Wright v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 20

OPINION AND ORDER: The Court GRANTS the relief sought in Plaintiff's Brief in Support of His Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 17 , REVERSES the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, and REMANDS this matter for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order. The Court DENIES Plaintiff's request to award benefits. Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul R Cherry on 1/26/2018. (jss)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
RICHARD WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration,
Defendant.

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CAUSE NO.: 2:17-CV-70-PRC

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a Complaint [DE 1] filed by Plaintiff Richard L. Wright
on February 14, 2017, and Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of His Motion to Reverse the Decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security [DE 17] filed by Plaintiff on June 23, 2017. Plaintiff requests that
the June 26, 2015 decision of the Administrative Law Judge denying his claim for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income be reversed and remanded for further
proceedings or, alternatively, that an award of benefits be made. On July 24, 2017, the
Commissioner filed a response, and Plaintiff filed a reply on August 22, 2017. For the following
reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request for remand.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 13 2013, Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income, alleging disability since April 2, 2012. Plaintiff later amended the
alleged onset date to March 13, 2013. The applications were denied initially and on reconsideration.
On May 27, 2015, Administrative Law Judge Brian Saame (“ALJ”) held a hearing. In attendance
at the hearing were Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s attorney, and an impartial vocational expert. On June 26,
2015, the ALJ issued a written decision denying benefits, making the following findings:

1.
The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act
through June 30, 2015.
2.
The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 13,
2013, the alleged onset date.
3.
The claimant has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease
of the lumbar spine, diabetes mellitus, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease,
congestive heart failure, alcohol-induced liver damage, and obesity.
4.
The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20
CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
5.
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined
in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) with some additional limitations. More
specifically, he is able to lift and carry up to 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10
pounds frequently, stand or walk for a total of two hours in an eight-hour workday,
and sit for a total of six hours in an eight-hour workday. He is limited to no more
than occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, and climbing of
ramps and stairs, and he cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He can tolerate
frequent exposure to extreme cold, wetness, vibration, fumes, odors, dusts, gases,
and poor ventilation, but he cannot tolerate any exposure to hazards, such as moving
machinery and unprotected heights. He needs the opportunity [to] alternate between
sitting and standing at will while remaining on task, and he requires full-time use of
a mobile oxygen tank.
6.

The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work.

7.
The claimant was born [in 1969] and was 42 years old, which is defined as
a younger individual age 18-44, on the alleged disability onset date.
8.
The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate
in English.
9.
Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability
because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that
the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills.
10.
Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that the claimant can perform.

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11.
The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security
Act, from March 13, 2013, through the date of this decision.
(AR 11-25).
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s decision the
final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481. Plaintiff filed this civil
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for review of the Agency’s decision.
The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate
Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case.
Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Social Security Act authorizes judicial review of the final decision of the agency and
indicates that the Commissioner’s factual findings must be accepted as conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, a court reviewing the findings of an ALJ will reverse
only if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence or if the ALJ has applied an erroneous
legal standard. See Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence
consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gudgel v. Barnhart,
345 F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003)).
A court reviews the entire administrative record but does not reconsider facts, re-weigh the
evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. See Boiles v.
Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005); Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000);
Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 1999). Thus, the question upon judicial review of an
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ALJ’s finding that a claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act is not
whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled, but whether the ALJ “uses the correct legal standards and
the decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir.
2013) (citing O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2010); Prochaska v.
Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 734-35 (7th Cir. 2006); Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir.
2004)). “[I]f the Commissioner commits an error of law,” the Court may reverse the decision
“without regard to the volume of evidence in support of the factual findings.” White v. Apfel, 167
F.3d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir. 1997)).
At a minimum, an ALJ must articulate his analysis of the evidence in order to allow the
reviewing court to trace the path of his reasoning and to be assured that the ALJ considered the
important evidence. See Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002); Diaz v. Chater, 55
F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir. 1995); Green v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1995). An ALJ must
“‘build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [the] conclusion’ so that [a reviewing
court] may assess the validity of the agency’s final decision and afford [a claimant] meaningful
review.” Giles v. Astrue, 483 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Scott, 297 F.3d at 595)); see
also O’Connor-Spinner, 627 F.3d at 618 (“An ALJ need not specifically address every piece of
evidence, but must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and [the] conclusions.”);
Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ALJ’s analysis must provide some
glimpse into the reasoning behind [the] decision to deny benefits.”).
DISABILITY STANDARD
To be eligible for disability benefits, a claimant must establish that he suffers from a
“disability” as defined by the Social Security Act and regulations. The Act defines “disability” as

