Novak v. Thrasher et al

Filing 34

OPINION AND ORDER: For the reasons set forth in the Opinion and Order, the Court DISMISSES the amended complaint 21 sua sponte for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to terminate this case. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 12/14/2017. (jss)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
GEORGE NOVAK,
Plaintiff,
v.
VICKY THRASHER, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 2:15 CV 48

OPINION and ORDER
This matter is before the court for resolution of the court’s sua sponte motion to
dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (DE # 32.) For the
following reasons, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that his due process rights were violated

during municipal ordinance proceedings (“the State Court Lawsuit”) that defendants
initiated against him in the Porter County Superior Court. (DE # 21.) At the time of the
State Court Lawsuit defendant Vicky Thrasher was a building commissioner employed
by her co-defendant, the City of Valparaiso, Indiana (“the City”). (DE # 21-3 at 4.)
Plaintiff was served with notice of the State Court Lawsuit on June 22, 2012.
(DE # 21 at 6.) On February 13, 2013, after he failed to respond to the complaint, the
State court found plaintiff in default. (DE # 21-2.) The State court ordered plaintiff to
make specific repairs to his property within 60 days of the order. (Id.) Plaintiff did not

comply, and on October 7, 2014, the State court entered judgment in favor of the City,
and against plaintiff, in the amount of $26,500. (DE # 21-4.)
Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that defendants wrongfully initiated
ordinance enforcement proceedings and obtained a money judgment against him.
(DE # 21 at 7-8.) According to plaintiff, the money judgment itself was unlawful because
it exceeded the statutory cap on ordinance violation sanctions under Indiana Law.
(Id. at 4.) He argues that defendants intentionally evaded the statutory cap by miscoding the state court action as a Miscellaneous (“MI”) case rather than an Ordinance
Violation (“OV”) case. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff also claims that the State court sanctions
violated his procedural due process rights, and that defendants knew that his rights had
been violated. (Id. at 9-12.) He now seeks monetary and injunctive relief against
defendants to prevent them from seizing his property and enforcing the State court
sanctions. (Id. at 13-14.)
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Application of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

This court has moved to sua sponte dismiss plaintiff’s case for want of subjectmatter jurisdiction. See Crawford v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 647 F.3d 642 (7th Cir.
2011) (“The district court correctly considered the Rooker-Feldman doctrine sua sponte.”).
Plaintiff has had the opportunity to address the court’s concerns regarding subjectmatter jurisdiction and the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional doctrine.
(DE # 33.) Therefore, this matter is now ripe for ruling.
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“The Rooker–Feldman doctrine applies when the state court’s judgment is the
source of the injury of which plaintiffs complain in federal court.” Harold v. Steel, 773
F.3d 884, 885 (7th Cir. 2014). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “precludes lower federal court
jurisdiction over claims seeking review of state court judgments . . . [because] no matter
how erroneous or unconstitutional the state court judgment may be, the Supreme Court
of the United States is the only federal court that could have jurisdiction to review a
state court judgment.” Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir.
2000). The doctrine is triggered when, “after state proceedings have ended, a losing
party in state court files suit in federal court complaining of an injury caused by the
state-court judgment and seeking review and rejection of that judgment.” Holt v. Lake
Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 408 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 2005).
Here, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to deprive this court of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Plaintiff seeks redress from the injury he allegedly sustained from the State
court’s entry of default judgment and contempt sanctions. Plaintiff makes his intent to
disrupt the State court judgment plain throughout his amended complaint. For
example, he alleges that he “was held in contempt of an invalid order that, but for the
Defendant’s violation of Indiana Supreme Court Administrative Rule 8, the Court
would not have entered.” (DE # 21 at 13.) He repeatedly references the contempt
sanction as the “unlawful money judgment” (DE # 21 at 7-9), and specifically asks this
court to enter a preliminary injunction prohibiting the enforcement of “the unlawful

