Holland et al v. The City of Gary et al

Filing 94

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 26 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by Defendant Deidre Monroe; GRANTING 30 MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed Civil Rule of Procedure 12(b)(4), (5), (6) by Defendants Carter, Rudy Clay, Johnny Gill, D Gill iam, House, S Jones, W Oliver, Ben Portis, The City of Gary, The City of Gary Police Department, T Williamson; GRANTING 35 MOTION (Joint) to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by Sheriff Dominguez, Warden Tatge, Officer Jansky, Officer May and th e Lake County Sheriff's Department by Defendant Dominguez; GRANTING 41 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by Defendants Carter, Rosie Lynch. Judge Deidre Monroe and/or Gary City Court, the Gary Defendants, the Lake County Defendants and the Prosecutor Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The case REMAINS PENDING as to Defendant Med Staff Inc only. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 3/18/16. (cc: Robert Holland; Christopher R Schmidgall). (cer)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
ROBERT HOLLAND,
THE LAW FIRM OF ROBERT HOLLAND,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE CITY OF GARY, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 2:15-CV-207

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on: (1) Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(B)6), filed by Defendant Judge Deidre
Monroe and/or Gary City Court on July 17, 2015 (DE #26); (2)
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Civil Rule of
Procedure 12(b)(4), (5), (6), filed by The City of Gary, City of
Gary Mayor Rudy Clay, City of Gary Chief of Police Carter, Gary
Detective S. Jones #1408, Sgt. Ben Portis #1142, Gary Officer W.
Oliver #1423, Gary Officer D. Gilliam #1231, Gary Officer Johnny
Gill #1384, Gary Officer T. Williamson #4284, Gary Officer House,
and the City of Gary Police Department (“Gary Defendants”), on July
23, 2015 (DE #30); (3) Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Dominguez,
Tatge, Jansky, May and the Lake County Sheriff’s Department (“Lake
County Defendants”), filed on July 23, 2015 (DE #35); and (4)
Prosecutor Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, filed by Defendants Lake
County Prosecutor Bernard Carter and Deputy Prosecutor Rosie Lynch

(“Prosecutor Defendants”) on July 27, 2015 (DE #41).
For the reasons set forth below, each of the above motions is
GRANTED.

This case remains pending as to Med Staff, Inc.

All

other Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff, Robert Holland, filed his complaint against
multiple defendants on June 1, 2015 (DE #1).

In his difficult-to-

read, rambling 82-page complaint, he names 20 different defendants.
He asserts that these defendants have conspired against him in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 1986,
and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), (b), (c) and (d)(Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) violations).

He also alleges

violations of the Hobbs Act (8 U.S.C. 1951) and the Travel Act (18
U.S.C. 1952); and, he alleges violations of Indiana state laws,
including RICO and civil conspiracy.
The complaint does not lend itself to a brief summary, as the
allegations are extensive.

Holland asserts in his complaint that

it is brought “pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
60(B)(1),(2),(3) and (6).”

(DE #1 at 4).

He “incorporates by

reference” the complaint filed previously in Cause No. 2:10-CV-454
- a case that was decided against Holland on summary judgment,
appealed, and affirmed.

Holland v. City of Gary, No. 2:10-CV-454

(N.D. Ind. 2013), aff’d, 533 Fed. Appx. 661 (7th Cir. 2013).
2

Despite his reference to and incorporation of the prior complaint,
Holland claims that this complaint “does not merely rehash legal
theories and arguments already addressed by the Court or add new
theories and arguments that should have been advanced in the
original

Motions

for

Summary

Judgment,

but

demonstrates

a

meritorious defense that would have changed the court’s decision.”
(DE #1 at 4).

Holland asserts that he was arrested without

probable cause and subjected to illegal search and seizure, false
imprisonment, fraudulent charges, intimidation, harassment, and
defamation.

(DE

#1

at

5).

He

further

alleges

that

he

was

involuntarily committed and maliciously prosecuted and that there
was an abuse of process designed to injure his person, business,
property, and profession. (DE #1 at 5).

