Robinson v. Superintendent
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 1 PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Joshua Lee Robinson. Clerk DIRECTED to close this case. Signed by Chief Judge Philip P Simon on 8/5/16. (cc: Joshua Robinson). (cer)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
JOSHUA ROBINSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.
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CAUSE NO. 2:15-CV-234-PPS
OPINION AND ORDER
Joshua Robinson, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the
prison disciplinary hearing (MCF 15-03-47) that was held at the Miami Correctional
Facility on March 17, 2015. The Disciplinary Hearing Officer found him guilty of
Possession/Use of a Wireless Communication Device in violation of A-121 and
sanctioned him with the loss of 180 days earned credit time and demoted him to credit
class 2. Robinson raises four grounds in his petition.
In Ground One, Robinson argues that the sanctions were excessive because,
while they were within the guidelines, there is a variance in punishment at the prison
and he was punished too severely compared to inmates in his position. Harshness of
sanctions, however, is not a valid basis for challenging a punishment that is within the
range of the offense for which the inmate was found guilty. Cf. United States ex rel. Long
v. Pate, 418 F.2d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir. 1970) (Where a sentence is “within the range
established by the legislature . . . this court will not [on habeas corpus review] question
the trial judge’s discretion in imposing sentence, nor will it question the refusal of the
Illinois Supreme Court to reconsider appellant’s petition for reduction of sentence.”)
Here, Robinson even admits that the punishment imposed was within the limits
permitted by Indiana’s Disciplinary Code for Adult Offenders for a Class A offense.
Ground One, therefore, is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.
In Ground Two, Robinson argues that the Disciplinary Hearing Officer was
biased and gave him the maximum punishment because his brother had been found
guilty of a similar offense. To the extent that this is an argument about the severity of
the punishment Robinson received, it is merely a restatement of the claim I rejected in
Ground One. To the extent that it is an argument that the hearing officer was biased
because of prior proceedings against his brother, that is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of honesty and integrity to which an adjudicator is entitled. See Withrow v.
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). A hearing officer is not automatically deemed biased
simply because he adjudicated or was involved in a previous disciplinary charge
against the prisoner. See Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666-67 (7th Cir. 2003); Pannell v.
McBride, 306 F.3d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 2002); Perotti v. Marberry, 355 Fed. Appx. 39, 43 (7th
Cir. 2009). Here, Robinson’s claim is even more tenuous than those cases because here
it is not a prior adjudication against him, but against his brother and Robinson has not
shown how the Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s familiarity with Robinson’s brother
actually biased Robinson. Ground Two, therefore, is not a basis for habeas corpus
relief.
In Ground Three, Robinson argues that the offense A-121, possessing a cell
phone, did not exist until March 1, 2015. Consequently, Robinson argues that he could
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not be written up for a violation of the “non-existent” rule on February 23, 2015. Here,
Robinson’s facts are just patently wrong. Rule A-121 prohibiting inmates from having
cell phones existed on February 23, 2015. [See DE 6-9 at 3.] Perhaps something about
the disciplinary rules changed on March 1, 2015, and A-121 was re-printed in a new or
revised version of the rules. Nevertheless, because the “no cell phone” rule existed
when Robinson was written up, Ground Three is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.
In Ground Four, Robinson argues that there are discrepancies on the Conduct
Report. The Report says that the incident occurred on “E housing unit, cell #126/126.”
[DE 6-1 at 1.] But it also says that the phone was found in #437/438 and that Robinson
was assigned to E-437. [Id.] Clearly the Disciplinary Hearing Officer resolved this
discrepancy and it is not my place in a habeas corpus case “to assess the comparative
weight of the evidence underlying the disciplinary board’s decision.” Webb v. Anderson,
224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000). Moreover, Robinson does not dispute that he told the
Disciplinary Hearing Officer at the hearing, “My Bunkie didn’t have anything to do
with it. It was mine.” [DE 6-5 at 1.] Given his confession, he clearly was not confused
by the inclusion of a reference to a different cell. Robinson also argues that the
Disciplinary Hearing Officer violated several prison rules. The violation of a prison rule,
however, is not a basis for habeas corpus relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991).
(“In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a
conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). Ground
Four, therefore, is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.
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For these reasons, the habeas corpus petition is DENIED and the clerk is
DIRECTED to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: August 5, 2016
_s/ Philip P. Simon________________
PHILIP P. SIMON, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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