Witt v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 24

OPINION AND ORDER: GRANTING 18 MOTION to Remand for Further Proceedings by Defendant Commissioner of Social Security, REVERSING the Administrative Law Judge's decision, and REMANDING this matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) consistent with this opinion. Signed by Magistrate Judge John E Martin on 2/5/2016. (lhc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
TAMARA S. WITT,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

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CAUSE NO.:2:14-CV-443-JEM

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Commissioner’s Motion for Remand for Further
Proceedings Pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) [DE 18], filed by the Commissioner
on June 29, 2015. Plaintiff filed a response on July 7, 2015, and on July 14, 2015, the Commissioner
filed a reply. On July 17, 2015, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a sur-reply to the instant Motion.
On August 5, 2015, this Court granted that request, and on August 7, 2015, Plaintiff filed her surreply.
A.

Procedural Background
On February 7, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits with the

U.S. Social Security Administration (“SSA”). Plaintiff claims that she is disabled and unable to work
due to a combination of Graves’ disease, depression, anxiety, light sensitivity, severe headaches,
pain behind her eyes, double vision, upper back pain, left shoulder pain, and left arm pain. Plaintiff’s
initial application was denied. On April 30, 2013, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Henry
Kramzyk held a hearing, and on August 6, 2013, he issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not
disabled. On October 2, 2014, The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving
the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner.

On December 3, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking reversal of the adverse SSA
determination. On April 1, 2015, the parties filed consent forms assigning the case to the
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order entry
of a final judgement. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(c) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
On April 17, 2015, Plaintiff filed a brief requesting that the matter be reversed and remanded
with full benefits paid, or alternatively, reversed and remanded to the SSA for further proceedings.
The Commissioner did not directly respond to Plaintiff, but instead, filed the instant Motion moving
for remand to the SSA for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of Section 405(g) of the
Social Security Act.
B.

Standard of Review
The Social Security Act authorizes judicial review of a final decision of the SSA. 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). Under sentence four of Section 405(g), federal courts have “the power to enter, upon the
pleadings and transcript of record, a judgement affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a hearing.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). At minimum, proper resolution of the Commissioner’s decision requires that the ALJ
explain his specific reasons for accepting or rejecting the proffered medical evidence and articulate
his analysis of that evidence in order to allow the reviewing court to trace the path of his reasoning
and to be assured that the ALJ considered the relevant evidence. See Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d
589, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2002); Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir. 1995); Green v. Shalala, 51
F.3d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1995). An ALJ must “‘build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence
to [the] conclusion’ so that, as a reviewing court, we may assess the validity of the agency’s final

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decision and afford [a claimant] meaningful review.” Giles v. Astrue, 483 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir.
2007) (quoting Scott, 297 F.3d at 595)); see also O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618
(7th Cir. 2010) ( “An ALJ need not specifically address every piece of evidence, but must provide
a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and his conclusions.”). A court reviews the entire
administrative record but does not reconsider facts, re-weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in
evidence, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. See Clifford
v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000); Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 1999).
C.

Analysis
In this case, the parties agree that there were multiple errors in the ALJ’s decision denying

Plaintiff’s claim for benefits and that a reversal and remand of the Commissioner’s decision is
warranted. The dispute is over the grounds for reversal and remand and what concomitant
instructions the ALJ should be provided. The Commissioner requests reversal and remand pursuant
to sentence four of Section 405(g) and a de novo hearing with an entry of a new decision by the ALJ.
The Commissioner proposes that on remand the Court order the ALJ to “further consider the
opinions of Drs. Lewyckyj and Muhrez, further evaluate the claimant’s credibility, further evaluate
the claimant’s residual functional capacity, and if warranted, obtain supplemental vocational expert
evidence.” Plaintiff contends that this proposed language is insufficient. Plaintiff requests that the
Court reverse and remand with full benefits paid, or alternatively, reverse and remand with an order
directing the ALJ to address the issues raised in her brief: (1) to further consider the opinions of Drs.
Lewyckyj and Dr. Muhrez; (2) to further evaluate Plaintiff’s credibility; (3) to further evaluate the
claimant’s residual functional capacity, and if warranted, obtain supplemental vocational expert
evidence; (4) to resolve any conflicts between the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and the
vocational expert’s responses to interrogatories; (5) to reexamine whether Plaintiff suffered from
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a medically determinable mental impairment; (6) to account for Plaintiff’s need for up-lighting; (7)
to reevaluate whether there are limitations attendant to Plaintiff’s left shoulder and left arm pain; (8)
and, if necessary, to obtain supplemental vocational expert testimony to assist in determining what
jobs exist in significant numbers for Plaintiff in the national economy.
Although Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner’s proposed remand language does not
address the arguments she raises in her brief, the requirement that the ALJ reevaluate the opinions
of Dr. Lewyckyj and Dr. Muhrez, further evaluate the claimant’s credibility, further evaluate the
claimant’s residual functional capacity, and if warranted, obtain supplemental vocational expert
evidence necessarily encompasses those arguments and adequately reflects the agreed upon errors
in the ALJ’s initial decision. Degrazio v. Colvin, 558 Fed. Appx. 649, 650–51 (7th Cir. 2014)
(holding that a sentence four remand “depends on a finding of error in the Commissioner’s
decision.”). Indeed, the requirement that the ALJ further evaluate Plaintiff’s RFC ensures that her
multiple claims of pain and light sensitivity are properly incorporated into the RFC, especially in
light of the requirement that he reevaluate Dr. Lewyckyj’s and Dr. Muhrez’s opinions.
Plaintiff also requests that the Court reverse the Commissioner’s decision and remand for
an award of benefits. However, an award of benefits is not proper when there remain outstanding
factual issues, Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 356 (7th Cir. 2005), and the record does not yet
support a finding of disability. Allord v. Asture, 631 F.3d 411, 417 (7th Cir. 2011). In this case, the
parties agree that the ALJ failed to properly weigh the entirety of the record. That the ALJ failed to
properly weigh the evidence of Dr. Lewyckyj and Dr. Muhrez does not support a finding by this
Court that the evidence demonstrates Plaintiff’s disability under the Social Security Act. See
Clifford, 227 F.3d at 869 (reasoning that a court in its review of the entire administrative record does

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not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment
for that of SSA). On remand, the ALJ must review the record and fully explain how all of Plaintiff’s
limitations are accounted for, supported by evidence, and incorporated by into her RFC. In this case,
because the ALJ has not properly weighed all the relevant evidence, this can only be resolved
through a remand for further proceedings.
D.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS the Commissioner’s Motion for

Remand for Further Proceedings Pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) [DE 18],
REVERSES the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, and REMANDS this matter to the
Commissioner for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) consistent
with this opinion.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to ENTER JUDGMENT in favor of Plaintiff and
against the Commissioner.
So ORDERED this 5th day of February, 2016.
s/ John E. Martin
MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN E. MARTIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
cc:

All counsel of record

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