Meredith v. Gary City of et al
Filing
84
OPINION AND ORDER: GRANTING 72 MOTION to Bifurcate § 1983 Monell Claims and Stay Discovery and Trial on Those Claims by Defendant Lake County Sheriff. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), the Monell claims against the Lake County Sheriff are BIFURCATED from the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the individually-named defendants for both discovery and trial. All discovery and trial of the Monell claims is STAYED pending resolution of the claims against the individually-named defendants. The Court ORDERS that Plaintiff's right to a jury trial on the Monell claims is preserved. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 9/13/2016. (lhc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
MARCEY MEREDITH,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
vs.
LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF,
et al.,
CAUSE NO. 2:14-CV-183
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on “Defendant Lake County
Sheriff’s Motion to Bifurcate § 1983
Monell
Claims and Stay
Discovery and Trial on Those Claims,” filed by the Lake County
Sheriff, on December 11, 2015 (DE #72).
below, the motion is GRANTED.
For the reasons set forth
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 42(b), the Monell claims against the Lake County Sheriff
are BIFURCATED from the 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claims against the
individually-named defendants for both discovery and trial.
discovery
and
trial
of
the
Monell
claims
is
STAYED
All
pending
resolution of the claims against the individually-named defendants.
The Court ORDERS that Plaintiff’s right to a jury trial on the
Monell claims is preserved.
BACKGROUND
The
plaintiff,
Marcey
Meredith
(“Plaintiff”),
filed
a
complaint in this case on May 30, 2014.
(DE #1).
Plaintiff was
granted leave to file an amended complaint on January 6, 2015, and
the first amended complaint was docketed that same day.
DE #30.)
1983.
(DE #29 &
This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section
According to the first amended complaint, on December 14,
2012, Plaintiff was a patron in a liquor store located in Gary,
Indiana, when she was approached by defendant Officer A. Thomas
(“Officer Thomas”) who asked her to step outside.
(DE #30, p. 2.)
When she exited the store, Officer Thomas grabbed her, slammed her
into a wall, and handcuffed her.
(Id.)
When she questioned this,
Officer Thomas and two other officers, Officer J. Corle (“Officer
Corle”) and Officer William T. Downs (“Officer Downs”), told her to
“shut-up bitch.”
(Id.)
Although she was not resisting, the
aforementioned officers allegedly slammed her onto the ground,
grabbed her hair, and began beating her head and face into the
cement.
(Id.)
One of the officers then shoved his knee into her
neck, picked her up, and dropped her onto the ground, which chipped
and loosened her tooth.
(Id.)
After the alleged beating, despite
being covered in blood, Plaintiff was taken to the Lake County Jail
instead of the hospital where she was held for two days without
appropriate medical treatment.
(Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff alleges
that, during that time, she was only offered Tylenol for her
injuries by defendants Shawn Emola, RN (“Nurse Emola”) and Dr.
William Forgey (“Dr. Forgey”).
(Id. at 5.)
2
Ultimately, Plaintiff
was not charged with a crime and was released.
(Id. at 3.)
Upon
leaving the Lake County Jail, she was treated in the emergency room
for her injuries which included a chipped tooth, physical pain,
cervical strain, bruising, contusions, a black eye, a split lip,
and soreness to her face, head, body, and limbs.
(Id.)
Plaintiff lists the defendants in her first amended complaint
as
the
Lake
County
Sheriff
(the
“Sheriff”)
in
his
official
capacity, and Officer Thomas, Officer Corle, and Officer Downs as
parties “acting in their individual capacity, within the scope of
their
employment
and
under
color
of
law”
(collectively,
“individually-named Officer Defendants”). (Id. at 1.) Nurse Emola
and Dr. Forgey are also named in their “individual capacity,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and were acting under color of law
and within the scope of their employment.”
(Id. at 5.)
Based on the actions described above, Plaintiff brings her
claims
against
the
individually-named
Officer
Defendants
for
“excessive and unreasonable force, a false arrest, and unreasonable
seizure, in violation of Plaintiff’s federally protected rights
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”
(Id. at 1.)
