Alvarez v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 23

OPINION AND ORDER: The Court hereby GRANTS the relief requested in Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Reversing the Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 18 and REMANDS this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Signed by Magistrate Judge John E Martin on 5/21/2018. (jss)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
BRAULIO ALVAREZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY BERRYHILL,
Deputy Commissioner for Operations,
performing the duties and functions not
reserved to the Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.

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CAUSE NO.: 2:17-CV-134-JEM

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a Complaint [DE 1], filed by Plaintiff on March 27, 2017,
and Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Reversing the Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
[DE 18], filed on December 1, 2017. Plaintiff requests that the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. On January 12, 2018, the Commissioner
filed a response, and on February 5, 2018, Plaintiff filed a reply. For the following reasons, the Court
grants Plaintiff’s request for remand.
I.

Procedural Background
On October 1, 2013, Plaintiff filed an application for benefits alleging that he became

disabled on July 1, 2013. Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. On
August 24, 2015, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Kevin Plunkett held a hearing at which
Plaintiff, with an attorney representative, and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. On October 9,
2015, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
The ALJ made the following findings under the required five-step analysis:

1.

The claimant met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act
through September 30, 2017.

2.

The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 1,
2013, the alleged onset date.

3.

The claimant has the following severe impairment: multiple sclerosis.

4.

The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments
in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

5.

The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 461.967(b), lifting and/or carrying
twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently. The claimant is able
to engage in sitting, standing, or walking for six hours each. The claimant can
push and/or pull as much as he can lift and/or carry. The claimant can
occasionally feel with his right and left upper extremities. The claimant can
occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds The claimant can occasionally balance, crouch, crawl, and kneel.
The claimant can never be exposed to unprotected heights or moving
mechanical parts. The claimant can never operate a motor vehicle.

6.

The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a bodyguard and
security guard. This work does not require the performance of work-related
activities precluded by the claimant’s residual functional capacity.

7.

The claimant has not been under a disability from July 1, 2013, through the
date of the decision.

The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate
Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case.
Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
II.

Standard of Review
The Social Security Act authorizes judicial review of the final decision of the agency and

indicates that the Commissioner’s factual findings must be accepted as conclusive if supported by

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substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, a court reviewing the findings of an ALJ will reverse
only if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence or if the ALJ has applied an erroneous
legal standard. See Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence
consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gudgel v. Barnhart,
345 F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003)).
A court reviews the entire administrative record but does not reconsider facts, re-weigh the
evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment
for that of the ALJ. See Boiles v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005); Clifford v. Apfel, 227
F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000); Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 1999). Thus, the
question upon judicial review of an ALJ’s finding that a claimant is not disabled within the meaning
of the Social Security Act is not whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled, but whether the ALJ
“uses the correct legal standards and the decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Roddy v.
Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618
(7th Cir. 2010) (O’Connor-Spinner I); Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 734-35 (7th Cir. 2006);
Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004)). “A reversal and remand may be required,
however, if the ALJ committed an error of law or if the ALJ based the decision on serious factual
mistakes or omissions.” Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
To be eligible for disability benefits, a claimant must establish that he suffers from a
“disability” as defined by the Social Security Act and regulations. The Act defines “disability” as
an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be

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expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(A). To be found disabled, the claimant’s impairment must not only prevent him or her
from doing her previous work, but considering his or her age, education, and work experience, it
must also prevent him or her from engaging in any other type of substantial gainful activity that
exists in significant numbers in the economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(e)-(f), 416.920(e)-(f).
When a claimant alleges a disability, Social Security regulations provide a five-step inquiry
to evaluate whether the claimant is entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
The steps are: (1) Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity? If yes, the claimant is not
disabled, and the claim is denied; if no, the inquiry proceeds to step two; (2) Does the claimant have
an impairment or combination of impairments that are severe? If not, the claimant is not disabled,
and the claim is denied; if yes, the inquiry proceeds to step three; (3) Do(es) the impairment(s) meet
or equal a listed impairment in the appendix to the regulations? If yes, the claimant is automatically
considered disabled; if not, then the inquiry proceeds to step four; (4) Can the claimant do the
claimant’s past relevant work? If yes, the claimant is not disabled, and the claim is denied; if no,
then the inquiry proceeds to step five; (5) Can the claimant perform other work given the claimant’s
Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”), age, education, and experience? If yes, then the claimant
is not disabled, and the claim is denied; if no, the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); see also Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699-700 (7th
Cir. 2004).
At steps four and five, the ALJ must consider an assessment of the claimant’s RFC. The RFC
“is an administrative assessment of what work-related activities an individual can perform despite

