Wilson v. Lear Seating Corporation

Filing 32

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 19 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Defendant Lear Seating Corporation; GRANTING 29 RULE 12(f) MOTION to Strike 25 Response to Motion by Defendant Lear Seating Corporation. This case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Clerk DIRECTED to close this case. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 6/14/17. (Copy mailed to pro se party).(cer)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
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TAMIKA WILSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LEAR SEATING CORPORATION,
Defendant.

NO. 2:14–CV-374

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed by Lear Seating Corporation (“Lear”) on
May 5, 2016 (DE #19), and Defendant’s Motion to Strike Inadmissible
Hearsay Evidence filed by Lear on July 1, 2016 (DE #29).

For the

reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(DE #19) is GRANTED, and Defendant’s Motion to Strike (DE #29) is
GRANTED.

Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED with prejudice and

the Clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Tamika Wilson (“Wilson”) had been employed by Lear
from 2000 until 2013.

In January 2012, Wilson filed a complaint

of sexual harassment by a co-worker, and as a result, Lear fired

‐1‐ 

the co-worker.

Wilson alleges that after the termination of this

co-worker, she was subjected to severe and pervasive harassment
and retaliatory conduct by her other co-workers and her supervisor.
In June 2013, Wilson filed a charge of sex discrimination and
retaliation
(“EEOC”).

with

the

Equal

Employment

Opportunity

Commission

Three months after filing this charge, Lear suspended

Wilson for performance.

Lear terminated Wilson’s employment on

October 28, 2013.
Wilson filed this action asserting that Lear had retaliated
against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.

Lear denies that it violated

Title VII, and filed the instant motion for summary judgment. This
motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for adjudication.

Lear

also filed a motion to strike certain evidence Wilson submitted in
response to Lear’s summary judgment motion. Wilson did not respond
to Lear’s motion to strike.

DISCUSSION
Motion to Strike
Lear’s motion to strike urges the Court to strike the alleged
declarations

of

union

representative

(“Franciski”) as inadmissible hearsay.

Sherri

Franciski

Wilson failed to respond

to this motion,  which is a sufficient reason to grant it.

See

generally Wojtas v. Capital Guardian Tr. Co., 477 F.3d 924, 926

‐2‐ 

(7th Cir. 2007) (failure to oppose an argument constitutes waiver).
“It is the function of the Court, with or without a motion to
strike, to carefully review the evidence and to eliminate from
consideration

any

argument,

conclusions,

and

assertions

unsupported by the documented evidence of record offered in support
of the statement.”

Wajvoda v. Menard, Inc., No. 2:11–CV–393, 2015

WL 5773648, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2015) (citations omitted).
As such, the Court will consider the merits of Lear’s motion to
strike.
In response to Lear’s motion for summary judgment, Wilson
relies on evidence that Franciski said that “there’s a witch hunt
after you [Wilson].

They do not want you in here.”

(DE #27-1 at

40.) The only evidence that Wilson cites to support this assertion
is

testimony

from

her

own

deposition.

Because

she

offers

Franciski’s statements “to prove the truth of the matter asserted,”
the statements are hearsay.

Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); see Rogers v.

Waukegan Pub. Sch. Dist. 60, 924 F. Supp. 2d 940, 946 (N.D. Ill.
2013) (disregarding plaintiff’s testimony as hearsay where he
testified to the statement of an out-of-court declarant in an
attempt to establish the truth of the matter asserted by the
declarant - that a group was “out to get” plaintiff and wanted to
replace him).

“A party may not rely upon inadmissible hearsay to

oppose a motion for summary judgment.”

‐3‐ 

Gunville v. Walker, 583

F.3d 979, 985 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).

Therefore,

Lear’s motion to strike (DE #29) is GRANTED.

Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

A genuine

dispute of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct.
2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).

Not every dispute between the

parties makes summary judgment inappropriate; “[o]nly disputes
over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing

law

will

properly

preclude

the

entry

of

summary

judgment.” Id. To determine whether a genuine dispute of material
fact exists, the Court must construe all facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences
in that party’s favor.

See Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358

(7th Cir. 2010).
A party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion
may not rely on allegations in her own pleading but rather must
“marshal and present the court with the evidence she contends will
prove her case.”
651,

654

(7th

Goodman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d
Cir.

2010).

“[I]nferences

‐4‐ 

relying

on

mere

speculation or conjecture will not suffice.” Stephens v. Erickson,
569 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

If the

nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an essential
element on which she bears the burden of proof at trial, summary
judgment is proper.

See Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th

Cir. 2006).

Facts
In August 2000, Lear hired Wilson to work at Lear’s facility
in Hammond, Indiana, where she assisted in assembling vehicle
seats. Wilson was represented by UAW and its Local 2335 (“Union”).
The Hammond facility had rules of employee conduct, a sexual
harassment policy, and a progressive discipline system.

Lear’s

sexual harassment policy provides that “[n]o associate will suffer
reprisal or retaliation as a result of reporting complaints of
sexual harassment.”
discipline

system,

misconduct

may

corrective

actions.

(DE #21-2 at 5.)
employees

receive

a
In

who

series
the

Under the progressive

violate
of

event

rules

or

increasingly
of

engage

more

sufficiently

in

severe
serious

misconduct, Lear could skip a step in the progression and implement
serious corrective action such as suspension or discharge.

Upon

the request of the Union, Lear could agree to repeat a step rather
than moving to the next step in the progression.

‐5‐ 

On January 17, 2008, Wilson received a verbal warning for
violating the rule against wasting time or loitering during work
hours.

Three years later, on January 19, 2011, Wilson received a

verbal warning for violating the rule against making scrap, rework or careless workmanship.

Wilson received a verbal warning

for the same conduct a few weeks later, on December 1, 2011.

On

December 21, 2011, Wilson received a verbal warning for wasting
time or loitering during work hours.

Wilson doesn’t recall the

circumstances surrounding of any of these verbal warnings.1
On January 27, 2012, Wilson submitted an incident report to
Barbara Sacha (“Sacha”), the human resource manager at Lear’s
Hammond facility.

In that report, Wilson accused co-worker Xavier

Curtis (“Curtis”) of making inappropriate sexual gestures.

Sacha

investigated Wilson’s complaint and discharged Curtis effective
February 1, 2012.
Wilson

Wilson was satisfied with this outcome.

testified

that

after

Curtis

was

terminated,

continued to be harassed by other male co-workers.

she

She identified

1

 Lear’s discipline policy states that a verbal warning will remain
on an employee’s record for three months, but if the employee
subsequently receives a written warning, both disciplines remain
on the employee’s record for six months, and if the employee
receives a second warning, all disciplines remain on the employee’s
record for one year. A suspension remains on an employee’s record
for one year.
While Wilson argues that her employment record
should have reflected only those disciplines that occurred within
one year of her termination on October 28, 2013, she does not
dispute that she received disciplines after October 28, 2012,
including suspensions.

‐6‐ 

several members of Lear management who allegedly turned a blind
eye

to

this

harassment,

including

Barnard

supervisors

(“Barnard”),

and

Akelius
Darryl

Lloyd

(“Lloyd”),

Clint

Harper

(“Harper”).

Wilson recalled occasions when supervisors would walk

past her work area and “just shake their heads” while co-workers
were making indecent gestures.

(DE #27-1 at 21.)

At one point,

Harper told Wilson that he would not hug her because “he would be
afraid that [she] would turn him in.”

(Id. at 36.)

On February 21, 2012, Wilson received a verbal warning for
wasting time or loitering during work hours.

On March 12, 2012,

she received a written warning for making scrap, re-work or
careless workmanship.

Three days later, on March 15, 2012, Wilson

received a written warning for leaving her work station.

Wilson

does not recall the details surrounding any of these disciplines.
On March 22, 2012, Wilson received a final warning for creating or
contributing to an unsanitary condition, but this warning was
rescinded under an agreement between Lear and the Union.
On

April

27,

that

two

alleging
gestures.
(“Holt”)

2012,

Wilson

co-workers

submitted

had

made

an

incident

report

inappropriate

sexual

Lear’s assistant human resources manager Monica Holt
and

a

Union

representative

investigated

Wilson’s

complaint by interviewing Wilson, the two co-workers Lamontrye
Edmond (“Edmond”) and Keith Barrington (“Barrington”), and other

‐7‐ 

employees.2

None

Wilson’s complaint.

of

the

employees

interviewed

corroborated

One employee allegedly stated that he had

“seen male [sic] [and] females frown at [Wilson], because, they
say she got someone fired, some say she’s crazy.”
20.)

(DE #21-7 at

Holt and the Union representative provided Edmond and

Barrington with copies of Lear’s rules of personal conduct and
harassment

policies

“as

behavior.”

