Brown v. 21st Mortgage Corporation

Filing 16

OPINION AND ORDER: Court GRANTS 12 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction or, alternatively, for Failure to State a Claim. Brown's complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 1/29/2016. cc: Brown (tc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION

MAURICE BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
21ST MORTGAGE CORPORATION
Defendant.

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No. 2:15-CV-118

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss

Plaintiff’s

Complaint

for

Lack

of

Subject-Matter

Jurisdiction or, alternatively, for Failure to State a Claim, filed
on June 12, 2015. For the reasons set forth below, this motion is
GRANTED.

Brown’s complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND
On March 30, 2015, Maurice Brown (“Brown”) filed a pro se
complaint against 21st Mortgage Corporation (“21st Mortgage”).

The

arguments presented in Brown’s complaint are extremely difficult
to follow.

Brown claims that jurisdiction is based on the First

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and he asserts that 21st

Mortgage

discriminated

against

him

based

on

his

race

and

disability.
It

appears

21st

that

Mortgage

sought

and

received

a

foreclosure judgment against Brown in an Indiana state court.
Brown appealed that judgment.
to dismiss the appeal.

21st Mortgage then filed a motion

In that motion, it appears that 21st

Mortgage represented that the property at issue was unoccupied.
Brown’s appeal was unsuccessful.
In

this

action,

Brown

contends

that,

when

21st

Mortgage

represented in the motion to dismiss that the property was not
occupied, it knew the statement was untrue.

Brown also contends

that 21st Mortgage assumed he was a substandard reader because he
is black, and that 21st Mortgage acted with the intention of
bothering his disabilities.

Brown seeks punitive damages to deter

21st Mortgage from similar conduct in the future.
In response to Brown’s complaint filed in this Court, 21st
Mortgage has filed the instant motion to dismiss.

21st Mortgage

asserts that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction both
because he has failed to state a federal claim and because his
claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.

Additionally,

21st Mortgage argued that, if not barred, Brown’s claims should be
dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim.
instant motion.

Brown did not file a response to the

This matter is ripe for adjudication.
2

DISCUSSION
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a
defendant may move to dismiss claims over which the federal court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
limited jurisdiction.
457

F.3d

675,

679

Federal courts are courts of

Hart v. FedEx Ground Package System Inc.,
(7th

Cir.

2006).

The

party

asserting

jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that the cause lies
within the federal court’s limited jurisdiction. Id. Furthermore,
this Court has an obligation to ensure that it has proper subject
matter jurisdiction over each lawsuit that it brought in this
Court. See Wernsing v. Thompson, 423 F.3d 732, 743 (7th Cir. 2005).
In order to avoid dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, a plaintiff must demonstrate that either diversity
jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction exists.
Broom, 732 F.3d 743, 744 (7th Cir. 2013).

Bovee v.

Diversity jurisdiction,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1332, requires complete diversity of
citizenship between the plaintiffs and the defendants and the
proper amount in controversy (more than $75,000).

Neuma, Inc. v.

AMP, Inc., 259 F.3d 864, 881 (7th Cir. 2001).

Brown has not

alleged diversity jurisdiction and nothing in Brown’s complaint
suggests

that

there

is

diversity

parties.

3

of

citizenship

between

the

Federal question jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section
1331, requires that the action arise “under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

“Ordinarily,

the basis for federal-question jurisdiction must be apparent from
the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint.”

Crosby v.

Cooper B-Line, Inc., 725 F.3d 795, 800 (7th Cir. 2013); see also
Northeastern Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power
Association, 707 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2013).

The only mention of

any federal constitutional provision, law or treaty in Brown’s
complaint

are

references

to

the

First

Amendment.

The

First

Amendment to the Constitution guarantees “the right of the people
... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S.
Const. Amend. I.

The Supreme Court has recognized the right to

petition as “one of the most precious of the liberties safeguarded
by the Bill of Rights.” BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516,
524 (2002)(citation and internal quotations omitted).

The right

to petition the courts guaranteed by the First Amendment is not,
however, an absolute right.

