Scott v. Buncich et al
Filing
117
OPINION AND ORDER: Defendants Joint Motion to Bifurcate § 1983 Monell Claims and Stay Discovery and Trial on Those Claims, filed by Defendants on 8/29/2017 82 , is DENIED. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 3/30/2018. (jss)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
TAMARA RACHEL SCOTT,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN BUNCICH, et al.,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CAUSE NO. 2:16-CV-114
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on “Defendants’ Joint Motion
to Bifurcate § 1983 Monell Claims and Stay Discovery and Trial on
Those Claims,” filed by the defendants on August 29, 2017 (DE #82).
For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Tamara Rachel Scott (“Plaintiff”), filed a
complaint in this case on April 6, 2016.
(DE #1.)
Plaintiff was
granted leave to file an amended complaint on August 9, 2017,1 and
the first amended complaint was docketed on August 11, 2017.2
(DE
1
Plaintiff sought leave to add several names of individual party defendants
and to update her Monell allegations to include the relevant policies and
procedures, incorporating information that was obtained during discovery.
(See DE #53.)
2
Several of Plaintiff’s original claims against Defendant John Buncich were
dismissed by the Honorable William C. Lee on September 23, 2016. (DE #39;
see also DE #46.)
#56 & DE #60.)
In her amended complaint, Plaintiff names the
following defendants: (1) John Buncich in his official capacity as
Sheriff of Lake County, Indiana (“Buncich”);3 (2) County of Lake,
Indiana (“Lake County”); (3) Willie Stewart in his individual and
official capacity as Jail Administrator of Lake County, Indiana
(“Stewart”); (4) Dr. William Forgey in his individual and official
capacity as Medical Director of Lake County Jail (“Dr. Forgey”);
(5) Dr. Robert M. Ehresman, a medical professional at Lake County
Jail
(“Dr.
Ehresman”);
(6)
Dr.
Kumpol
Dennison,
a
medical
professional at Lake County Jail (“Dr. Dennison”); (7) D. May, a
correctional officer at Lake County Jail (“May”); (8) Lt. Hailey
(a/k/a
Haley),
a
correctional
officer
at
Lake
County
Jail
(“Hailey”); (9) Patricia Kerr, an employee of Lake County Jail
(“Kerr”); (10) Unknown Employees of Lake County Jail (the “Unknown
Jail Employees”); (11) Correctional Health of Indiana, Inc., a for
profit Indiana corporation that contracted with Lake County and
the Lake County Sheriff’s Department to provide medical care to
the detainees incarcerated at the Lake County Jail (“Correctional
Health”); and (12) Unknown Employees of Correctional Health (the
3
In the caption of her amended complaint, Plaintiff makes it clear that she
is suing Buncich in his official capacity only, which is consistent with the
Court’s previous orders (DE #39 & DE #46) and the allegations set forth in
the amended complaint (DE #60). Therefore, the Court assumes that reference
to his individual capacity on page 3 of the amended complaint is simply a
typographical error.
2
“Unknown
Correctional
Defendants).
(DE #60.)
Health
Employees”)
(collectively,
Plaintiff brings federal claims pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and state claims pursuant to Indiana law
as follows: Count I – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – denial of medical care
against all Defendants; Count II - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – conspiracy
against all Defendants except for Buncich;4 Count III - 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 – failure to intervene against all Defendants except for
Buncich; Count IV – state law medical malpractice against all
Defendants except for Buncich; Count V – state law respondeat
superior against Correctional Health.
(Id. at 11-19.)
Plaintiff’s claims stem from her arrest on April 1, 2014, and
subsequent incarceration at Lake County Jail, where she alleges
she received inadequate medical care that led to severe and
debilitating lifelong medical problems.
Plaintiff
alleges
that
on
or
about
(Id.)
April
Specifically,
4,
2014,
while
incarcerated, she began experiencing rectal pain that worsened
over the following days and weeks to eventually include rectal
bleeding,
severe
pain,
vomiting
of
blood,
diarrhea,
appetite, weight loss, fever, and constipation.
loss
of
(Id. at 7-10.)
Despite receiving ample notice regarding her precarious state, the
4
Although not noted in the heading of Count II of the amended complaint, the
conspiracy claims against Buncich were previously dismissed by the Court with
prejudice. (See DE #39.)
3
Individual Defendants, including various doctors and correctional
employees, repeatedly failed to diagnose and/or treat Plaintiff’s
medical condition(s).