(Id. at 8.)

a

reminder

of

expected/prohibited

They also met with Wilson to advise her

of the investigation results, and encouraged her to report any
additional concerns.
On May 31, 2012, Wilson received a final warning for wasting
time and loitering during work hours.

On September 20, 2012, she

received a final warning for refusing to adhere to reasonable
orders, not performing job assignment, or restricting output.
Wilson does not remember the details of either of these final
warnings.
On September 20, 2012, Wilson submitted an incident report
alleging that she had a confrontation with two co-workers in which
a co-worker swore at her.

The two co-workers submitted incident

reports asserting that Wilson had sworn at a co-worker.

Holt and

2

  Lear’s human resources specialist Patricia Tarver (“Tarver”)
emailed Holt on April 27, 2012, stating that Edmonds was completing
an incident report against Wilson, asserting that “she is harassing
him. Barb [Sacha] came in and inquired. GET READY!!!!!” (DE
#25-10.)

‐8‐ 

a

Union

representative

investigated

the

incident,

including

interviewing Wilson, the two co-workers, another employee, and
supervisor

Joseph

corroborate

Watson

Wilson’s

(“Watson”).

complaint.

They

Wilson

were

admits

unable

signing

to
the

September 20, 2012, incident report, but does not recall meeting
with Holt or their investigation of the incident.
On September 26, 2012, Wilson received a final warning for
threatening, intimidating, coercing, abusive language or fighting
with

any

employee

or

supervisor.

She

does

not

recall

the

circumstances surrounding this discipline.
On October 4, 2012, Wilson submitted an incident report
complaining that co-workers were harassing her by making faces and
a

cuckoo

gesture

behind

inappropriate manner.

her

back

and

rubbing

seats

in

an

Wilson noted that “[e]very day since my

incident with the sexual harassment case which lead to an employee
being fired, I’ve had to indure [sic] mental pain [and] plain out
harassment

from

some

co-workers.”

(DE

#21-2

at

25.)

She

identified Jaime Moran (“Moran”) as one of the co-workers engaging
in this conduct.

(Id.)

Sacha met with Wilson to discuss this

complaint.
Sacha emailed Holt on October 5, 2012, stating in part that
Wilson “has filed another Incident form alleging that she has had
to endure mental pain every day since the termination of Xavier
Curtis – as if nothing has ever occurred between 2011 and today.

‐9‐ 

I know that isn’t true.”

(DE #25-5.)

Sacha and Holt interviewed

Moran, supervisor Watson, and a co-worker who was a potential
witness

to

the

alleged

misconduct.

Moran

denied

Wilson’s

allegations, and Sacha and Holt found him to be credible.
and the co-worker denied witnessing the alleged misconduct.

Watson
Sacha

asked Watson “to stay on the alert to any inappropriate behavior
on the line so that he can address it.”

(DE #21-7 at 51.)

Sacha

and Holt met with Wilson and a Union representative to explain
that they had investigated the incident but could not substantiate
her complaint.
On January 16, 2013, Wilson was suspended for wasting time or
loitering, but the suspension was rescinded under an agreement
between Lear and the Union.

On February 9, 2013, supervisor Dave

Maple (“Maple”) emailed Holt and Tarver asking that Wilson be
disciplined for wearing headphones in both ears while walking on
the production floor.

(DE #25-6 at 1.)

Assistant materials

manager Brant Johnson (“Johnson”), who had been copied on Maple’s
email, responded, “[s]hould we send her for a drug test?”
Maple replied, “[i]f it was up to me, yes.”

(Id.)

(Id.)

Holt denied

the request, stating that “[p]rogressive discipline is appropriate
in this case.”

(Id. at 2.)

On February 13, 2013, Wilson was

suspended for disregarding safety rules by wearing headphones in
both ears while walking on the production floor.

‐10‐ 

Wilson denied

doing so, and testified that Maple was lying about her wearing
both headphones.
On February 21, 2013, Wilson was suspended for making scrap,
re-work or careless workmanship.

Wilson believes she filed a

grievance with the Union about this discipline, but the Union never
responded to it.

On March 12, 2013, Wilson was suspended for

creating or contributing to unsanitary conditions.

She does not

recall the circumstances surrounding this discipline.

On May 9,

2013, Wilson was suspended for making scrap, re-work or careless
workmanship by making defective seats. Wilson recalls being spoken
to about making defective seats, and believes that that the seats
were sabotaged.

