McCoy v. Buncich et al

Filing 140

OPINION AND ORDER: The Court GRANTS Defendant Curtis Pearson's Motion for Summary Judgment 124 ; GRANTS Defendant Yvonne Hogan-Foster's Motion for Summary Judgment 125 ; GRANTS Defendant Jose Menchaca's Motion for Summary Judgment [1 26]; GRANTS Defendant Niecey Gore's Motion for Summary Judgment 127 ; GRANTS Michael Atherton's Motion for Summary Judgment 128 ; DENIES Plaintiff Keith McCoy's Motion for Summary Judgment 130 ; and DENIES Plaintiff Keith McCoy's Perjury Motion Against Defendant Niecey Gore 132 . The Clerk shall ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiff. Signed by Judge Philip P Simon on 12/14/2017. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(jss)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
KEITH MCCOY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NIECEY GORE, MR. ATTHENTON,
Y. HOGAN, MS. PIERSON, and
JOSE MENCHACA
Defendants.

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CAUSE NO. 2:14-CV-355-PPS

OPINION AND ORDER
This case has had a long and complex history. To sum it up, pro se Plaintiff
Keith McCoy brought this action against several employees of Lake County Jail
regarding McCoy’s treatment while held as a pretrial detainee. In McCoy’s own words,
McCoy is a gay man who identifies as a woman, DE 1 at 5, and has used feminine
pronouns to refer to herself in her filings. As such, I also have used feminine pronouns
to refer to her in the past and continue to do so today. After a very long process of
repeated amendments to the complaint, we are left with two claims against five
defendants. The first claim relates to the supposed misclassification of McCoy when
she originally was brought into the Lake County Jail. McCoy was assigned to the
administrative segregation on the medical floor rather than general population by
Defendants Niecey Gore and Jose Menchaca, and it is this classification that McCoy
says was unnecessary and punitive. The second claim arises from an incident

involving a fight between McCoy and another inmate during which McCoy alleges she
was stabbed several times and Defendants Michael Atherton, Curtis Pearson, and
Yvonne Hogan-Foster (“Hogan”) were deliberately indifferent to her need for medical
attention. All five defendants and McCoy moved for summary judgment on all claims.
Based on the evidence presented to me by the Defendants on summary judgment, and
the lack of evidence presented to me by McCoy, there appears to be no genuine issue
of material fact in this matter. Because the classification of McCoy was not done in a
punitive way and because there is no evidence that the Defendants ignored McCoy’s
injuries after the fight, summary judgment will be granted.
Background
This case arises out of McCoy’s pre-trial detention at Lake County Jail during
the period of September 2012 to October 2012. McCoy was incarcerated, booked into
the Lake County Jail, and classified as a pretrial detainee on September 20, 2012. [DE
126-1 at 2.] Defendant Jose Menchaca personally classified McCoy and placed her in
administrative segregation on the medical floor of the jail purportedly to protect her
from other inmates preying on her and from her potentially preying on other inmates
due to McCoy’s sexual orientation. [Id.] McCoy has presented no evidence to the
contrary and asserts only that she was “cleared” by medical staff because she is not
transgender and was initially placed and assigned to general population and then
approximately an hour or two later reclassified to administrative segregation on the
medical floor. [DE 130 at 1.] McCoy presents no evidence that the reclassification was
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punitive in nature or for a reason other than McCoy’s protection and the protection of
the other inmates, as Menchaca asserts.
On October 25, 2012, McCoy was involved in a fight with another inmate at the
Lake County Jail. [DE 128-1.] Defendant Atherton was one of the officers who
responded to the fight and completed a Jail Log for the incident. [DE 127-2 at 3.]
According to the log, when Atherton entered the room in which the inmates were
fighting, McCoy had blood on her clothes and the other inmate had a cut over his left
eye that was bleeding. [Id.] There was a broken broomstick on the floor that was
dropped by both inmates. McCoy was examined and found to have no visible injuries
to her person and the blood on her uniform was from the other inmate’s cut. [Id.]
After the incident, the officers reviewed security camera footage of the fight and
noted that McCoy threw the first punch and the other inmate returned several punches.
[Id. at 3-4.] The other inmate then grabbed a broomstick and threw it at McCoy, who
picked it up and struck the other inmate in the face causing the cut above his left eye.
[Id. at 4.] The other inmate then grabbed a broken piece of the broomstick and
attempted to strike McCoy, but was subdued by McCoy. [Id.]
McCoy claims that she actually was stabbed in the leg several times during the
fight and was treated by medical staff, who gave her a shot, cleaned her wound, and
applied bandaids. [DE 130 at 2-3.] McCoy cites to exhibits in support of this, but
nothing was attached to her motion for summary judgment. Notably, McCoy’s

