Jaroscak v. The Times of Northwest Indiana et al

Filing 73

OPINION AND ORDER: For the reasons set forth in the Opinion and Order: The Motions to Dismiss 25 , 27 , 30 , 33 , 38 , and 43 are GRANTED as follows: the federal claims (Counts V, VI, VII, VIII, X, and XI) are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and the state claims (Counts I, II, III, IV, and IX) are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 10/23/2017. (jss)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
DAVID A. JAROSCAK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
The Times of Northwest
Indiana, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
) CAUSE NO. 2:17-cv-91
)
)
)
)
)

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on six motions to dismiss: (1)
the Motion to Dismiss, filed by Defendant, Aaron Ridgway, on April
13, 2017 (DE #25); (2) the Motion to Dismiss, filed by Defendants
Town of Merrillville Police Department and Police Chief Joseph
Petruch, on April 17, 2017 (DE #27); (3) the Motion to Dismiss,
filed by Defendants Crown Point Police Department, Officer Stanko
Gligic, Officer Robert Ballas, Officer Mille Knezevic, Officer D.
Wilkins, Officer J. Burkholder, and Police Chief Pete Land, on
April 24, 2017 (DE #30); (4) the Motion to Dismiss filed by Lee
Publication, Inc. d/b/a The Times Media Company (improperly Named
as “The Times of Northwest Indiana”) and Reginald Edwards, on April
24, 2017 (DE #33); (5) the Motion to Dismiss, filed by Defendants
Officers John Doe, on April 27, 2017 (DE #38); and (6) the Motion
to Dismiss, filed by Defendants Lake County Sheriff’s Department

and Sheriff John Buncich, on May 3, 2017 (DE #43).
For the reasons set forth below: the Motions to Dismiss (DE ##
25, 27, 30, 33, 38, and 43) are GRANTED as follows:

the federal

claims (Counts V, VI, VII, VIII, X, and XI) are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE and the state claims (Counts I, II, III, IV, and IX) are
dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff,

David

A.

Jaroscak,

filed

a

complaint

against

numerous plaintiffs on February 27, 2017 (DE #1), all stemming from
an occurrence at Jaroscak’s house on March 1, 2015, when defendant,
Theresa

Ridgway,

was

delivering

newspapers

for

the

Times

of

Northwest Indiana, and got her vehicle stuck in the snow in
Jaroscak’s driveway.
officer

for

the

Theresa’s husband, Aaron Ridgway (a police

Town

of

Merrillville),

got

into

a

verbal

confrontation with Jaroscak, Aaron Ridgway called the police, and
Jaroscak was ultimately arrested by the Lake County Police two days
later. Defendants have moved to dismiss the claims against them
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim.1

Each of the motions has been fully briefed and is

ready for adjudication. Because the motions share the same nucleus
of

facts,

for

the

sake

of

judicial

1

economy,

this

Court

has

All defendants except Theresa Ridgway have filed motions to dismiss.
The Court notes that the claims against Theresa Ridgway are only state law
claims (Counts I and II).

2

consolidated these motions into one order.
DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a complaint to
be dismissed if it fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Allegations other than fraud

and mistake are governed by the pleading standard outlined in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and
plain statement” that the pleader is entitled to relief. Maddox v.
Love, 655 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2011).
In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint
“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). All well-pleaded facts must
be accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences from those facts
must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.
521 F.3d 686, 692 (7th Cir. 2008).

Pugh v. Tribune Co.,

However, pleadings consisting

of no more than mere conclusions are not entitled to the assumption
of truth.
conclusions

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
couched

as

factual

This includes legal

allegations,

as

well

as

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

3

Id. at 678 (citing

Facts
On March 1, 2015, around 6:00 a.m. in the morning, Jaroscak
was in his home watching the news when he heard a thud on his front
porch.

(Compl. ¶ 24.)

Thinking that the noise was simply the snow

and cold he stayed in his home and continued watching the news. Id.
About forty-five minutes later he took his dog outside when he
noticed a car stuck in his driveway, with about half the car in his
yard. (Id. ¶ 25.)

Plaintiff’s driveway is approximately 350 feet

long, none of which was plowed, and the stuck car was approximately
100 feet from the street. (Id. ¶¶ 25-26.) The vehicle belonged to
Theresa Ridgway, a co-defendant and the wife of Defendant, Aaron
Ridgway. (Id. ¶ 27.)