(Id.)
When she was released from the Lake
County Jail on June 3, 2014, she went to St. Anthony Hospital in
Crown
Point,
hospitalized
Anthony’s,
Indiana,
until
she
was
June
where
9,
treated
she
was
2014.
for
admitted
(Id.
a
at
severe
dehydration, and a low hemoglobin count.
and
remained
10-11.)
rectal
At
St.
infection,
(Id. at 11.)
Doctors
there attempted to perform a colonoscopy but were unable to fully
complete the procedure due to the infection, swelling, and damage.
(Id.)
Plaintiff was ultimately diagnosed with severe ulcerative
colitis and other debilitating medical problems that she continues
to suffer from.
(Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that her injuries were proximately caused
by the policies and practices of Buncich, Stewart, Dr. Fogey, and
Correctional Health.
(Id. at 12.)
Plaintiff alleges that Buncich
and Stewart had notice of widespread policies and practices by
health care and corrections employees at Lake County Jail, wherein
inmates with serious medical conditions were routinely denied
access
to
proper
medical
diagnoses
and
treatment.
(Id.)
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that pervasive known procedural
deficiencies existed including inadequate/untimely responses to
4
and examination of inmates’ medical needs, inadequate training and
supervision of unqualified health care personnel, insufficient
staffing levels, routine denials of timely and necessary specialty
care from outside providers, a lack of suitable continuity of care
and discharge planning, and a failure to adequately punish or
discipline prior instances of employee misconduct regarding the
foregoing.5
(Id. at 13-17.)
To the extent Plaintiff seeks damages against Buncich and
Stewart in their official capacities, these claims are, in effect,
actions
against
municipality.
the
Lake
County
Sheriff’s
Department,
a
Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
690 (1978); Smith v. County of Kosciusko, No. S91-5(RDP), 1991 WL
261766, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 15, 1991).
Plaintiff
seeks
capacity,
these
damages
claims
against
are,
Dr.
in
Correctional Health, a municipality.
effectively
asserted
Monell
claims
Similarly, to the extent
Forgey
effect,
Id.
in
his
official
actions
against
Thus, Plaintiff has
against
the
Lake
County
5
As noted in footnote 1 above, Plaintiff’s complaint was amended, in part,
to include updates to her Monell allegations based on additional information
obtained during discovery regarding the relevant policies and procedures.
(See DE #53.) The record currently includes a report prepared by the U.S.
Department of Justice (“DOJ”), Civil Rights Division, on December 7, 2009
(“DOJ Report”) (DE #32-1), a copy of the settlement agreement entered into
between the DOJ and Lake County Jail on August 18, 2010 (“Settlement
Agreement”) (DE #32-2), and various excerpts of compliance reports related to
the Settlement Agreement (collectively, “Compliance Reports”) (see e.g. DE
#54-7 through DE #54-12).
5
Sheriff’s
Department,
Lake
County,
and
(collectively, the “Entity Defendants”).
individual
claims
against
the
known
Correctional
Health
She has also asserted
and
unknown
medical
and
correctional personal named above (collectively, the “Individual
Defendants”).
Defendants filed the instant motion to bifurcate on August
29, 2017.
bifurcate
(DE #82.)
all
of
In it, Defendants request that the Court
Plaintiff’s
claims
against
the
Individual
Defendants from Plaintiff’s section 1983 Monell claims against the
Entity Defendants and to stay discovery and trial on the Monell
claims until and unless Plaintiff first proves an underlying
constitutional violation by the Individual Defendants. (Id.) That
same day, Defendants also filed a joint motion to stay the Monell
related discovery until the Court rules on the motion to bifurcate.
(DE #83.)
On September 11, 2017, Plaintiff filed a response to
the motion to bifurcate.
(DE #89.)
Defendants filed their reply
in support of the motion to bifurcate on September 21, 2017.
95.)
(DE
On October 11, 2017, Magistrate Judge John E. Martin (“Judge
Martin”) denied the motion to stay.
(DE #104.)
At the time the motion to bifurcate was filed, discovery had
been pending for almost ten months.
(See DE #44 & DE #50.)
According to Plaintiff, during that time the parties exchanged
6
multiple
rounds
communications
of
written
regarding
numerous deponents.
discovery,
electronic
(DE #89, pp. 5-6.)
engaged
discovery,
in
and
extensive
identified
Additionally, the parties
litigated Plaintiff’s motion to compel documents and information
from Correctional Health and Dr. Fogey, which was ultimately
granted by Judge Martin.