Holland claims that the

Defendants’ criminal conduct has lasted continually for 20 years
and is persisting. (DE #1 at 22).

He complains specifically of

actions surrounding his arrest on March 3, 2010 (an arrest stemming
from an alleged altercation with his mother), and his ensuing
incarceration - events that were the subject of the complaint filed
in Cause No. 2:10-CV-454. (DE #1 at 23-50).
The instant motions to dismiss set forth numerous arguments in
favor of dismissal.

Judge Deidre Monroe argues that she is

entitled to judicial immunity, that Holland’s claims are precluded,
and that the claims are frivolous. (DE #26-1). The Gary Defendants
argue that they were not properly served, that the complaint does

3

not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), fails to
state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and
is barred by collateral estoppel.

(DE #32).

The Lake County

Defendants argue that the complaint is unintelligible and violates
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, that the claims are precluded by
res judicata and collateral estoppel, and that the claims are
barred by the statute of limitations. (DE #36).

The Prosecutor

Defendants argue that the complaint should be dismissed because it
was brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, does
not satisfy Rule 8 and is barred by res judicata, collateral
estoppel, the applicable statutes of limitations, the Indiana Tort
Claims Act, and prosecutorial immunity.

Holland has responded to

each of these motions.1

The Gary Defendants and Lake County

Defendants have replied.

The motions to dismiss are fully briefed

and ripe for adjudication.

DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the
dismissal of a complaint, or any portion of a complaint, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

“To

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

1

In his response briefs, Holland has requested that various portions of
Defendants’ filings be stricken. Northern District of Indiana Local Rule 71(a) requires that motions be filed separately. Because Holland did not file
separate motions to strike, his requests will be disregarded by this Court.

4

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (internal quotations omitted); see also Ray v. City of
Chicago, 629 F.3d 660, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted)
(“While the federal pleading standard is quite forgiving . . . the
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”).
A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief.”

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561 (2007)

(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Plus, Iqbal
requires that a plaintiff plead content which allows this Court to
draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
alleged misconduct.

556 U.S. at 678.

In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal
Rule

of

Civil

reasonable

Procedure

inferences

12(b)(6),

that

favor

the

the

court

must

plaintiff,

draw

all

construe

the

allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff,

and

accept

as

true

allegations in the complaint.
Regulation,

300

F.3d

750,

all

well-pleaded

a

motion

to

and

Thompson v. Ill. Dep't of Prof'l

753

(7th

Cir.

2002);

Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1991).
withstand

facts

dismiss,

5

a

complaint

must

Perkins

v.

In order to
allege

the

“operative facts” upon which each claim is based.

Kyle v. Morton

High Sch., 144 F.3d 448, 454-55 (7th Cir. 1998); Lucien v. Preiner,
967 F.2d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 1992).

A plaintiff is required to

include allegations in the complaint that “plausibly suggest that
the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above
a ‘speculative level’” and, “if they do not, the plaintiff pleads
itself out of court.”

E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc.,

496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting in part Twombly, 550
U.S. at 569 n. 14 (2007)).

“Factual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even
if doubtful in fact).”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotation marks,

ellipsis, citations and footnote omitted). Thus, a “plaintiff must
do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of
an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened to
her that might be redressed by the law.”

Swanson v. Citibank,

N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original).
The Court notes that Holland is appearing pro se in this
matter. Generally, although “pro se litigants are masters of their
own complaints” and “[d]istrict judges have no obligation to act as
counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants,” Myles v. United States,
416 F.3d 551, 552 (7th Cir. 2005), a document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
6

pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). However, “on a motion to dismiss, courts are not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,
286 (1986) (quotation marks omitted)).

In this case, the Court

notes that Holland is a former attorney.

According to the Seventh

Circuit, “[a]s a former attorney, [Holland] has only the most
tenuous claim to the more forgiving pleading standards we afford
typical pro se plaintiffs.”). Weston v. Illinois Dep’t Of Human
Services, 433 Fed. Appx. 480, 482 n.1 (7th Cir. 2011).
Even pro se plaintiffs, however, must “make their pleadings
straightforward so that judges and adverse parties need not try to
fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud.”

