Talley v. Campos

Filing 10

ORDER DISMISSING CASE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 1/29/2016. (cc: Talley)(rmn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
HERVIN TALLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALEJANDRO CAMPOS,
Defendant.

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Cause No. 2:16-CV-029 JD

OPINION AND ORDER
Hervin Talley, a pro se prisoner, is again attempting to sue East Chicago Police Officer
Alejandro Campos for his actions surrounding Talley’s August 5, 2012, arrest. The court is
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A to review Talley’s complaint. “A document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
In this case, Talley alleges that on August 5, 2012, Officer Campos staged a “bogus
burglary” to justify stopping him without probable cause. (DE 1 at 4.). This is not the first time
that Talley has sued Officer Campos based on these same events. In Talley v. Campos, 2:15-CV435 (N.D. Ind. filed Nov. 24, 2015), he alleged Officer Campos violated his Fourth Amendment
rights by stopping him without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion on August 5,
2012. The court found that this claim was untimely under the applicable two-year statute of
limitations and dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. (Cause No. 2:15-CV-435, DE 12.)
Judgment was entered on January 4, 2016, and Talley did not appeal.

“A fundamental precept of common-law adjudication, embodied in the related doctrines
of collateral estoppel and res judicata, is that a right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and
directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. . . cannot be disputed in a subsequent
suit between the same parties or their privies[.]” Ross v. Bd. of Educ. of Tp. H.S. Dist. 211, 486
F.3d 279, 282 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). These companion
doctrines “protect against the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserve
judicial resources, and foster reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of
inconsistent decisions.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). In Indiana, for res judicata,
or claim preclusion to apply, the question is whether the following four factors have been met:
(1) the former judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the former
judgment was rendered on the merits; (3) the matter now at issue was, or could have been,
determined in the prior action; and (4) the controversy adjudicated in the former action was
between parties to the present suit or their privies.” Kalwitz v. Kalwitz, 934 N.E.2d 741, 750
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes
the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that
action.” Barr v. Bd. of Trustees of W. Illinois Univ., 796 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
It is quite clear that Talley’s most recent claims against Alejandro Campos fit the bill.
First, there is no question that the former judgment was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction. Second, that judgment was rendered on the merits. See Smith v. Chicago, 820 F.2d
916 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that a prior decision to dismiss on grounds of statute of limitations
was “on the merits.”). Third, all current claims against Campos stem from his investigation into

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Talley’s 2012 arrest and subsequent prosecution on burglary charges. These claims were or
could have been determined in the prior action. Last, the parties in this case are the same as in
Talley’s previous lawsuit. Accordingly, these claims could have been raised in the previous
litigation, to the extent they weren’t raised, and they are now barred by res judicata.
Re-filing an unsuccessful claim against the same defendant is malicious. See Pittman v.
Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 994-95 (5th Cir. 1993) (it is malicious for a plaintiff with in forma
pauperis status to file a lawsuit that duplicates allegations of another lawsuit brought by the
same plaintiff) and Lindell v. McCallum, 352 F.3d 1107, 1109 (7th Cir. 2003) (suit is
“malicious” for purposes of Section 1915A if it is intended to harass the defendant or is
otherwise abusive of the judicial process).
Though it is usually necessary to permit a plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended
complaint when a case is dismissed sua sponte, see Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th
Cir. 2013), that is unnecessary where the amendment would be futile. Hukic v. Aurora Loan
Servs., 588 F.3d 420, 432 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[C]ourts have broad discretion to deny leave to
amend where . . . the amendment would be futile.”) Such is the case here. No amendment could
overcome the bar of res judicata.
For these reasons, this case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: January 29, 2016
/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
Judge
United States District Court

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