In all, seven different supervisors or plant

superintendents,

including

Watson,

requested discipline for Wilson.3

Maple,

Barnard,

and

Lloyd

Several of Wilson’s disciplines

were issued by Lear’s human resources personnel Sacha, Holt and
Tarver.
On June 5, 2013, Wilson filed an EEOC Charge (“EEOC Charge”)
alleging:
In January of 2012 I filed a sexual harassment complaint
against my co-worker, he was discharged.
I am being
harassed by my Supervisor and my co-workers, making my
work environment hostile to work in. On May 9, 2013, I
was suspended for four days, allegedly for having 12
defective seats. My White male co-worker had defective
seats also but he received no discipline. I feel this

3

  After Curtis was discharged, Lear hired Barnard, Lloyd, and two
other supervisors who recommended discipline for Wilson. (DE #216 at 4.)

‐11‐ 

is retaliation because of the incident.
My male coworkers get behind me on the line and make inappropriate
jesters [sic] behind my back and the Supervisor does
nothing.
(DE #21-2 at 38.)

Wilson identified Barnard as the supervisor and

“Dave” (last name unknown to her) as the white male co-worker
mentioned in the EECO Charge.

(DE #27-1 at 34-35.)

She testified

that Dave built the allegedly defective seats in October 2013
(after she filed the EEOC Charge), and admitted that it was
possible that Dave received discipline without her knowledge.
(Id.)
or

Wilson did not discuss the EEOC Charge with her co-workers

Lear

management.

Lear’s

production

supervisors

and

superintendents were not informed that Lear had received the EEOC
Charge.
On September 25, 2013, supervisors Barnard and Lloyd emailed
Lear’s

new

human

resources

(“Miller”), about Wilson.

assistant

manager,

Stacey

Miller

Their emails asserted that Wilson had

not completed her work on particular seats on September 24 and 25,
2013, among other issues.

Miller and Lear’s new human resources

manager,

(“Guajardo”),

Jose

investigation.

Guajardo

conducted

an

initial

On September 30, 2013, Miller and Guajardo met

with Wilson and Union representative Jamie Luna (“Luna”).

Wilson

insisted that she had built the seats correctly and that the seats
had been sabotaged.

Miller, Guajardo, Luna and Wilson met with

William Bear (“Bear”), a seat repair worker.

‐12‐ 

During that meeting,

Bear was repeatedly asked “if he had seen anything as far as the
seats. And [Bear] said that he did not. He did not find anything.”
(Id. at 39.)

Wilson noted that she was not shown a repair log

reflecting the allegedly defective seats.4

Wilson was suspended

pending further investigation.
Guajardo and Miller met with Barnard, Luna and Bear outside
of Wilson’s presence.

Bear then confirmed that on September 24,

2013, he repaired eleven seats from the zone in which Wilson was
working.

Miller attests that Bear “reluctant[ly]” identified

Wilson as the operator.

(DE #21-4 at 5 (Miller Aff. ¶11).)

Guajardo and Miller found no proof of sabotage.
Guajardo and Miller found that Wilson had violated the rule
against making scrap, re-work and careless workmanship.
attests

that

she

and

Guajardo

decided

to

terminate

Miller
Wilson’s

employment “because it was the next step in the progressive
discipline process.”

(Id., ¶12.)

They reviewed her discipline

history and saw that Wilson had been disciplined at the suspension
level for the past four disciplines, rather than progressing to
the next step of termination.

They concluded that Lear had given

Wilson multiple breaks, but her performance had not improved. They
did not consult with or seek input from any superintendent or

4

 Lear maintains that Guajardo and Miller did not need a repair log

because Lloyd’s and Barnard’s emails “specifically identif[ied]
the seats at issue by their BSN number.” (DE #28 at 8; see DE
#21-4 at 8, 10.) 
‐13‐ 

production supervisor in making the decision to terminate Wilson.
Wilson’s employment was terminated effective October 28, 2013.
The Union filed a grievance on Wilson’s behalf.