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an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(A). To be found disabled, the claimant’s impairment must not only prevent him from
doing his previous work, but considering his age, education, and work experience, it must also
prevent him from engaging in any other type of substantial gainful activity that exists in significant
numbers in the economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f),
416.920(e)-(f).
When a claimant alleges a disability, Social Security regulations provide a five-step inquiry
to evaluate whether the claimant is entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
The steps are: (1) Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity? If yes, the claimant is not
disabled, and the claim is denied; if no, the inquiry proceeds to step two; (2) Does the claimant have
an impairment or combination of impairments that are severe? If no, the claimant is not disabled,
and the claim is denied; if yes, the inquiry proceeds to step three; (3) Do(es) the impairment(s) meet
or equal a listed impairment in the appendix to the regulations? If yes, the claimant is automatically
considered disabled; if no, then the inquiry proceeds to step four; (4) Can the claimant do the
claimant’s past relevant work? If yes, the claimant is not disabled, and the claim is denied; if no,
then the inquiry proceeds to step five; (5) Can the claimant perform other work given the claimant’s
residual functional capacity (RFC), age, education, and experience? If yes, then the claimant is not
disabled, and the claim is denied; if no, the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I)-(v),
416.920(a)(4)(I)-(v); see also Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699-700 (7th Cir. 2004).

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At steps four and five, the ALJ must consider an assessment of the claimant’s RFC. The RFC
“is an administrative assessment of what work-related activities an individual can perform despite
[his] limitations.” Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1178 (7th Cir. 2001). The RFC should be
based on evidence in the record. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 676 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1545(a)(3)). The claimant bears the burden of proving steps one through four, whereas the
burden at step five is on the ALJ. Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 885-86; see also Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d
309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff seeks an award of benefits or, in the alternative, remand, arguing that the ALJ erred
in assigning weight to the medical opinion evidence, in evaluating Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms,
in determining Plaintiff’s RFC, and in interpreting the vocational expert’s testimony.
A. Medical Opinion Evidence
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in affording only some weight to the medical opinion of
Dr. Jay Joshi. Dr. Joshi opined that Plaintiff could lift, carry, push, and pull ten pounds or less with
the right arm and no weight with the left arm; could sit for 30 minutes at one time for a total of five
hours in a work day with breaks of 20 to 30 minutes needed after prolonged sitting; could stand and
walk for 10 minutes at one time for a total of one hour in a work day with breaks of 20 to 30 minutes
needed after prolonged standing or walking; could never bend, kneel, or squat; could not reach
above the shoulder with his left arm; could occasionally perform fine finger manipulation and grasp
with the left hand; had 10-15 pounds of grip strength in his right hand and 0-5 pounds of grip
strength in his left hand; could not operate motorized vehicles or moving machinery and foot
controls; and could work for four to five hours per day.

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Dr. Joshi is Plaintiff’s treating physician. Under what is known as the “treating physician
rule,” the opinion of a treating physician on the nature and severity of an impairment is given
controlling weight if it “is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory techniques
and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” Jelinek v. Astrue,
662 F.3d 805, 811 (7th Cir. 2011); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). When an ALJ does
not give controlling weight to the opinion of a treating physician, he must weigh the opinion in
accordance with the factors in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2),
416.927(c)(2) (“When we do not give the treating source’s opinion controlling weight, we apply the
factors listed in paragraphs (c)(2)(I) and (c)(2)(ii) of this section, as well as the factors in paragraphs
(c)(3) through (c)(6) of this section in determining the weight to give the opinion.”); Scrogham v.
Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2014); Bauer v. Astrue, 532 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2006).
An ALJ must offer good reasons if he does not assign controlling weight to a treating physician’s
medical opinion. Brown v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 247, 252 (7th Cir. 2016).
The ALJ gave Dr. Joshi’s opinion “some weight to the extent that it is consistent with both
the claimant’s RFC and the evidence of record, which shows a history of treatment for chronic pain,
fatigue, and breathing difficulty caused by degenerative disc disease, COPD, congestive heart
failure, and diabetes.” (AR 17). The ALJ also gave little weight to Dr. Joshi’s opinion regarding
Plaintiff’s inability to work eight hours in a day, because the ultimate issue of disability is reserved
for the Commissioner.
The ALJ failed to provide any reasoning as to why Dr. Joshi’s opinion was not given more
weight. To find the RFC first and to then assign weight to evidence only to the extent that the
evidence is consistent with the RFC is to reverse the proper order. Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640,