In addition to or
in the alternative, she alleges those same claims under a “theory
of bystander liability” because the individually-named Officer
Defendants “watched as their fellow officers battered and subjected
the Plaintiff to excessive and unreasonable force, false arrest,
3
and unlawful seizure but failed to intervene to protect the
Plaintiff, in spite of having a meaningful opportunity to do so.”
(Id. at 4.)
Defendants
She also alleges that the individually-named Officer
“denied
Plaintiff
adequate
medical
care
for
her
injuries, when they failed to take Plaintiff to the hospital
following her arrest” in violation of the Eighth and/or Fourteenth
Amendments and section 1983. (Id.) Her claims against the Sheriff
stem
from
the
allegedly
“unconstitutional/constitutionally
deficient policies, practices, procedures, and/or customs in effect
(including the custom and policy of inadequate training), that
resulted in the excessive and unreasonable force and false arrest
of Plaintiff in violation of her right to be free from unreasonable
seizure” pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and
section 1983. (Id. at 2.) Finally, her claims against Nurse Emola
and Dr. Forgey arise under the Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments
and section 1983 because they allegedly “denied her adequate
medical care and adequate pain management care for the serious
medical condition(s)” and “declined to permit the Plaintiff to be
sent to a hospital so that appropriate, adequate medical and pain
management care could be received.”
(Id. at 5.)
To the extent Plaintiff seeks damages against the Sheriff in
his official capacity, his claim is, in effect, an action against
the Sheriff’s Department, a municipality.
Soc.
Servs.,
436
U.S.
658,
690
4
Monell v. Department of
(1978);
Smith
v.
County
of
Kosciusko, No. S91-5(RDP), 1991 WL 261766, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Nov.
15, 1991).
The Sheriff filed the instant motion to bifurcate on December
11, 2015.
(DE #72.)
In it, the Sheriff requests that the Court
bifurcate all of Plaintiff’s claims against the individually-named
Officer Defendants from Plaintiff’s section 1983 Monell claims
against the Sheriff’s Department and to stay discovery and trial on
the Monell claims until and unless Plaintiff first proves an
underlying
constitutional
violation
individually-named Officer Defendants.
against
any
of
the
On December 18, 2015, the
Sheriff also filed a motion for extension of time to respond to the
pending Monell discovery until ruling on the motion to bifurcate
was complete.
(DE #73.)
Magistrate Judge Paul R. Cherry (“Judge
Cherry”) took the motion under advisement and ordered Plaintiff to
file a written response by December 30, 2015. (DE #74.) Plaintiff
filed a response in opposition to the motion for bifurcation on
December 21, 2015, but did not file a separate response to the
motion for extension of time.
on December 28, 2015.
(DE #75.)
(DE #76.)
The Sheriff filed a reply
Noting the lack of objection by
Plaintiff, on January 25, 2016, Judge Cherry granted the motion for
extension of time and stayed the deadline for the Sheriff to
respond to Plaintiff’s discovery requests pending a ruling on the
motion to bifurcate.
(DE #77.)
The motion to bifurcate is thus
ripe for adjudication.
5
DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) states, in relevant
part, that “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite
and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more
separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party
claims.
When ordering a separate trial, the court must preserve
any federal right to a jury trial.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
Bifurcation may be appropriate if one or more of the Rule 42(b)
criteria is met.
See, e.g., Treece v. Hochstetler, 213 F.3d 360,
365 (7th Cir. 2000).
Courts have broad discretion in deciding
whether to bifurcate issues presented in a case or to try them
separately.
2000).
Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 516 (7th Cir.
Indeed, the district court’s exercise of its discretion to
bifurcate will be set aside on appeal “only upon a clear showing of
abuse.”
Treece, 213 F.3d at 364-65.
Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(d) also permits a court to stay discovery on Monell
claims.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d); see also Carr v. City of N.
Chicago, 908 F.Supp.2d 926, 927 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
The decision of
whether to bifurcate is a case-specific analysis. Cadiz v. Kruger,
No. 06 C 5463, 2007 WL 4293976, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2007).