(DE #54 & DE #86.)
Plaintiff further
filed a motion to modify the scheduling order to allow additional
depositions to be taken, and that motion was granted by Judge
Martin, permitting Plaintiff to take the requested ten additional
depositions plus the depositions of any fact witnesses and experts
disclosed by Defendants.
(DE #63 & DE #88.)
On January 25, 2018,
Plaintiff filed a motion to depose Buncich based on his status as
the Sheriff of Lake County and final policymaker during the
relevant time period.
(DE #109.)
The motion, which was unopposed
by Defendants, was granted by Judge Martin on January 31, 2018.
(DE #111.)
DISCUSSION
Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) states, in relevant
part, that “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite
and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more
7
separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or thirdparty claims.
When ordering a separate trial, the court must
preserve any federal right to a jury trial.”
42(b).
Fed. R. Civ. P.
Bifurcation may be appropriate if one or more of the Rule
42(b) criteria is met.
365 (7th Cir. 2000).
See Treece v. Hochstetler, 213 F.3d 360,
Courts have broad discretion in deciding
whether to bifurcate issues presented in a case or to try them
separately.
Cir.
Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 516 (7th
2000).
Indeed,
the
district
court’s
exercise
of
its
discretion to bifurcate will be set aside on appeal “only upon a
clear showing of abuse.”
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
Treece, 213 F.3d at 364-65.
26(d)
discovery on Monell claims.
also
permits
a
court
Federal
to
stay
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d); see also Carr
v. City of N. Chicago, 908 F.Supp.2d 926, 927 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
The decision of whether to bifurcate is a case-specific analysis.
Cadiz v. Kruger, No. 06 C 5463, 2007 WL 4293976, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 29, 2007).
In the instant motion, Defendants argue that bifurcating the
claims
will
be
more
convenient
for
all
parties,
will
avoid
prejudice, will expedite the matter, and will economize resources
for the Court and parties during the discovery process and trial.
(DE #82, p. 3.)
However, in response, Plaintiff argues that
8
judicial economy, convenience, and expediency favor a unitary
discovery process and trial.
(DE #89, p. 3.)
Individual Defendant Liability Effect on Monell Claims
Defendants begin by arguing that section 1983 actions are
particularly
well-suited
for
bifurcation
because
“unless
a
plaintiff proves that an officer or other individual municipal
official or employee violated his or her constitutional rights,
the Monell claim against the municipality will fail as a matter of
law, and the litigation will be over without the need for discovery
or trial on the Monell claim.”
(DE #82, p. 3.)
In other words,
according to Defendants, an adverse finding as to Plaintiff’s
individual claims would necessarily dispose of her Monell claims.
It is true that the Supreme Court has stated, “[i]f a person has
suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual
police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might
have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is
quite beside the point.”
City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S.
796, 799 (1986); see also Treece, 213 F.3d at 364 (“municipality’s
liability for a constitutional injury requires a finding that the
individual officer is liable on the underlying substantive claim”)
(internal
quotation
marks,
brackets,
9
and
citation
omitted).
However, as pointed out by Plaintiff, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has cautioned that interpreting the holding of Heller to
“require[] individual officer liability before a municipality can
ever be held liable for damages under Monell” is an “unreasonable
extension” of the law.
Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604
F.3d 293, 305 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).
Rather, the
distinct factual circumstances of each case must be considered to
determine whether municipal liability may be found even in the
absence of underlying individual liability.
Id. at 304.
Thomas, the court noted the following:
The plaintiff in Heller sued the City of Los
Angeles and individual members of the police
force for damages under § 1983, alleging that
the officers arrested him without probable
cause and used excessive force in making the
arrest.
On the constitutional claims, the
jury returned a verdict for the individual
officer, and the Supreme Court agreed that the
district court properly dismissed the claim
against the City. The Court noted that the
jurors were not instructed on any affirmative
defenses that the individual officer may have
asserted, nor were they presented with any
qualified immunity issues.
The absence of
these defenses is significant . . . . Without
any affirmative defenses, a verdict in favor
of the officer necessarily meant that the jury
did not believe the officer violated the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights. And since
the City’s liability was based on the
officer’s actions, it too was entitled to a
verdict in its favor.
10
In
Id. (internal citations omitted).
