Munster Steel Co Inc v. Crane 1 Services Inc

Filing 152

OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 124 MOTION Crane 1 Services Motion to Strike Cincinnati Crane Affirmative Defenses. The Court STRIKES the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Affirmative Defenses in Cincinnati Crane & Hoist LLC's Answer [DE 115]. Signed by Magistrate Judge John E Martin on 2/4/19. (ksp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
MUNSTER STEEL CO., INC.,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
v.
)
)
CRANE 1 SERVICES, INC., et al.,
)
Defendants.
)
____________________________________)
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CRANE 1 SERVICES, INC.,
)
Third-Party Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CINCINNATI CRANE & HOIST, LLC,
)
Third-Party Defendant.
)

CAUSE NO. 2:16-CV-345

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Crane I Services, Inc.’s Motion to Strike Cincinnati Crane
& Hoist, LLC’s Affirmative Defenses [DE 124], filed December 12, 2018. Third-Party Plainitff
Crane 1 Services seeks to strike all of Third-Party Defendant Cincinnati Crane & Hoist’s affirmative
defenses pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). Cincinnati filed a response on January
9, 2019, and Crane 1 replied on January 24, 2019.
I.

Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that a “court may strike from a pleading an

insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(f). Motions to strike are generally disfavored, but when striking portions of a pleading
“remove[s] unnecessary clutter from the case,” the motion may “serve to expedite, not delay.” Heller
Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989). Ultimately, whether

to strike material under Rule 12(f) is within the sound discretion of the court. Talbot v. Robert
Matthews Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 1992). Because affirmative defenses are
pleadings, they must meet all pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
including “set[ting] forth a ‘short and plain statement’ of the defense.” Heller, 883 F.2d at 1294
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). “[B]are bones conclusory allegations” which “omit[] any short and
plain statement of facts and fail[] totally to allege the necessary elements of the alleged claims” will
not meet this standard and may be stricken. Id. at 1295.
II.

Analysis
Crane 1 seeks to strike each of Cincinnati’s affirmative defenses. Cincinnati argues that its

defenses meet the requisite pleading standard. The Court addresses each in turn.
A.

First Affirmative Defense

Cincinnati’s first affirmative defense states that Crane 1 fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Crane 1 argues that it should be stricken as lacking in factual support.
However, the former Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 84, now abrogated, and the accompanying
Form 30 in the Appendix to the Rules explicitly provided for an affirmative defense of failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Kimbrew v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp.,
No. 10 C 4531, 2010 WL 5135908, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2010) (declining to strike on the grounds
that “[the] first defense, however, follows the form set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 30); Leon v. Jacobson Transp. Co., No. 10 C 4939, 2010
WL 4810600, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2010) (“[T]his language is specifically listed in Form 30, and
Rule 84 explicitly states that the Forms ‘suffice’ under the rules.”). Therefore, the Court finds that
it suffices under the Rules and will not be stricken.

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B.

Second, Tenth, and Twelfth Affirmative Defenses

Cincinnati’s second affirmative defense states that the alleged injuries and damages were
caused by “the superseding or intervening conduct of other parties”; its tenth states that Cincinnati
is “not a proximate or legal cause of any injury or loss”; and its twelfth states that Crane 1 “does not
have standing to assert claims raised in the Complaint.” Crane 1 argues that the second defense is
duplicative of the tenth, that lack of standing is not an affirmative defense, and that all three lack
factual basis and are redundant given the denials to the allegations in the Complaint. Cincinnati
provides no argument as to these affirmative defenses. The Court finds that they do not provide
sufficient factual detail.
C.

Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Thirteenth Affirmative Defenses

Cincinnati’s third affirmative defense alleges that Crane 1’s claims are limited by its failure
to mitigate damages. Its fourth affirmative defense alleges that it is entitled to “apportionment [from
other tortfeasors] for that person or entity’s percentage of the tortuous conduct.” Its fifth and sixth
affirmative defenses state that the claims are barred by “the doctrine of waiver, release, laches, or
estoppel” and “Plaintiff’s own negligence, fault, laches, or estoppel,” respectively. Its thirteenth
defense states that it has “a right to set off damages.” These amount to a laundry list of would-be
defenses, consisting of “nothing but bare bones conclusory allegations” without “any short and plain
statement of facts.” Heller, 883 F.2d at 1295. Accordingly, they must be stricken.
D.

Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Affirmative Defenses

Cincinnati’s seventh affirmative defense alleges lack of subject matter and/or personal
jurisdiction, and its eighth states that the claims “may be barred because venue is not appropriate
in this forum.” Its ninth defense states that the claims “may be barred . . . because Plaintiff has failed

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to join a necessary party.” These, like Cincinnati’s prior defenses, are devoid of factual allegations.
Cincinnati argues that jurisdiction, venue, and failure to join are contemplated as affirmative
defenses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. They are, but that does not excuse Cincinnati’s
obligations to provide a sufficient factual basis for its pleadings.
E.

Eleventh Affirmative Defense

Cincinnati’s eleventh defense states that “Plaintiff’s claim is barred . . . because Plaintiff is
not a party in interest to the relevant agreements.” The Complaint against Cincinnati alleges that
Cincinnati entered into certain contracts with Crane 1, attached as exhibits to the Complaint, which
apparently form the basis of the claims against Cincinnati. The Court finds that given that the
contracts were discussed in and attached to the Complaint, Cincinnati’s allegation that it was not a
party to those contracts contains sufficient factual detail, and the defense need not be stricken.
F.

Reservation of Rights and Defenses

Crane 1 also seeks to strike Cincinnati’s statement that it “reserves the right to amend and/or
supplement these affirmative defenses as appropriate.” It is true that affirmative defenses cannot be
added without Crane 1’s written consent or the Court’s leave, but nothing in the sentence at issue
contradicts that, and Defendant has not attempted to add any defense without seeking leave.
According, the Court declines to strike the statement.
III.

Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Crane

I Services, Inc.’s Motion to Strike Cincinnati Crane & Hoist, LLC’s Affirmative Defenses, filed
December 12, 2018 [DE 124]. The Court STRIKES the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,

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Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Affirmative Defenses in Cincinnati Crane
& Hoist LLC’s Answer [DE 115].
So ORDERED this 4th day of February, 2019.
s/ John E. Martin
MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN E. MARTIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
cc: All counsel of record

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