Theresa was delivering newspapers for The

Times of Northwest Indiana (“The Times”) the morning of the
incident. (Id. ¶ 5.)
After seeing Theresa’s stuck vehicle, Jaroscak noticed a SUV
pull into his driveway.

(Id. ¶¶ 27-28.)

The SUV belonged to

Reginald Edwards, a co-worker of Theresa’s from The Times. (Id. ¶¶
7, 33.)

Edwards ended up getting his vehicle stuck as well. (Id.

¶ 28.) Plaintiff watched Theresa and Edwards attempt to free their
vehicles for about twenty minutes, at which point he decided to put
his dog back inside the house and approach the drivers to ask why
they were at his home. (Id. ¶ 29.)

Theresa told Jaroscak that she

was delivering his newspaper, to which he responded that he doesn’t

4

get the paper and that she was trespassing. (Id. ¶ 30.)

Jaroscak

asked Theresa and Edwards to both leave, and they responded by
ignoring him.

(Id. ¶ 32.)

He then told the two of them “I can go

get my shotgun or call the police.” Id.

Theresa responded by

saying she would call the police. Id.
After telling Theresa that he could go get his shotgun or call
the police, Jaroscak began walking back towards his front porch.
(Id. ¶¶ 32-33.) He picked up the newspaper which Theresa delivered
earlier that morning, walked back and placed the paper in Theresa’s
vehicle, and then went back inside his home. Id.
Sometime after 8:00 a.m., about an hour after Jaroscak first
noticed that Theresa was stuck in his driveway, he heard a knock at
his door and the doorbell. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 34.) He went to the door and
saw a man in plain clothes, defendant Aaron Ridgway, who identified
himself as the husband of the woman stuck in the driveway, to which
Jaroscak

responded

“O.K.”

(Id.

¶¶

35-36.) According

to

the

complaint, Ridgway then “accused the Plaintiff of threatening his
wife,” “said he was a Crown Point Police Officer,” and “proceeded
to verbal[ly] threaten, scream, spit and yell[] at the Plaintiff
through the Plaintiff’s storm door.” (Id. ¶ 37.) During this time,
Plaintiff’s storm door remained closed between them, and it was
locked.

(Id. ¶¶ 35-37.)

Although the complaint alleges that

Ridgway identified himself as a Crown Point Police Officer, he is
actually a Police Officer of the Town of Merrillville, Indiana.
5

(Id. ¶¶ 38-39.)

This conversation occurred on Jaroscak’s porch,

which was approximately 200 feet from Theresa and Reginald’s stuck
vehicles. (Id. ¶¶ 33, 38.) After exchanging words with Plaintiff,
the complaint alleges Ridgway then called the police on his cell
phone while standing on the Plaintiff’s porch. (Id. ¶ 38.)
Plaintiff also alleges that at 8:30 a.m., he received a
telephone call from the Crown Point Police Department, requesting
that he go outside of his home because police officers were there.
(Id. ¶ 40.)

Plaintiff did not see any police officers at that

time, and he did not go outside - instead, he requested the caller
to send a supervisor to the door.

(Id.)

He received a second

phone call at 8:39 a.m. from the Crown Point Police Department,
requesting him to go outside of his home.

(Id. ¶ 41.)

Plaintiff

saw officers standing by the woods, approximately 80 feet from his
front porch.

(Id. ¶ 42.)

He proceeded to walk out onto his front

porch and yell to the officers “where is the supervisor.”

(Id.)

According to Plaintiff, the officers then drew their weapons,
pointed them at Plaintiff, and yelled at him, so he retreated into
his house.

(Id.)

Plaintiff then observed from inside the removal

of the two stuck vehicles.

(Id. ¶ 43.)

Plaintiff alleges he was arrested by Lake County Police
officers two days later, on March 3, 2015.

(Id. ¶ 50.)

He was

released after he posted bond in the amount of $500 to the City of
Crown Point on the charge of Intimidation and another $500 at the
6

Lake County Jail for the charge of Resisting Law Enforcement. (Id.
¶ 54.)

The charge of Resisting Law Enforcement was never filed

against Jaroscak, and the charge of Intimidation was dismissed by
the State on February 16, 2016.

(Id. ¶¶ 54-55.)