After Wilson

was discharged, Lear offered Wilson a “last chance agreement,”
which included a release of Wilson’s claims against Lear and the
possibility of immediate discharge upon a future violation of
certain rules of employee conduct. Wilson rejected this agreement.
Lear

has

employees.

offered

last

chance

agreements

to

other

discharged

When Wilson filed for unemployment benefits, Lear

disputed her benefits claim. Lear has disputed unemployment claims
of other discharged employees who had not made internal complaints
about unlawful discrimination or harassment or filed EEOC charges.
Analysis
The Complaint alleges that Lear retaliated against Wilson for
engaging in the protected activity of making sexual harassment
complaints about her co-worker, and filing EEOC charges alleging
sex discrimination and retaliation. (DE #1, ¶38.) When attempting
to establish a retaliation claim, a plaintiff may proceed under
the direct or indirect methods of proof.

Both methods of proof

converge on the same question at issue here: “could a reasonable
trier of fact infer retaliation”?

Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc.,

786 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2015).

To establish retaliation under

the direct method, “a plaintiff must prove (1) that she engaged in
statutorily protected activity; (2) that she was subjected to an

‐14‐ 

adverse

employment

action;

connection between the two.”

and

(3)

that

there

was

a

causal

Greengrass v. Int'l Monetary Sys.

Ltd., 776 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).5
Lear

concedes

that

Wilson’s

January

27,

2012

internal

complaint and June 5, 2013 EEOC Charge constituted protected
activity.

For the purpose of the instant motion, Lear assumes

that Wilson’s internal complaints on April 27, 2012, September 20,
2012, and October 4, 2012, also constituted protected activity.
(DE #20 at 15 n.6); see Castro, 786 F.3d at 570 n.4 (noting that
informal complaints can constitute protected activity for purposes
of Title VII retaliation claim).
The

Complaint

alleges

that

Lear

took

adverse

employment

action against Wilson by: ignoring her complaints about severe and
pervasive harassment by co-workers; targeting her for unwarranted
and trumped-up discipline; attempting to lure Wilson into dropping
her case by offering her the last chance agreement; and terminating

5
  Under the indirect method, an employee must show that “(1) the

employee engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she was
meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) she suffered
an adverse employment action; and (4) she was treated less
favorably than similarly situated employees who did not engage in
statutorily protected activity.” Majors v. General Elec. Co., 714
F.3d 527, 537 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). The Court need
not analyze the record under the indirect method because Wilson’s
response brief does not raise this method, and so this argument
has been waived. See Hutt v. AbbVie Prod. LLC, 757 F.3d 687, 694
(7th Cir. 2014). Nonetheless, such an argument would likely fail
because Wilson failed to provide evidence of a similarly-situated
comparator who had not engaged in protected activities and who was
treated more favorably than she. See id.
‐15‐ 

her, after which Lear opposed her unemployment benefits claim.
(DE #1, ¶39.)

Lear does not dispute that Wilson’s suspensions and

termination constituted adverse employment action, and assumes
that the verbal, written and final warnings that she received also
constituted adverse employment action.

(DE #20 at 16 n.7); see

Ellis v. CCA of Tennessee LLC, 650 F.3d 640, 650 (7th Cir. 2011)
(noting

“suspension

could

qualify

as

an

adverse

employment

action”); Castro, 786 F.3d at 564 (noting that termination is an
adverse employment action).

Lear challenges the allegations that

it retaliated against Wilson by: (1) ignoring her complaints about
harassment; (2) trying to lure her into accepting the last chance
agreement; and (3) opposing her unemployment benefits claim.
#20 at 21-24.)
arguments

Because Wilson offers no response to Lear’s

regarding

abandons them.

(DE

these

three

allegations,

she

effectively

See generally Roe-Midgett v. CC Servs., Inc., 512

F.3d 865, 876 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that undeveloped argument
constitutes waiver); see also Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., No.
3:09-CV-338-PPS, 2011 WL 1884339, at *2 (N.D. Ind. May 18, 2011)
(finding plaintiff had abandoned a particular retaliation theory
because she did not rely on it in her summary judgment briefing).
Therefore, for the purpose of this motion, the Court finds that
Wilson was subjected to adverse employment action when she was
disciplined by being issued warnings and being suspended, and when
she was discharged.

‐16‐ 

The question is whether there is a causal connection between
Wilson’s protected activity and the adverse employment action.
Wilson relies on a “cat’s paw” theory of liability to prove her
retaliation claim, asserting that questions of fact remain as to
whether Lear’s decision-makers were “the unwitting dupes” of the
“retaliatory supervisors” who sabotaged her.

