Cilek v. Hobart Police Department et al

Filing 23

OPINION AND ORDER re 20 Amended Complaint: Court GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed on a claim against Zachary Crawford, Adrian Bustos, Ryan Snedecor and Corey Hanrahan in their individual capacities for monetary damages for violating th e Fourth Amendment as set forth in order. Court DISMISSES all other claims; DISMISSES the Hobart Police Department, Scott Shaginaw and K-9 Spike. U.S. Marshals Service to effect service as set forth in order. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 11/18/15. cc: USMS, Cilek(mc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
ANTHONY WAYNE CILEK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HOBART POLICE
DEPARTMENT, et al.
Defendants.

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CAUSE NO. 2:15-CV-151 RL

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on an amended “Prisoner
Complaint 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” filed by Anthony Wayne Cilek, a pro se
prisoner, on September 28, 2015. (DE #20.) For the reasons set
forth below, the Court:
(1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed on a claim against
Zachary

Crawford,

Adrian

Bustos

and

Ryan

Snedecor

in

their

individual capacities for monetary damages for violating the Fourth
Amendment by using excessive force against him on June 5, 2014;
(2) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed on a claim against
Zachary Crawford, Adrian Bustos, Ryan Snedecor and Corey Hanrahan
in their individual capacities for money damages for violating the
Fourth Amendment by conducting a warrantless search of Cilek’s
residence on June 5, 2014;
(3) DISMISSES all other claims;
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(4) DISMISSES the Hobart Police Department, Scott Shaginaw and
K-9 Spike;
(5) DIRECTS the clerk to transmit the summons and USM-285 for
Zachary Crawford, Adrian Bustos, Ryan Snedecor and Corey Hanrahan
to the United States Marshals Service along with a copy of the
amended complaint (DE #20) and this order;
(6) DIRECTS the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service of
process on Zachary Crawford, Adrian Bustos, Ryan Snedecor and Corey
Hanrahan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and
(7) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Zachary
Crawford, Adrian Bustos, Ryan Snedecor and Corey Hanrahan respond,
as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D.
Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims for which the plaintiff has
been granted leave to proceed in this screening order.

BACKGROUND
Anthony Cilek raises claims of unlawful search and seizure and
excessive force. He alleges that Hobart Police Officers came to his
home without a warrant in June 2014.

They proceeded to kick in the

door of his home, attack him and then took his dog. He brings suit
against

the

Hobart

Police

Department,

Hobart

Police

Officers

Zachary Crawford, Adrian Bustos, Corey Hanrahan, Scott Shaginaw and
Ryan Snedecor, and Hobart K-9 police dog, Spike.

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DISCUSSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review a
prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief. Courts apply the same standard under § 1915A as when
addressing a motion to dismiss under FEDERAL RULE

OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE

12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir.
2006). Under federal pleading standards,
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009) (quotation marks and
internal citations omitted). Furthermore, “[t]hreadbare recitals of
the elements of the cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. To survive dismissal, the
plaintiff “must do better than putting a few words on paper that,
in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something
has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v.
Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in
original).
To start, Cilek sues Hobart Police Officers Zachary Crawford,
Adrian Bustos, Ryan Snedecor and Corey Hanrahan in connection with

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an alleged unreasonable search that occurred at his home on June 5,
2014. The complaint alleges that on that date, those officers were
investigating a battery claim and had a search warrant for a yellow
and white trailer located at 615 W. 37th Ave., Lot 38, but for some
undisclosed reason they came to his red and white trailer located
at 615 W. 37th Ave., Lot 50. When they arrived at his trailer, they
spoke with Cilek and asked to search the residence. Cilek refused.
Despite this, those four officers went into the home and conducted
a warrantless search. Cilek brings a claim against these officers
for entering and searching his home without a warrant in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated . . . .”

U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.

The

Fourth Amendment generally protects an individual’s right to be
free from warrantless intrusions into the home.
Foxworth, 8 F.3d 540, 544 (7th Cir. 1993).
exceptions to the warrant requirement.

United States v.

However, there are

One such exception is when

exigent circumstances are present. Id. “Exigent circumstances are
defined as a compelling need for official action and no time to
secure a warrant.”

Id. (citations omitted).

Here, the complaint can be read to allege that the four Hobart
officers busted down his front door, entered and searched Cilek’s
home without consent, without a warrant, and without the presence

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of

any

exigent

circumstances.

Notably,

the

allegations

and

attachments to the complaint reveal that the search of Cilek’s
residence was likely an issue in the underlying criminal case.
However, it is unclear whether that issue was previously litigated
to invoke res judicata. Giving Cilek the inferences to which he is
entitled at this stage, he has alleged enough to proceed further
against these officers.
Next, Cilek claims that Officers Crawford, Bustos and Snedecor
assaulted him after they entered his residence. He alleges Officer
Snedecor sent K-9 Spike into the residence to attack him.