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contempt fines entered in the State Court Lawsuit.” (DE # 21 at 14.) Because plaintiff
seeks to disrupt the State court judgment, his claims are barred by Rooker-Feldman.
Plaintiff argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because his
federal claims are independent of the State court judgment. He argues, for example, that
he had an independent right to have his State court case filed and coded as an
Ordinance Violation case, rather than a Miscellaneous case, and that his federal suit
merely seeks redress for the violation of that right. (DE # 33 at 3.) Yet, an allegation that
a State court judgment violated a state or federal law is not sufficient to give this court
subject-matter jurisdiction to review the State court judgment. “The question for RookerFeldman purposes is not whether the state judgment was wrong or unconstitutional or
void. Rather, it is whether . . . the injuries for which plaintiffs seek redress resulted or
are inextricable from the state judgment, or if . . . plaintiffs have alleged an injury
independent of the state judgment.” Lennon v. City of Carmel, Indiana, 865 F.3d 503, 507
(7th Cir. 2017) (alleged misuse or misapplication of local ordinance did not serve as
basis for federal review of state-court judgment).
Here, plaintiff’s alleged injuries are inextricably tied to the State court judgment.
The injury he allegedly sustained was not a result of defendants’ classification of the
case, but a result of the State court’s judgment against him; he would have suffered no
injury had the State court not entered judgment against him. See, e.g., Harold, 773 F.3d at
886 (“No injury occurred until the state judge ruled against [plaintiff].”). Thus, his
claims necessarily implicate the validity of the State court’s judgment. See Mains v.
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Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 2017 WL 3069966 (U.S. Oct.
2, 2017) (“If we were to delve into the question whether fraud tainted the state court’s
judgment, the only relief we could give would be to vacate that judgment. That would
amount to an exercise of de facto appellate jurisdiction, which is not permissible.”);
Andress v. Daubert Law Firm, LLC, 667 F. App’x 154, 155 (7th Cir. 2016) (federal court did
not have jurisdiction to review plaintiff’s claim related to State court entry of default
judgment because resulting injury could not be separated from State court judgment);
Kelley v. Med-1 Sols., LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 2008) (plaintiff’s federal claims
could not be separated from State court judgment because review would require court
to determine whether State court erred in granting relief). Here, because plaintiff’s
federal claims necessarily challenge the validity of the State court’s judgment, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to bar his federal claims.
B.

Application of the Younger Abstention Doctrine

To the extent that this case remains open and on-going at the State court level,
the Younger abstention doctrine applies to bar plaintiff’s request for a preliminary
injunction. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Younger abstention doctrine
“generally requires federal courts to abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal
constitutional claims that involve or call into question ongoing state proceedings.”
FreeEats.com, Inc. v. Indiana, 502 F.3d 590, 595 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Gakuba v. O’Brien,
711 F.3d 751, 753 (7th Cir. 2013). Under Younger, “federal courts must abstain from
enjoining or otherwise interfering in ongoing state court proceedings that are (1)
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judicial in nature, (2) involve important state interests, and (3) provide an adequate
opportunity to raise federal claims, as long as (4) no exceptional circumstances exist that
would make abstention inappropriate.” Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Martinez, 505 F.3d 658,
662 (7th Cir. 2007).
“Younger abstention ensures that individuals or entities who have violated state
laws cannot seek refuge from enforcement of those laws behind the equitable powers of
the federal courts . . . .” Forty One News, Inc. v. Cty. of Lake, 491 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir.
2007). “[I]f a person is believed to have violated a state law, the state has instituted a
criminal, disciplinary, or other enforcement proceeding against him, and he has a
federal defense, he cannot scurry to federal court and plead that defense as a basis for
enjoining the state proceeding.” Nader v. Keith, 385 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 2004); see also
Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 592 (2013) (identifying State civil contempt
order as a matter subject to Younger abstention).
Here, plaintiff argues that the court should not abstain from this case because it
qualifies for the ‘bad faith’ exception to the Younger doctrine. Plaintiff argues that the
State court proceedings were motivated by defendants’ desire to harass and/or
impermissibly expand their claims outside the statutory confines of an Ordinance
Violation claim. (DE # 33 at 4-5.) According to plaintiff, this court must accept his
allegation that defendants acted in bad faith because the court must analyze the facts in
the light most favorable to the party opposing a motion to dismiss. (DE # 33 at 4-5.)
However, the Seventh Circuit has explicitly rejected this argument when made in the
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context of the Younger abstention doctrine. See Suster v. Jefferson-Moore, 118 F. App’x 87,
90 (7th Cir. 2004); Crenshaw v. Supreme Court of Indiana, 170 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 1999).
To the contrary, where Younger is implicated, a plaintiff must have alleged “specific
facts to support her inferences of bad faith . . . [and] must present more than mere
allegations and conclusions.” Crenshaw, 170 F.3d at 729. Here, plaintiff has set forth no
more than conclusory allegations that defendants intentionally mis-coded this case. This
is not sufficient to establish bad faith. See e.g. Forty One News, Inc., 491 F.3d at 666
(Younger abstention appropriate where federal plaintiff challenged constitutionality of
State court ordinance enforcement proceeding). Thus, to the extent that the matter
remains pending before the State court, the Younger abstention doctrine applies, and
this court will not consider plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court DISMISSES the amended complaint

(DE # 21) sua sponte for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court DIRECTS the
Clerk to terminate this case.
SO ORDERED.
Date: December 14, 2017
s/James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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