Deardorff v. Superintendent

Filing 11

OPINION AND ORDER: The petition 1 is DENIED. The clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 9/25/2017. (Copy mailed to pro se party) (tc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER DEARDORFF,
Petitioner,
v.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.

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CAUSE NO. 2:17-cv-132-RL-PRC

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Petition under 28
U.S.C.

Paragraph

2254

for

Writ

of

Habeas

Corpus,

filed

by

Christopher Deardorff, a pro se prisoner. For the reasons set forth
below, the petition (ECF 1) is DENIED. The clerk is DIRECTED to
CLOSE this case.
BACKGROUND
In the petition, Deardorff challenges the prison disciplinary
hearing (MCF 16-09-494) where he was found guilty of conspiracy to
traffic in violation of Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC)
policy A-111/A-113 by the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO). ECF
1 at 1. Deardorff was sanctioned with the loss of 90 days earned
credit time and was demoted from Credit Class 1 to Credit Class 2.
The Conduct Report charges:
On August 22, 2016 at approximately 11:10am the
Investigation Department confiscated a package coming
into the facility for Offender Christopher Deardorff,
985307. The package was a Priority Mail 2-Day package
containing one paperback book titled; The Charm School.
This department has reason to believe the book contained
Suboxone. Phone calls acknowledged that Deardorff worked

with a female suspect, and another offender to traffic
drugs. Upon further inspection hidden inside the book was
twelve suboxone strips. Investigation shows Deardorff and
Offender Jeffrey Pellegrino, 966538 did conspire with a
female, Ms. Michelle Wooten in the amount of $500 which
Deardorff’s family sent to Wooten for purchasing,
packaging and sending this package to Deardorff. Details
of this case can be reviewed by DHB in the DII office;
jpays, calls related documents. Ms. Wooten during an
interview acknowledged that she did package and send
Suboxone in at the request of Deardorff. See attached
Investigation Report for details on Case 16-MCF-0101. MCF
is currently working with outside Law Enforcement
Agencies on warrants for all parties involved.
ECF 7-1.
DISCUSSION
When

prisoners

lose

earned

disciplinary hearing, they are

time

credits

in

a

prison

entitled to certain protections

under the Due Process Clause: (1) advance written notice of the
charges; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial
decision maker; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present
documentary

evidence

in

their

defense,

when

consistent

with

institutional safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written
statement by a fact finder of evidence relied on and the reasons
for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563
(1974). To satisfy due process, there must also be “some evidence”
to support the hearing officer’s decision. Superintendent, Mass.
Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
Deardorff claims that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief
because IDOC failed to follow its own policies in imposing his
discipline. However, the IDOC’s failure to follow its own policy
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does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Estelle
v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991) (“state-law violations provide
no basis for federal habeas relief”); Keller v. Donahue, 271 F.
App’x 531, 532 (7th Cir. 2008) (inmate’s claim that prison failed
to follow internal policies had “no bearing on his right to due
process”). Thus, Deardorff’s first argument does not identify a
basis for habeas corpus relief.
Next, Deardorff claims that he is entitled to habeas corpus
relief because he was denied access to evidence. Specifically, he
requested evidence: (1) that he called Ms. Wooten on the phone; (2)
a review of the interview with Ms. Wooten; and (3) any statement
submitted by Ms. Wooten. Inmates have a right to present relevant,
exculpatory evidence in their defense. Miller v. Duckworth, 963
F.2d 1002, 1005 (7th Cir. 1992). Exculpatory in this context means
evidence which “directly undermines the reliability of the evidence
in the record pointing to [the prisoner’s] guilt.”
McBride,

81

F.3d

717,

721

(7th

Cir.

1996).

Meeks v.

However,

prison

officials are provided great deference in their decisions to limit
this right based on the administrative or security needs of the
facility. An “inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be
allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his
defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous
to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at
566–67.

