Martin v. Copeland et al

Filing 21

OPINION AND ORDER: Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART 9 Motion for Partial Dismissal and 11 Motion to Dismiss as outlined. Signed by Judge Joseph S Van Bokkelen on 1/17/2017. (tc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
TERRI G. MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No.: 2:16-CV-59-JVB-JEM

ANTHONY COPELAND, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Terri G. Martin sued the City of East Chicago, its mayor, and three other individuals in
connection with her employment termination in October 2015. East Chicago moved for partial
dismissal. (DE 9.) The four individual Defendants also moved for dismissal. (DE 11.)

A.

Standard for evaluating a motion to dismiss
The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim

is to test the sufficiency of the pleadings, not to decide the merits of the case. See Gibson v. Chi.,
910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint must contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” However,
“recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).1

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In Twombly, the Supreme Court “retooled federal pleading standards, retiring the oft-quoted
[Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 42, 47 (1957)] formulation that a pleading ‘should not be dismissed
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the [pleader] can prove no set of

As the Supreme Court has stated, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. Rather, “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A complaint is facially
plausible if a court can reasonably infer from factual content in the pleading that the defendant is
liable for the alleged wrongdoing. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
The Seventh Circuit has synthesized the standard into three requirements. See Brooks v.
Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). “First, a plaintiff must provide notice to defendants of
her claims. Second, courts must accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, but some factual
allegations will be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice to
defendants of the plaintiff’s claim. Third, in considering the plaintiff’s factual allegations, courts
should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or
conclusory legal statements.” Id.

B.

Plaintiff’s complaint
Martin alleges the following:
She entered into an employment contract on December 17, 2014, with the East Chicago

Board of Health to act as its Director from January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2017. The contract
says Martin may be removed from her position only for cause after a hearing by the East
Chicago Board of Health.

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank
Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007).
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Mayor Copeland “looked with disfavor” on Martin’s handling of certain matters—Martin
doesn’t say why—and as a result the individual Defendants conspired to terminate Martin’s
employment.
On October 13, 2015, Dabertin and Favella delivered a letter to Martin signed by
Browning, terminating Martin’s employment without a hearing. Dabertin and Favella demanded
Martin turn over various items, and they confined her in her office and intimidated her.
Martin purports to bring § 1983 claims under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. She claims the contract created a property interest in her employment protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. She claims she did not receive a pre-termination hearing or
opportunity to object. She claims political considerations of the Defendants motivated the
termination. She claims Defendants retaliated against her for exercising her rights in the
performance of her duties.
Martin also purports to bring state claims for intentional tortious interference with
contract, confinement, intimidation, and defamation.

C.

Discussion

(1)

Defendant East Chicago’s motion to dismiss

(a)

Defamation
Defendant East Chicago seeks dismissal of the defamation claim because the complaint

does not state the specific defamatory statement, nor does the Complaint allege East Chicago
published any statement. In her response, Plaintiff Martin failed to address these arguments.

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The Supreme Court of Indiana considers it a matter of hornbook law that a plaintiff must
include the alleged defamatory statement in the complaint. Trail v. Boys & Girls Clubs Nw. Ind.,
845 N.E.2d 130, 136–37 (Ind. 2006). And even under the liberal federal pleading standards,
Plaintiff failed to state a defamation claim because she failed to put East Chicago on notice
regarding the claim’s basis. Plaintiff has not alleged who said what, even by way of paraphrase.
Moreover, Plaintiff waived her defamation claim by failing to respond to East Chicago’s
arguments for its dismissal. Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.S., 624 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2010).
The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s defamation claim against Defendant East
Chicago.

(b)

Tortious interference with contract
Defendant East Chicago seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s tortious-interference claim on the

ground that this tort requires the action of an independent third party. East Chicago argues it is
not an independent third party because one of the parties to the contract—the East Chicago
Board of Health—is an instrumentality of East Chicago. Therefore, the argument goes, East
Chicago is not an independent third party whose actions could give rise to a claim for tortious
interference with contract.
Although Plaintiff addressed this claim in her response to East Chicago’s motion to
dismiss, Plaintiff failed to address the argument that East Chicago cannot be liable for this claim
because it is not a third party with respect to the contract. Plaintiff presented no argument against
East Chicago’s assertion that the East Chicago Board of Health, which was a party to the
contract, is an instrumentality of East Chicago such that East Chicago is not a third party.