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argument contradicts her allegations in her complaint that she did not receive any
treatment for a day or two. [DE 13 at 67-72.]
Discussion
All five Defendants moved for summary judgment and McCoy also moved for
summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute about a material fact exists
only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A nonmoving
party is not entitled to the benefit of “inferences that are supported by only speculation
or conjecture.” Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations
and quotations omitted).
I will first quickly address McCoy’s response to the Defendants’ motions for
summary judgment, raising only the issue of their timeliness. [DE 133.] All
dispositive motions were to be filed no later than September 5, 2017. [DE 118.] All five
Defendants filed their motions for summary judgment on that date. As such, they are
timely.
The first three Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are pretty
straightforward and require little discussion. Based on the evidence that has been
submitted, there is simply nothing to show that these Defendants were at all involved
in either incident at issue in this case. Let’s start with Defendant Pearson’s motion for
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summary judgment. [DE 124.] According to Pearson’s affidavit filed with his motion
for summary judgment, his employment as a Correctional Officer at the Lake County
Jail did not begin until 2014. [DE 124-2.] As such, he could not have been involved in
either incident upon which this action is based. McCoy does not contest this fact or
present any evidence to the contrary. As such, there is no genuine dispute about a
material fact regarding the claim against Pearson and his motion for summary
judgment is granted.
As for Defendant Hogan-Foster’s motion for summary judgment, [DE 125], it is
supported by her own affidavit which states that her employment with the Lake
County Sheriff’s Department, Court Security, began March 1, 1999. [DE 125-2.] HoganFoster states that she has no personal knowledge of Keith McCoy, and that, critically,
she had no contact with her from September 20, 2012 until December 3, 2012. [Id.]
McCoy does not contest this fact or present any evidence to the contrary. As such, there
is no genuine dispute about a material fact regarding the claim against Hogan-Foster
and her motion for summary judgment is granted.
Next I turn to Defendant Niecey Gore’s motion for summary judgment. [DE
127.] Gore currently is Assistant Warden for the Lake County Sheriff’s Department.
[DE 127-2 at 1.] Gore states that she was not personally involved or present at the time
Keith McCoy was incarcerated, booked into the Lake County Jail, and classified as a
pretrial detainee. [Id.] McCoy does not contest this fact or present any evidence to the