United States ex rel.

Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003).
They must “be presented with sufficient clarity to avoid requiring
a district court or opposing party to forever sift through its
pages . . . .”
1990).

Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1436 (7th Cir.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that

complaints contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

See Vicom, Inc.

v. Harbridge Merchant Servs., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 775-76 (7th Cir.
1994) (“A complaint that is prolix and/or confusing makes it
difficult for the defendant to file a responsive pleading and makes
it difficult for the trial court to conduct orderly litigation.”),
7

and Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1436 (7th Cir. 1990) (a
complaint “must be presented with clarity sufficient to avoid
requiring a district court or opposing party to forever sift
through its pages in search” of the plaintiff’s claims).

In sum,

Rule 8 requires a complaint to be presented with “intelligibility
sufficient for a court or opposing party to understand whether a
valid claim is alleged and [,] if so [,] what it is.”
F.3d

at

775.

Wordy,

redundant,

and

seemingly

Vicom, 20

interminable

complaints violate the letter and the spirit of Rule 8 and may be
dismissed with leave to refile.
complaint

fails

to

meet

these

Id. at 776.
standards.

Here, Holland’s
Usually,

such

shortcomings would result in a without-prejudice dismissal, and a
plaintiff would be given an opportunity to amend his complaint to
comply with Rule 8. Here, however, the failure to comply with Rule
8 is only one of several problems with Holland’s complaint.
The Seventh Circuit recently reviewed an appeal of one of
Holland’s cases in Holland v. Lake County Municipal Government, et
al., No. 2:13-CV-179 (N.D. Ind. 2013), aff’d, 605 Fed. Appx. 579
(7th Cir. 2015).

In this case, Judge Theresa Springmann dismissed

claims similar to those raised in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because Holland failed to state a plausible
claim for relief and the allegations were deemed fantastical and
delusional. Id.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted the

following:

8

The suit alleges that since 1998 an array of
public and private actors have conspired “to
put him out of business.” The defendants, he
says, cost him his job with the Lake County,
Indiana, prosecutor’s office, got him banned
from the Lake County government building,
leveled false allegations that prompted the
suspension of his law license, unlawfully
seized two real properties, and caused him to
be falsely arrested and imprisoned.
This
suit, though, is actually Holland’s fifth
raising similar allegations. See Holland v.
CEO Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 2:14cv5
(N.D. Ind. 2014), aff’d, No. 14-3447 (7th Cir.
Feb. 9, 2015); Holland v. City of Gary, No.
2:10-CV-454-PRC (N.D. Ind. 2013), aff’d, 533
F. App’x 661 (7th Cir. 2013); Holland v. City
of Gary, No. 2:12-CV-62-TS (N.D. Ind. 2012),
aff’d, 503 F. App’x 476 (7th Cir. 2013);
Holland v. Lake County Mun. Gov’t, No. 2:13CV-180 PS (N.D. Ind. 2013).
Id.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals described the appeal as

frivolous, noted that Holland had been warned previously that
frivolous submissions would be sanctioned, and again warned Holland
about frivolous appeals.
Here,

although

the

claims

are

incredibly

difficult

to

decipher, the complaint is clearly duplicative of other cases
Holland has initiated; most notably, Holland v. City of Gary, No.
2:10-CV-454 (N.D. Ind. 2013), aff’d, 533 Fed. Appx. 661 (7th Cir.
2013).

Holland’s incorporation of the complaint in the previous

case, together with his assertion that the judgment in that case is
void and should be vacated pursuant to various sections of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60, leave little doubt that this action is
duplicative.

Accordingly, this Court must consider whether the

9

claims or issues raised in the instant case are precluded.
Because Holland’s previous cases were brought in federal
court, this Court looks to the federal common law to determine
whether the current claims are precluded.