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The Supreme Court of Indiana recognizes that a party cannot interfere with its own
contracts, so only third parties can commit tortious interference with contract. Trail, 845 N.E.2d
at 138.
Plaintiff waived any argument against the applicability of Trail.
The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant East Chicago for
tortious interference with contract.

(c)

Confinement
Defendant East Chicago seeks dismissal of the confinement claim against it on the

grounds that the complaint lacks supporting facts and presents only labels and conclusions. But
the complaint does not lack supporting facts. Plaintiff claims that when Defendants Dabertin and
Favella delivered the termination letter to Plaintiff on October 13, 2015, they “kept the Plaintiff
confined in her office, until she turned over various items of personal property which they
demanded . . . .” (Compl., DE 1, ¶ 17.)
This allegation does not provide every detail of the occurrence, but it provides enough
details to give East Chicago fair notice of the claim. Plaintiff provides the date and location, the
names of the alleged confiners, and the context of the occurrence. Plaintiff provides more than
mere labels and conclusions. East Chicago has not demonstrated that this claim is facially
implausible.
The Court denies Defendant East Chicago’s motion to dismiss the confinement claim.

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(d)

Intimidation
Plaintiff alleges “intentional tortious acts of . . . intimidation . . . .” (Compl., DE 1, ¶ 32.)

Defendant East Chicago moved to dismiss this claim without addressing the issue of whether
Indiana recognizes such a claim, let alone what its elements are. Instead, East Chicago focuses
on whether the facts are sufficient.
The movant bears the burden on a motion to dismiss to establish the legal insufficiency of
the complaint. Yeksigian v. Nappi, 900 F.2d 101, 104 (7th Cir. 1990).
As East Chicago failed to carry its burden, the Court denies the motion to dismiss the
intimidation claim against it, without deciding anything further regarding this claim.

(2)

Individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss

(a)

Section 1983 official-capacity claims
Plaintiff’s complaint purports to bring § 1983 claims against each individual Defendant in

his official capacity and individual capacity.
Defendants Copeland, Dabertin, Favella, and Browning (“individual Defendants”) moved
to dismiss the § 1983 claims against them in their official capacities on the grounds that officialcapacity claims are actually claims against the governmental entity and are duplicative of the
claims against the named governmental entity.
Section 1983 allows a party to sue a “person” in his individual or official capacity, or
both. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Official-capacity
suits are “another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Id.
at 690 n.55. An official-capacity suit is not a suit against the government official individually,
but against the local government entity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). An
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individual-capacity suit, on the other hand, seeks to impose personal liability on an individual
who, under color of state law, custom, or policy, violates someone’s constitutional rights. Id.
Here, Plaintiff named East Chicago itself as a Defendant. The official-capacity claims
against the individual Defendants are duplicative of the claim against East Chicago. Accordingly,
the Court dismisses the official-capacity claims against the individual Defendants.

(b)

Section 1983 individual-capacity claims
The individual Defendants also seek dismissal of the § 1983 individual-capacity claims

against them. These Defendants correctly note that an individual is only liable in a § 1983 action
if he caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation. Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864,
869 (7th Cir. 1983).
The individual Defendants argue that all the actions the complaint alleges they performed
were performed in their official capacities. The individual Defendants argue that the complaint
does not allege they stepped outside their roles with East Chicago and became personally
involved in the alleged constitutional deprivations. They further argue that the individualcapacity claims are duplicative.
But these arguments miss the mark.
The mere fact that an individual who causes a constitutional deprivation is an official
employed by a government entity does not insulate that individual from individual-capacity
liability. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27–28 (1991) (“The requirement of action under color of
state law means that Hafer may be liable for discharging respondents precisely because of her

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authority as auditor general. We cannot accept the novel proposition that this same official
authority insulates Hafer from suit.”)
Nor is an individual-capacity claim duplicative of a claim against the government entity.
See Hafer, 502 U.S. 21.
The relevant question is: did these individual Defendants cause or participate in a
constitutional deprivation? Wolf-Lillie, 699 F.2d at 869.
At this stage, the individual Defendants have not established that Plaintiff failed to allege
facts supporting plausible individual-capacity claims against them. The Court therefore denies
the motion to dismiss the individual-capacity claims.

