Riley v. Saavedra et al

Filing 22

OPINION AND ORDER denying 15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 7/3/18. (nal)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
WILLIAM RILEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
LAKE COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 2:17 CV 368

OPINION and ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendant Lake County’s motion to dismiss.
(DE # 15.) For the reasons identified below, defendant’s motion is denied.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff William Riley’s first amended complaint alleges that defendant deputy

sheriff E. Saavaedra or defendant deputy sheriff R. Watts used excessive force against
him at the Lake County Jail. (DE # 11 at 2.) Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Lake
County, Indiana is liable to indemnify the deputy sheriff defendants pursuant to
Indiana law.
Lake County now moves to dismiss the claim against it, for failure to state a
claim. (DE ## 15, 16.) Lake County argues that plaintiff’s indemnification claim should
be dismissed for the following reasons: (1) the amended complaint does not cite case
law; (2) the amended complaint seeks indemnification for a tort, but does not identify
what tort the deputy sheriffs allegedly committed; (3) plaintiff improperly pursues a
theory of respondeat superior liability against Lake County; and (4) Lake County does not

employ the deputy sheriff defendants and thus is not the proper party from whom to
seek indemnification.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
A judge reviewing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) must construe the

allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, accept
all well-pleaded facts as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007); Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank, 595
F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2010). Under the liberal notice-pleading requirements of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint need only contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). A plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
III.

ANALYSIS
A.

Lack of Citations to Authority in the Amended Complaint

Lake County’s first argument – that plaintiff’s amended complaint should be
dismissed for failure to cite case law – plainly lacks merit.1 Under the federal noticepleading standard, a pleading need only contain three things: “(1) a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the court already has

1

Defense counsel is reminded of his obligation, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11, to present only good-faith arguments to the court. Counsel is warned that
similarly frivolous arguments in the future may result in the imposition of sanctions.
2

jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand
for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A plaintiff need not provide citations to authority within the
complaint. See e.g. Holleman v. Weist, 202 F.3d 273 (7th Cir. 1999) (unpublished) (“Under
notice pleading, it was neither necessary nor desirable for [plaintiff] to include case
citations in the complaint itself.”). Thus, the first ground identified in Lake County’s
motion does not serve as a basis for dismissal.
B.

Plaintiff does not Allege a Tort Claim

Lake County’s second argument is similarly unavailing. According to Lake
County, while plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that public entities are required to
indemnify its employees for any tort judgment, plaintiff has not specifically alleged
what tort was committed. Defense counsel appears to be under the mistaken impression
that Indiana law only indemnifies judgments for state law torts. However, Indiana has
two indemnification statutes, one of which provides indemnification for civil rights
violations and plainly applies to this case. The statute states:
If a present or former public employee, including a member of a board, a
committee, a commission, an authority, or another instrumentality of a
governmental entity, is or could be subject to personal civil liability for a
loss occurring because of a noncriminal act or omission within the scope
of the public employee’s employment which violates the civil rights laws
of the United States, the governmental entity (when the governmental
entity defends or has the opportunity to defend the public employee)
shall, subject to IC 34-13-3-4, IC 34-13-3-14, IC 34-13-3-15, and IC
34-13-3-16, pay:
(1) any judgment (other than for punitive damages) of the claim or
3

suit; or
(2) any judgment for punitive damages, compromise, or settlement
of the claim or suit if:
(A) the governor, in the case of a claim or suit against a state
employee; or
(B) the governing body of the political subdivision, in the
case of a claim or suit against an employee of a political subdivision;
determines that paying the judgment for punitive damages, compromise,
or settlement is in the best interest of the governmental entity. The
governmental entity shall also pay all costs and fees incurred by or on
behalf of a public employee in defense of the claim or suit.
Ind. Code § 34-13-4-1 (emphasis added). The statute expressly applies to constitutional
torts, such as the one plaintiff identifies in the amended complaint. Therefore, the
second ground identified by Lake County does not serve as a basis for dismissal.
C.