The Sheriff argues that bifurcation will be more convenient
and efficient for the parties, it will avoid prejudice, expedite
the matter, and economize resources for the Court and parties
6
during the discovery process and trial.
(DE #72, p. 2.)
In
response, Plaintiff “agrees that discovery could be stayed on the
§ 1983 Monell claims” against the Sheriff, but she states, without
any argument or explanation, that it will “hardly ‘expedite and
economize’ the case” . . . “[i]f anything, it will drag it out and
cause this [C]ourt to continue the case and trial for another two
or three years.”
(DE #75, p. 2.)
In this case, the Monell claims center around allegations of
excessive
force,
Specifically,
a
failure
Plaintiff
to
intervene,
alleges
and
that
false
there
arrest.
were
“unconstitutional/constitutionally deficient policies, practices,
procedures, and/or customs in effect (including the custom and
policy of inadequate training), that resulted in the excessive and
unreasonable force and false arrest of Plaintiff in violation of
her right to be free from unreasonable seizure.”1
(DE #30, p. 2.)
The Court finds that these types of claims are well suited for
bifurcation.
constitutional
This is so because “[i]f a person has suffered no
injury
at
the
hands
of
the
individual
police
officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have
authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite
beside the point.”
City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796,
799 (1986) (emphasis in original).
1
See also Swanigan v. City of
The Court notes that Plaintiff does not appear to allege any
unconstitutional policies, practices, procedures, or customs related to the
denial of adequate medical treatment claims. (See DE #30, generally.)
7
Chicago, 775 F.3d 953, 962 (7th Cir. 2015) (“If the plaintiff fails
to prove a violation of his constitutional rights in his claim
against the individual defendants, there will be no viable Monell
claim based on the same allegations.”). Furthermore, “there can be
no liability under Monell for failure to train when there has been
no violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Jenkins v.
Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 2007).2
Thus, the Court
agrees with the Sheriff that it is logical to determine whether the
individually-named
Officer
Defendants
violated
Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights before requiring the Court (and the parties)
to expend resources litigating the Monell claims against the
Sheriff’s Department that might never be reached or adjudicated.
In the event that the individually-named Officer Defendants are
found
not
to
have
committed
the
constitutional
violations,
bifurcating the Monell claims would have served to avoid prejudice
to the Sheriff’s Department for unnecessarily defending these
claims.
And should the individually-named Officer Defendants be
found liable, ultimately, Plaintiff’s right to a jury trial on the
Monell
claims
Plaintiff
does
would
not
be
unaffected
argue
that
2
she
by
bifurcation;
would
be
in
fact,
prejudiced
by
While the Seventh Circuit has left the door open for the possibility
that, when questions of qualified immunity are at play, a municipality could
be found liable under Monell even if its officers are not, such a hypothetical
concern is premature at this stage and could be appropriately determined at
the conclusion of a trial on individual liability. See Saunders v. City of
Chicago, 146 F. Supp. 3d 957, 969-70 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (citing Thomas v. Cook
Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 305 (7th Cir. 2010)).
8
bifurcation in any concrete way.
Efficiency, convenience, and economy also weigh in favor of
bifurcation.
and
“[D]iscovery relating to the municipality’s policies
practices,
which
(depending
on
the
size
of
the
police
department) can add significant time, effort, and complications to
the discovery process.”
Medina v. City of Chicago, 100 F. Supp. 2d
893, 895 (N.D. Ill. 2000); see also Price v. Kraus, No. 2:15-CV331-PRC, 2016 WL 36982, at *2-3 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 1, 2016).
Judges
throughout the circuit have recognized that oftentimes, “claims of
municipal liability require an extensive amount of work on the part
of plaintiff’s attorneys and experts, and an extraordinary amount
of money must be spent in order to prepare and prove them.”
Moore
v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 5130, 2007 WL 3037121, at *9 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 15, 2007); see also Cruz v. City of Chicago, No. 08 C
2087, 2008 WL 5244616, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2008) (convenience
and efficiency would be best served through bifurcation, in part,
because of “extensive amount of work” associated with Monell
claims).