Taylor v. Sturgell, 128

S. Ct. 2161 (2008).
A
fundamental
precept
of
common-law
adjudication,
embodied
in
the
related
doctrines of collateral estoppel and res
judicata, is that a right, question or fact
distinctly
put
in
issue
and
directly
determined
by
a
court
of
competent
jurisdiction
cannot
be
disputed
in
a
subsequent suit between the same parties or
their privies. Under res judicata, a final
judgment on the merits bars further claims by
parties or their privies based on the same
cause of action.
Ross v. Bd. of Educ., 486 F.3d 279, 282 (7th Cir. 2007) (quotation
marks, ellipsis and citations omitted).
For res judicata to apply, defendants must show identity of
the cause of action, identity of the parties or their privies, and
a final judgment on the merits.
F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2014).

Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742

To decide whether there is identity of

the cause of action, the court looks at “whether the claims
comprise the same core of operative facts that give rise to a
remedy.”

Id. (quoting Matrix IV v. American National Bank and

Trust Company of Chicago, 649 F.3d 539, 547 (7th Cir. 2011)).
other words, it must arise out of the same transaction.
F.3d at 283.

In

Ross, 486

If it did, then even if the claim were not raised in

the earlier lawsuit, it cannot be asserted.
10

Id.

Here, there can

be no question that this action arises from the same transaction as
the claims raised in Cause No. 2:10-CV-454; Holland admits as much
in the complaint itself. And, the previous case was disposed of on
the merits at the summary judgment stage. The only remaining issue
is whether there is identity of the parties.

While there is

considerable overlap, each complaint named numerous parties, and
the defendants are not identical in the two suits.

As to any party

named in Cause No. 2:10-CV-4542, however, claim preclusion bars all
claims raised in the instant complaint.
With regard to the defendants who were not named in Cause No.
2:10-CV-454,

collateral

considered.

estoppel

(issue

preclusion)

must

be

Under this doctrine, “once an issue is actually and

necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that
determination
different

is

cause

litigation.”

conclusive
of

action

in

subsequent

involving

a

suits

party

to

based
the

on

a

prior

See Carter v. C.I.R., 746 F.3d 318, 321 (7th Cir.

2014)(quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979)).
Unlike

res

judicata,

collateral

estoppel

can

be

used

as

an

affirmative defense even where the party asserting it was not a
party to the earlier litigation.

Id.

In order for a federal

judgment to have a preclusive effect, four elements must be

2

The City of Gary, City of Gary Mayor Rudy Clay, City of Gary Chief of
Police, Lake County Sheriff Dominguez, Warden of the Lake County Jail, Johnny
Gill Officer #1384, Officer Williams #4282, and Officer Tremell Williamson
were among the numerous defendants named in Cause No. 2:10-CV-454.

11

satisfied:
(1) the issue sought to be precluded is the
same as an issue in the prior litigation; (2)
the issue must have been actually litigated in
the prior litigation; (3) the determination of
the issue must have been essential to the
final judgment; and (4) the party against whom
estoppel is invoked must have been fully
represented in the prior action.
Adams, 742 F.3d at 736 (citing Matrix IV, 649 F.3d at 547).
Holland, who chose to proceed pro se in both this action and
each of the prior actions which could potentially have a preclusive
effect in this action, cannot use his pro se status to avoid
collateral estoppel.

DeGuelle v. Camilli, 724 F.3d 933, 938 (7th

Cir. 2013)(“[T]he idea that litigating pro se should insulate a
litigant from application of the collateral estoppel doctrine, or,
more broadly, the doctrine of res judicata, of which collateral
estoppel is an aspect, is absurd.”). That is especially true here,
where Holland was a practicing attorney for many years.
With regard to the remaining elements, the Court begins by
looking at what issues were addressed in Cause No. 2:10-CV-454. In
that case, Magistrate Judge Cherry issued three summary judgment
rulings covering a variety of issues. Holland, No. 2:10-CV-454, DE
##203, 317, 322.

Defendants City of Gary, Mayor Rudy Clay, City of

Gary Chief of Police, Officer Johnny Gill, and Officer Williams
argued that Holland could not demonstrate that his March 3, 2010,
arrest was without probable cause.

Magistrate Judge Cherry agreed

and, as a result, dismissed Holland’s claims for wrongful arrest,
12

unreasonable search and seizure, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, and failure to investigate. Holland, No. 2:10-CV-454,
DE #203 at 10-11.