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645-46 (7th Cir. 2012). The Court could look beyond this boilerplate language if the ALJ provided
reasons for rejecting specific portions of Dr. Joshi’s opinion, such as Plaintiff’s inability to bend,
kneel, or squat or Plaintiff’s limit of sitting only five hours in a work day. The opinion implies that
the portions of Dr. Joshi’s opinion that were not accepted are not consistent with the evidence of
record, but the ALJ does not identify that evidence to enable the Court’s review of the consistency.
Evidence cited earlier in the decision, however, shows that some of the rejected portions of Dr.
Joshi’s opinion are consistent with evidence of record. The ALJ reported that Plaintiff was unable
to stoop and squat at a consultative physical examination in April 2013, which is consistent with Dr.
Joshi’s opinion that Plaintiff cannot bend or squat. (AR 16).
The ALJ has not sufficiently articulated his analysis to permit the Court to trace his
reasoning and be assured that he considered the important evidence in deciding to not give
controlling weight to Dr. Joshi’s opinion. Remand is required for a re-weighing of Dr. Joshi’s
opinion.
B. Subjective Symptom Evaluation
On March 28, 2016, Social Security Ruling (SSR) 16-3p became effective and issued new
guidance regarding the evaluation of a disability claimant’s statements about the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms. See SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1237954 (Mar. 28, 2016).
Under SSR 16-3p, an ALJ now assesses a claimant’s subjective symptoms rather than assessing his
“credibility.” However, SSR 16-3p is not retroactive; therefore, the “credibility determination” in
the ALJ’s January 22, 2015 decision is governed by the standard of SSR 96-7p.
In making a disability determination, the ALJ must consider a claimant’s statements about
his symptoms, such as pain, and how the symptoms affect his daily life and ability to work. See 20

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C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a). Subjective allegations of disabling symptoms alone cannot
support a finding of disability. Id. The ALJ must weigh the claimant’s subjective complaints, the
relevant objective medical evidence, and any other evidence of the following factors:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

The individual’s daily activities;
Location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms;
Precipitating and aggravating factors;
Type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication;
Treatment, other than medication, for relief of pain or other symptoms;
Other measures taken to relieve pain or other symptoms;
Other factors concerning functional limitations due to pain or other
symptoms.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). “Because the ALJ is in the best position to
determine a witness’s truthfulness and forthrightness . . . a court will not overturn an ALJ’s
credibility determination unless it is ‘patently wrong.’” Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310-11 (7th
Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 504-05 (7th Cir.
2004)); see also Prochaska, 454 F.3d at 738. Nevertheless, “an ALJ must adequately explain his
credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record.” Pepper v. Colvin, 712
F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2009)); SSR 96-7p,
1996 WL 374186, at *2 (Jul. 2, 1996) (“The determination or decision must contain specific reasons
for the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently
specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator
gave to the individual’s statements and the reasons for that weight.”). Though the case is already
being remanded, a couple of the asserted errors in the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility
warrant discussion.
First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly inferred from Plaintiff’s activities of daily
living that Plaintiff is able to work full time. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that
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there are “critical differences between activities of daily living and activities in a full-time job,”
including “that a person has more flexibility in scheduling the former than the latter,” and, in
performing activities of daily living, a person “is not held to a minimum standard of performance,
as [he] would be by an employer.” Bjornson, 671 F.3d at 647. The ALJ, without citation to evidence
in the record, found that Plaintiff “is able to perform a considerable number of activities of daily
living, including independently maintaining his personal hygiene, preparing meals, cleaning, doing
laundry, shopping in stores, managing his finances, and using a computer.” (AR 18). The ALJ noted
that these activities are not conclusive proof of an ability to work full time but must be considered
“especially in light of his complaints of disabling pain, fatigue, and problems with memory,
concentration, and social functioning—and it weighs against the credibility of his allegations.” Id.
Plaintiff presented evidence—ignored by the ALJ—that shows limitations to the ability to perform
the tasks listed. For example, Plaintiff needs help getting in and out of the bathtub, id. at 241, and
cannot bend down far enough to put laundry in the clothes dryer, id. at 242, and Plaintiff’s girlfriend
performs household chores and grocery shopping, id. at 47. Further, the ALJ has not explained how
Plaintiff’s stated limited ability to perform the tasks listed is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s allegations
of pain and fatigue. The ALJ has not provided a sufficient explanation of his reasoning to discount
Plaintiff’s credibility due to his activities of daily living.
Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s treatment “has been essentially routine and
conservative in nature.” Id. at 18. The ALJ is allowed to consider whether treatment is conservative.
See 20 C.F.R.§§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). However, ALJs are not permitted to draw adverse
inferences about treatment without first properly assessing the underlying reasons for the course of
treatment, such as inability to pay. Hill v. Colvin, 807 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2015). The law on the