(DE #25 at 1; see

id. at 7-8 (citing Miller v. Polaris Labs., LLC, 797 F.3d 486, 492
(7th Cir. 2015)).
[T]he “cat’s paw” theory can apply when a biased
subordinate who lacks decision-making power uses the
formal decision-maker as a dupe in a deliberate scheme
to
trigger
a
discriminatory
employment
action.
Liability under that theory can be imposed where a nondecision-making employee with discriminatory animus
provided factual information or input that may have
affected the adverse employment action.
Matthews v. Waukesha County, 759 F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 2014)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see Miller, 797
F.3d at 490 (noting that the cat’s paw theory is premised on the
ability of the culpable actor to use an innocent decision-maker as
an unknowing tool of the former’s animus).

To create a question

of fact under the “cat’s paw” theory, a plaintiff must present
“affirmative evidence that [somebody] improperly influenced the
decision-makers.”

Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d

1101, 1108 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

Speculation that

improper influence may have existed is insufficient to carry this
burden.

Id.

‐17‐ 

In Miller v. Polaris Laboratories, LLC, Polaris fired Miller
after she consistently failed to meet a processing quota.
F.3d at 490.

797

Polaris argued that its decision to fire Miller was

the direct consequence of her poor performance.

Id.

Miller

maintained that she was set up to fail for racially discriminatory
reasons because her supervisor and a coworker had tampered with
her work, and the decision-makers were unaware that her ability to
meet her quota had been sabotaged.

Id.

The Seventh Circuit found

that Miller had shown a dispute of fact regarding whether her
supervisor and coworker were motivated by racial animus based on
evidence that they had made racially derogatory comments about
Miller.

Id. at 491.

The Seventh Circuit also found that an issue

of fact existed regarding whether the supervisor and coworker took
actions that proximately caused Miller’s termination based on
evidence that the supervisor and coworker had been seen sabotaging
Miller’s work on multiple occasions.

Although Polaris had some

evidence that Miller’s work could not have been manipulated to the
extent that she claimed, the Court found that this evidence “[wa]s
not ironclad.”

Id. at 492.

Here, Wilson maintains that Lear’s human resources department
issued

disciplines

with

little

or

‐18‐ 

no

scrutiny

based

upon

a

supervisor’s request.6

Similar to the plaintiff in Miller, Wilson

asserts that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether
her

supervisors

harbored

retaliatory

animus

against

her

for

getting Curtis fired, and whether the supervisors turned a blind
eye to other co-workers’ harassment of Wilson.

In support, Wilson

asserts that she was written up twelve times in the sixteen months
after she made the sexual harassment complaint against Curtis in
January 2012, four of which occurred in the two months after making
the complaint.7

The Court notes that Wilson also received three

verbal warnings in 2011, before she complained about Curtis.
“Suspicious timing alone rarely establishes causation, but if
there is corroborating evidence that supports an inference of
causation, suspicious timing may permit a plaintiff to survive
summary judgment.”

Sklyarsky v. Means-Knaus Partners, L.P., 777

F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 2015).
Wilson

relies

upon

three

statements

by

supervisors

as

evidence that Lear management had a negative attitude toward her:
(1) supervisor Harper’s alleged statement that he would not hug
Wilson for fear she would turn him in; (2) manager Johnson’s
suggestion that Wilson take a drug test in response to supervisor

6

 The human resources department personnel included Sacha, Holt and
Tarver, who issued disciplines to Wilson in 2012 and 2013, and
Guajardo and Miller, who discharged Wilson in October 2013.
7

 Wilson acknowledges that the March 22, 2012 write-up and January

16, 2013 suspension were rescinded.
‐19‐ 

Maple’s email requesting Wilson’s discipline in February 2013; and
(3) Maple’s emailed statement, “[i]f it was up to me, yes,” in
response to Johnson’s suggestion that Wilson take a drug test.
(DE #27-1 at 36; DE #25-6.) Wilson offers no evidence that Harper,
Johnson or Maple had a role in the decision to discharge her.
Therefore, a trier of fact could not find that any of them
influenced that decision.

See Castro, 786 F.3d at 568 (holding

that a reasonable trier of fact could not find that a supervisor
influenced termination decisions where there was no evidence that
he had any input in the decisions to terminate plaintiffs).

Nor

does Wilson offer evidence that Harper or Johnson influenced Lear’s
decisions to discipline her.

While Harper’s alleged statement

could be interpreted as referring to Wilson’s sexual harassment
complaint, “stray remarks that are neither proximate nor related
to the employment decision are insufficient to defeat summary
judgment.”