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her limitations.” Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1178 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing SSR 96-8p, 1996
WL 374184 (July 2, 1996); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)) (other citations omitted). The RFC should be
based on evidence in the record. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 676 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1545(a)(3)). The claimant bears the burden of proving steps one through four, whereas the
burden at step five is on the ALJ. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001); see also
Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).
At a minimum, an ALJ must articulate his analysis of the evidence in order to allow the
reviewing court to trace the path of his reasoning and to be assured that the ALJ considered the
important evidence. See Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002); Diaz v. Chater, 55
F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir. 1995). An ALJ must “‘build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence
to [the] conclusion’ so that, as a reviewing court, we may assess the validity of the agency’s final
decision and afford [a claimant] meaningful review.” Giles v. Astrue, 483 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir.
2007) (quoting Scott, 297 F.3d at 595)); see also O’Connor-Spinner I, 627 F.3d at 618 (“An ALJ
need not specifically address every piece of evidence, but must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between
the evidence and his conclusions.”); Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 889 (“[T]he ALJ’s analysis must provide
some glimpse into the reasoning behind [the] decision to deny benefits.”).
III.

Analysis
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s ability to work was not adequately

supported and not based in the evidence of record. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s opinion
is supported by substantial evidence.
A.

Treating Neurologist

Plaintiff’s treating neurologist completed a residual functional capacity questionnaire

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addressing Plaintiff’s work-related limitations caused by his multiple sclerosis. He opined that
Plaintiff has marked limitations in a number of work-related abilities, including the need to take
unscheduled breaks 2-3 times per day for 10-15 minutes each, the need to shift positions at will and
to sometimes use a cane. He wrote that Plaintiff was likely to be absent for work about three days
per month because of impairments or treatment, and that Plaintiff’s symptoms would occasionally
interfere with attention and concentration needed to perform simple work tasks during a typical
workday. In this case, the ALJ stated that he gave “little weight” to the opinion of the treating
neurologist. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to give controlling weight to the treating
neurologist’s opinions regarding Plaintiff’s ability to work and that his description of the decision
not to give it weight was illogical. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly considered his
opinion.
“A treating physician’s opinion regarding the nature and severity of a medical condition is
entitled to controlling weight if it is well supported by medical findings and not inconsistent with
other substantial evidence in the record.” Gudgel, 345 F.3d at 470 (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(2)); see also Hamilton v. Colvin, 525 F. App’x 433, 439 (7th Cir. 2013) (“While the
ALJ is right that the ultimate question of disability is reserved to the Commissioner, a treating
physician’s opinion that a claimant is disabled ‘must not be disregarded.’”) (quoting SSR 96–5p,
1996 WL 374183, at *5 (July 2, 1996)) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e)(2)); Roddy, 705 F.3d at 636
(“Even though the ALJ was not required to give [the treating physician]’s opinion [that the claimant
could not handle a full-time job] controlling weight, he was required to provide a sound explanation
for his decision to reject it.”).
In this case, the ALJ gave three reasons for his decision to give little weight to the treating