Respondeat Superior Liability

Lake County argues that plaintiff’s indemnification claim must be dismissed
because plaintiff fails to state a claim under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Lake County claims that plaintiff’s indemnification claim is
improperly premised on a theory of respondeat superior, a theory not tenable under
Monell and its progeny. Yet, plaintiff’s indemnification claim against Lake County is not
premised on Monell liability – it is premised on the State indemnification statute. See
Vinson v. Vermilion Cty., Illinois, 776 F.3d 924, n. 4 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Monell was irrelevant
to the theory on which the [plaintiffs] sought to hold the Counties and the elected
Sheriffs liable. Their claims against the Counties and Sheriffs were essentially claims for
indemnification under state law. . . Had the [plaintiffs] sought respondeat superior
liability against the Sheriffs in their section 1983 claim, the court would have been

4

correct that Monell and a host of later cases firmly establish that there is no respondeat
superior liability under section 1983.”). Thus, the third ground identified by Lake
County does not serve as a basis for dismissal.
D.

Lake County does not Employ the Deputy Sheriff Defendants

Lake County’s final argument is that it is not the proper defendant for purposes
of indemnifying the deputy sheriff defendants. First, it claims that it does not employ
the defendants. (DE # 15 at 4.) Second, it argues that it does not have the authority to
control the actions of the Sheriff’s Department, and thus is not the proper party for
indemnification of actions taken by Sheriff Department employees. (Id.) Lake County’s
first argument is a misstatement of Indiana law. Indiana law provides, “[a] county
police force is established in each county. The members are employees of the county . . .
.” Ind. Code § 36-8-10-4(a). However, the court will consider defendant’s broader
argument that the Sheriff’s Department, and not the County, is the proper party for
purposes of indemnification.
The indemnification statute provides that a “governmental entity” shall
indemnify certain judgments against public employees. Ind. Code § 34-13-4-1. The
question, then, is whether it is the Sheriff’s Department or the County that is the
“governmental entity” liable to indemnify a deputy sheriff. This question does not
appear to have been answered by either Indiana courts or the Seventh Circuit.
Moreover, neither party has pointed to authority that answers this question.

5

Lake County relies on Donahue v. St. Joseph Cty. ex rel. Bd. of Comm’rs of St. Joseph
Cty., 720 N.E.2d 1236, 1241 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), for the proposition that it cannot be
liable under a theory of respondeat superior because the County does not have an agency
relationship with the Sheriff’s Department. However, as previously noted, plaintiff has
not asserted a claim against Lake County for respondeat superior liability.
Plaintiff argues that, ‘[i]n seeking a claim for indemnification, Plaintiff is
essentially naming the county simply as a necessary party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 as an
indemnor of the individually-named Defendants.” (DE # 21 at 4.) Plaintiff points to
Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle Cty., 324 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2003), in which the Seventh Circuit
held that, under Illinois law, when a sheriff is sued in his official capacity, the Illinois
county in which the sheriff serves is a necessary party under Rule 19. Plaintiff does not,
however, acknowledge Askew v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., Ill., 568 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2009), in
which the Seventh Circuit found that – unlike a sheriff sued in his official capacity – the
county is not a necessary party under Rule 19 when a county employee is sued in his
individual capacity. Here, the deputy sheriffs were named in their individual capacities.
Furthermore, there is no question of whether Lake County should be joined as a
necessary party because it has already been named as a defendant.
While no relevant case law exists to assist the court in determining whether Lake
County is the proper party to indemnify a deputy sheriff, the plain language of the
Indiana Code reveals that it is Lake County, and not the Lake County Sheriff’s
Department, that is the “governmental entity” liable for indemnifying the deputy
6