In distinguishing the facts of
Heller from cases where, for example, a plaintiff had only sued
the county or where a plaintiff did not know the identity of the
individual defendants, the court found that “a municipality can be
held liable under Monell, even when its officers are not, unless
such a finding would create an inconsistent verdict.”
(emphasis
in
original).
Thus,
to
determine
Id. at 305
whether
a
municipality’s liability is dependent on its individual employees,
courts must “look to the nature of the constitutional violation,
the theory of municipal liability, and the defenses set forth.”
Id. (holding that the county could be liable even if none of its
individual employees were, because a jury could have found that
the
individuals
were
not
“deliberately
indifferent”
to
the
plaintiff’s medical needs but were simply unable to adequately
respond
due
to
the
breakdowns
in
the
county’s
policies
and
procedures).
Turning to the case at hand, the Court agrees with Plaintiff
that the nature of the alleged constitutional violations, the
theory of liability, and the defenses raised set this case apart
from those like Heller.
First, more than the Fourth Amendment
objective reasonableness standard, which requires no culpable
mindset, is at play here; rather, in Eighth Amendment medical care
11
cases
such
as
this,
standard applies.
the
subjective
“deliberate
indifference”
Compare Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397
(1989) with Thomas, 604 F.3d at 304-05.
Plaintiff alleges that
she did not receive adequate medical treatment or diagnosis during
her incarceration and that she was ultimately “simply released
from jail, gravely ill, to transport herself to the emergency
room.”
(DE #89, p. 5; see also DE #60, pp. 7-11.)
Plaintiff’s
theory of Monell liability includes allegations that the facility
was insufficiently staffed and that its health care personnel were
unqualified, lacking in experience, and inadequately trained and
supervised.
(DE #60, pp. 12-17.)
Plaintiff also points to
widespread policies and/or practices that resulted in inmates
routinely being denied timely and necessary specialty care from
outside providers and being discharged without proper planning or
continuity of care.
(Id.)
In addition, Plaintiff’s claims
implicate both named and unnamed/unknown Individual Defendants.
(Id. at pp. 5, 7, 9.)
Based on these allegations, it is possible
that a jury could find one or more Entity Defendants liable without
finding that any of the Individual Defendants were individually
responsible.
As the court noted in Thomas, it would not be
difficult to reconcile a verdict wherein a jury determined that
the
Individual
Defendants
were
12
not
necessarily
deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs but simply could not
respond adequately due to the policies described above.
604, F.3d at 305.
Thomas,
For example, Plaintiff points to several DOJ
Compliance Reports in the record that could reasonably suggest the
Individual Defendants were unable to provide Plaintiff with an
urgently
needed
deficiencies
that
colonoscopy
existed
because
with
regard
of
to
the
well-documented
transportation
tracking of these types of off-site appointments.
and
(See DE #89, p.
5, n. 2 (citing DE #54-7 through DE #54-9).)
In their reply brief, however, Defendants seem to suggest
that because Plaintiff’s Monell claims do not directly “align with”
or “mirror” those in Thomas, bifurcation is appropriate.
pp. 3-4.)
(DE #95,
Defendants argue that this is so because none of
Plaintiff’s allegations “state that a policy or custom existed
that the individual defendants could not respond adequately to the
alleged serious medical needs due to a specific policy, such as
detailed in Thomas.”
(Id. at 4.)
Defendants assert that the
eleven policies and/or practices outlined in the amended complaint
are simply “general in nature” and “amount to a broad overarching
Monell claim” rather than a well-documented policy breakdown as
was found in Thomas.
(Id.; see also DE #82, pp. 4-5.)
The Court
disagrees. As noted above, based on the allegations in the amended
13
complaint and the additional information contained in the record,
the policy deficiencies are described in sufficient detail so as
to ward off a motion for bifurcation at this stage.6
Numerous
district courts in this circuit have denied bifurcation based on
similarly pled allegations.7
See, e.g., Terry v. Cook Cnty. Dep’t
of Corr., No. 09C3093, 2010 WL 2720754, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. July 8,
2010); Martinez v. Cook Cnty., No. 11 C 1794, 2011 WL 4686438, at
*1-2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2011); Carter v. Dart, No. 09 C 956, 2011
WL 1466599, at *1-4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2011).
In addition to the nature of the constitutional violations
and theories of liability, Plaintiff points out that the Individual
Defendants have raised immunity defenses in this case.
DE #81, p. 25.)
(See e.g.