In this case, the Sheriff argues that discovery related
to Plaintiff’s Monell claims would be a burdensome, time consuming,
expensive task because the Sheriff’s Department would have to
“locate, compile, and produce numerous documents” and engage in a
“detailed investigation” to answer Monell interrogatories.
#72, p. 4.)
The Sheriff further contends that:
[t]here will inevitably be depositions of
several fact witnesses relating to Plaintiff’s
9
(DE
Monell claims in addition to Fed. R. Civ. P.
30(b)(6) witnesses. Additionally, each party
will need to retain and defend against expert
witnesses, which will add to the discovery
process, add to ligation expenses, and
lengthen the trial of this matter.
Thus,
bifurcating and staying discovery on the
Monell claims prevents the parties from
spending a daunting amount of time, resources,
and money participating in discovery that may
be ultimately unnecessary.
(Id. at 4-5.)
Other than a brief and unelaborated upon statement
that bifurcation will “drag [the case] out and cause this [C]ourt
to continue the case and trial for another two or three years,”
Plaintiff does not specifically dispute any of the Sheriff’s
assertions.
(DE #75, p. 2.)
Plaintiff’s main concern appears to
be with the possibility that the Sheriff could be using the motion
“as a court-sanctioned means to prevent Plaintiff from receiving
discovery responses that she needs regarding each named officer.”
(Id.)
Plaintiff notes that she has sent discovery requests to the
defendants asking for “copies of all discipline given to Officers
Thomas, Corle, and Downs for any reason from the year 2006 through
today’s date” and interrogatories asking for further “details of
allegations made against the three officers for battery, excessive
force, police brutality or physical injury to a suspect, as well as
information regarding arrests made without probable cause, false
arrest or false imprisonment for the five (5) years preceding
Plaintiff’s Complaint.”
(Id.)
In his reply, the Sheriff points
out that he has not proposed staying the discovery related to the
10
individually-named Officer Defendants and is responding in good
faith to all of the non-Monell discovery.
(DE #76, p. 2.)
According to Plaintiff’s response and attached discovery
exhibits, it does appear that Plaintiff has misconstrued the
Sheriff’s bifurcation request.
prevented
from
undertaking
Her concern that she will be
in
discovery
related
individually-named Officer Defendants is misplaced.
to
the
Rather, the
Sheriff’s argument is that limiting discovery to the individuallynamed Officer Defendants at this time (as opposed to allowing the
discovery related to the Monell claims against the Sheriff to
proceed concurrently) will expedite and economize the case.
The
Court agrees that this is likely, especially given the general
nature of the policies, procedures, and/or customs described above3
that led to the alleged constitutional violations. See Price, 2016
WL 36982 at *3 (distinguishing general policy allegations from
specifically detailed ones and granting bifurcation); see also
Carr, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 933-34 (describing the additional cost,
time,
and
effort
burdens
related
to
Monell
discovery
as
distinguishable from discovery associated with the individual
claims and finding that “bifurcation is likely to allow some or all
of the parties to avoid those burdens.”)
Based on the foregoing, and in light of Plaintiff’s apparent
misunderstanding regarding the extent of the Sheriff’s request, the
3
Pages 7, supra & First Amended Complaint (DE #30, pp. 1-2).
11
Court finds that the avoidance of prejudice and the interests of
justice, efficiency, convenience, and economy support bifurcation.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, “Defendant Lake County
Sheriff’s Motion to Bifurcate § 1983
Monell
Claims and Stay
Discovery and Trial on Those Claims” (DE #72) is GRANTED. Pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), the Monell claims against
the Lake County Sheriff are BIFURCATED from the 42 U.S.C. section
1983 claims against the individually-named defendants for both
discovery and trial.
All discovery and trial of the Monell claims
is
resolution
STAYED
pending
individually-named defendants.
of
the
claims
against
the
The Court ORDERS that Plaintiff’s
right to a jury trial on the Monell claims is preserved.
DATED: September 13, 2016
/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
12
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