sheriff defendants pursuant to Section 34-13-4-1.
The Indiana Code defines “governmental entity” for purposes of Chapter 34-134, as “the state or a political subdivision of the state.” Ind. Code § 34-6-2-49(a).
“‘Political subdivision’ means municipal corporation or special taxing district.” Ind.
Code § 36-1-2-13. “‘Municipal corporation’ means unit, school corporation, library
district, local housing authority, fire protection district, public transportation
corporation, local building authority, local hospital authority or corporation, local
airport authority, special service district, or other separate local governmental entity
that may sue and be sued. The term does not include special taxing district.” Ind. Code
§ 36-1-2-10.2 “‘Unit’ means county, municipality, or township.” Ind. Code § 36-1-2-23.
Thus, under Indiana law, a county qualifies as a “governmental entity.” The question,
then, is whether the Lake County Sheriff’s Department also qualifies as a “separate local
governmental entity that may sue and be sued.” Ind. Code § 36-1-2-10. If so, it too
would qualify as “governmental entity” for purposes of Section 34-13-4-1.
The capacity of a party to sue or be sued, for those who are not individuals or
corporations, is determined by the law of the state where the court is located. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 17(b)(3). While local governmental entities may be subject to suit for
constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, “local

2

Indiana law distinguishes between a “municipal corporation” and a
“municipality.” “‘Municipality’ means city or town,” Ind. Code § 36-1-2-11, while a
municipal corporation includes entities such as counties.
7

government liability under § 1983 ‘is dependent on an analysis of state law.’” Sow v.
Fortville Police Dep’t, 636 F.3d 293, 300 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting McMillian v. Monroe Cty.,
520 U.S. 781, 786 (1997)).
Both Indiana courts and the Seventh Circuit have found that local governmental
departments are not entities that may be sued in their own right under Indiana law. See
e.g. Hoosier Mountain Bike Ass’n, Inc. v. Kaler, 73 N.E.3d 712, n. 3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017);
City of Peru v. Lewis, 950 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); Jennings v. City of Indianapolis,
637 F. App’x 216, n. 1 (7th Cir. 2016); Dewitt v. City of Greendale, Ind., 599 F. App’x 588,
589 (7th Cir. 2015); Ball v. City of Indianapolis, 760 F.3d 636, 643 (7th Cir. 2014).
In fact, the Seventh Circuit relied on the same statutory definitions discussed
above to determine that a municipal police department was not a suable entity under
Indiana law. “Under Indiana law, a ‘[m]unicipal corporation’ is a ‘unit, . . . or other
separate local governmental entity that may sue and be sued.’ A ‘[u]nit’ means county,
municipality, or township,’ and a ‘[m]unicipality’ is a ‘city or town[.]’ Thus, the Indiana
statutory scheme does not grant municipal police departments the capacity to sue or be
sued.” Sow, 636 F.3d at 300 (internal citations omitted).
While the Seventh Circuit in Sow considered the question in the context of a
municipal police department, the Court’s analysis applies equally to county sheriff’s
departments. Other district courts in this Circuit have also concluded that county sheriff
departments are not suable entities under Indiana law. See e.g. Lamb v. Harrison Cty.
Sheriff Dep’t, 2017 WL 3605284, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 22, 2017); Marks v. Indiana, 2015 WL
8

4421338, at *2 (N.D. Ind. July 17, 2015); Miller v. St. Joseph Cty., 2014 WL 3740175, at *9
(N.D. Ind. July 30, 2014), aff’d, 788 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2015); Beiler v. Jay County Sheriff’s
Office, 2012 WL 2880563, at *2 (N.D.Ind. July 13, 2012); Fermaglich v. Indiana, 2004 WL
2750262, at *21 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2004). See also Slay v. Marion Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 603
N.E.2d 877, 887 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (cited with approval in Dewitt v. City of Greendale, Ind.,
599 F. App’x 588, 589 (7th Cir. 2015)).
In light of the foregoing, it is plain that the Lake County Sheriff’s Department is
not a “separate local governmental entity that may sue and be sued,” and thus does not
qualify as “governmental entity” that may be liable for indemnification pursuant to
Section 34-13-4-1. Lake County, however, does meet this definition, and therefore may
be required to indemnify deputy sheriff E. Saavaedra or deputy sheriff R. Watts. Lake
County is not an improperly named party, and Lake County’s motion to dismiss on this
ground is denied.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the court DENIES defendant Lake County’s motion to

dismiss. (DE # 15.)
SO ORDERED.
Date: July 3, 2018
s/James T. Moody______________
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT

9