As noted by the court in Thomas, the absence of
any affirmative defenses and qualified immunity issues in the
6
Defendants repeatedly characterize Plaintiff’s Monell allegations as
“tenuous[s],” “general,” and seem to discount the existence of the DOJ Report,
Settlement Agreement, and Compliance Reports altogether. However, the Court
finds that Plaintiff’s allegations, albeit of a different type, are at least as
detailed as those found in Miller v. City of Plymouth, 2:09-CV-205-JVB-PRC,
2010 WL 1754028, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 29, 2010), the case cited by Defendants
to support their argument. As pointed out earlier in the instant case by the
Honorable William C. Lee, even Plaintiff’s original complaint - which was less
detailed than the amended complaint – contained Monell claims based on specific
facts and policies/procedures that went well beyond vague, boilerplate
allegations. (DE #39, pp. 7-20.)
7
Plaintiff also argues that bifurcation should be denied because her
victory on the individual claims would likewise fail to resolve her Monell
claims, as Correctional Health could be held liable for punitive damages
separate from any damages award against the Individual Defendants. (DE #89,
p. 11.) Because arguments regarding punitive damages need not be addressed
at this point, this issue does not affect the Court’s current analysis
regarding bifurcation.
14
Heller
case
was
significant,
for
“[w]ithout
any
affirmative
defenses, a verdict in favor of the officer necessarily meant that
the jury did not believe the officer violated the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.
And since the City’s liability was based
on the officer’s actions, it too was entitled to a verdict in its
favor.”
798-99).
Thomas, 604 F.3d at 304-05 (citing Heller, 475 U.S. at
Because qualified immunity defenses have been raised
here, it is possible that a jury could credit those defenses
without foreclosing Plaintiff’s Monell claims as described above.
Thus, bifurcation may not prevent a second trial if a jury finds
the Individual Defendants immune.
See e.g. McIntosh v. City of
Chicago, No. 15 C 1920, 2015 WL 5164080, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2,
2015) (“bifurcation may not avoid a second trial if the officers
are immune, and the second trial (of the Monell claim) would likely
duplicate
the
first
trial
against
the
individual
officers”);
Clarett v. Suroviak, No. 09 C 6918, 2011 WL 37838, at *1-3 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 3, 2011) (denying bifurcation because if the officers
were found not liable based on their qualified immunity defense,
“there would still be a need for a second duplicative trial as to
the Village’s liability”); Medina v. City of Chicago, 100 F. Supp.
2d 893, 896 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (denying bifurcation because, among
15
other things, the individual officers asserted qualified immunity
defenses).
Defendants
argue
in
reply
that
the
issue
concerning
inconsistent verdicts due to potential qualified immunity defenses
is premature and should be addressed at the close of trial on the
individual claims.
(DE #95, pp. 2-3.)
While it is true that
qualified immunity issues can be addressed following the initial
trial, none of the cases cited by Defendants (including one of
this Court’s own previous opinions)8 stand for the proposition that
the issues must be addressed separately or that bifurcation is
required on that basis.
In fact, as noted in Saunders v. City of
Chicago, 146 F. Supp. 3d 957, 969–70 (N.D. Ill. 2015), the court
was not persuaded in either direction on the issue of immunity and
stated that it did “not influence the Court’s calculus regarding
the propriety of bifurcation.”
9
8
See Meredith v. Lake County Sheriff, No. 2:14-CV-183, 2016 WL 4751198, at
*3, n. 2 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 13, 2016); Price v. Kraus, 2:15-CV-331-PRC, 2016 WL
369682, at *2, n. 1 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 1, 2016). See also Saunders v. City of
Chicago, 146 F. Supp. 3d 957, 968 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (recognizing that
bifurcation motions are highly discretionary in nature and noting that the
court itself had “both granted and denied motions to bifurcate” because each
motion had to be evaluated on its own merits).
9
Defendants also seem to suggest McIntosh is distinguishable from the
instant case because, there, the motion to bifurcate was denied during the
“early stage of litigation,” whereas here Plaintiff claims that the parties
have engaged in a significant amount of discovery. (DE #95, p. 3.) While it
is true that discovery has progressed in this case, the Court still cannot
“unequivocally state that there can be no municipal liability in the absence
of underlying individual liability,” and, as described above, it is plausible
to reach consistent verdicts with regard to Individual versus Entity
16
Thus, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that, in this particular
case,
Heller
is
not
implicated
in
a
way
that
would
favor
bifurcation.