Sun v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 473 F.3d 799,

813 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

Wilson does not offer any

evidence that his remark was related to any discipline, or that
Harper

recommended

discipline

or

otherwise

“exercised

a

significant degree of influence” over any decision to discipline
her.

Id. (citation omitted).

As for Johnson, Wilson offers no

evidence that he harbored any retaliatory animus toward her, or
that he recommended any discipline for her.
Johnson’s

suggestion

that

Wilson

‐20‐ 

take

a

To the extent that
drug

test

could

be

considered an attempt to exercise influence over Lear’s decision,
the attempt was unsuccessful because Holt declined the suggestion.
Although
discipline,

Maple
Wilson

recommended
offers

no

Wilson’s
evidence

February
that

Maple

13,

2013

harbored

retaliatory animus toward her for filing internal complaints or
EEOC charges.

Maple’s email recommending discipline does not

reference Wilson’s protected activity, and Wilson testified that
she “never had any issues with [Maple].”

(DE# 27-1 at 29.)

“[P]laintiffs must produce evidence that a retaliatory motive
actually influenced the decision-maker, not merely that it could
have.”

Brown, 700 F.3d at 1108 (emphasis in original).

Wilson

does

not

assert

that

Barnard

and

Lloyd

-

the

supervisors who provided the information that led to her discharge
-

made

derogatory

complaints.

statements

about

her

sexual

harassment

Wilson points to no evidence suggesting that Barnard

or Lloyd harbored retaliatory animus against Wilson for submitting
internal complaints of sexual harassment, or that they (or any
other supervisors) were even aware of her EEOC Charge.

The Court

is “not required to draw inferences that, are supported by only
speculation [or] conjecture.”

Simpson v. Beaver Dam Cmty. Hosps.,

Inc., 780 F.3d 784, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Wilson

cites

two

emails

between

Lear’s

human

resources

personnel as demonstrating their frustration with Wilson’s issues

‐21‐ 

with other co-workers.

On April 27, 2012, Tarver emailed Holt,

relaying co-worker Edmonds’ complaint that Wilson was harassing
him, and suggesting that Holt “GET READY!”

(DE #25-10.)

On

October 5, 2012, Sacha emailed Holt to relay Wilson’s complaint
“that she has had to endure mental pain every day since the
termination of Xavier Curtis – as if nothing has ever occurred
between 2011 and today.

I know that isn’t true.”

(DE #25-5.)

Considered in the light most favorable to Wilson, these emails
indicate that Lear’s human resources personnel knew that a coworker had a conflict with Wilson in April 2012, and that they
questioned the credibility of Wilson’s October 2012 harassment
complaint.

However, the undisputed evidence shows that Lear

investigated these complaints, including interviewing the parties
involved and possible witnesses.

Wilson does not question the

efficacy of these investigations. Moreover, she offers no evidence
that Tarver or Sacha recommended any discipline for Wilson, or had
any role in her discharge.

For these reasons, Wilson has failed

to submit evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could
conclude that she was disciplined and discharged in retaliation
for filing internal sexual harassment complaints or EEOC charges.
Even if Wilson had evidence of a retaliatory motive, Lear may
show that Wilson would have been discharged even absent her
complaints about harassment.

See Lord v. High Voltage Software,

Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 564 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.

‐22‐ 

1115, 197 L. Ed. 2d 185 (2017).

Where an employer can make such

a showing, then the alleged retaliatory motive was not “a but-for
cause of [the employee’s] harm.”

Id. (citation omitted).

An

employee can avoid summary judgment by showing that a material
factual dispute exists on the question of pretext.
To show pretext, an employee must present evidence
suggesting that the employer is dissembling.
The
question is not whether the employer’s stated reason was
inaccurate or unfair, but whether the employer honestly
believed the reason it has offered to explain the
discharge.
To meet this burden, the employee must
identify
such
weaknesses,
implausibilities,
inconsistencies, or contradictions in the employer's
proffered reason that a reasonable person could find [it]
unworthy of credence.
Castro, 786 F.3d at 565 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted); see O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 635
(7th Cir. 2011) (“It is not the court’s concern that an employer
may be wrong about its employee’s performance, or may be too hard
on

its

employee.

Rather,

the

only

question

is

whether

the

employer’s proffered reason was pretextual, meaning that it was a
lie.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Lear meets the burden of presenting a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment actions by providing
evidence that it disciplined and discharged Wilson for repeatedly
violating company rules.
uniformly

bad

termination.”