Magistrate Judge Cherry also determined that

these defendants could not be liable for the actions of the judge,
clerk

staff,

and

prosecuting

attorneys

officers of the city government.
Magistrate

Judge

Cherry

because

Id. at 5-6.

determined

that,

they

are

not

Furthermore,

following

Holland’s

arrest, his initial appearance was timely and summary judgment was
warranted on Holland’s claim that he was denied a prompt initial
hearing.

Id. at 12.

In considering Holland’s failure to train

claim, Magistrate Judge Cherry noted that Holland had not raised
any issue of material fact to support his claim that he suffered a
constitutional violation. Id. Without that, the Court did not need
to

consider

whether

there

was

a

policy

liability under section 1983 could attach.

or

custom

such

that

Id.

Thereafter, the City of Gary, Mayor Rudy Clay, the City of
Gary Chief of Police, Officer Johnny Gill, and Officer Williams
filed another motion for summary judgment, arguing that Holland’s
remaining claims should be dismissed. Holland, No. 2:10-CV-454, DE
#317. Magistrate Judge Cherry found that summary judgment in favor
of the defendants was appropriate as to Holland’s remaining two
claims: abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.

Id.

In addressing this motion, Magistrate Judge Cherry

found both that Holland could not point to any evidence in the

13

record of any nefarious intent and that the Defendants’ acts in the
arrest were procedurally proper under the circumstances. Id. at 6.
Magistrate Judge Cherry found that Holland had produced no evidence
to support his claim and that, in light of his earlier finding that
probable cause for the arrest existed, the Defendants had done
nothing outrageous.

Id. at 7.

Magistrate Judge Cherry also ruled on motions for summary
judgment filed by Lake County Board of Commissioners, Sheriff
Dominguez, and Warden of the Lake County Jail.
CV-454, DE #322.

Holland, No. 2:10-

Magistrate Judge Cherry ruled that the Lake

County Board of Commissioners could not be liable to Holland for
the actions of the Sheriff Dominguez or the Lake County Jail even
if they violated his constitutional rights.

Id. at 7-8.

With

regard to Sheriff Dominquez and the Warden of the Lake County Jail,
Magistrate Judge Cherry granted summary judgment in their favor
because Holland produced no admissible evidence to support his
claim that there was a policy or custom of violating inmates’
constitutional rights.

Id. at 8-13.

Each of these issues were litigated on summary judgment and
essential to the Court’s judgment.3

Holland had the opportunity to

3
Holland claims that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to
litigate these issues in the prior case. More specifically, he complains that
he did not get to conduct more discovery before responding to the summary
judgment motion. He also complains that the judgment was void because not all
Defendants had properly consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge.
These arguments are misplaced. If Holland wanted to challenge Magistrate
Judge Cherry’s rulings regarding discovery, the proper procedure was to raise
the issue with the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the appeal of that

14

appeal Magistrate Judge Cherry’s rulings.

He did so, and the

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered his arguments and
upheld Magistrate Judge Cherry’s judgment in all respects. Holland
v. City of Gary, 533 Fed. Appx. 661 (7th Cir. 2013).
Holland is precluded from relitigating each of the issues that
Magistrate Judge Cherry decided in Cause No. 2:10-CV-454.
leaves little left to litigate.

This

With so many issues decided

against him, Holland’s complaint lacks traction.

Because part of

the purpose of res judicata and collateral estoppel are to preserve
the limited resources of the judiciary, this Court declines to
conduct a similar analysis of each of the at least five other cases
that also appear related to the instant suit.

This decision is

made in part because, even if there remains a claim or issue not
precluded by either res judicata or collateral estoppel, there are
other problems with the complaint, as outlined below.
Holland has not demonstrated that he has properly served the
Gary Defendants.