Efficiency, Convenience, and Economy
Defendants argue that it will be more efficient, convenient,
and
economical
to
resolve
Plaintiff’s
claims
against
the
Individual Defendants before turning to the more “burdensome and
time-consuming task of litigating the Monell claims.”
5.)
(DE #82, p.
Defendants assert that separating the Monell claims at this
stage will “expedite Plaintiff’s claims against the Individual
Defendants and economize resources since the extensive amount of
discovery necessary to prove a Monell claim against the [Entity]
Defendants will be eliminated,” and they allege that they will
need to spend an “extraordinary amount of time and money” to defend
against the Monell claims.
Id.
Plaintiff, on the other hand,
argues that bifurcation would lengthen both the discovery phase
and the trial phase for no benefit, which would “severely prejudice
[her] by bringing substantial delay and unwarranted expense to
disposition of her case, in which the individual and Monell claims
overlap significantly.”
(DE #89, p. 12.)
Plaintiff points out
Defendant liability based on the presentation of immunity defenses.
McIntosh, 2015 WL 5164080, at *8. Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive.
17
that she has already devoted substantial time and expense into
discovery of Monell issues.
(Id.)
The Court acknowledges that
case law in this circuit has gone both ways on the issue of whether
bifurcation is appropriate based on these types of issues.
For
example, many district courts have found that discovery of Monell
claims “can add significant time, effort, and complications to the
discovery process.” Medina, 100 F.Supp. 2d at 895; see also Readus
v. Dercola, No. 09 C 4063, 2012 WL 1533167, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May
1, 2012).
at
However, other courts have concluded that bifurcation
this
stage
confusion.
give
rise
may
actually
add
unnecessary
complexity
and
“A stay of Monell discovery could, and often does,
to
arguments
about
whether
Plaintiffs’
discovery
requests relate to his Monell claim or to his other claims.”
Cadle
v. City of Chicago, No. 15 C 4725, 2015 WL 6742070, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 2, 2015).
Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Monell claims should
be bifurcated because litigating them will be burdensome, and an
“extraordinary amount of time and money must be spent” to properly
defend against them.
(DE #82, p. 5.)
They assert that these
claims are unduly complex - being premised upon numerous policies
and practices - and they point to Plaintiff’s “expansive” discovery
requests
regarding
the
DOJ
Report,
18
Settlement
Agreement,
and
Compliance Reports as evidence of this complexity and its effect
on the discovery process.
citing
DE
#82-1
through
(Id. at 4-5 & DE #95, pp. 5-6 (both
82-3).)
They
also
point
out
that
additional depositions were requested by Plaintiff because of her
Monell claims.
(Id. at 6.)
Defendants ultimately urge the Court
to grant bifurcation as a means of promoting judicial economy
because it will eliminate the need for judicial intervention into
discovery disputes, rulings on dispositive motions related to the
Monell claims, and the likelihood of a long, complex trial.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that nothing about
Plaintiff’s
“Proposed
Email
Search
Protocol”
or
requests
for
production regarding the DOJ Report and Settlement Agreement are
overly
burdensome
straightforward
on
their
attempts
to
face;
rather,
gather
they
information
appear
to
related
be
to
documents that have existed and been known to the parties since
very early on in this litigation.
As pointed out by Plaintiffs,
at the time the motion to bifurcate was filed, discovery concerning
both the individual and Monell claims had been pending for nearly
a year, and discovery has continued to progress post-filing.
In
fact, Defendants’ motion to stay discovery pending determination
of the bifurcation issue was denied by the Court in October of
2017 (DE #104), and Plaintiff’s motion to take the deposition of
19
Buncich,
which
will
recently granted.
clearly
include
(DE #109 & DE #111.)
Monell
information,
was
Without more, Defendants’
allegations regarding the “extraordinary” amount of time and money
that will be spent are hyperbolic and non-specific in nature and
are not enough to persuade the Court that bifurcation is warranted
here. See Cadle v. City of Chicago, No. 15 C 4725, 2015 WL 6742070,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2015).
In fact, all of the alleged time
and cost savings described by Defendants remain speculative and
would only be realized if Monell discovery would never have to be
litigated at a later date.
See Carter v. Dart, No. 09 C 956, 2011
WL 1466599, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2011) (“If the Court were to
follow Defendants’ proposed schedule, there might be a need for
two rounds of discovery, two trials to prepare for, and two trials
that would include much redundant evidence.