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neurologist’s opinion: that he did not have a chance to review the more recent medical records,
which showed effective treatment; that the opinion is conclusory because it did not complete all of
the narrative questions; and that it was inconsistent with examination visits. Instead of giving weight
to the treating specialist, the ALJ instead gave great weight to the opinions of non-examining agency
physicians who merely reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records. Plaintiff argues that the reasons for
discounting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating neurologist are illogical and inconsistent with his
reasons for giving great weight to the opinions of non-examining physicians. The consultants drafted
their opinions in December 2013 and August 2014, well before the neurologist’s opinion in January
2015. If the ALJ thought there might have been a significant change in Plaintiff’s symptoms after
January 2015, that would have been a reason to fully develop the record to obtain that information,
see, e.g.,20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(b), 416.919(b), not to give more weight to even older opinions.
Similarly, although the ALJ stated that the opinion was inconsistent with examination records, he
does not point out any inconsistencies, leaving the Court unable to trace the path to his conclusions.
His last reason for discounting the opinion is that it is conclusory because it left a narrative question
blank. However, review of the opinion is inconsistent with the ALJ’s characterization. He concluded
that the opinion about the number of days per work Plaintiff would miss, section l of question 10,
was unsubstantiated, despite the neurologist completing sections a through l of question 10, since
question 11, asking about “any other limitations,” was not completed. The Court again is unable to
ascertain why the absence of additional limitations means that the limitations already described are
insufficient to support the neurologist’s opinion about how they affect Plaintiff’s ability to work.
Again, this lack of logical reasoning is particularly troubling when it was used to discount the
opinion of Plaintiff’s treating neurologist.

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Generally, the opinion of a physician who has examined the patient is given more weight
than that of a physician who has only reviewed the medical record. “An ALJ can reject an examining
physician’s opinion only for reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record; a contradictory
opinion of a non-examining physician does not, by itself, suffice.” Vanprooyen v. Berryhill, 864
F.3d 567, 573 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Gudgel, 345 F.3d at 470); see also Aurand v. Colvin, 654 F.
App’x 831, 837 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he problem is that the ALJ has not pointed to any logical reason
to discount the opinions of the only examining mental-health professionals, one of whom was the
state agency’s own consultative examiner, in favor of a non-examining reviewer.”); 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(c)(1), 416.927(c)(1) (“Generally, we give more weight to the opinion of a source who has
examined you than to the opinion of a source who has not examined you.”). Furthermore, because
the ALJ failed to give controlling weight to Plaintiff’s treating neurologist, he was required to
analyze the following factors to describe what weight to give their opinions: the length, nature, and
extent of the physician’s treatment relationship with the claimant; whether the physician’s opinions
were sufficiently supported; how consistent the opinion is with the record as a whole; whether the
physician specializes in the medical conditions at issue; and other factors, such as the amount of
understanding of the disability programs and their evidentiary requirements or the extent to which
an acceptable medical source is familiar with other information in the claimant’s case. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(c)(2)(i)-(ii), (c)(3)-(6); see also Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 2011)
(“[W]henever an ALJ does reject a treating source’s opinion, a sound explanation must be given for
that decision.”). The ALJ failed to thoroughly address these factors, and failed to identify any
treating or examining physicians whose opinions as to Plaintiff’s limitations were given more than
“little” weight. The Court is left unable to trace a path from the medical evidence in the record to

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the ALJ’s conclusions about the Plaintiff’s ability to work. On remand, the ALJ must thoroughly
address the evidence of Plaintiff’s physical limitations, and is reminded of his responsibility to
develop the record, which may include ordering additional examinations or contacting medical
sources to obtain records and evidence necessary to making the determination. See, e.g., Barnett,
381 F.3d at 669 (“An ALJ has a duty to solicit additional information to flesh out an opinion for
which the medical support is not readily discernable.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3); SSR 962p, 1996 WL 374188 at *4 (July 2, 1996)); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(d)(1), 416.919(b).
B.