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issue is clear—an ALJ must inquire into the reason behind conservative treatment before drawing
a negative inference on that basis. See id. (citing Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 840 (7th Cir.
2014); SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *7). Further, the ALJ should cite medical evidence
regarding what kind of treatment would be appropriate. Brown v. Barnhart, 298 F. Supp. 2d 773,
797 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (citing Dominguese v. Massanari, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1096 (E.D. Wis.
2001)). Here, the ALJ erred by neither inquiring of Plaintiff why he has not undergone more
aggressive treatment nor citing medical evidence indicating what treatment would be appropriate
if Plaintiff’s symptoms are as severe as alleged.
C. RFC Determination
The RFC is a measure of what an individual can do despite the limitations imposed by his
impairments. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)
416.945(a). The determination of a claimant’s RFC is a legal decision rather than a medical one. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(1), 416.927(e)(1); Diaz, 55 F.3d at 306 n.2. The RFC is an issue at steps four
and five of the sequential evaluation process and must be supported by substantial evidence. SSR
96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *3 (July 2, 1996); Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870. “The RFC assessment must
include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion.” SSR 96-8p,
1996 WL 374184 at *7.
“RFC is an assessment of an individual’s ability to do sustained work-related physical and
mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis. A ‘regular and continuing’
basis means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule.” SSR 96-8p at *1.
“The RFC assessment is a function-by-function assessment based upon all of the relevant evidence
of an individual’s ability to do work-related activities.” Id. at *3. The relevant evidence includes

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medical history; medical signs and laboratory findings; the effects of symptoms, including pain, that
are reasonably attributed to a medically determinable impairment; evidence from attempts to work;
need for a structured living environment; and work evaluations, if available. Id. at *5. In arriving
at an RFC, the ALJ “must consider all allegations of physical and mental limitations or restrictions
and make every reasonable effort to ensure that the file contains sufficient evidence to assess RFC.”
Id.
Given the errors noted above in assessing the medical opinion of Dr. Joshi and in evaluating
Plaintiff’s allegations of his subjective symptoms, the ALJ’s RFC finding cannot stand. Many of
Plaintiff’s contentions of error in the RFC finding are connected to the ALJ’s decisions to not give
higher weight to Dr. Joshi’s opinion and to discount Plaintiff’s credibility. After correcting the noted
errors, the probability of changes being made to Plaintiff’s RFC on remand is high. Accordingly,
an in-depth analysis of Plaintiff’s myriad of asserted errors in the RFC determination are not
warranted here in light of the previously shown basis for remand.
D. Vocational Expert Testimony
The vocational expert (“VE”) opined that a hypothetical individual with Plaintiff’s RFC
except for the full-time use of a mobile oxygen tank would be able to work as a document preparer
(1,000 jobs in Indiana; 30,000 jobs nationally), telephone information clerk (1,500 jobs in Indiana;
60,000 jobs nationally), and food and beverage order clerk (1,000 jobs in Indiana, 30,000 jobs
nationally). When asked how the use of the mobile oxygen tank would affect the availability of the
jobs, the VE testified that, in his experience, the number of jobs available would “drop 70%.” (AR
64).

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When the ALJ relayed this information in his decision, however, he reported that the VE
testified that Plaintiff had the following job numbers available: document preparer (300 jobs in
Indiana; 9,000 jobs nationally); telephone information clerk (1,500 jobs in Indiana; 60,000 jobs
nationally); food and beverage order clerk (300 jobs in Indiana; 9,000 jobs nationally). The ALJ
reduced the number of jobs available by 70% for the document preparer and order clerk jobs but not
for the telephone information clerk jobs, which should have been reduced to 450 jobs in Indiana and
18,000 jobs nationally.
The number of jobs in Indiana with the 70% reduction is 1,050, and 1,000 jobs is a
significant number of jobs, Weatherbee v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 565, 572 (7th Cir.2011) (citing Liskowitz
v. Astrue, 559 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2009)), so remand is not required on this basis.
Plaintiff asserts that the VE testified that, in addition to the 70% drop in available jobs, the
use of the mobile oxygen tank would require accommodation by employers and the VE did not
testify whether there would be any jobs available for which use of the oxygen tank would not be
considered accommodated work. Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing. The VE testified as to the
number of jobs available if an oxygen tank is not needed and that the number would drop by 70%
if an oxygen tank is needed. The VE did not mention workplace accommodation or indicate that the
remaining 30% of the jobs were available only as accommodated work. There is no error here.
E. Request for Award of Benefits
Plaintiff asks the Court to reverse and remand for an award of benefits or, in the alternative,
for additional proceedings. An award of benefits is appropriate “only if all factual issues involved
in the entitlement determination have been resolved and the resulting record supports only one
conclusion—that the applicant qualifies for disability benefits.” Allord v. Astrue, 631 F.3d 411, 415

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(7th Cir. 2011). Based on the discussion above, remand, not an immediate award of benefits, is
required for the ALJ to properly consider Plaintiff’s RFC.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS the relief sought in Plaintiff’s Brief in
Support of His Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security [DE 17],
REVERSES the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, and REMANDS this matter
for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s
request to award benefits.
So ORDERED this 26th day of January, 2018.
s/ Paul R. Cherry
MAGISTRATE JUDGE PAUL R. CHERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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