Williams v. Superintendent

Filing 2

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 1 PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner Roosevelt Williams. Clerk DIRECTED to close this case. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 8/30/17. (Copy mailed to pro se party).(cer)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
ROOSEVELT WILLIAMS,
Petitioner,
vs.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.

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CAUSE NO. 2:17-CV-242-RL-JEM

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Petition under 28
U.S.C. Paragraph 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed by Roosevelt
Williams, a pro se prisoner. For the reasons set forth below, the
petition (ECF 1) is DENIED. The clerk is DIRECTED to close this
case.
BACKGROUND
In the petition, Williams challenges the prison disciplinary
hearing (MCF 16-04-287) where he was found guilty of possession
and/or use of a controlled substance in violation of Indiana
Department of Correction (IDOC) policy B-202 by the Disciplinary
Hearing Officer (DHO). ECF 1 at 1. Williams was sanctioned with the
loss of 90 days earned credit time and was demoted from Credit
Class 1 to Credit Class 2. Id.
The Conduct Report charges:
On 4-14-2016 at 2:20pm I Sergeant T. Heishman was
conducting range checks on the ½ side of PHU and observed
Offender Williams Roosevelt 974618 PHU-220 sitting in the
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top bunk leaning over his pillow in an unusual way that
looked suspicious. I had the cell door opened and advised
both offenders to step out of the cell because I thought
it smelled like hooch and I just wanted to do a quick
check. Both offenders complied and stepped out. I entered
the cell and I told Officer Hunt to stand by the door. As
I turned Offender Williams pillow on the top bunk over I
found a white powdery substance spread out over a red
folder. Immediately Offender Williams reentered the cell
and attempted to get between me and his bunk in an
aggressive way. I and Officer Hunt both took a defensive
stance and ordered Offender Williams out of the cell and
then restrained him and Offender Mims. Both Offenders
were then escorted to the center and searched without any
incidents. Upon questioning Offender Mims claimed the
substance to be his and the substance to be cocaine. The
paper work in the red folder was Offender Williams and
contained conduct reports and other personal card (sic)
with his name on them. Next to the red folder I located
a small bag inside a glove finger containing the white
substance believed to be cocaine[.] All items were
located on the top bunk that is assigned to Offender
Williams.
(ECF 1 at 24.) Officer Hunt also submitted a witness report:
On 4-14-2016 at 2:20pm I officer J. Hunt observed
Sergeant T. Heishman conducting a range check on the ½
side of PHU. I assisted Sgt. Heishman at conducted a cell
search of PHU 219/220. As Sgt. Heishman was searching the
top bunk, Offender Williams reentered the cell and
attempted to get between Sgt. Heishman and his bunk in an
aggressive way. I and Sgt. Heishman both took a defensive
stance and ordered Offender Williams out of the cell and
then restrained him and Offender Mims. Both Offenders
were then escorted to the center and searched without any
incidents. Sgt. Heishman questioned Offender Mims.
Offender Mims claimed the substance to be his and the
substance to be cocaine. All items were located on the
top bunk that is assigned to Offender Williams.
(ECF 1 at 26.) Both offenders were issued disciplinary reports.
DISCUSSION
When

prisoners

lose

earned

disciplinary hearing, they are

time

credits

in

a

prison

entitled to certain protections
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under the Due Process Clause: (1) advance written notice of the
charges; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial
decision maker; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present
documentary

evidence

in

their

defense

when

consistent

with

institutional safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written
statement by a fact finder of evidence relied on and the reasons
for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563
(1974). To satisfy due process, there must also be “some evidence”
to support the hearing officer’s decision. Superintendent, Mass.
Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
In Ground One, Williams argues that the DHO did not have
sufficient evidence to find him guilty because his cell-mate
claimed ownership of the substance. In evaluating whether there is
adequate evidence to support the findings of a prison disciplinary
hearing, “the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in
the record that could support the conclusion reached by the
disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. A conduct report
alone can provide evidence sufficient to support the finding of
guilt. McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). “In
reviewing a decision for some evidence, courts are not required to
conduct an examination of the entire record, independently assess
witness credibility, or weigh the evidence, but only determine
whether the prison disciplinary board’s decision to revoke good
time credits has some factual basis.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 457

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(quotations marks and citation omitted).
[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board [need only]
have the support of some evidence in the record. This is
a lenient standard, requiring no more than a modicum of
evidence. Even meager proof will suffice, so long as the
record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of
the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise
arbitrary. Although some evidence is not much, it still
must point to the accused’s guilt. It is not our province
to assess the comparative weight of the evidence
underlying the disciplinary board’s decision.
Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation
marks, citations,

parenthesis, and ellipsis omitted).

Here, there was sufficient evidence to find Williams guilty of
possession

of

a

controlled

substance.