In his complaint filed on February 27, 2017, Plaintiff alleges
the following claims: (1) trespass against Lee Publication, Inc.
d/b/a The Times Media Company (improperly Named as “The Times of
Northwest Indiana”) (hereinafter “the Times Defendants”), Theresa
Ridgway, and Reginald Edwards (Count I); (2) slander against the
Times Defendants, Theresa Ridgway, and Reginald Edwards (Count II);
(3) trespass against Aaron Ridgway (Count III); (4) slander against
Aaron Ridgway (Count IV); (5) violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983: failure
to train, refusing or neglecting to prevent, against the Town of
Merrillville Police Department and Chief of Police Joseph Petruch
(Count V); (6) violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983: false arrest, against
the Crown Point Police Department (Count VI); (7) violations of 42
U.S.C. 1983: detention and confinement, against the Crown Point
Police Department (Count VII); (8) violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983:
failure to train, refusing or neglecting to prevent, against the
Crown Point Police Department and Chief of Police, Pete Land as
Chief for the Crown Point Police Department (Count VIII); (9)
trespass against the Crown Point Police Department (Count IX); (10)
violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983: arrest, against the Lake County
Sheriff’s

Department

officers

John

7

Doe

(Count

X);

and

(11)

violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983: refusing or neglecting to prevent,
against the Lake County Sheriff’s Department and Sheriff John
Buncich (Count XI).
This Court will begin its analysis with the federal claims.
Federal Claims
42 U.S.C. section 1983:
Neglecting to Prevent

Failure

to

Train,

Refusing

or

Plaintiff has stated claims for violation of 42 U.S.C. section
1983: failure to train, refusing or neglecting to prevent against:
the Town of Merrillville Police Department and Chief of Police
Joseph Petruch in his official capacity (Count V); the Crown Point
Police Department and Chief of Police, Pete Land as Chief for the
Crown Point Police Department in his official capacity (Count
VIII); and the Lake County Sheriff’s Department and Sheriff John
Buncich in his official capacity (Count XI).

Count V alleges

“pursuant to official policy or custom,” Defendants Joseph Petruch
and the Town of Merrillville Police Department “failed to instruct,
supervise, control and discipline” Officer Ridgway in his duties to
refrain from unlawfully and maliciously arresting, imprisoning,
using unreasonable force against, and entering the dwelling place
of a citizen without a warrant and “fail[ed] to train the officer
with respect to conduct when not on duty.” (Compl. ¶ 76.)

Count

VIII contains similar language against the Crown Point Police
Department (Id. ¶ 89), and Count XI about the Lake County Sheriff’s
8

Department (Id. ¶ 105).
Defendant Police Departments and the Sheriff’s Department
argue that the claims for failure to adequately train their
officers and neglecting to prevent should be dismissed for failure
to state a claim under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Of New York,
436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), because Plaintiff has failed to provide
any factual basis for those claims.

In his response, Plaintiff

claims he has met the pleading standard.
As to the claims against the Police Departments and the
Sheriff’s Department, it is well settled that a government entity
cannot be held vicariously liable under section 1983 for the acts
of its employees.
Sch.

Dist.,

491

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Jett v. Dallas Indep.
U.S.

701,

735-36

(1989).

In

order

for

a

municipality to be held liable under section 1983, the municipality
must have adopted a policy, practice, or custom that deprived the
plaintiff of his constitutional rights.

Bennett v. Roberts, 295

F.3d 687, 699 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
In order to demonstrate that a municipal policy has violated
his civil rights under section 1983, Plaintiff must allege that:
(1) the [municipality] had an express policy that,
when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation;
(2) the [municipality] had a widespread practice
that, although not authorized by written law or
express municipal policy, is so permanent and well
settled as to constitute a custom or usage within
the force of law; or (3) plaintiff's constitutional
injury was caused by a person with final
9

policymaking authority.
McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 324 (7th Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted).

Further, a municipality may only be liable

under section 1983 if it is the "moving force behind the injury."
Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 405 (1997).

In other words, to prevail on a claim against the

Departments, Plaintiff must ultimately demonstrate that Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights were violated and that the Department’s
policy or custom of failing to train its employees caused the
constitutional violation.

Collins v. City of Harker Heights,

Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 123 (1992).
While it is true that there is no heightened pleading standard
for municipal liability under Section 1983, a complaint must still
satisfy the plausibility standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal.
Boilerplate

allegations

of

municipal

insufficient to state a Monell claim.

customs

or

policies

are

See Strauss v. City of

Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 767-70 (7th Cir. 1985).

To state a

successful claim under Monell, a plaintiff must “plead factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the [municipality] maintained a policy, custom, or practice that
was the moving force behind the constitutional violations.” Dixon
v. Buncich, No. 2:15-CV-458 JD, 2016 WL 2643454, at *3 (quoting
McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011)).
Mere legal conclusions will not suffice to survive a motion to
10

dismiss.