(c)

Defamation
Like East Chicago, the individual Defendants seek dismissal of the defamation claim

because the complaint does not state the specific defamatory statement, nor does it allege
publication of any statement. In her response to this motion, Plaintiff Martin again failed to
address these arguments.
For the same reasons given above regarding dismissal of the defamation claim against
East Chicago, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s defamation claim against the individual
Defendants.

(d)

Tortious interference with contract
The individual Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s tortious-interference claim on the

ground that this tort requires the action of an independent third party. The individual Defendants

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argue they are employees and agents of East Chicago, of which the East Chicago Board of
Health is an instrumentality, and therefore they are not independent third parties to the East
Chicago Board of Health’s contract.
In her response, Plaintiff failed to address the argument that the individual Defendants
cannot be liable for this claim because they are not third parties to the contract.
As noted above, the Supreme Court of Indiana recognizes that a party cannot interfere
with its own contracts, so only third parties can commit tortious interference with contract. Trail,
845 N.E.2d at 138. Moreover, Plaintiff waived any argument against the applicability of Trail.
The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the individual Defendants for
tortious interference with contract.

(e)

Confinement
The individual Defendants seek dismissal of the confinement claim against them on the

grounds that the complaint lacks supporting facts and presents only labels and conclusions. But,
as noted above, the complaint does not completely lack supporting facts. Plaintiff claims that
when Defendants Dabertin and Favella delivered the termination letter to Plaintiff on October 13,
2015, they “kept the Plaintiff confined in her office, until she turned over various items of
personal property which they demanded . . . .” (Compl., DE 1, ¶ 17.)
This allegation does not provide every detail of the occurrence, but it provides enough
details to give Defendants Dabertin and Favella fair notice of the claim. Dabertin and Favella
have not demonstrated that this claim is facially implausible.

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The complaint does not, however, state facts to support a plausible confinement claim
against Defendants Copeland and Browning.
The Court therefore dismisses the confinement claim against Copeland and Browning,
but denies the motion to dismiss the confinement claim against Dabertin and Favella.

(f)

Intimidation
Plaintiff alleges “intentional tortious acts of . . . intimidation . . . .” (Compl., DE 1, ¶ 32.)

Like East Chicago, the individual Defendants moved to dismiss this claim without addressing the
issue of whether Indiana recognizes such a claim, let alone what its elements are.
As Dabertin and Favella failed to carry their burden at this stage, the Court denies the
motion to dismiss the intimidation claim against them, without deciding anything further
regarding this claim.
Copeland and Browning, however, have carried their burden at this stage. As the
complaint lacks facts supporting a plausible claim that they committed intentional tortious acts of
intimidation against Plaintiff, the Court dismisses the intimidation claim against them.

D.

Conclusion
The Court GRANTS Defendant East Chicago’s motion for partial dismissal (DE 9) in

part and DENIES it in part. The Court dismisses:
a.

Plaintiff’s defamation claim against East Chicago; and

b.

Plaintiff’s tortious-interference claims against East Chicago.

In all other respects the Court denies the motion.

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The Court GRANTS the individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss (DE 11) in part and
DENIES it in part. The Court dismisses:
a.

Plaintiff’s official-capacity federal claims against the individual
Defendants;

b.

Plaintiff’s defamation claim against the individual Defendants;

c.

Plaintiff’s tortious-interference claim against the individual Defendants;

d.

Plaintiff’s confinement claim against Copeland and Browning; and

e.

Plaintiff’s intimidation claim against Copeland and Browning.

In all other respects the Court denies the motion.
SO ORDERED on January 17, 2017.

s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen
JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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