Then,

once the K-9 had subdued Cilek, Bustos and Crawford starting
kicking him. Cilek suffered injuries that required him to seek
medical attention. While at the hospital, Officers Crawford and
Bustos poked and pushed on Cilek’s open wounds in an effort to hurt
him.
The “core requirement” for an excessive force claim is that
the defendant “used force not in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically to cause
harm.” Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2009)
(internal citation omitted). Several factors guide the inquiry of
whether an officer’s use of force was legitimate or malicious,
including the need for an application of force, the amount of force
used, and the extent of the injury suffered by the prisoner. Id.
Here, the complaint can be read to allege that Officers

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Crawford, Bustos and Snedecor used force against him to maliciously
or sadistically cause harm. Giving him the inferences to which he
is entitled at this stage, he has alleged enough to proceed further
against Officers Crawford, Bustos and Snedecor. Further factual
development may show the officers acted reasonably under the
circumstances, but Cilek has alleged enough at this stage.
Next, Cilek claims that Corey Hanrahan seized Cilek’s dog
while he was searching his residence. The Fourteenth Amendment
provides that state officials shall not “deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”, but a
state tort claims act that provides a method by which a person can
seek

reimbursement

for

the

negligent

loss

or

intentional

depravation of property meets the requirements of the due process
clause by providing due process of law. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 533 (1984) (“For intentional, as for negligent deprivations of
property by state employees, the state's action is not complete
until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable post
deprivation remedy.”) Indiana’s tort claims act (INDIANA CODE § 3413-3-1 et seq.) provides for state judicial review of property
losses caused by government employees, and provides an adequate
post-deprivation remedy to redress state officials’ accidental or
intentional deprivation of a person’s property. Wynn v. Southward,
251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Wynn has an adequate postdeprivation remedy in the Indiana Tort Claims Act, and no more

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process was due.”) “The courts in this and in other states in
numerous decisions have held that dogs are property.” Vantreese v.
McGee, 26 Ind. App. 525, 527 (1901). Therefore, even though Cilek
may

have

a

state

tort

claim,

he

does

not

have

a

federal

constitutional claim based on the taking of his property.
Next, Cilek alleges that Officer Scott Shaginaw made false
statements that were recklessly made in the affidavit used to
obtain the search warrant.
Under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), if a
defendant can demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that the signatory of the warrant
affidavit made a false statement (or omitted a
material fact) either intentionally or with
reckless disregard for the truth, then a court will
consider whether the content of the affidavit,
setting aside the false material (or including the
omitted material), is sufficient to establish
probable cause. If it is not, the search warrant
must be voided and the fruits of the search
excluded.
United States v. Merritt, 361 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2004)
(parallel citations omitted). If the alleged false statements were
not sufficient to result in voiding the warrant and excluding the
evidence obtained with it, then Cilek suffered no injury as a
result of the false statements and he does not have a claim. If the
alleged false statements were sufficient to result in voiding the
warrant and excluding the evidence obtained with it, then that
claim is not ripe until the conviction which resulted from the
evidence obtained with that warrant is overturned or set aside.
Where the successful prosecution of a civil rights case would
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undermine or imply the invalidity of a criminal prosecution, the
civil rights case cannot proceed without proof “that the conviction
was

reversed

on

direct

appeal,

expunged

by

executive

order,

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination,

or

called

into

question

by

a

federal

court’s

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477, 486-7 (1994). Here, a monetary award based on a finding that
the warrant affidavit contained relevant, intentionally false
statements

would

imply

the

invalidity

of

Cilek’s

charges

or

conviction, therefore this allegation does not state a claim on
which relief can be granted at this time and the claim must be
dismissed

without

demonstrate

that

prejudice.
his

charges

If,

in

were

the

dropped

future,
or

any

Cilek

can

resulting

conviction has been overturned, then he may re-file this claim.
As a final matter, Cilek has brought suit against the Hobart
Police Department and K-9 Spike. Neither of these are proper
defendants.

It appears he is trying to hold the Hobart Police

Department liable as the police officers’ employer.
Indiana

statutory

scheme

does

not

grant

However, “the

municipal

police

departments the capacity to sue or be sued.” Sow v. Fortville
Police Dep’t, 636 F.3d 293, 300 (7th Cir. 2011). Moreover, a
section 1983 suit cannot be maintained against a dog; thus his
claim against K-9 Spike cannot be maintained either. Dye v. Wargo,
253 F.3d 296 (7th Cir. 2001). Therefore, both of these defendants

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must be dismissed.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court:
(1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed on a claim against
Zachary

Crawford,

Adrian

Bustos

and

Ryan

Snedecor

in

their

individual capacities for monetary damages for violating the Fourth
Amendment by using excessive force against him on June 5, 2014;
(2) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed on a claim against
Zachary Crawford, Adrian Bustos, Ryan Snedecor and Corey Hanrahan
in their individual capacities for money damages for violating the
Fourth Amendment by conducting a warrantless search of Cilek’s
residence on June 5, 2014;
(3) DISMISSES all other claims;
(4) DISMISSES the Hobart Police Department, Scott Shaginaw and
K-9 Spike;
(5) DIRECTS the clerk to transmit the summons and USM-285 for
Zachary Crawford, Adrian Bustos, Ryan Snedecor and Corey Hanrahan
to the United States Marshals Service along with a copy of the
amended complaint (DE #20) and this order;
(6) DIRECTS the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service of
process on Zachary Crawford, Adrian Bustos, Ryan Snedecor and Corey
Hanrahan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and
(7) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Zachary
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Crawford, Adrian Bustos, Ryan Snedecor and Corey Hanrahan respond,
as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D.
Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims for which the plaintiff has
been granted leave to proceed in this screening order.

DATED: November 18, 2015

/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

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