Combination of Impairments

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ also failed to consider the combination of Plaintiff’s
impairments and to incorporate the limitations from his non-severe impairments into the RFC. The
record reflects that Plaintiff has diagnoses of major depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress
disorder, degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, and ulcerative colitis, all of which the ALJ
found to be non-severe impairments. Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate
Plaintiff’s depression and failed to explain how his major depressive disorder did not have “more
than minimal limitation” on Plaintiff’s work-related activities. The ALJ disregarded Plaintiff’s
scores on the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scale, which ranged from 45-56, numbers
that indicate that Plaintiff experienced moderate-to-serious symptoms and difficulties in social or
occupational functioning. He concluded that Plaintiff has experienced no extended episodes of
decompensation and that his mental impairments of major depressive disorder and post-traumatic
stress disorder are controlled through monitoring and medication, so “no more than minimally limit
the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities.” As Plaintiff argues, “A diagnosis of ‘major
depression’ means, by definition, that an individual’s ‘symptoms cause clinically significant distress

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or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.’” O’Connor–Spinner
v. Colvin, 832 F.3d 690, 693 (7th Cir. 2016) (O’Connor-Spinner II) (noting GAF score of “50,
indicating serious symptoms or functional impairments” and finding error in conclusion that
depression was not a severe impairment) (quoting Am. Psychiatric Ass’n., Diagnostic & Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders 356 (4th ed. text revision 2000)).
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to explain how he incorporated limitations from
Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, major depressive disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder into the RFC. “Although [] impairments may not on their own be disabling,
that would only justify discounting their severity, not ignoring them altogether. Moreover, . . . an
ALJ must consider the combined effects of all of the claimant’s impairments, even those that would
not be considered severe in isolation.” Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2009); see also
Martinez v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Even if each problem assessed separately
were less serious than the evidence indicates, the combination of them might be disabling.”); Getch
v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n ALJ is required to consider the aggregate effects
of a claimant’s impairments, including impairments that, in isolation, are not severe.”) (citing 20
C.F.R. § 404.1523; Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 918 (7th Cir. 2003)).
The ALJ did not explain how the RFC incorporated any limitations experienced by Plaintiff
as a result of his depressive disorder, post traumatic stress disorder, degenerative disc disease, or
ulcerative colitis. Despite recognizing that the record contained multiple reports of Plaintiff’s
difficulties with gait and balance and his use of a cane and wheelchair, the ALJ explained that he
did not include Plaintiff’s use of a cane in the RFC because Plaintiff attended some of his medical
appointments without using an assistive device. Although Plaintiff may not need an assistive device

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all of the time, the RFC determination must address all Plaintiff’s work-related limitations, including
occasional cane use. See, e.g., Ross v. Barnhart, 119 F. App’x 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2004) (“‘The RFC
is an assessment of what work-related activities the claimant can perform despite her limitations.’
In considering a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ is expected to take into consideration all relevant evidence,
both medical and non-medical.”) (quoting Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004));
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), (a)(3); 416.1545(a)(1), (a)(3). The ALJ’s failure is particularly
concerning because the VE testimony at the hearing means that Plaintiff’s ability to perform past
work if he needed to use a cane at work.
The ALJ erred in failing to consider the combination of Plaintiff’s impairments. On remand,
the ALJ is directed to consider the combination of Plaintiff’s impairments, even those that are not
severe in isolation, and to specifically address the impact his severe depressive disorder has on his
other impairments and his ability to work, including a thorough evaluation of whether it is a severe
or non-severe impairment.
C.

Plaintiff’s Testimony

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in his evaluation of Plaintiff’s statements about his
symptoms. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is not as limited as he alleged because he has not been
entirely complaint in taking his prescribed medications. When considering non-compliance with
treatment as a factor in determining whether a claimant’s statements regarding her symptoms are
credible, an ALJ is also required make a determination about whether non-compliance with
treatment is justified and develop the record accordingly. See Shauger v. Astrue, 675 F.3d 690, 696
(7th Cir. 2012) (“Although a history of sporadic treatment or the failure to follow a treatment plan
can undermine a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ must first explore the claimant’s reasons for the lack