–

is

a

“Inconsistent performance – though not
legitimate,

non-retaliatory

reason

Castro, 786 F.3d at 580 (citation omitted).

‐23‐ 

for

Lear’s

decisions to discipline Wilson were based on seven different
supervisors’ assertions that Wilson violated various rules of
employee conduct.
Guajardo

and

allegations

Its decision to discharge Wilson was based on

Miller’s

that

investigation

Wilson

violated

improperly in September 2013.

of

rules

two
by

supervisors’

building

seats

Because Lear offers legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for disciplining and discharging Wilson,
the burden shifts to Wilson to demonstrate that Lear’s proffered
reasons are a pretext for retaliatory intent.
Wilson cannot recall the details of most of the disciplines
she received.

She contends that genuine issues of material fact

exist as to two events:

whether she violated Lear’s rule against

wearing two headphones in February 2013, and whether she improperly
built seats in September 2013.

Wilson maintains that Bear made

conflicting statements regarding whether she improperly built
seats in September 2013.

When questioned in Wilson’s presence,

Bear allegedly said that he did not see “anything” regarding the
defective seats (DE #27-1 at 39), but later “reluctant[ly]” told
Miller that Wilson was the operator in the zone producing the
defective seats (DE #21-4 at 5 (Miller Aff. ¶11).

Wilson argues

that Bear’s statement to Miller is inadmissible hearsay because it
is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

But Bear’s

statement to Miller is not hearsay because Lear does not offer
this evidence as proof of the truth of that statement.

‐24‐ 

Rather, it

is

offered

to

prove

that

Guajardo

and

Miller

conducted

an

investigation of Barnard’s and Lloyd’s allegations and decided to
discharge Wilson for reasons other than her sexual harassment
complaints.

See Boutros v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., LLC, 802 F.3d

918, 924 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that out-of-court statements
“presented not for their truth but as evidence of Avis's reasons
for suspending and then firing” the plaintiff to be “clearly
probative”

as

to

whether

Avis

fired

the

plaintiff

for

nondiscriminatory reasons); Smith v. Wilson, 705 F.3d 674, 679
(7th Cir. 2013) (statements were not hearsay where “they were
offered not to prove the truth of the matter asserted . . . but
rather

for

the

non-hearsay

subsequent actions”).

purpose

of

explaining

Wilson's

This evidence also goes to demonstrate

Guajardo and Miller’s honest belief that Wilson improperly built
the seats.

See Pugh v. City of Attica, Ind., 259 F.3d 619, 627

n.7 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that an out-of-court statement offered
to

prove

employer’s

honest

belief

that

plaintiff

had

misappropriated funds was not hearsay); Brill v. Lante Corp., 119
F.3d

1266,

1271

(7th

Cir.

1997)

(holding

that

out-of-court

statements concerning an employee’s performance problems were not
hearsay because they went to the issue of the employer's “honest
belief” concerning such problems).
Moreover, where “the employer contends that the plaintiff’s
job performance was wanting, the plaintiff must do more than

‐25‐ 

dispute the validity of the employer’s criticisms.”
F.3d at 635.

O'Leary, 657

“The question is not whether the employer’s stated

reason was inaccurate or unfair, but whether the employer honestly
believed

the

reason

employment action.
that

Lear’s

it

has

Id.

offered”

to

explain

the

adverse

Wilson proffers no evidence suggesting

decision-makers

did

not

believe

that

Wilson

had

violated the rules of employee conduct when deciding to discipline
and discharge her.
Wilson also contends that questions of fact exist as to
whether supervisor Maple fabricated allegations that she violated
the headphone rule in February 2013, whether supervisors Barnard
and Lloyd fabricated allegations that she improperly built seats
in September 2013, and why they would do so.

Wilson relies on her

own testimony that these supervisors were lying about her violating
rules of employee conduct.

But even assuming that the supervisors

had lied, Wilson proffers no evidence that any of them recommended
discipline
complaints.

for

her

in

retaliation

for

her

sexual

harassment

Because Wilson proffers no evidence of retaliatory

animus, she fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Lear’s reasons for disciplining and discharging her were
pretextual.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS summary judgment on

Wilson’s retaliation claim.

‐26‐ 

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (DE #19) is GRANTED, and Defendant’s Motion to
Strike (DE #29) is GRANTED.

Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED

with prejudice and the Clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case.

DATED:

June 14, 2017

/s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

‐27‐