Such a result would
excessively
not
prolong
this
case
and
would
serve
judicial
economy.”).
After reviewing the particular circumstances presented in
this case as well as its current procedural posture, the Court
finds Plaintiff’s position more persuasive.
First, as noted in
detail above, adjudication of the individual claims will not
necessarily dispose of the Monell claims.
Thus, bifurcation could
likely require two rounds of discovery (including the potential of
20
dual depositions of many of the individuals), two rounds of motion
practice, and two rounds of trial -– none of which would be
efficient or economical for the parties and/or the Court.
See Id.
Moreover, as stated succinctly by Plaintiff, “[t]he policies and
practices that governed the Individual Defendants’ behavior in the
jail, the oversight and supervision that they received, the effect
of policies on their performance with respect to Plaintiff, and
many other issues are both relevant to claims against the Entity
Defendants
and
Defendants.”
the
actions
and
(DE #89, p. 13.)
omissions
of
Individual
Because these types of claims
overlap with regard to evidence, parties, witnesses, and experts,
the Court finds it likely that bifurcation will lead to more
discovery disputes rather than to less.10
See e.g. Terry, 2010 WL
2720754, at *3 (“If the Court were to grant the bifurcation motion,
the
need
for
the
parties
to
separate
Monell
evidence
from
individual liability evidence may further complicate rather than
simplify these proceedings.”).
Moreover, as the court noted in
Cadiz, “[t]o the extent that plaintiff’s Monell discovery requests
10
In their reply, Defendants point to Plaintiff’s sole motion to compel and
the resultant attorney fees as evidence that the Monell related discovery is
burdensome and complex. (DE #95, p. 6.) However, that motion was granted in
full by the Court two days after the instant motion to bifurcate was filed,
and Defendants do not adequately explain why an already resolved discovery
dispute necessarily leads to the conclusion that all Monell discovery going
forward will be similarly complicated or expensive if bifurcation is not
granted. (DE #54 & DE #86.)
21
are overly broad or would impose undue burden and expense, the
court can and will tailor them as necessary, as other courts have
done.”
Cadiz, 2007 WL 4293976, at *3.
Based on the foregoing,
the Court finds that considerations of efficiency, convenience,
and economy are not best supported by bifurcation.
Prejudice
Finally, Defendants argue that, while Plaintiff will not be
prejudiced
by
bifurcation,
“presenting
evidence
regarding
an
alleged entity-wide policy, practice or custom of improper actions
by the [Entity] Defendants poses a danger of undue prejudice to
the Individual Defendants by creating a perception that the entity
that employs each Individual Defendant routinely acts improperly,
even if the Individual Defendants acted properly in this case.”
(DE #82, p. 7.)
premature.
However, the Court finds that this argument is
As other district courts have noted, “judges often
address and can mitigate potential prejudice that might arise from
a unitary trial involving multiple defendants and multiple claims
through the use of limiting instructions, motions in limine and
the Federal Rules of Evidence.”
Cadiz, 2007 WL 4293976, at *3
(citing Giles v. City of Chicago, No. 12-CV-6746, 2013 WL 6512683,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2013); Elrod v. City of Chicago, Nos. 06
22
C 2505, 07 C 203, 2007 WL 3241352, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2007);
Medina, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 897; see also Awalt v. Marketti, No. 11
C 6142, 2012 WL 1161500, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2012) (“The
Court has at its disposal an[y] number of tools to properly order
and organize a trial that will not be unfairly prejudicial to any
of the Defendants”).
These tools should be sufficient to address
issues of potential prejudice at trial and if not, the Court may
still order a bifurcation of trial at a later stage.
Ultimately, Defendants have not clearly shown that they would
be prejudiced if bifurcation is denied.
Whatever efficiencies
might be gained by bifurcation are offset by the potential for
confusion of issues and discovery, inefficiency in delaying the
case, and possible prejudice to Plaintiff during that delay.
See
e.g. Miller, 2010 WL 1754028, at *3 (quoting Cadiz, 2007 WL
4293976, at *5) (stating a “stay of Monell discovery will achieve
cost savings only if one assumes that the parties are never
required to go back and conduct Monell discovery at some later
date”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, “Defendants’ Joint Motion to
Bifurcate § 1983 Monell Claims and Stay Discovery and Trial on
23
Those Claims,” filed by Defendants on August 29, 2017 (DE #82), is
DENIED.
DATED: March 30, 2018
/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
24
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?