See Wright v. DeArmond, 977 F.2d 339,

347

also

(7th

Cir.

1992);

see

U.S.

Postal

Serv.

v.

Hustler

Magazine, Inc., 630 F.Supp. 867, 872 (D.D.C.1986) (“While the right
to petition Government is among the most precious of the liberties
safeguarded by the Bill of Rights, we recognize that this right,
like many rights, is not absolute but can be subject to reasonable
limitations.”)(citation and internal quotations omitted).
4

Although Brown references the First Amendment and his right
to petition the courts, the complaint does not appear to bring any
claims that arise “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States.” The mere mention of a constitutional provision
is insufficient to provide subject matter jurisdiction where there
is not also a claim arising under that provision.
Assuming for a moment that Brown has stated a cause of action
under the First Amendment such that this Court could exercise
subject matter jurisdiction over his claim, Brown has another
problem: the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would bar his claim.

The

Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal district courts from
reviewing state court civil judgments, including all claims that
are inextricably intertwined with those judgments.

See District

of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983);
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).

The Rooker-

Feldman doctrine is based upon recognition of the fact that lower
federal

courts

generally

do

not

have

the

power

appellate review over state court decisions.

to

exercise

In Rooker, the

Supreme Court held that even if a state court decision was wrong,
only that state’s appellate court has the power to reverse or
modify that judgment, since the jurisdiction of federal district
courts

is

strictly

original.

Rooker,

263

U.S.

at

415-16.

Similarly, the Supreme Court in Feldman held that “a United States
District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a
5

state court in judicial proceedings.”

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482.

This circuit has consistently emphasized that “[t]aken together,
Rooker and Feldman stand for the proposition that lower federal
courts lack jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of statecourt determinations.”

Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 753 (7th

Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted).

“In order to determine the

applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the fundamental and
appropriate question to ask is whether the alleged injury by the
federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself or
is distinct from that judgment.”
1365 (7th Cir. 1996).

Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362,

“If the alleged injury resulted from the

state court judgment itself, Rooker-Feldman directs that the lower
federal court lacks jurisdiction.”

Id.

The key element in a

Rooker-Feldman analysis is whether the federal claim alleges that
the

injury

was

caused

by

the

state

court

judgment,

or,

alternatively, whether the federal claim alleges an independent
prior injury that the state court failed to remedy.

Long v.

Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1999).
“A plaintiff may not circumvent the effect of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine simply by casting [a] complaint in the form of a federal
civil rights action.”
825 (7th Cir. 1999).

Maple Lanes, Inc. v. Messer, 186 F.3d 823,
The Seventh Circuit has held that “[i]f the

injury alleged resulted from the state court judgment itself, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine dictates that the federal courts lack
6

subject matter jurisdiction, even if the state court judgment was
erroneous or unconstitutional.”

Rizzo v. Sheahan, 266 F.3d 705,

713 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
Brown’s complaint is difficult to interpret.

It appears,

however, that Brown lost his state court battle with 21st Mortgage
and that he believes he suffered that loss because of the false
representation

made

by

21st

Mortgage.

While

Brown

does

not

explicitly ask this Court to review and reject the state court’s
judgment,

an

assessment

of

what

injuries

the

alleged

false

statement could have caused cannot be separated from a review of
the state court judgment.
Rocker-Feldman.

As such, Brown’s claims are barred by

Accordingly,

the

Court

lacks

subject

matter

jurisdiction to hear these claims, and 21st Mortgage’s motion to
dismiss is GRANTED.1

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction or,
alternatively, for Failure to State a Claim, filed on June 12,

1

Because this Court has determined that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over Brown’s claims, 21st Mortgage’s arguments under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) will not be addressed in detail. There are, however,
serious problems with the instant complaint, and if the Court had subject
matter jurisdiction, the complaint would have been dismissed under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The complaint is vague, conclusory,
and confusing, and does not give a defendant fair notice of the claims being
brought or the grounds for such claims. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

7

2015,

is

GRANTED.

Brown’s

complaint

is

DISMISSED

WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

DATED: January 29, 2016

/s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

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