Trustees of the Teamsters Union No 142 Pension Fund et al v Underground Incorporated

Filing 21

OPINION AND ORDER: GRANTING 19 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Plaintiffs Teamsters Union Local No 142 Annuity Fund Trustees of the, Teamsters Union Local No 142 Training and Apprenticeship Fund Trustees of the, Teamsters Union No 142 Pension Fund Trustees of the and ORDERING that Dft Underground Incorporated is liable to Plaintiffs in the total amount of $10,667.08. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against Dft Underground Incorporated in the amount of $10,667.08. Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul R Cherry on 8/31/2015. (lhc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
TRUSTEES OF THE TEAMSTERS UNION
NO. 142 PENSION FUND, TRUSTEES OF THE
TEAMSTERS UNION LOCAL NO. 142
TRAINING AND APPRENTICESHIP TRUST
FUND, and TRUSTEES OF THE TEAMSTERS
UNION LOCAL NO. 142 ANNUITY FUND,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNDERGROUND INCORPORATED,
Defendant.

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CAUSE NO.: 2:14-CV-449-PRC

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 19], filed
by Plaintiffs Trustees of the Teamsters Union No. 142 Pension Fund, Trustees of the Teamsters
Union Local No. 142 Training and Apprenticeship Trust Fund, and Trustees of the Teamsters Union
Local No. 142 Annuity Fund on July 20, 2015. Defendant Underground Incorporated has not filed
a response, and the time to do so has passed. For the reasons set forth below, summary judgment is
granted in favor of Plaintiffs.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 8, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Underground Incorporated
(“Underground”), alleging that Underground violated its obligations under a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), Restated Trust Agreement, and Employer Contribution Collection Policy in that
Underground failed to make the required contributions, beginning with contributions owed for July
2014 through the present. The action is brought pursuant to Section 502(a)(3), (e)(1), and (f) of the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and Section 301(a) of the Labor

Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(3), (e)(1), and (f); 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a). Underground filed an Answer on January 21, 2015.
The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate
Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case.
Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that motions for summary judgment be
granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 further requires the entry
of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party “who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate—in fact, is
mandated—where there are no disputed issues of material fact and the movant must prevail as a
matter of law. In other words, the record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.” Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994)
(citations and quotations omitted).
A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of
the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, that it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party may discharge its initial responsibility by simply “‘showing’—that
is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
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party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. When the nonmoving party would have the burden of proof
at trial, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar
materials negating the opponent’s claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 325; Green v. Whiteco Indus.,
Inc., 17 F.3d 199, 201 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994); Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 916 F.2d 1254,
1256 (7th Cir. 1990). However, the moving party, if it chooses, may support its motion for summary
judgment with affidavits or other materials, and, if the moving party has “produced sufficient
evidence to support a conclusion that there are no genuine issues for trial,” then the burden shifts
to the nonmoving party to show that an issue of material fact exists. Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill
Assoc., 914 F.2d 107, 110-111 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Hong v. Children’s
Mem’l Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1993).
Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the non-moving party
cannot resist the motion and withstand summary judgment by merely resting on its pleadings. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994). Rule 56(e)
provides that “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address
another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact
undisputed for purposes of the motion [or] grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting
materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it . . . .”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), (3); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986).
Thus, to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact, the nonmoving party must “do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” but must “come forward with
‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

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In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all
facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences in favor
of that party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir.
2009); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-Am., Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1995). A court’s role is not
to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth
of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. See Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249-50.
MATERIAL FACTS
Underground entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the Teamsters
Union Local No. 142 (“Union”) for the period of June 1, 2014, through May 31, 2017. The CBA
requires Underground to make periodic contributions on behalf of its employees to Plaintiffs’
Pension Fund, Training and Apprentice Fund, and Annuity Fund (“the Funds”) in amounts
established by the CBA.
Underground failed to pay the required contributions into the Funds from July 2014 through
November 2014. After this lawsuit was filed in December 2014, Underground made a series of
payments of contributions and interest and has paid through March 2015.
Contributions still owed are detailed in the Affidavit of Jay Smith, as well as supporting
documents. Underground has reported hours worked by its Teamster members for the period of
April through June 2015, but those payments are now overdue. According to its reports,
Underground owes $1,454.68 to the Pension Fund, $623.20 to the Annuity Fund, and $65.50 to the
Training and Apprenticeship Trust Fund for April 2015 contributions. Underground owes $1,156.40
to the Pension Fund, $490.00 to the Annuity Fund and $49.00 to the Training and Apprenticeship
Trust Fund for May 2015 contributions. Underground owes $1,486.80 to the Pension Fund, $630.00
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to the Annuity Fund and $63.00 to the Training and Apprenticeship Trust Fund for June 2015
contributions. Exhibit D. The total of all outstanding contributions owed to all three funds from
April through June 2015 is $6,018.58.
As a signatory to the CBA, Underground is bound by the Restated Agreement and
Declaration of Trust (“Trust Agreement”). If Underground is delinquent in contributions, the Trust
Agreement provides that the Trustees may take any steps necessary to collect the funds and that
Underground shall pay interest on all moneys due and shall pay all expenses of collection incurred
by the Trustees, including costs and legal fees. In addition, the Trust Agreement and the Employer
Contribution Collection Policy require Underground to pay 10% per annum interest on any unpaid
contributions, to pay liquidated damages in the sum of 20% of the total amount due, and to pay
attorney fees and costs.
Accrued interest is $67.73 owed to the Pension Fund, $28.86 owed to the Annuity Fund, and
$2.94 owed to the Training and Apprenticeship Fund, for a total of $99.53. The total amount of
liquidated damages (20% of $6,018.58, the amount of unpaid contributions) is $1,203.71. Attorney
fees and costs for all collection efforts and litigation to date total $3,345.26. The total amount owed
to the Funds by Underground in unpaid contributions, interest, liquidated damages, attorney fees,
and costs is $10,667.08.
Underground has never communicated directly or through counsel that it disputes the amount
of contributions owed or the amount of interest, liquidated damages, or attorney fees assessed.
(Exhibit 1, ¶ 27).

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ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs move the Court to enter summary judgment in their favor in the amount of
$10,667.08 on the basis that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding Defendant
Underground’s failure to pay contributions and related costs to Plaintiffs’ funds as required by the
CBA, Restated Trust Agreement, and Employer Contribution Collection Policy for April, May, and
June 2015.
Based on the undisputed material facts above, Plaintiffs have established through the
Affidavit of their fund manager, Jay Smith, and Defendant Underground has not disputed, that
Underground owes $4,097.88 to the Pension Fund for the contributions for the period of April
through June, 2015, to which $67.73 in interest has accrued; Underground owes the Annuity Fund
$1,743.20 for the same time period, to which $28.86 in interest has accrued; and Underground owes
the Training and Apprenticeship Trust Fund $177.50 for the same time period, to which $2.94 in
interest has accrued.
The affidavit of Jay Smith establishes that liquidated damages owed by Underground total
$1,203.71.
Smith’s affidavit and the affidavit of attorney fees also establish that Underground owes
attorney fees and costs in the amount of $3,345.26.
Therefore, Defendant Underground Incorporated is liable to Plaintiffs in the total amount of
$10,667.08.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [DE 19] and ORDERS that Defendant Underground Incorporated is liable to Plaintiffs
in the total amount of $10,667.08.
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The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against
Defendant Underground Incorporated in the amount of $10,667.08.
So ORDERED this 31st day of August, 2015.
s/ Paul R. Cherry
MAGISTRATE JUDGE PAUL R. CHERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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