See F.R.Civ. P. 4(j)(2) and Ind. Tr. Pro. Rule

4.6 (both requiring that service be made upon the chief executive
officer of any municipal corporation; in this case, the current
mayor of Gary).
Additionally, Holland has attempted to sue individuals who are

case. Likewise, if Holland thought that Magistrate Judge Cherry’s orders were
void due to a problem with the consent, he could have raised that argument
when appealing Magistrate Judge Cherry’s judgment. This separate civil action
is not the proper mechanism for these challenges. On the record before this
Court, there is every indication that Holland had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate his claims before Magistrate Judge Cherry.

15

entitled to immunity.

Holland’s complaint alleges that Judge

Diedre Monroe engaged in a variety of judicial acts that resulted
in violations of his rights, but she enjoys absolute immunity for
these acts “even if [her] exercise of authority is flawed by the
commission of grave procedural errors.”
U.S. 349, 359 (1978).

Stump v. Sparkman, 435

Likewise, Holland’s allegations regarding

Lake County Prosecutor Bernard Carter and Deputy Prosecutor Rosie
Lynch stem directly from their handling of his 2010 criminal case.
They are entitled to prosecutorial immunity for their duties as
advocates for the State, even where they have acted maliciously or
violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

See Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409
(1976).4
Lastly, it appears that many, if not all, of Holland’s claims
would be barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Whether

the two-year Indiana statute of limitations related to injuries
applied or the four-year statute of limitations related to federal
civil RICO claims applies, Holland’s claims would fall outside the
statute

of

limitations.

See

I.C.

§

34-11-2-4(a);

Cancer

Foundation, Inc. v. Cerberus Capital Management, 559 F.3d 671 (7th

4

It is possible, as Holland has argued, that some of the actions he
complains of would be entitled only to qualified immunity; but due to the
sheer number of problems with Holland’s complaint, it is not necessary for
this Court to sort out whether any of Holland’s allegations regarding the
Prosecutor Defendants might fall outside the acts for which they enjoy
absolute immunity.

16

Cir. 2009)(“The statute of limitations for a civil RICO cause of
action is a fairly generous four years.

It begins to run when the

plaintiffs discover, or should, if diligent, have discovered, that
they had been injured by the defendants.”).

Although Holland

claims that the alleged conspiracy has continued for 20 years and
will continue into the future, the crux of his complaint centers
around an arrest occurring on March 3, 2010.

This suit was not

filed until June 1, 2015 - over five years later.

Holland argues

that the six-year statute of limitations for fraud and breach of
contract applies to his state law claims and that the Indiana civil
Rico statute has a five-year statute of limitations.

He further

argues that Defendants should be estopped from raising the statute
of limitations as a defense because their alleged fraud in Cause
No. 2:10-CV-454 prevented him from filing a timely complaint.

He

further argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled
because there is a continuing violation.

This Court finds each of

these arguments without merit.
Other arguments have been made that this Court declines to
address.

Given

all

the

shortcomings

outlined

above,

it

is

unnecessary to explore the merits of any remaining arguments.
Under these circumstances of this case, any attempt to allow
Holland to amend his complaint would be futile.5

5

Barry Aviation

In fact, this Court briefly entertained whether sanctions are
warranted, given the myriad of previous warnings Holland has received that
frivolous filings must be avoided. That, however, will be left to the
discretion of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, should Holland choose to
appeal this order.

17

Inc. v. Land O'Lakes Municipal Airport Comm'n, 377 F.3d 682, 687
(7th

Cir.

complaint

2004)(“Unless
that

any

it

is

certain

amendment

would

from

be

the

futile

face
or

of

the

otherwise

unwarranted, the district court should grant leave to amend after
granting a motion to dismiss.”).

Accordingly, Holland’s claims

against Judge Diedre Monroe and/or Gary City Court, the Gary
Defendants,

the

Lake

County

Defendants,

and

the

Prosecutor

Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, each of the instant motions to
dismiss are GRANTED.

(DE ##26, 30, 35, 41).

Judge Deidre Monroe

and/or Gary City Court, the Gary Defendants, the Lake County
Defendants,
PREJUDICE.

and

the

Prosecutor

Defendants

are

DISMISSED

WITH

The case remains pending as to Med Staff, Inc. only.

DATED: March 18, 2016

/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

18