Id.; see also S.J. v. Perspectives Charter Sch., 685 F.

Supp. 2d 847, 857-58 (N.D. Ill. 2010). Further, one incident of an
alleged

constitutional

violation

is

insufficient

to

show

a

municipal custom or policy. Hossman v. Blunk, 784 F.2d 793, 796-97
(7th Cir. 1986).
In this case, the complaint fails to state claims under
Monell.
about

There are no details or facts whatsoever in the complaint

the

alleged

policies,

customs,

or

allegations only involve the one incident.

practices,

and

the

Plaintiff has merely

recited boilerplate phrases, which is insufficient.
Plaintiff argues that Strauss is no longer valid law and that
his complaint is sufficient to put Defendants on notice of the
claims; however, his arguments are simply incorrect.2

Strauss is

still good law, as evidenced by the following recent Northern
District of Indiana cases: Cano v. Vasquez, No. 2:16-cv-401, 2016
WL 7475658, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 29, 2016) (citing Strauss for the
“Seventh Circuit precedent [which] requires dismissal of claims
based upon bare allegations of custom or policy under Monell where
a plaintiff has alleged no facts to suggest that the inadequate
policies of which he complains actually exist.”); Scott v. Buncich,
No. 2:16-cv-114, 2016 WL 5341309, at *7 (N.D. Ind. Sept 23, 2016)

2

In arguing Strauss is no longer good law, Plaintiff cites Marcavage v.
City of Chicago, 467 F.Supp.2d 823 (7th Cir. 2006) (DE #52 at 8). This is not
a Seventh Circuit case, and the correct citation is Marcavage v. City of
Chicago, 467 F.Supp.2d 823 (N.D. Ill. 2006), which itself was reversed and
remanded by Marcavage v. City of Chicago, 659 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2011).

11

(citing to Strauss, and noting Buncich correctly stated “that a
plaintiff asserting a Monell claim under section 1983 cannot
survive a motion to dismiss when Plaintiff’s claim rests solely on
conclusory allegations of de facto municipal policy and fails to
allege any well plead facts of any occurrence or policy other than
the single incident involving the plaintiff.”); Nevinger v. Town of
Goodland, Indiana, No. 4:11-cv-25, 2011 WL 2694662, at *4-5 (N.D.
Ind. July 12, 2011) (dismissing boilerplate claims where plaintiff
failed to allege a single fact outside the incident spurring the
complaint).
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit just recently upheld a district
court’s entrance of judgment on the pleadings where:
Gill also failed to plead a plausible Monell claim.
His complaint states that the City of Milwaukee has
a de facto policy of ‘placing an emphasis on
clearing cases and convicting suspects over seeking
truth,’ which led to the coercion of his confession
and the concealment of exculpatory evidence.
A
municipal body may be liable for constitutional
violations ‘pursuant to a governmental custom even
though such custom has not received formal approval
through the body’s official decision making
channels.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. To succeed
on this de facto custom theory, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the practice is widespread and
that the specific violations complained of were not
isolated incidents.
Jackson v. Marion Cty., 66
F.3d 151, 152 (7th Cir. 1995).
At the pleading
stage, then, a plaintiff pursuing this theory must
allege facts that permit the reasonable inference
that the practice is so widespread so as to
constitute a governmental custom. See McCauley v.
City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 618 (7th Cir. 2011).

12

Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir. 2017).
Plaintiff’s complaint fails to do this.

It does not provide any

other examples of other Merrillville Police Department Officers, or
other Lake County Sheriff Department Officers, or Crown Point
Police

Department

officers,

taking

similar

actions

to

those

complained of in this complaint. Indeed, Plaintiff has not alleged
any facts outside the single incident alleged in his complaint that
would lend toward a plausible inference of a department custom or
policy.

This is insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.

See Palmer v. Marion Cty., 327 F.3d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 2003)
(holding “isolated acts of misconduct will not suffice; a series of
violations must be presented”); Sheehan v. Noble Cnty. Sheriff’s
Dep’t, No. 1:14-cv-324, 2015 WL 3670092, at *4 (N.D. Ind. June 12,
2015) (dismissing failure to train claim where “the complaint makes
no mention of any prior instances” of excessive force); Sanders v.
City of Indianapolis, No. 1:09-cv-622-SEB-JMS, 2010 WL 2484772, at
*4 (S.D. Ind. June 11, 2010) (dismissing failure to train claim
where complaint “alleges nothing to substantiate” the claim and
instead relies upon boilerplate language because “[f]ormulaic
assertions such as this are entirely inadequate under the standards
articulated in Rule 8 and Iqbal.”).
Finally, a Monell claim cannot be maintained where plaintiff
fails to establish an underlying constitutional violation.