The

Conduct

Report

specifically identified Williams as the offender who was “leaning
over his pillow in an unusual way that looked suspicious.” It was
also Williams who aggressively attempted to reenter the cell once
the officers discovered the substance on the pillow. Moreover, the
substance was discovered in Williams’ cell, inside a folder where
Williams stored his personal property. This certainly amounts to
“some evidence” that Williams was in possession of the substance.
Williams appears to believe that only one person can be in
possession of contraband at a time. However, that is not the case
under IDOC policy. The IDOC defines possession as follows:
POSSESSION: On one’s person, in one’s quarters, in one’s
locker or under one’s physical control. For the purposes
of these procedures, offenders are presumed to be
responsible for any property, prohibited property or
contraband that is located on their person, within their
cell or within areas of their housing, work, educational
or vocational assignment that are under their control.
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Areas under an offender’s control include, but are not
limited to: the door track, window ledge, ventilation
unit, plumbing and the offender’s desk, cabinet/locker,
shelving, storage area, bed and bedding materials in
his/her housing assignment and the desk, cubicle, work
station and locker in his/her work, educational or
vocational assignment.
The

Disciplinary

Code

for

Adult

Offenders.

http://www.in.gov/idoc/files/02-04-101_The_Disciplinary_Code_for_
Adult_Offenders___6-1-2015.pdf. Multiple offenders may have control
over a space, and thus multiple offenders can be in possession of
contraband. See Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir.
1992) (where contraband was present in a cell occupied by four
inmates, and there was a substantial likelihood that all inmates
were aware of the contraband, there was sufficient evidence to
support a disciplinary finding for possession). While Williams
claims that Mims used his property without his permission, he does
not contend that Mims used his property without his knowledge. It
was not unreasonable for the DHO to infer that Williams was aware
of the substance, given that the substance was in his cell and
concealed within his property. Finally, Williams’ contention that
Mims owned the substance is irrelevant to the question of Williams’
possession; pursuant to IDOC policy, an offender does not need to
be the owner of the contraband in order to be guilty of possession.
Therefore, Ground One does not identify a basis for habeas corpus
relief.
In Ground Two, Williams argues that he was denied due process

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because the DHO did not test the confiscated substance. However,
Williams did not have a due process right to have the substance
tested. “Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal
prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such
proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556
(1974).

Though

prisoners

have

a

right

to

submit

relevant

exculpatory evidence, they do not have the right to create evidence
which does not already exist because “[p]rison officials must have
the necessary discretion to keep the hearing within reasonable
limits.” Id. See also Freitas v. Auger, 837 F.2d 806, 812 n.13 (8th
Cir. 1988) (“Freitas was not entitled to a polygraph examination .
. .”); Rhatigan v. Ward, 187 Fed. Appx. 889, 890-891 (10th Cir.
2006); and Arthur v. Ayers, 43 Fed. Appx. 56, 57 (9th Cir. 2002)
(inmates

not

entitled

to

laboratory

testing

of

substances).

Moreover, there was no need to test the substance, as Mims admitted
that the substance was his, and admitted that the substance was
cocaine. Thus, Ground Two does not identify a basis for habeas
corpus relief.
In Ground Three, Williams argues that he was denied his right
to an impartial decision-maker. In the prison disciplinary context,
adjudicators

are

"entitled

to

a

presumption

of

honesty

and

integrity," and "the constitutional standard for improper bias is
high." Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003). Due
process

prohibits

a

prison

official

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who

was

personally

and

substantially involved in the underlying incident from acting as a
decision-maker in the case.

Id.

However, due process is not

violated simply because the hearing officer knew the inmate or
presided over a prior disciplinary case. Id.
Here, Williams has not met the high standard necessary to
establish

bias.

He

argues

that

the

DHO’s

“prosecutorial”

questioning is evidence that he was not impartial. (ECF 1 at 11.)
Williams claims that, after reading the Conduct Report at the
hearing, the DHO asked Williams, “Now tell me how you’re not
guilty?” (ECF 1 at 11.) The DHO also told Williams that “all the
evidence

points

toward

you.”

Id.

These

statements

are

not

sufficient to prove that the DHO was predisposed to find Williams
guilty based on factors outside of the disciplinary record. Even
Williams’ claim that the DHO stated, “I feel that you’re guilty
because of the things you did to me in the past,” does not meet the
high standard of proof necessary to establish bias because it must
be read in the context of the DHO’s other statements. In the proper
context, the DHO’s statements demonstrate that the DHO was unmoved
by Williams’ defense, not that the DHO was biased. Thus, Ground
Three does not identify a basis for habeas corpus relief.
In Ground Four, Williams argues that he was denied a copy of
the

DHO’s

written

factual

findings

explaining

why

Mims’

“exculpatory” statement was “rejected.” While Williams had a right
to a “written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence

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relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action,” Wolff, 418
U.S. at 563, Williams did receive such a written statement in the
Report of Disciplinary Hearing. Williams may have preferred a more
detailed explanation of why the DHO was not persuaded to find in
his favor based on Mims’ claim of ownership, but his due process
right was satisfied by the explanation he was given. Therefore,
Ground Four does not serve as a basis for habeas corpus relief.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the petition (ECF 1) is
DENIED. The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.

DATED: August 30, 2017

/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

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