet addressed the merits
of the state-law claims. Other than discovery rulings, the court has entered two orders
pertaining to the state-law claims: (1) an order denying summary judgment based solely
on the court’s finding that the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act does not apply (DE
# 64), and (2) an order excluding an expert opinion as unreliable (DE # 65). The court
did not reach the underlying substance of the state-law claims, and, therefore, it is not
absolutely clear how those claims will be decided.
Plaintiff’s argument focuses on the second exception, pertaining to judicial
resources and the potential for duplication of judicial effort. As stated above, the court
has issued only two non-discovery orders on the state-law claims. Plaintiff argues that
the court did invest substantial judicial efforts in issuing those orders, specifically the
order excluding expert testimony. (DE # 77 at 3.) But, in reality, they were relatively
short orders. The expert order was only six pages in length (DE # 65), and even
Franciscan’s motion for summary judgment was disposed of by the court in only two

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pages (DE # 64 at 1–2). The amount of resources devoted to those orders is unlike the
efforts expended in Miller Aviation v. Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors, 273 F.3d 722
(7th Cir. 2001), in which the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court’s decision to
relinquish jurisdiction where the lower court had held 9 hearings and issued 19 orders,
including a 71-page decision. Furthermore, as noted above, none of the orders in the
case at hand delve into the merits of the state-law claims. See RWJ Mgmt. Co., Inc., 672
F.3d at 481 (affirming relinquishment of jurisdiction where “the extensive pretrial
activity was largely attributable to discovery disputes, not the merits of the state-law
claims”). Accordingly, the court finds that it has not committed substantial judicial
resources to resolving the state-law claims.
Plaintiff also argues that the court should retain jurisdiction because the trial date
is less than a month away. (DE # 77 at 3–4.) But this relative proximity to trial is not
enough to rebut the presumption of relinquishment. RWJ Mgmt. Co., Inc., 672 F.3d at 481
(affirming a district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction two business days before
a two-week trial was set to begin).
Additionally, the court is not required to retain jurisdiction due to the length of
time this case has been under its jurisdiction. Although this case was filed over four
years ago, the Seventh Circuit has upheld an order relinquishing jurisdiction “just
before trial after five years of discovery.” Olive Can Co., Inc. v. Martin, 906 F.2d 1147,
1153 (7th Cir. 1990). Moreover, the question of whether or not to retain supplemental
jurisdiction did not arise until the other defendants were dismissed less than two
months ago.
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For these reasons, the court concludes that the second exception to the
presumption does not apply. This is not a relinquishment that would “clearly
disserve[ ]” judicial economy. See Williams Elecs. Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 479 F. 3d 904, 906
(7th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff also argues, separately, that the court should deny Franciscan’s motion
“[i]n fairness to the litigants.” (DE # 77 at 4.) The court disagrees that ignoring the
presumption of relinquishment would be “fair” to the parties. On the contrary, granting
the motion to dismiss is fair to the parties since it will prevent this court from intruding
into areas of state law where Indiana courts have relative expertise.
Lastly, plaintiff argues that dismissal is not proper because the case still “retains
a federal element.” (DE # 77 at 4.) It is not entirely clear what plaintiff means by this,
but it seems he is implying that by retaining jurisdiction, this court could assist in the
development of federal case law regarding forced catheterizations. Regardless, this does
not change the fact that there are no pending federal claims in this case. If this court
were to retain jurisdiction, it would simply be applying Indiana state law.
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds no reason to rebut the presumption of
relinquishment of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss (DE # 75) is
GRANTED, the court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and the
remaining claims are DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
Date: July 31, 2018
s/James T. Moody________________
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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