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of medical care before drawing a negative inference. . . . The claimant’s ‘good reasons’ may include
an inability to afford treatment, ineffectiveness of further treatment, or intolerable side effects.”);
Craft, 539 F.3d at 679 (“[T]he ALJ ‘must not draw any inferences’ about a claimant’s condition
from this failure unless the ALJ has explored the claimant’s explanations as to the lack of medical
care.”) (quoting SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (July 2, 1996)). In this case, the ALJ did not ask
Plaintiff about his compliance with prescribed medications at the hearing and his opinion does not
address the reasons for his noncompliance that appear in the record, including severe side effects.
A.R. 1104, 1144.
The Court is also concerned by the ALJ’s treatment of Plaintiff’s daily activities, listing some
very basic activities of necessary housework, reading, and watching television as evidence that his
work-related activities are not as limited as claimed. To the extent that the ALJ is implying that these
meager activities indicate an ability to work, the Court notes that the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has repeatedly criticized credibility determinations that equate a plaintiff’s ability to take
care of his personal hygiene, children, or household chores with the ability to work. See, e.g.,
Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 887; Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 2006). It appears that
the ALJ failed to take into account “critical differences between activities of daily living and
activities in a full-time job,” such as the fact that a person has more flexibility in scheduling the
former than the latter, can get help from other persons . . . and is not held to a minimum standard
of performance, as she would be by an employer.” Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir.
2012); see also, e.g., Punzio, 630 F.3d at 712 (“[The Plaintiff’s] ability to struggle through the
activities of daily living does not mean that she can manage the requirements of a modern
workplace.”); Mendez v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 360, 362 (7th Cir. 2006) (“We have cautioned the

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Social Security Administration against placing undue weight on a claimant’s household activities
in assessing the claimant’s ability to hold a job outside the home . . . The pressures, the nature of the
work, flexibility in the use of time, and other aspects of the working environment . . . often differ
dramatically between home and office or factory or other place of paid work.”). Particularly
concerning is the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s “return to school suggests that [he] believes there
are some positions he will be able to perform in the national economy.” A.R. 24. Not only did the
ALJ fail to explain how the ability to attend class on a part-time basis translates to the ability to
attend a workplace every day and complete a full day’s work, but Plaintiff testified that he was
unable to complete his course because he missed too many days due to his fatigue, depression, and
pain. A.R. 72-73. Not only does attending class on its own not indicate an ability to work, but the
record reflects that Plaintiff was not even able to successfully complete part-time coursework. The
Court cannot trace the ALJ’s reasoning from Plaintiff’s failed attempt to take a class to his
conclusion that Plaintiff can work, especially since “[a] desperate person might force h[im]self to
work – or . . . certify that []he is able to work – but that does not necessarily mean []he is not
disabled.” Richards v. Astrue, 370 F. App’x 727, 732 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Pierce v. Colvin, 739
F.3d 1046, 1051 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[A] claimant’s dogged efforts to work beyond her physical
capacity would seem to be highly relevant in deciding her credibility and determining whether she
is trying to obtain government benefits by exaggerating her pain symptoms.”).
On remand, the ALJ is instructed to draw a logical bridge from the evidence as it actually
appears in the record to his conclusions about Plaintiff’s RFC, and must thoroughly address the
medical evidence in the record. The ALJ is reminded that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
warned ALJs against cherry-picking evidence in the record. “An ALJ cannot rely only on the

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evidence that supports [his] opinion.” Yurt v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 850, 859 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1093, 1099 (7th Cir. 2013)); see also Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685,
698 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he ALJ identified pieces of evidence in the record that supported her
conclusion that [the plaintiff] was not disabled, but she ignored related evidence that undermined
her conclusion. This ‘sound-bite’ approach to record evaluation is an impermissible methodology
for evaluating the evidence.”); Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010) (“An ALJ has
the obligation to consider all relevant medical evidence and cannot simply cherry-pick facts that
support a finding of non-disability while ignoring evidence that points to a disability finding.”).
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS the relief requested in Plaintiff’s Brief

in Support of Reversing the Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security [DE 18] and
REMANDS this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SO ORDERED this 21st day of May, 2018.
s/ John E. Martin
MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN E. MARTIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
cc:

All counsel of record

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