3

In this case, Deardorff’s requests were properly denied.
First, Deardorff’s request for evidence that he spoke with Ms.
Wooten on the phone was properly considered and denied. Prior to
the hearing, Deardorff received a response to his requests for
evidence. This response explained that the Screening Officer spoke
with an investigator, reviewed the materials relevant to the
disciplinary case, and confirmed that Deardorff did not make any
phone calls to Ms. Wooten. The DHO could not review or produce
evidence that did not exist.
Next, the DHO properly denied Deardorff’s request to review
the interview and other statements by Ms. Wooten. The interview was
confidential and was part of an on-going criminal investigation. At
the time of his discipline, warrants were in the process of being
issued

against

the

involved

parties.

Respondent

submitted

a

declaration of Lorna Harbuagh, the investigating officer assigned
to this disciplinary case. ECF 7-10 at 1. Investigator Harbuagh
explained that Deardorff could not have been shown the interview of
Ms. Wooten because “the interview was conducted by outside law
enforcement during an ongoing criminal investigation. Additionally,
the interview would have been kept confidential from offender
Deardorff because he, Ms. Wooten, and offender Pellegrino, were all
suspects in the ongoing criminal investigation.” Id. at 2. Thus,
IDOC had a reasonable security concern related to the disclosure of
any statement by a suspect in the criminal investigation, and the

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denial of Deardorff’s requests did not violate his due process
rights and do not entitle him to habeas corpus relief.
Finally, Deardorff argues that the DHO did not have sufficient
evidence to find him guilty. In evaluating whether there is
adequate evidence to support the findings of a prison disciplinary
hearing, “the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in
the record that could support the conclusion reached by the
disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. A conduct report
alone can provide evidence sufficient to support the finding of
guilt. McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). “In
reviewing a decision for some evidence, courts are not required to
conduct an examination of the entire record, independently assess
witness credibility, or weigh the evidence, but only determine
whether the prison disciplinary board’s decision to revoke good
time credits has some factual basis.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 457
(quotations marks and citation omitted).
[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board [need only]
have the support of some evidence in the record. This is
a lenient standard, requiring no more than a modicum of
evidence. Even meager proof will suffice, so long as the
record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of
the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise
arbitrary. Although some evidence is not much, it still
must point to the accused’s guilt. It is not our province
to assess the comparative weight of the evidence
underlying the disciplinary board’s decision.
Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation
marks, citations,

parenthesis, and ellipsis omitted).

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Here, Deardorff was found guilty of violating IDOC A-111/A-113
by conspiring to traffic contraband into the prison. The IDOC
defines offense A-111 as, “[a]ttempting or conspiring or aiding and
abetting with another to commit any Class A offense.” Adult
Disciplinary Process, Appendix I. http://www.in.gov/idoc/files/0204-101_APPENDIX_I-OFFENSES_6-1-2015(1).pdf. IDOC A-113 prohibits
inmates from “[e]ngaging in trafficking (as defined in IC 35-44.13-5) with anyone who is not an offender residing in the same
facility.” Id. Indiana law defines the offense of trafficking as:
(b) A person who, without the prior authorization of the
person in charge of a penal facility or juvenile
facility, knowingly or intentionally:
(1) delivers, or carries into the penal
facility or juvenile facility with intent to
deliver, an article to an inmate or child of the
facility;
(2) carries, or receives with intent to carry
out of the penal facility or juvenile facility, an
article from an inmate or child of the facility; or
(3) delivers, or carries to a worksite with
the intent to deliver, alcoholic beverages to an
inmate or child of a jail work crew or community
work crew.
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-5 (West).
The DHO had sufficient evidence to find Deardorff guilty. A
review of the confidential intelligence file establishes that there
was far more than “some evidence” connecting Deardorff to the
trafficking scheme. Mr. Deardorff claims that there is no evidence
that he asked for the package. However, evidence contained in the
confidential investigation file directly refutes this claim. The

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DHO’s decision was not unreasonable or arbitrary in light of the
comprehensive evidence connecting Deardoff to the trafficking
scheme.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the petition (ECF 1) is
DENIED. The clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case.

DATED: September 25, 2017

/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

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