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contrary. As such, there is no genuine dispute about a material fact regarding the claim
against Gore, and therefore her motion for summary judgment is granted.
Let’s move now to Defendant Jose Menchaca’s motion for summary judgment.
[DE 126.] McCoy alleges that she was punitively misclassified when she was placed in
administrative segregation on the medical floor. It’s true that Menchaca is the one who
made the classification of McCoy. [DE 126-2 at 1.] But Menchaca states that “McCoy
was placed in administrative segregation on the medical floor of the jail, to protect him
from other inmates preying on him and from him potentially preying on other inmates
due to McCoy’s sexual orientation.” [Id.] Menchaca reiterates that “McCoy’s
classification was not punitive, instead it was primarily to protect him.” [Id.] In her
motion for summary judgment on the issue, McCoy asserts only that Menchaca placed
McCoy in administrative segregation on the medical floor despite the fact that her
medical and mental health evaluator had determined that it was unnecessary and the
medical staff refused to move her despite her complaints. [DE 130 at 1-2.] These facts
do not appear to be disputed. But in order to be successful on her claim against
Menchaca, or at least survive summary judgment, McCoy needs to present evidence
that the motivation for her classification was punitive.
During the relevant time period, McCoy was a pretrial detainee at Lake County
Jail. “Incarcerated persons are entitled to confinement under humane conditions which
provide for their basic human needs. . . . [For] a pretrial detainee, it is the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment’s proscription
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against cruel and unusual punishment which is the source of this right. However,
courts still look to Eighth Amendment case law in addressing the claims of pretrial
detainees, given that the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
clause are at least as broad as those that the Eighth Amendment affords to convicted
prisoners.” Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs. (In re Estate of Rice), 675 F.3d 650, 664 (7th Cir.
2012) (citations omitted). To prove a violation of the Eighth Amendment in a case like
this one, McCoy would have to show that Menchaca was deliberately indifferent to her
health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1994).
While there are circumstances in which punitive misclassification to medical
segregation could qualify as a due process violation, there is no evidence of that in this
case. See Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[N]o process is required if [a
pretrial detainee] is placed in segregation not as punishment but for managerial
reasons. . . . [Including] if he was placed in segregation to protect himself from other
prisoners, or to protect jail staff from his violent propensities.”); De Jesus v. Odom, 578
Fed. App’x 598, 600 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Restrictions like segregation are not punishment
when imposed because of a legitimate governmental objective.”). Here, the
undisputed evidence, which includes an affidavit from Menchaca, shows that
managerial reasons, specifically safety concerns, motivated McCoy’s placement in
administrative segregation on the medical floor. “Prison officials must be free to take
appropriate action to ensure the safety of inmates and corrections personnel.” Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979). Menchaca’s reasons for reclassifying McCoy to
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administrative segregation on the medical floor were administrative and for the
purposes of protecting both McCoy and the other inmates and, therefore, were not
punitive and thus do not violate due process. For these reasons, Menchaca’s motion
for summary judgment is granted.
Finally, I turn to defendant Michael Atherton’s motion for summary judgment.
[DE 128.] McCoy alleges that she was stabbed multiple times in the leg with a broken
broom handle during an altercation with another prisoner and that she was not taken
for medical care until a day or two later in violation of her rights under the Eighth
Amendment. [DE 13 at 59-64.] Defendant Atherton was one of the officers who
responded to the altercation. Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment, “failure
to treat a significant painful medical condition, with deliberate indifference to the
prisoner’s situation, is a form of inaction that offends the Constitution.” Turley v.
Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 654 (7th Cir. 2013) (Easterbrook, C.J., concurring) (citing Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). This same standard applies both to convicted individuals
under the Eighth Amendment and to pre-trial detainees under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Palmer v. Marion Cnty., 327 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2003).
To succeed on her claim, McCoy must prove that she“suffer[ed] from an objectively
serious medical condition,” meaning “the need for treatment would be obvious to a
layperson,” and that the Defendants “knew about [McCoy’s] condition and the risk it
posed, but disregarded that risk.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014)
(citations omitted).
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Defendant Atherton attached to his motion for summary judgment a copy of the
Lake County Sheriff’s Office Jail Log documenting the fight that occurred between
McCoy and another inmate. [DE 128-2.] As I discussed above, the log notes that
McCoy was examined after the incident and found to have no visible injuries to her
person and the blood on her uniform was from the other inmate’s cut. McCoy offers no
admissible evidence contradicting this account of the incident, requiring I grant
Atherton’s motion for summary judgment because there is no evidence that Atherton
did anything to violate McCoy’s constitutional rights. I will note, however, that McCoy
asserts a different version of the facts in her motion for summary judgment—one that
independently defeats her claim. McCoy asserts that she was stabbed during the fight
and medical records show that she was treated after the fight and received a shot, had
her wounds cleaned, and bandages were applied. [DE 130.] So even in McCoy’s own
account of the incident was in the form of an admissible affidavit, it would defeat her
own claim because it indicates that McCoy was immediately treated and her
constitutional rights, therefore, were not violated. So according to either version of the
facts, McCoy cannot prevail. As such, Atherton’s motion for summary judgment is
granted.
As I have discussed throughout, McCoy has presented no evidence to create a
genuine dispute about a material fact in order to survive the Defendants’ motions for
summary judgment. All of the evidence submitted by all of the Parties through their
summary judgment filings support the grant of the Defendants’ motions for summary
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judgment and the denial of McCoy’s motion for summary judgment. Finally, McCoy
filed what she refers to as a “Perjury Motion” against Defendant Niecey Gore. [DE
132.] In this motion, McCoy repeats the contents of the Affidavit of Niecey Gore, copies
of which were filed in support of Niecey Gore and Michael Atherton’s respective
motions for summary judgment, but does not designate any evidence to support her
assertion that Defendant Gore perjured herself. [DE 127-2, 128-2.] As such, McCoy’s
Perjury Motion, DE 132, is denied.
Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court:
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GRANTS Defendant Curtis Pearson’s Motion for Summary Judgment, DE
124;

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GRANTS Defendant Yvonne Hogan-Foster’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, DE 125;

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GRANTS Defendant Jose Menchaca’s Motion for Summary Judgment, DE
126;

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GRANTS Defendant Niecey Gore’s Motion for Summary Judgment, DE
127;

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GRANTS Defendant Michael Atherton’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
DE 128;

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DENIES Plaintiff Keith McCoy’s Motion for Summary Judgment 130; and

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DENIES Plaintiff Keith McCoy’s Perjury Motion Against Defendant
Niecey Gore, DE 132.

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The Clerk shall ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of the Defendants and
against the Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: December 14, 2017.

_s/ Philip P. Simon________________
PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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