Petty

v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 424-25 (7th Cir. 2014).

Here,

13

the

complaint

fails

to

allege

that

the

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights in any way.

officers

violated

Rather, the counts

against Officer Ridgway assert only state law trespass and slander
claims, the complaint does not allege any direct involvement by the
Crown

Point

rights,

and

Officers
Count

in
XI

violating
does

not

Plaintiff’s
allege

constitutional

that

plaintiff’s

constitutional rights were deprived as the result of acts pursuant
to any express policy, custom, or practice.
Plaintiff attempts to get around these insufficiencies by
arguing that “[t]he Complaint, taken as a whole, tells the story of
a conspiracy” that violated his rights.

(DE #52 at 6.)

This

argument was directly addressed and rejected by the Court in Crews
v. City of Gary, No. 2:13-cv-292-PPS-PRC, 2014 WL 6474099, at *6
(N.D. Ind. Nov. 19, 2014), which found a plaintiff:
[C]an’t use the conspiracy claim to get around §
1983's limitation on derivative liability. Burks
v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 593 (7th Cir. 2009). In
other words, Monell still applies. Starks v. City
of Waukegan, 946 F.Supp.2d 780, 787 (N.D. Ill.
2013) (“[T]he only way the City could be liable
under [a conspiracy claim] is by virtue of the acts
of its employees, yet municipalities cannot be held
liable under a respondeat superior theory for the
acts of their officers”). So, conspiracy or no,
[plaintiff] has to plausibly allege that [the
municipality]
had
an
established
policy
or
widespread practice that was the moving force
behind her injury.
A similar result was reached in Carr v. City of Chicago, No. 85 C
8322, 1988 WL 53153, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 18, 1988), where the
14

court dismissed a broad assertion of conspiracy involving municipal
entities, “find[ing] that plaintiff seeks to impose liability on a
respondeat superior basis in contravention of the rule enunciated
in Monell.” As such, the conspiracy arguments made by Plaintiff in
his memoranda do not save his claim because Defendants cannot be
liable on a conspiracy theory under Monell.
To the extent Plaintiff has sued Police Chief Joseph Petruch,
Sheriff Buncich, and Chief Pete Land in their official capacities,
those claims also fail because an official capacity claim is
construed as a suit against the municipal entity.

It is well

settled that a suit against a public employee in his official
capacity is equivalent to a suit against the government entity.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985).

The claims

against Sheriff Buncich are really claims against the Lake County
Sheriff’s Department, the claims against Chief Petruch are really
claims against the Merrillville Police Department, and the claims
against Chief Pete Land are really claims against the Crown Point
Police Department.

See Estate of Szuflita v. City of South Bend,

Ind., No. 3:10-cv-346, 2012 WL 1095377, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 30,
2012) (finding a suit against a municipal official in his official
capacity is construed as a suit against the municipality).
official

capacity

prejudice.

claims

should

therefore

be

dismissed

The
with

See Estate of Sims ex rel. Sims v. Cnty. of Bureau, 506

F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 2007).

15

Violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983: False Arrest
Plaintiff has stated claims of violations of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. section 1982 for false arrest
against the Crown Point Police Department (based upon the conduct
of Officers Gligic, Ballas, Knezevic, Wilkins, and Burkholder)
(Count VI), and the Lake County Sheriff’s Department (based upon
the conduct of Officers John Doe and John Doe) (Count X).
First, any municipal liability for these claims fails for the
reasons articulated above - Plaintiff has not met the specificity
requirements for alleging a Monell claim. Count X asserts a claim
that “Defendants were subject to U.S.C. Sec. 1983" (Compl. ¶ 99)
and Count VI contains the same language (Id. ¶ 81).
allegations

fall

far

short

of

pleading

that

These cursory
Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights were deprived as the result of acts pursuant
to an express policy, custom or practice.

Moreover, Plaintiff

fails to support the counts with specific facts indicating a
pattern or series of incidents to support the allegation. Hossman,
784 F.2d at 796-97.

Consequently, these claims are properly

dismissed. See Nevinger, 2011 WL 2694662, at *5 (dismissing Monell
claim after concluding that plaintiff “failed to allege a single
fact outside of [his own single] incident to support any claim
under Monell.”.
It is difficult to decipher Plaintiff’s complaint. Even if he
has asserted claims against Officers Gligic, Ballas, Knezevic,
16

Wilkins, or Burkholer (the “Crown Point Officers”) for false
arrest, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was arrested by Lake County
officers.

(DE #1 ¶¶ 50-53.)

In order for Defendants to be liable

to Plaintiff for his allegedly false arrest, they must have been
personally involved in the arrest.

See, e.g., Rascon v. Hardiman,

803 F.2d 269, 273-74 (7th Cir. 1986).

Because Plaintiff has not

alleged any personal involvement in his arrest by the Crown Point
Officers, any claims against them fail.
To the extent Plaintiff has alleged a section 1983 claim or
constitutional claim for false arrest against the Lake County
Sheriff Department Officers John Doe, a person arrested pursuant to
a facially valid arrest warrant cannot prevail on a section 1983
claim of false arrest.

See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,

143-44 (1979); Neiman v. Keane, 232 F.3d 577, 579-80 (7th Cir.
2000); Brooks v. City of Aurora, Illinois, 653 F.3d 478, 483 n.5
(7th Cir. 2011).

The Plaintiff himself refers to the Lake County

officers having “papers” when they arrested him (Compl. ¶ 50), and
the Lake County Sheriff Officers attached the arrest warrant as an
exhibit to their motion (DE #38-1).3

3

The bald allegation in the

“Documents referred to in, but not attached to, a plaintiff’s
complaint that are central to its claim may be considered in ruling on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion if they are attached to the defendant’s motion to dismiss.”
Duferco Steel v. M/V Kalisti, 121 F.3d 321 324 n.3 (7th Cir. 1997); see also
Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429,431-32 (7th Cir.
1993). Here, the Court can properly consider the arrest warrant attached as
Exhibit 1 to the Lake County Sheriff Officers’ motion to dismiss (DE #38-1)
because the document is referenced in the complaint and attached to
Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

17

complaint that Plaintiff’s arrest “was made without probable cause
or some other legal right” (Compl. ¶ 101) is not supported by any
factual allegations whatsoever.

Where a false arrest claim is

based on a facially valid warrant, there must be a showing that the
arresting officers knew that the warrant lacked probable cause.
Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 443-44 (7th Cir. 2013).

There

is no such allegation in the complaint that the arresting officers
knew the warrant was obtained by deceiving an authorizing body, or
that it lacked probable cause.
Violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983: Detention and Confinement
In Count VII, Plaintiff alleges a claim for violation of 42
U.S.C.: detention and confinement, against the Crown Point Police
Department.
As found earlier in this decision, any municipal claim against
the Crown Point Police Department fails under Monell for lack of
specificity.

There can be no vicarious liability, and Plaintiff

does not even plead boilerplate language that there was any custom,
policy, or practice for this count.
While it is unclear whether Plaintiff has tried to state a
claim against the Crown Point Officers, any such claim would also
fail, because the complaint does not allege that any Crown Point
officer was involved in his arrest or detention. Consequently,
dismissal is warranted on this claim.

18

In sum, all of the federal

claims in this case are dismissed with prejudice.
State Law Claims
Jaroscak has also alleged state law claims for trespass and
slander against The Times Defendants, Theresa Ridgway, Reginald
Edwards, and Aaron Ridgway (Counts I-IV), and trespass against the
Crown Point Police Department (Count IX).

The Court has granted

dismissal in favor of Defendants on all of Plaintiff’s federal
claims, which were the sole basis for federal jurisdiction in this
action. (Compl. ¶ 1.)

The parties are not diverse.

Therefore, I

must decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims.
Upon due consideration, the state law claims are dismissed
without prejudice because the federal claims have been dismissed
prior to trial.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co.,

193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is the well-established
law of this circuit that the usual practice is to dismiss without
prejudice state supplemental claims whenever all federal claims
have been dismissed prior to trial.”); see also Williams v. Fort
Wayne Police Dep’t Officers John/Jane Does, No. 1:12-CV-202, 2012
WL 6727534, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 27, 2012).

As such, Counts I,

II, III, IV, and IX are dismissed without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth below: the Motions to Dismiss (DE ##

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25, 27, 30, 33, 38, and 43) are GRANTED as follows:

the federal

claims (Counts V, VI, VII, VIII, X, and XI) are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE and the state claims (Counts I, II, III, IV, and IX) are
dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

DATED: October 23, 2017

/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

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